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Resumen
La celebracio´n de contratos por medios electro´nicos constituye una realidad inneg-
able en nuestro tiempo. Los empresarios se han visto abocados a realizar su actividad
econo´mica a trave´s de Internet, casi de forma obligada, a fin de satisfacer la creciente
demanda de productos y servicios on line.
Aunque nuestra Tesis Doctoral se centra en el examen de la normativa reguladora
de los adquisicio´n de productos, sin entrar en el ofrecimiento de servicios, tanto en
un caso como en el otro se acusa que el mercado on line no ha adquirido el potencial
pretendido por las Instituciones Comunitarias. Esto se debe, en gran medida, a la
falta de confianza manifestada por los propios consumidores, y derivada, entre otros
aspectos, de la falta de contacto directo con el sujeto con el que contratan; de la
imposibilidad de comprobar f´ısicamente aquello que esta´n adquiriendo; y del hecho
de que buena parte de las transacciones llevadas a cabo en la Red tienen cara´cter
transfronterizo.
El establecimiento de deberes precontractuales de informacio´n, en cuyo estudio se
centra nuestra Tesis Doctoral, viene a suplir, de alguna forma la carencia apuntada en
el pa´rrafo precedente, si bien, debemos dejar claro, desde el principio, que los mismos
no deben ser el u´nico cauce para la proteccio´n de los consumidores y para garantizar
su confianza en el Mercado. Un sistema de deberes a cargo de los empresarios pierde
todo su sentido si el mismo no viene acompan˜ado del establecimiento de los remedios
adecuados para garantizar el cumplimiento de dichos deberes.
Es cierto, en este sentido, que la imposicio´n de sanciones por incumplimiento de
los mencionados deberes y consagrada en las normas comunitarias sobre proteccio´n
de los consumidores, comercio electro´nico y competencia leal, y, como no puede
ser de otra forma, en las de transposicio´n, satisface en gran medida el intere´s del
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Mercado Interior y garantizan el correcto funcionamiento del mismo. Ahora bien,
la imposicio´n de una sancio´n administrativa a aquel empresario que, por ejemplo,
omite informacio´n detallada sobre sus datos personales, sobre las caracter´ısticas del
bien, o sobre elementos esenciales del contrato, no contribuye, de igual forma, a
la satisfaccio´n de los intereses individuales de los consumidores que, sobre la base
de la informacio´n que ha facilitado el empresario, han celebrado un determinado
contrato electro´nico. El consumidor, en general, y en especial el ciberconsumidor,
necesita contar con remedios – mecanismos –means of redress – a los que acogerse
para satisfacer sus intereses individuales.
Nos enfrentamos, en este sentido a un problema digno de un estudio pormenoriz-
ado. Si bien los deberes precontractuales de informacio´n establecidos por el legislador
europeo son incorporados a los Derechos nacionales por v´ıa de la transposicio´n, no
es menos cierto que dicha trasposicio´n no se ha llevada a cabo siguiendo con rigor
los dictados comunitarios. Esta cr´ıtica, a la que dedicamos un profundo estudio,
se plasma especialmente en el establecimiento de los remedios privados frente al
incumplimiento de los deberes informativos, cuya regulacio´n, adema´s, queda al ar-
bitrio de los legisladores estatales. Nuestro Trabajo, centrado en el examen de los
ordenamientos espan˜ol e ingle´s, pone de relieve este hecho.
Si al inconveniente resen˜ado sumamos la influencia que sobre la consagracio´n de
los deberes de informacio´n y de los remedios frente a su incumplimiento tiene el
Derecho interno espan˜ol (civil law) e ingle´s (common law), los problemas se acre-
cientan.
Nos enfrentamos a un problema de solapamiento de recursos. Habra´ supuestos
de incumplimiento que podra´n solucionarse acudiendo a los remedios establecidos en
las disposiciones especiales de consumo, de comercio electro´nico o de competencia
leal; habra´ otros que encontraran respuesta en el Derecho general; y habra´ algunos
que podra´n ser resueltos por ambas v´ıas. Sera´ el consumidor el que deba decidir cua´l
de ellas satisface, en mayor medida, sus necesidades.
Dos inconvenientes adicionales al respecto pueden sen˜alarse.
El primero debido a que los ordenamientos analizados adolecen de un importante
defecto en la articulacio´n del sistema de informacio´n y del sistema de remedios. No
se regula en ninguno de ellos, de forma general, que informacio´n es fundamental y
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cual no tiene dicha consideracio´n, lo que genera que tampoco se consagren, de forma
general, los remedios atendiendo a la informacio´n incumplida, sino que los mismos se
ofrecen, de forma gene´rica, quedando como hemos dicho al arbitrio del consumidor
la opcio´n por aque´l que satisfaga mejor sus necesidades. Decimos de forma gene´rica
porque esta regla tiene excepciones establecidas por las propias leyes, que en oca-
siones consagran remedios automa´ticos; y, porque existen diferencias entre los orde-
namientos, que, en determinados casos preve´n un sistema jera´rquico de remedios.
El segundo inconveniente proviene del tipo de consumidor al que se refieren
las normas comunitarias. Sin entrar en detalles, se parte de un consumidor activo,
informado, se conf´ıa en un consumidor que toma decisiones racionales.
Con el objeto de intentar dar respuesta a los inconvenientes apuntados hemos
decidido realizar un estudio comparativo de los ordenamientos espan˜ol e ingle´s, por
considerar que el mismo permitira´ poner de relieve la gran variedad de soluciones
jur´ıdicas adoptadas y, lo que es ma´s importante, adoptables, a fin de garantizar la
proteccio´n de los consumidores que adquieren productos en el mercado electro´nico,
por v´ıa de la informacio´n y por v´ıa de los remedios.
Nos planteamos tres cuestiones principales.
La primera el examen del objeto, es decir, del contenido y la articulacio´n del
sistema de deberes precontractuales de informacio´n en la contratacio´n electro´nica
con consumidores. Abordamos el estudio de los deberes directamente establecidos
por los legisladores, as´ı como de aquellos otros que se infieren de otras disposiciones
de forma indirecta.
Sentada esta base, abordamos, en segundo lugar, el tratamiento legislativo de
los deberes precontractuales de informacio´n que lleva a cabo cada ordenamiento.
Las notables diferencias, a pesar del origen comunitario de dichos deberes, funda-
mentan el estudio. No podemos olvidar la existencia en Derecho espan˜ol de un deber
gene´rico de buena fe en la contratacio´n que inspira todo el sistema jur´ıdico de los
contratos e incide en la interpretacio´n que deba darse a los mismos. No podemos
olvidar igualmente que el sistema ingle´s se sustenta sobre la libertad contractual, re-
conoce la adversidad entre las partes contratantes y nos les exige un comportamiento
respetuoso con buena fe alguna.
En tercer te´rmino analizamos el sistema de consecuencias o remedios frente al
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incumplimiento de los deberes de informacio´n previsto en cada ordenamiento. Con
este objetivo, se tomara´n en consideracio´n tanto la regulacio´n prevista en las normas
de Derecho privado general, como en las disposiciones espec´ıficas, de consumo y de
comercio electro´nico, sin olvidar la referencia a las reguladoras de la competencia
leal. Este examen nos lleva a estudiar la variedad de planteamientos posibles, as´ı
como, la importancia de los deberes concretos y de los remedios frente a su incump-
limiento en cada sistema, sobre todo ante supuestos controvertidos como la falta de
informacio´n relativa a las caracter´ısticas principales del bien objeto del contrato,
los supuestos de suministro de informacio´n falsa o aquellos en los que el empresario
omite determinada informacio´n. Esto nos permite demostrar, adema´s, la import-
ante influencia que el Derecho Privado general de cada uno de los ordenamientos
analizados ejerce sobre la configuracio´n tanto de los deberes como de las consecuen-
cias ligadas a su incumplimiento. Este examen va acompan˜ado, en todo momento,
del estudio de los pronunciamientos de los Tribunales, toda vez que los mismos no
siempre se acomodan al remedio espec´ıficamente previsto en la normativa especial.
El examen comparativo que realizamos se basa en el principio de la funcional-
idad, en tanto, las normas examinadas y comparadas cumplen el mismo papel en
ambos ordenamientos. No se trata, en consecuencia de comparar normas, sino de
comparar el contenido y finalidad de las normas. En cumplimiento de este objet-
ivo hemos considerado conveniente el examen conjunto de ambos ordenamientos, o
mejor dicho, el examen que ambos ordenamientos realizan de un determinado de-
ber y de las consecuencias de su incumplimiento. Quiza´ ello dificulta el tratamiento
de la materia, ma´s fa´cil si se hubiera separado, pero permite poner de relieve en
mayor medida la comparacio´n pretendida. Ello no obstante, y a fin de evitar reit-
eraciones innecesarias, se ha adoptado un sistema de organizacio´n ma´s aproximado
al Derecho ingle´s que al espan˜ol, dada por ejemplo, la importante diferencia que
existe entre ambos en relacio´n con el incumplimiento derivado del suministro de in-
formacio´n falsa o de la omisio´n de informacio´n derivada del distinto rol que la buena
fe contractual/precontractual cumple en cada uno de ellos.
Hemos intentado, adema´s, seguir los principios de neutralidad e imparcialidad,
en la medida en la que nos lo ha permitido su estudio tomando como referencia
las diferencias inherentes al ordenamiento en el que esta´n inmersas. Esta preferen-
cia por el enfoque funcional nos lleva a la bu´squeda objetiva de las consecuencias
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del incumplimiento de los deberes de informacio´n en ambos sistemas, sin hipo´tesis
inicial acerca de las normas del derecho investigadas. Ello no impide, en aras de la
concrecio´n del estudio, que nos hallamos centrado, exclusivamente en el a´mbito del
Derecho privado de consumo y de comercio electro´nico, sin atender a otros remedios
que puedan derivarse de la aplicacio´n de las disposiciones reguladoras del Derecho
administrativo sancionador.
El estudio que hemos realizado, desde la perspectiva del incumplimiento se aprox-
ima al me´todo comparativo basado en hechos. Aunque no se examinan hechos con-
cretos, de un caso hipote´tico o real, el aspecto pra´ctico del estudio se evidencia
por la investigacio´n de las reacciones de los ordenamientos espan˜ol e ingle´s ante la
premisa del incumplimiento. Se han considerado varias posibilidades: el incumpli-
miento que resulta de la omisio´n de informacio´n y del suministro de la informacio´n
falsa; el incumplimiento relativo a diferentes tipos de informacio´n. Se han realiz-
ado cuadros esquema´ticos de las distintas disposiciones aplicables a los supuestos
de incumplimiento de los deberes de informacio´n en el a´mbito de los contratos de
consumo electro´nicos, a fin de realizar una presentacio´n gra´fica y esquematizada de
las normas que facilite la comparacio´n de los sistemas.
Desde el punto de vista ma´s te´cnico, no hemos centrado nuestro estudio, exclu-
sivamente en el examen de la legislacio´n vigente, sino que se han tenido en consid-
eracio´n los documentos preparatorios de las mismas, tanto al nivel europeo como
nacional, as´ı como otros documentos oficiales no vinculantes, tales como, las prop-
uestas legislativas que se esta´n llevando a cabo en orden a la modernizacio´n del
Derecho de obligaciones o las derivadas del propuesto Marco Comu´n de Referencia.
El examen de los pronunciamientos judiciales dimanantes tanto del Tribunal de Jus-
ticia de la Unio´n Europea, como de los distintos Tribunales nacionales completa el
examen que hemos realizado, en el que se ha tenido en cuenta, adema´s, y como no
puede ser de otra forma en un trabajo de investigacio´n de las caracter´ısticas del que
sometemos a evaluacio´n, los pronunciamientos de la doctrina cient´ıfica.
La terminolog´ıa empleada merece una explicacio´n en este resumen, pues como
hemos indicado, las diferencias propias de los ordenamientos analizados han impos-
ibilitado, en ocasiones, el recurso a la traduccio´n de los te´rminos, pues la misma
hubiera llevado a la referencia a instituciones jur´ıdicas diferentes en uno y en otro.
As´ı sucede por ejemplo en relacio´n con los conceptos de error provocado y dolo,
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del Derecho espan˜ol, y el de misrepresentation del Derecho ingle´s, que aunque rela-
cionados refieren a realidades jur´ıdicas diferentes. Hemos recurrido, no obstante,
cuando lo hemos considerado necesario para mantener la claridad del discurso a la
aproximacio´n terminolo´gica.
Nuestra Tesis Doctoral se ha estructurado en tres cap´ıtulos fundamentales, ma´s
uno dedicado a exponer las principales conclusiones obtenidas de la misma.
El Cap´ıtulo primero tiene como objetivo centrar el marco social y jur´ıdico en el
que se desenvuelve la materia objeto de estudio. Se parte del examen del re´gimen
de la contratacio´n electro´nica como modalidad especial de contratacio´n a distancia,
completamente diferente por ejemplo de la que se lleva a cabo fuera de establecimi-
ento mercantil, por su accesibilidad, su rapidez, su celeridad, su inmediatez. Aunque
las figuras contractuales ba´sicas no var´ıan en su estructura en la contratacio´n on line
y off line, si hay incidencia del medio en la comunicacio´n entre las partes, su celeridad
e inmediatez, formas de manifestacio´n del consentimiento, etc. Se han analizado as´ı
aquellos caracteres de la contratacio´n electro´nica que inciden, de forma directa sobre
el eje de nuestra Tesis Doctoral, el deber de informacio´n.
Para ello, hemos tenido que concretar los elementos que la hacen diferente del
sistema de contratacio´n, digamos, tradicional y sobre la base de los cuales se impone
la necesidad de establecer mecanismos de proteccio´n del consumidor diferentes de los
tradicionales y sustentados sobre la obligacio´n de suministro de informacio´n. Esto es
as´ı puesto que la informacio´n se convierte en el u´nico elemento con el que cuenta el
consumidor para fundar su consentimiento y decidir sobre si quiere quedar vinculado
por un determinado contrato celebrado en forma electro´nica. As´ı, por mencionar
algunos caracteres especialmente relevantes para el objeto de nuestra Tesis: la falta
de presencia f´ısica simulta´nea de las partes, suplida por la v´ıa de la obligacio´n de
proporcionar una informacio´n detallada sobre el empresario con el que se contrata,
el lugar desde el que realiza su actividad econo´mica (fundamental en el entorno
transfronterizo en el que se desenvuelve la contratacio´n electro´nica para determinar
la legislacio´n aplicable y la jurisdiccio´n competente) y sobre los medios que permitan
un contacto directo y personal con e´l; la imposibilidad de examinar f´ısicamente
aquello que se esta´ adquiriendo, que se consigue por v´ıa de la obligacio´n de suministro
de informacio´n detallada sobre el producto, las caracter´ısticas esenciales del mismo,
su precio, etc.
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La informacio´n se convierte, como analizaremos, en un elemento clave en la
Pol´ıtica europea de proteccio´n de los consumidores y, especialmente, en el a´mbito del
e-commerce. As´ı lo ha puesto de relieve el legislador comunitario en la Directiva sobre
el comercio electro´nico de 2002 y en la relativa a los derechos de los consumidores
de 2011, hasta el punto que, el sistema ha merecido duras cr´ıticas a las que hemos
dedicado un ana´lisis en profundidad. Apuntamos en este momento , simplemente el
sentido de las mismas.
Se critica que la exigencia de informacio´n se pueda convertir en el u´nico mecan-
ismo de proteccio´n del consumidor y de garant´ıa de funcionamiento del Mercado.
No cabe olvidar que en la economı´a cla´sica, la idea de mercado perfecto estaba aso-
ciada a la no existencia de asimetr´ıas de informacio´n. Entre otras causas porque el
precio era por si mismo el crisol de toda la informacio´n existente. Sin embargo, la
asimetr´ıa de la informacio´n tiene una incidencia especial en la contratacio´n on line
pues dificulta los escrutinios y comparaciones adema´s de incentivar una manifest-
acio´n del consentimiento inmediata (no podemos olvidar el potencial problema de
la seleccio´n adversa, que hemos analizado). Respecto a esta cr´ıtica quiza´ no debe
partirse, al menos de forma absoluta, del concepto de consumidor activo, toda vez
que actitud no debe confundirse con aptitud. Para que la informacio´n precontractual
pueda cumplir con la funcio´n que tiene atribuida, el consumidor debe haber fundado
su decisio´n en la informacio´n recibida, lo que supone que es capaz no solo de en-
tenderla, sino de asimilarla, eligiendo entre las distintas ofertas de forma racional
conforme a dicha informacio´n. Los riesgos derivados de este concepto de consumidor
y de la importancia del denominado empoderamiento a trave´s de la informacio´n son
objeto de estudio en este Cap´ıtulo.
Se critica de la misma forma que el sistema se sustente sobre la cantidad y no
calidad. No se tienen en cuenta, al menos en la medida en que debiera, que inform-
acio´n es la que realmente necesita el consumidor para fundar su consentimiento. Se
le suministra una ingente cantidad de informacio´n, unas veces innecesaria y otras
poco comprensible (pie´nsese en lo sucedido hace an˜os con los prospectos de medic-
amentos). La idea de calidad de la informacio´n a suministrar constituye otra parte
importante de este Cap´ıtulo.
Sobre estas bases, concluimos con el examen pormenorizado de los deberes pre-
contractuales de informacio´n, que se realiza desde la perspectiva comparativa de
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ambos ordenamientos. Se estudian los deberes de informacio´n que hemos calific-
ado como directos, porque de forma expresa se contemplan por los legisladores de
comercio electro´nico y consumo. Se abordan los deberes de informacio´n de cara´cter
indirecto derivados de la aplicacio´n al a´mbito del comercio electro´nico tanto de las
disposiciones generales en materia de contratos vigentes en ambos ordenamientos,
como de aquellas ma´s espec´ıficas, relativas, por ejemplo, a la proteccio´n de la com-
petencia leal. En este examen se detallan las diferencias encontradas en el re´gimen
de Derecho espan˜ol e ingle´s, especialmente, en cuanto a principios de relevancia en
uno de ellos (el de buena fe) inexistente en el otro.
El Cap´ıtulo segundo de nuestra Tesis Doctoral tiene como objetivo el ana´lisis
general tanto de la forma en la que ha de cumplirse la exigencia de suministro de
informacio´n, como del concepto sobre lo que hemos de entender como su incumpli-
miento o, ma´s precisamente, por el conepto legal de incumplimiento del deber.
Partiendo del contenido y alcance de los deberes de informacio´n, que nos ha
llevado al examen de la importancia de la publicidad como cauce para su suministro
y de la insercio´n de la informacio´n en el contrato por v´ıa del condicionado general
del mismo, hemos analizado la forma requerida para el cumplimiento del deber
(transparencia, claridad, documentacio´n, gratuidad, etc.), acusando las principales
diferencias observadas en los ordenamientos espan˜ol e ingle´s.
Para poder analizar el incumplimiento de los deberes de informacio´n, no solo
hemos tenido que estudiar los deberes concretos, sino lo que es ma´s importante
determinar su contenido y a´mbito. Los deberes de informacio´n son obligaciones
legales, que normalmente se presentan en la fase precontractual, pero que terminan
integrando el contrato por voluntad del propio legislador (buena muestra de ello son
el art´ıculo 97.5 del TRLDCU y las secciones 11(4), 11(5), 12, 36(3), 36(4), 37, 50(3)
y (4) del CRA 2015).
Analizar el cumplimiento es imprescindible para concretar que sea el incumpli-
miento, porque no siempre la falta de informacio´n va a merecer el mismo calificativo.
Habra´ casos de incumplimiento absoluto, otros de incumplimiento parcial, otros de
omisio´n, otros de suministro de informacio´n falsa. La calificacio´n de las distintas
modalidades constituye parte significativa de nuestro Cap´ıtulo segundo.
El incumplimiento de los deberes precontractuales de informacio´n demanda,
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como no puede ser de otra forma, la reaccio´n del ordenamiento, plasmada en el es-
tablecimiento de los remedios adecuados para garantizar los derechos individuales de
los consumidores afectados. No todos los remedios son iguales no cualquier remedio
es ido´neo. Por ello, hemos considerado conveniente abordar en el Cap´ıtulo segundo
los aspectos generales de los mecanismos, cauces, remedios, soluciones, means of
redress, previstos por los ordenamientos espan˜ol e ingle´s frente al incumplimiento.
Lo hemos hecho porque entendemos que un sistema de exigencia de informacio´n,
de imposicio´n de deberes a los empresarios en este sentido, carece de fundamento,
desde la perspectiva de la proteccio´n del consumidor, si las consecuencias son, ex-
clusivamente, de naturaleza administrativa sancionadora.
Nos planteamos la necesidad de que los legisladores, europeos y nacionales, pre-
vean mecanismos concretos para la satisfaccio´n del consumidor que ve incumplido
los deberes precontractuales de informacio´n y entramos a analizar que´ sistema se
considera ma´s adecuado a dicha finalidad. Lo hemos hecho poniendo de relieve las
deficiencias acusadas tanto en el Derecho europeo, por omisio´n en muchos casos,
como en los Derechos nacionales, por exceso en el establecimiento de remedios, por
falta de concrecio´n de cua´les sean aplicables al caso concreto y por falta de estableci-
miento de procedimientos jera´rquicos en la ordenacio´n de los remedios disponibles.
Estas deficiencias nos han llevado a plantear otro problema ı´ntimamente rela-
cionado con la naturaleza de la solucio´n que el ordenamiento preve´ ante el incumpli-
miento del deber de informacio´n. No siempre sera´ una responsabilidad contractual,
habra´ supuestos subsumibles en la extracontractual. Delimitar unos casos y otros
constituye el punto final del Cap´ıtulo segundo.
El objetivo del Cap´ıtulo tercero y u´ltimo es el examen detallado de los remedios
concretos previstos en los ordenamientos espan˜ol e ingle´s frente al incumplimiento de
los deberes precontractuales de informacio´n. Hemos considerado conveniente comen-
zar con una ilustracio´n de manera gra´fica de las normas aplicables, de las clasifica-
ciones legales del incumplimiento y de los remedios disponibles en ambos sistemas
analizados. El objetivo no es otro que resaltar o poner en evidencia las diferencias ex-
istentes en ambos ordenamientos y facilitar el conocimiento de las normas aplicables
en cada uno de ellos.
Aplicando el principio de especialidad hemos comenzado con el ana´lisis de los
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remedios previstos en las normas sobre consumo y sobre comercio electro´nico, para
proceder posteriormente a estudiar los concretados en las normas de Derecho general,
intentando pronunciarnos sobre la adecuacio´n de estos u´ltimos a los contratos de
consumo electro´nicos.
El ana´lisis de los remedios espec´ıficos previstos en las normas sobre Derecho
de consumo y sobre comercio electro´nico se ha abordado desde la perspectiva de
dos incumplimientos fundamentales. El primero, aquel que afecta a la informacio´n
relativa a las principales caracter´ısticas del bien (producto) objeto del contrato. El
segundo, aquel que toma en consideracio´n los supuestos en los que no se facilita
informacio´n sobre el empresario, sobre los pasos te´cnicos que han de llevarse a cabo
para celebrar el contrato o sobre el contenido de las comunicaciones comerciales.
Hemos dedicado un tratamiento especial, porque especiales son las consecuencias
previstas en ambos ordenamientos, a los supuestos de incumplimiento del deber por
omisio´n de informacio´n y a aquellos que consisten en el suministro de la informacio´n
falsa.
El examen de la adecuacio´n de los remedios que ofrece el Derecho privado gen-
eral de los ordenamientos analizados a la contratacio´n electro´nica con consumidores
ocupa un papel relevante en el contenido del Cap´ıtulo tercero, quiza´ porque la
respuesta de los Tribunales, sobre todo en Espan˜a, ante supuestos de incumpli-
miento de los deberes de informacio´n se fundamenta ma´s en el Derecho general que
en el especial.
Hemos considerado necesario hacer un ana´lisis de cua´les son los remedios que
ofrecen el Derecho de contratos en cada uno de los ordenamientos (resolucio´n por
incumplimiento, cumplimiento forzoso, reclamacio´n de dan˜os y perjuicios, nulidad
del contrato por vicios en el consentimiento, comu´n en Derecho espan˜ol e ingle´s; re-
duccio´n del precio y derecho a rescindir el contrato a corto plazo, propio del Derecho
ingle´s), centra´ndonos en los planteamientos doctrinales al respecto.
De forma espec´ıfica se han analizado las diferencias entre los supuestos de in-
cumplimiento por omisio´n de informacio´n y por provisio´n de informacio´n falsa,
poniendo de relieve las notables diferencias existentes en ambos ordenamientos y
que se relacionan, como ya hemos apuntado, con la aplicacio´n del principio de buena
fe contractual del Derecho espan˜ol, inexistente en el Derecho ingle´s.
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No procede entrar en detalles en este resumen, sin embargo, si consideramos con-
veniente apuntar las deficiencias del sistema, objeto de estudio detallado en nuestra
Tesis. La doble naturaleza de los remedios a disposicio´n del consumidor (de Derecho
especial y de Derecho general); la falta de establecimiento de un sistema jera´rquico,
ordenado y coherente de remedios que tenga en cuenta el deber incumplido y que
establece de forma coordinada el reproche; las deficiencias en el establecimiento de
exclusiones de un remedio a favor de otro, de los generales sobre los especiales; etc.,
provoca un efecto contrario al inicialmente pretendido, generando dudas e incer-
tidumbres en el consumidor que han sido puestas de relieve.
Nos hemos planteado, por ello, la adecuacio´n del sistema general de remedios a
los supuestos de incumplimiento del deber de informacio´n en los contratos de con-
sumo electro´nicos. Debemos aventurar que las conclusiones no son buenas, porque
entendemos que el legislador debe establecer remedios ma´s directos, como hace por
ejemplo en los supuestos de falta de informacio´n sobre la obligacio´n de pago en
supuestos de adquisicio´n de productos que la conlleven, o en los casos en los que
ampl´ıa el plazo de desistimiento porque el consumidor no ha sido informado debi-
damente sobre este derecho.
No pretendemos en este resumen aventurar los resultados de nuestra invest-
igacio´n, porque los mismos han quedado de alguna forma plasmados en las conclu-
siones con las que se cierran nuestra Tesis Doctoral. En ellas hemos intentado plas-
mar las ventajas e inconvenientes del sistema articulado, por el legislador europeo y
por los legisladores nacionales (espan˜ol e ingle´s) para el establecimiento de remedios
individuales frente al incumplimiento de los deberes precontractuales de informacio´n
en los contratos de consumo electro´nicos.
No puede culminarse un trabajo de investigacio´n de la envergadura del que
presentamos sin una obligada referencia a las fuentes que nos han servido para
su elaboracio´n.
Hemos incorporado, en este sentido, un documento en el que se resen˜an las prin-
cipales resoluciones judiciales que han tenido como objeto el examen de los deberes
analizados, haciendo la oportuna distincio´n entre las resoluciones que proceden de
Derecho europeo y las dictadas por los distintos Tribunales nacionales, espan˜oles e
ingleses.
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Hemos incluido una bibliograf´ıa detallando la doctrina que nos ha servido de
fuente. Respecto de esta u´ltima, la novedad de la materia objeto de estudio, nos ha
llevado a una importante labor de clasificacio´n. Es obvio que se han tomado como
referencias las fuentes doctrinales cla´sicas en materia de contratos, referenciando
incluso aquellas que se han considerado imprescindibles, pero tambie´n lo es que la
novedad de la materia y los constantes cambios legislativos que la misma ha experi-
mentado nos ha llevado a centrarnos, fundamentalmente, en los autores posteriores
a las reformas.
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Introduction
Background and Motivation
There has been a proliferation of information duties in the B2C electronic contracts
in the law of the EU and its Member States. Electronic commerce plays nowadays
a crucially important role in both professional and private activity of European
consumers and businesses, as it has been emphasized by the European Commis-
sion on numerous occasions.1 Although the possibility of forming a contract online
revolutionised the B2C commerce and e-commerce is becoming one of the most pop-
ular ways of selling goods and services in the European internal market, it is still
far from reaching its full potential, especially in what refers to the cross-boarder
transactions,2 as it has been observed:
Consumer expenditure accounts for 56 % of EU GDP and is essential
to meeting the Europe 2020 objective of smart, inclusive and sustain-
able growth. Stimulating this demand can play a major role in bringing
the EU out of the crisis. To make this possible, the potential of the
Single Market must be realised. Data show that consumers shopping on-
line across the EU have up to 16 times more products from which to
choose, but 60 % of consumers do not yet use this retail channel. As a
result of this reluctance, they do not fully benefit from the variety of
choice and price differences available in the Single Market. Improving
1 See, eg Commission, ‘A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for
e-commerce and online services’ (Communication) COM(2011) 942 final, 1.
2 Commission, ‘Digital Agenda Scoreboard 2013’ (Staff Working Document) SWD(2013) 217 final,
18.
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consumer confidence in cross-border shopping online by taking appro-
priate policy action could provide a major boost to economic growth
in Europe. Empowered and confident consumers can drive forward the
European economy.3
The scope of this study is limited to the electronic contracts also due to the
particular importance of the information duties for this type of contracts on the one
hand,4 and the proliferation of the information requirements on the other. When
dealing on the Internet with traders from foreign jurisdictions consumers experience
the inequality of economic power to a higher extent than in other situations due
to an information asymmetry particularly influencing the B2C online relationship.5
Moreover, studies show that lack of trust, which could be remedied through provid-
ing relevant information, is one of the main factors responsible for discouraging
consumers from online buying.6 Identifying those and other obstacles that prevent
the cross-boarder e-commerce from flourishing is particularly relevant in the current
economic situation of post-crisis Europe.7
3 Commission, ‘A European Consumer Agenda – Boosting confidence and growth’ (Communication)
COM(2012) 225 final.
4 OECD, ’Empowering and Protecting Consumers in the Internet Economy’ (2013) 216 OECD Di-
gital Economy Papers (OECD Publishing) ¡http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4c6tbcvvq2-en¿ accessed
9 June 2016, 5-6: ’Clarification of consumer rights and obligations in online and mobile commerce
is (...) needed. Work in this area could be done through countries’ examination of the effectiveness
of their B2C e-commerce frameworks, including through initiatives aimed at providing consumers
with the information and tools they need to make informed decisions in e-commerce. This could also
be done through the development of standards which would specify the type of essential information
that should be provided to consumers prior to purchasing products. In the area of digital content
products, this could cover information on the functionality and interoperability of products. Any
such work should take concerns relating to competition, the rapid pace of technological innovation,
and differences in legal frameworks.’
5 Lorna E GILLIES, Electronic Commerce and International Private Law: A Study of Electronic
Consumer Contracts (Markets and the Law, Ashgate 2008) 1, where a number of factors specific
for the online cross-boarder transactions is listed, such as the consumer reliance on the information
listed by the traders themselves on their webpages; see also Annette NORDHAUSEN SCHOLES,
‘Information Requirements’ in Geraint Howells and Reiner Schulze (eds), Modernising and Har-
monising Consumer Contract Law (sellier European law publishers 2009) 213ff.
6 Alberto UREN˜A and others, Estudio sobre Comercio Electro´nico B2C 2013: Edicio´n 2014 (Ob-
servatorio Nacional de las Telecomunicaciones y de la SI 2014) 10ff.
7 Desire´e van WELSUM and others, ‘Unlocking the ICT Growth Potential in Europe: Enabling
people and businesses, Executive Summary: A study prepared for the European Commission’ (DG
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The European acquis relative to consumer contracts is to an important extent
organised around the central aim of empowering consumers through information.8
This approach resulted in legislation establishing significant amounts of information
duties that have been transposed into the national legal systems. Despite such em-
phasis put on the duties to inform,9 the consequences of their breach are very often
left to the discretion of Member States’ regulators.10
The principle of effectiveness can be sufficiently fulfilled through simple intro-
duction of institutional sanctions imposed on traders breaching information duties
in the B2C e-commerce.11 Nevertheless, information duties also necessarily interfere
with the contract law of the Member States,12 as the duties regulate the contracting
Communications Networks, Content & Technology, UE 2013) <http : / / ec . europa . eu / digital -
agenda/en/download-scoreboard-reports> accessed 12 June 2014, 3.
8 Geraint HOWELLS, ‘The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information’ (2005)
32 Journal of Law and Society 349, 351; Norbert REICH and Hans-W MICKLITZ, ‘Economic Law,
Consumer Interests and EU Integration’ in Norbert Reich and others (eds), European Consumer
Law (2nd edn, Ius Communitatis Series, Intersentia 2014) 22; see also Gillian K HADFIELD
and others, ‘Information-Based Principles for Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy’ (1998) 21
Journal of Consumer Policy 131, 132 who call information an ‘organizing idea of consumer protec-
tion’; Hans-W MICKLITZ, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices and Misleading Advertising’ in Norbert
Reich and others (eds), European Consumer Law (2nd edn, Ius Communitatis Series, Intersentia
2014) 79 refers to ‘pivotal position of information paradigm’.
9 Much attentions has been devoted to information duties both in legislation and in academic liter-
ature.
10 This was already observed as a general trend more than ten years ago, see Thomas WILHELMS-
SON, ‘Private Law Remedies against the Breach of Information Requirements of EC Law’ in
Reiner Schulze and others (eds), Informationspflichten und Vertragsschluss im Acquis Commun-
autaire (Mohr Siebeck 2003) 247, who explains that ‘(...) remedies for breaches of information
duties are often the responsibility of national law. Usually, the Directives only require Member
States to ensure that adequate and effective means exist to ensure compliance.’; see also NORD-
HAUSEN SCHOLES (n 5) 223; Raquel GUILLE´N CATALA´N, ‘La Directiva sobre los Derechos
de los Consumidores: un Paso hacia Delante, pero Incompleto’ (2012) 7801 Diario La Ley 1, 3ff.
11 Horst EIDENMULLER and others, ‘Towards a Revision of the Consumer Acquis’ (2011) 48 Com-
mon Market Law Review 1077, 1118-1119.
12 Often despite declarations found in various directives that they are without prejudice to the na-
tional contract law, see eg recital (9) of the Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the
internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and
2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of
the European Parliament and of the Council on unfair commercial practices [2005] OJ L149/22 or
recital (14) of the Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Oc-
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behaviour of the parties and often overlap with traditional doctrines relative to the
information exchange in the pre-contractual phase.13 The focus of this study is only
on the contract law — or private law as including also tortious liability — rules and
remedies for the breach of information requirements.
The national general contract law of the Member States coexists with the spe-
cific legislation concerning consumer contracts, as ‘(...) consumer law is not a self-
standing area of private law. It consists of some deviations from the general principles
of private law, but it is built on them and cannot be developed without them.’14 Due
to the vast amount of the rules and provisions concerning information duties and
private law consequences of their breach both at the European and national level,
the research presented needs to be limited mainly to the contracts for the online sale
of goods, although other contracts concerning supply of digital content or services
are also mentioned. This study aims at showing mechanisms and tendencies govern-
ing the breach of information duties in consumer contracts from the perspective of
private law and individual redress rights.15
The focus of this study is not the European law but the national legal systems
of England and Spain and the approach those two systems take to the information
duties and their breach and remedies available to consumers in an event of breach.
English and Spanish law are legal systems that represent two different European
legal traditions: common law and civil law,16 distant in what refers to their origins
and basic concepts, yet close in practice due to cross-boarder online transactions
being an everyday reality. The research in the field of information duties is of both
tober 2011 on consumer rights amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2011] OJ L304/64.
13 EIDENMULLER (n 11) 1119.
14 DCFR Outline Edition, Prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research
Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group), edited by Christian von Bar and others (Munich 2009),
Introduction para 40.
15 However is by no means a complete guide to the remedies and information duties in all consumer
contracts due to the amount of the information requirements established.
16 Konrad ZWEIGERT and Hein KOTZ, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, translated
by Tony Weir, Oxford University Press and JCB Mohr Paul Siebeck 1998) 41 propose to focus on
great legal families: Anglo-Saxon, Romanistic, Germanistic and Nordic.
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practical17 and theoretical interest, as it is closely connected to the core concepts of
the contract law such as the caveat emptor rule, duty to disclose, pre-contractual
good faith and a principle of fair dealing;18 the starting point of the analysis being the
existence of fundamental differences in approach to the issue between the common
law and civil law systems.19
The analysis of the national laws in the context of information duties and their
breach is necessary as it is where the consequences of breach are established, a
comparative analysis of two systems allows to present various possible solutions
adopted.20 The comparative approach to law can serve many different purposes,21
the first and foremost being simply knowledge as such, discovery of national models,
identifying a wide range of possible solutions to a problem.22 The main purpose being
pursued in this study is better understanding of the rules of both systems analysed
through comparison.23 Main problems relative to the breach of information duties
17 As electronic commerce is not restricted to consumers and businesses situated in one jurisdiction,
see eg observations made in the context of the private international law, but relevant to substantial
law as well by GILLIES (n 5) 6.
18 ‘An investigation of the “duty to disclose” on a comparative law basis is most rewarding; it leads
us straight to the philosophy underlying the law of contracts’, see the classic work of Friedrich
KESSLER and Edith FINE, ‘Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of
Contract: A Comparative Study’ (1964) 77 Harvard Law Review 401, 438.
19 Thomas WILHELMSSON, ‘European Rules on Pre-Contractual Information Duties?’ (2006) 7
ERA Forum Journal of the Academy of European Law 16, 16.
20 As ZWEIGERT and KOTZ (n 16) 15 observe: (...) no study deserves a name of science if it limits
itself to phenomena arising within its national boundries. (...) [C]omparative law offers the only
way by which law can become international and consequently a science.
21 Hugh COLLINS, ‘Methods and Aims of Comparative Contract Law’ (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 396 points to four often adopted purposes of comparative legal studies: a quest for
a natural law of obligations – 396; examine of law in order to discover the forces and mechanisms
causing changes in legal systems and societies – 396-397; finding the best solutions to legal problems
through comparison – 397-398; understanding one’s own domestic legal system better – 398ff;
ZWEIGERT and KOTZ (n 16) 16ff name five practical benefits of comparative law: (1) an aid
to the legislator; (2) a tool of construction, ie interpretation of national rules of law, eg when
common law courts make reciprocal references – English to Australian decisions for instance; (3)
a component of the curriculum of the universities; (4) a contribution to the systematic unification
of law; (5) the development of a private law common to the whole Europe.
22 Rodolfo SACCO, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Instalment I of II)’
(1991) 39 The American Journal of Comparative Law 1, 4-5; ZWEIGERT and KOTZ (n 16) 16.
23 COLLINS, ‘Methods and Aims of Comparative Contract Law’ (n 21) 398ff.
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are identified, and, where appropriate, solutions are proposed. Nevertheless, finding
the best solution and then recommending its adoption in the other system is not
the main focus of the study.24
Research Questions
The focus of this work is the issue of breach of information duties in the B2C
electronic contracts in two European legal systems: English and Spanish; the analysis
of the complex framework of specific consumer law provisions and general private
law rules and their interactions in the two legal systems aims at identifying the legal
mechanisms governing the disclosure duties and possible different solutions adopted.
The present study provides response to three main questions relative to the breach
of information duties from a comparative perspective.
The first question concerns the information duties in consumer electronic con-
tracts existing in both legal systems analysed. There are various sources of inform-
ation requirements in the national laws of England and Spain, which need to be de-
termined as the origin and type of the duties breached imply different consequences
of the breach. The perspective of breach adopted in this study assists in identify-
ing the requirements which are established in a less explicit manner, both at the
European level and in the national systems as a result of the transposition of the
European rules and originating in national internal law of general or specific nature.
The second question is relative to the approach of the two analysed legal systems
to the information duties and their breach. The dominant role of the European law in
establishing information requirements makes it necessary to look at the justification
of introduction of information duties in consumer contracts for the functioning of the
European internal market. However, also the general contract law of the analysed
systems independently recognises various doctrines relating to the information duties
based on the premise of the general disclosure duty – or lack thereof – founded on
24 COLLINS, ‘Methods and Aims of Comparative Contract Law’ (n 21) 397 refers to such approach
as positivist and utilitarian; such approach results in recommending legal transplants, which are
nevertheless a highly controversial issue, see: Pierre LEGRAND, ‘The Impossibility of “Legal Trans-
plants”’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 111; see also: Otto KAHN-
FREUND, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 The Modern Law Review 1.
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the good faith and fair dealing principle. The standpoint of the English and Spanish
law needs to be examined and compared as a starting point for further analysis of
more concrete duties and consequences of their breach established in the general
contract law and specific consumer legislation.
The third question consists in describing various possible classifications of the
breach of information duties in English and Spanish law, identifying problematic
issues and proposing possible solutions. Both general private law rules and specific
consumer statutory provisions need to be taken into account. The solutions adopted
by the two systems need to be compared in order to present a variety of approaches
to the transposition of the European law on the matter on the one hand, and to
establish the significance of the concrete duties and the remedies for their breach
in each system on the other. Moreover, the comparative perspective should help
ascertain the influence of the general law and traditional approach to the issue of
disclosure on the practical solutions in place. The analysis of the remedies also aims
at determining whether different types of breach, such as information omission or
provision of false information, and different types of information duties, for instance
relative to the main characteristics of the subject-matter of the contract or to other
information items, result in availability of different remedies and if so, how the man-
ners in which the problem is resolved in the two legal systems analysed vary. Finally,
the survey of the remedies for breach should lead to identification of the main prob-
lematic areas, and comparative approach contributes to proposing improvements.
Methodology
The methodology of research adopted in this study corresponds with various lay-
ers of the analysis of the breach of information duties in the B2C contracts from
a comparative perspective. The comparative approach involves engaging in a study
that presents certain features of a vicious circle: comparative analysis is only pos-
sible and fruitful if the compared phenomena are known to the researcher, however
the knowledge deepens and develops through the very activity of the comparative
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analysis.25 The same is true for this study, and even more so, as various new laws
pertinent to this study have been adopted recently,26 which results in significant lack
of literature and court decisions dealing with those new provisions.
The comparative approach is based on the principle of functionality: the legal
rules examined and compared are those that fulfil the same function in both English
and Spanish law.27 A neutrality and impartiality of the analysis have been pursued,28
although it needs to be pointed out that the presumption of differences between the
two systems resulting from their belonging to different legal families29 have been
accepted as a starting point for the analysis.30
The functional approach adopted means that the search for the consequences of
breach of information duties in both systems needs to be carried out without initial
presumptions as to the areas of law that are to be investigated,31 however this study
is only focused on private law and individual redress rights, therefore the institutional
sanctions resulting from application of administrative law or competition law stay
outside of the scope of research. Nevertheless, within the private law offering redress
rights all potentially applicable rules originating in general law, specific legislation
25 SACCO (n 22) 5.
26 Such as: Ley 3/2014, de 27 de marzo, por la que se modifica el texto refundido de la Ley General
para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios y otras leyes complementarias, aprobado por el
Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2007, de 16 de noviembre. Bolet´ın Oficial del Estado, 28 de marzo de
2014, nu´m. 76, p. 26967 (Ley 3/2014 de 27 de marzo); The Consumer Contracts (Information,
Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/3134 (Consumer Contracts Reg-
ulations 2013); The Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/870 (Consumer
Protection Amendment 2014); Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA 2015).
27 ZWEIGERT and KOTZ (n 16) 34.
28 My premise is to analyse two systems objectively rather than comparing a foreign system to my
own; I studied both of the systems analysed, together with two other systems: Polish and French
and although I qualified as ‘abogada’ under Spanish law, I do not treat any of those legal systems as
my own strictly speaking; cf also John CARTWRIGHT and Martijn HESSELINK, ‘Introduction’
in John Cartwright and Martijn Hesselink (eds), Precontractual Liability in European Private Law
(The Common Core of European Private Law, Cambridge University Press 2008) 10.
29 On legal families of the world see eg ZWEIGERT and KOTZ (n 16) 64ff.
30 A presumption of similarity might turn out to be harmful to the research, see eg ZWEIGERT
and KOTZ (n 16) 39; Ruth SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ in Ruth Sefton-Green (ed),
Mistake, Fraud and Duties to Inform in European Contract Law (The Common Core of European
Private Law, Cambridge University Press 2004) 15.
31 ZWEIGERT and KOTZ (n 16) 35.
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and case law have been looked at in both systems.
The criticism of the functional approach is well-known;32 however adopting a re-
medial perspective – starting from the premise of the main focus of the study: breach
of information duties, allows to overcome the main shortcomings of the functional
method. First of all, these are definitely not only the black-letter law provisions
that are taken into account when investigating the treatment of the breach of in-
formation requirements in the English and Spanish systems: court decisions33 and
academic writing have all been considered.34 The general approach of the systems
towards the information duties and their breach is being investigated. Secondly, as
already noted, no similarity is being presumed, although necessarily there is a high
degree of resemblance between the systems especially where the transposition of the
European rules has taken place.
Taking up the breach of the information duties as the starting point for the
analysis approximates the approach adopted in this study to the classic factual
method.35 Although no concrete facts of a hypothetical (or real) case are examined,
there is nevertheless a significant practical side to the research conducted in this
study: the possible reactions of the English and Spanish systems to the premise
of breach of information requirements in a consumer electronic contract are under
investigation. Various possibilities of breach are taken into account: breach consisting
in omission of material or required information and that relative to providing false
information; breach concerning different types of information items.
Various diagrams are elaborated and presented in Figures 1.–4., which show the
multiple possible provisions and rules to be taken into account when the breach of
information duties occurs in a B2C electronic contract. Such presentation of rules
makes it easier to compare the systems and also provides guidance for readers not
32 See eg CARTWRIGHT and HESSELINK, ‘Introduction’ (n 28) 4ff in the context of the Trento
Common Core Method.
33 Especially in Spain where there is no precedence principle and therefore court decisions form part
of the legal culture rather than being case-law as the court decisions in English law.
34 Which roughly correspond to legal formants, see SACCO (n 22) 21ff.
35 As first applied in Rudolf B SCHLESINGER and Pierre G BONASSIES (eds), Formation of
Contracts: a Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems, conducted under the auspices of the
General principles of law project of the Cornell Law School (Oceana Publications 1968).
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familiar with the law of England or Spain on that matter. It is evident that a certain
degree of preparation was needed in order to divide the consequences of breach
according to various factors (false information v information omission; information
relative to the main characteristics of goods v other information items), however
this is also the illustration of the comparative law vicious circle: comparison is only
possible when (some) knowledge has already been acquired previously.
From a more technical point of view, the research carried out in the present study
consisted mainly of black-letter law analysis, together with preparatory documents,
both at the European and national level, official documents and soft law propositions
of various international bodies and court decisions of the CJEU and national English
and Spanish courts. Furthermore, a lot of time was dedicated to the research of
literature both concerning the European and national law relative to the matters
examined in this study.
No separate reports of English and Spanish law, apart from the diagrams, have
been prepared and the rules and provisions are analysed together and compared
within the same subsections of the study.36 The main aim of this study is not the
preparation of thorough description of each of the systems analysed but rather the
comparison of the specific provisions and rules fulfilling a similar function in relation
to the breach of information duties. Certain characteristics of the systems analysed
will necessarily influence the shape of the study: the division of the remedies for
breach, ie the distinction between information omission and provision of false in-
36 ZWEIGERT and KOTZ (n 16) 43-47 suggest to prepare separate reports on the different systems
analysed and subsequently proceed with their evaluation and comparison according to the principle
of functionality; in various studies such reports are included expressly, see eg John CARTWRIGHT,
‘Defects of Consent in Contract Law’ in Arthur S Hartkamp and others (eds), Towards a European
Civil Code (4th edn, Kluwer Law International 2011); Hanna SIVESAND, The Buyer’s Remedies
for Non-conforming Goods: Should There be Free Choice Or are Restrictions Necessary? (European
Legal Studies Vol 2, Sellier European Law Publishers 2005). Nevertheless, in various other studies,
no complete separate reports are incorporated in the published text, see eg Paula GILIKER,
‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French Law’ (2005) 5
European Review of Private Law 621; Hugh BEALE, ‘Pre-contractual Obligations: The General
Contract Law Background’ (2008) XIV Juridica International 42; Hugh BEALE and others, Cases,
Materials and Text on Contract Law (Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe,
Hart Publishing 2010). It does not mean however, that those reports have not been produced at
an earlier stage of the research in form of notes and drafts that were subsequently turned into
a coherent text including comparative remarks and evaluation. I do not see the need to present
separately the relevant law of England and Spain, as the main purpose of this study is comparison.
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formation, is inspired by a different treatment of those by the English system. As
this issue is not of such significance for the Spanish law,37 it is therefore logical to
follow the English law pattern, as it will allow to show how the systems deal with
particular situations of breach. Moreover, a distinction between the breach of in-
formation duties relative to the main characteristics of goods or other information
items is common to both systems as it is a consequence of the implementation of
the European law, therefore it was also applied in this study.
Such an organisation of the work will inevitably lead to some repetition – refer-
ring to the same legal rules more than once, as the possible classifications of breach
and remedies often overlap within each system. I tried to limit the repetition to
the necessary minimum through presenting each issue only once in more detail and
cross-referencing to the relevant subsection when needed.
Finally, the terminology used needs to be briefly referred to. Some concepts
referred to in this study are unique to each system analysed, as for instance the
concept of misrepresentation. In such case an equivalent – a similar doctrine of the
other system is referred to; in the example of misrepresentation it would be fraud
(dolo) for fraudulent misrepresentation and provoked mistake (error provocado) for
negligent and innocent misrepresentation. It is clearly much more than just an issue
of terminology:38 it is evident that those concepts do not denote identical doctrines
in both systems, the differences and similarities are presented, however some ap-
proximation of terminology for the sake of simplicity and flow of the written work is
37 However strictly speaking there are also some differences in what refers to the provisions applicable
depending on the type of breach, their pertinence for the final ourcome is less significant than in
the case of the English law.
38 Cf COLLINS, ‘Methods and Aims of Comparative Contract Law’ (n 21) 399 in the context of
comparing English and French contract law: ‘The problem is that it is simply no good to compare
superficially similar legal doctrines. Just because the word “erreur” is usually translated by the word
“mistake”, that cannot provide a ground for restricting the comparison to those two doctrines in
French and English contract law. Since French law regulates most mistakes which induce contracts
by the doctrine of erreur (and vices cachees in the law of sales) whereas English law regulates most
mistakes by the doctrine of misrepresentation and implied terms, the correct focus of comparison
should be between erreur on the one hand and misrepresentation, implied terms, and mistake on
the other. In other words, this fourth comparative method demands a comparison not between
legal doctrines directly, but between the legal doctrines regulating a common social problem such
as serious mistakes inducing agreement to a contract. The success of the enterprise thus turns
upon the selection of an instructive social problem which the two legal systems address in different
ways.’
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necessary. Other issues with terminology may arise out of discrepancies present in
each system internally, such is the case of the notions of contract being void (nulo)
or voidable (anulable) in the Spanish law. There I am trying to use the term correct
in what refers to the consequences of the legal rules and not necessarily the one
corresponding with the literal translation of the provision. The choice of the English
language for this study does not mean that any more emphasis is put on the Eng-
lish system or that the English law is anyhow closer to me personally,39 however it
implies the use of English — or rather anglicized40 — terminology to describe legal
concepts analysed.
Outline of the Study
There are three main Chapters in this study; the motivation, research questions and
methodology used in the study are presented in the Introduction, and conclusions
and final observations are set out at the end in Conclusions.
In Chapter 1 the focus is placed on putting the information duties and their
breach in the social and legal framework. The Chapter responds to the first research
question, concerning the information duties in the systems analysed. Particular as-
pects of the e-commerce, relevant to abundant introduction of information duties in
electronic contracts are presented, then the information duties and their breach are
looked at in more detail. I examine the role that the information requirements play
in the European internal market together with justifications for the proliferation
of the duties in B2C electronic contracts. The model of consumer deserves special
attention as it is central to the European information paradigm. The information
duties are subject to vast criticism which needs to be mentioned, some observations
are made as to possible improvements of the status quo, for instance such as finding
an optimal level of information duties in the consumer contracts. Subsequently, vari-
39 See footnote 28 above on my background.
40 On the issues arising out of the use of the English language to talk about legal concepts of the
European law and the main problem being not linguistics as such but rather semantic differences
deeply embedded in the national legal traditions see Ruth SEFTON-GREEN, ‘How Far can we
Go when Using the English Language for Private Law in the EU?’ (2012) 8 European Review of
Contract Law 30.
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ous sources of information requirements in the national laws of England and Spain
are identified and legal provisions of various origin, nature and type introducing
information duties are presented, including the constitutional foundations, general
disclosure duty resulting from the good faith principle and specific requirements
that can be found in general law and consumer legislation. The information duties
of direct and indirect character are considered. Also, I compare the approach that
the two systems adopt in what refers to the information duties and their breach,
pointing to various differences having an important impact on the treatment of the
breach of disclosure duties in English and Spanish laws, which answers the second
research question.
Chapter 2 examines the characteristics of the duties to inform and their breach
and introduces the issue of the remedies available for breach of information duties.
Various types of information duties, such as duties to disclose and advise, among
others, their content and scope are presented. The third research question relative
to various possible classifications of breach is tackled in this Chapter. Breach of
information duties can give rise to diverse consequences resulting from both specific
consumer legislation and general private law: various possible classifications of the
breach of information duties in English and Spanish law are identified. Next, I fo-
cus on the problematic aspects of the remedies potentially available for breach of
information duties, stemming from the dual and casuistic nature of the information
requirements, and discuss the types and nature of the remedies.
Chapter 3 consists of a thorough description and analysis of the remedies avail-
able for breach of information duties in English and Spanish law arising under dif-
ferent heads. First, the specific remedies established in the sectoral legislation are
discussed. I decided to tackle the specific remedies first, despite the fact that the
way they operate is in many instances an evidence of the influence of the general
private law. Nevertheless, the specific remedies not only suit consumer needs better
in many situations, but their application may exclude the availability of the general
law remedies. The general law remedies, that is mainly those arising out of contrac-
tual liability and under the heads of defects of consent, fulfill rather a subsidiary
function, although evidence is presented of their usefulness in consumer cases as
well. Furthermore, the analysis of the general law remedies, although not the main
focus of the study, is necessary also for comparative purposes, as demonstrates the
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approach to the information duties and their breach of each of the systems and up
to certain extent explains legislative choices made in what refers to the specific rem-
edies. In Chapter 3 I also point out to problematic issues relative to the remedies for
breach and propose some punctual improvements on the basis of the comparative
analysis carried out.
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1.1. INFORMATION DUTIES AND THEIR BREACH IN THE B2C
E-COMMERCE
1 Social, conceptual and legal
framework of information
duties and their breach in the
B2C e-commerce
1.1 Information duties and their breach in the
B2C e-commerce
1.1.1 Particular aspects of the B2C e-commerce
1.1.1.1 Characteristics of the e-commerce
Consumer protection takes special importance in the context of the electronic com-
merce.1 The e-commerce2 has become very popular with both consumers and traders
1 See OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce (1999),
Pt two. General principles, s I. Transparent and effective protection, where it is noted that the
special circumstances of electronic commerce require effective consumer protection; see also James
CATCHPOLE, ‘The Regulation of Electronic Commerce: A Comparative Analysis of the Issues
Surrounding the Principles of Establishment’ (2001) 9 International Journal of Law and Inform-
ation Technology 1, 1 who observes: ‘[t]he consensus (...) is that e-commerce should be embraced
as an integral part of business and, therefore, regulated and controlled to afford consumers, and
alike, the legislative protections that are available in the physical world’.
2 This Chapter focuses only on the aspects of the e-commerce relevant to the present study as a
whole. The law of the electronic commerce, or e-commerce, has been an object of numerous studies
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in the EU, practically changing the trade as we knew it.3 European Commission ac-
knowledges ‘the digital revolution’ pointing out to the benefits further development
of the e-commerce could bring to European consumers.4
The words ‘e-commerce’ can be understood in a broad sense as any exchange
of data through electronic means and interactive networks.5 More precisely how-
ever, e-commerce refers to commercial transactions between individuals and (or)
published in many different languages on various legal systems, see inter alia: Gema Alejandra
BOTANA GARCI´A (ed), Comercio Electro´nico y Proteccio´n de los Consumidores (La Ley 2001);
Fransisco Javier ORDUN˜A MORENO and others (eds), Contratacio´n y Comercio Electro´nico (Tir-
ant lo Blanch 2003); Ruth NIELSEN and others (eds), EU Electronic Commerce Law (Djof/Jurist-
og Okonomforbundet 2004); Pablo Luis GARCI´A MEXI´A (ed), Principios de Derecho de Internet
(2nd edn, Tirant lo Blanch 2005); Jose´ Antonio VEGA VEGA, Contratos Electro´nicos y Pro-
teccio´n de los Consumidores (Coleccio´n de Derecho de las Nuevas Tecnolog´ıas, Reus 2005); Paul
TODD, E-commerce Law (Cavendish 2005); Alan DAVIDSON, The Law of Electronic Commerce
(Cambridge University Press 2009); Diane ROWLAND and others, Information Technology Law
(4th edn, Routledge 2012); Javier PLAZA PENADE´S and others, Derecho y Nuevas Tecnolog´ıas
de la Informacio´n y la Comunicacio´n (Aranzadi 2013); Ian J LLOYD, Information Technology Law
(7th edn, Oxford University Press 2014); Pedro Alberto de MIGUEL ASENSIO, Derecho Privado
de Internet (5th edn, Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, Civitas 2015).
3 Agust´ın MADRID PARRA, ‘Uso de las Nuevas Tecnolog´ıas en la Construccio´n del Mercado In-
terior Europeo’ in Jose´ Mar´ıa Ban˜o Leo´n and others (eds), Memorial para la Reforma del Estado.
Estudios en Homenaje al Profesor Santiago Mun˜oz Machado (Vol I Centro de Estudios Pol´ıticos y
Constitucionales 2016) 322-323 refers to new technologies as essential and indispensable in today’s
society.
4 Commission, ’A European Consumer Agenda – Boosting confidence and growth’ (Communication)
COM(2012) 225 final: ’e-commerce can deliver considerable welfare gains since consumers have at
least twice the choice when shopping online rather than oﬄine. Cloud computing in particular can
offer more flexible services that are device or platform independent. It has been calculated that,
if e-commerce in goods reaches 15% of retail sales and all Single Market barriers are removed, the
overall gain for consumers would be around EUR 204 billion (1.7% of EU GDP).’
5 Fernando HERNA´NDEZ JIME´NEZ-CASQUET, ‘’El Marco Jur´ıdico del Comercio y la Con-
tratacio´n Electro´nicos’ in Pablo Luis Garc´ıa Mex´ıa (ed), Principios de Derecho de Internet
(2nd edn, Tirant lo Blanch 2005) 439; United Nations General Assembly, ’Model Law on Electronic
Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’ Resolution
51/162 of 16 December 1996, amended in 1998 (UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce)
in Article 1 refers to ‘any kind of information in the form of a data message used in the context
of commercial activities’, where ‘[t]he term “commercial”’ is understood widely ‘so as to cover
matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not.’; OECD
Guidelines use the concept of a ‘global network environment’; see also VEGA VEGA (n 2) 57 who
points out that the e-commerce can be perceived even broarder as a concept including economic
activities of varied nature.
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traders which are carried out through electronic means,6 including activities addi-
tional to the mere contract formation, such as previous negotiations, advertising
and information search.7 It is then a relatively new form of trade taking place over
the Internet8 and linked with the information society,9 not necessarily restricted
6 Cf Jesu´s Ignacio FERNA´NDEZ DOMINGO, ‘Algunas Notas acerca de la Contractacio´n y el Comer-
cio Electro´nico’ in Francisco Javier Ordun˜a Moreno (ed), Contractacio´n y Comercio Electro´nico
(Tirant lo Blanch 2003) 241, who describes the e-commerce as a possibility (or even better — pos-
sibilities) to buy or sell ‘anything’ what is possible, anything that can be legally traded, between
individuals, companies, or companies and individuals.
7 Cf DAVIDSON (n 2) 1, who begins with the following definition: ‘Electronic commerce refers to all
commercial transactions based on the electronic processing and transmission of data, including text,
sound and images. This involves transactions over the internet, plus electronic funds transfers and
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)’; Lorna E GILLIES, Electronic Commerce and International
Private Law: A Study of Electronic Consumer Contracts (Markets and the Law, Ashgate 2008) 24
points out that ‘[e]lectronic commerce enables parties to use digital language on computers to com-
municate, negotiate and contract with each other’; see also HERNA´NDEZ JIME´NEZ-CASQUET
(n 5) 439; David LO´PEZ JIME´NEZ and Francisco Jose´ MARTI´NEZ LO´PEZ, ‘La Formacio´n del
Contrato Electro´nico’ (2009) 105 Revista de Contratacio´n Electro´nica 3, 5 highlight that to be able
to talk about the e-commerce, both the offer and acceptance have to take place through electronic
means; August´ın MADRID PARRA, ‘Contratos Electro´nicos y Contratos Informa´ticos’ (2011) 111
Revista de Contratacio´n Electro´nica 5, 6 considers that in any case, whatever terminology we use,
what is relevant is the fact that the electronic means were used to form the contract, whatever the
contract type and whatever its object is. In what refers to the formation of electronic contracts, see:
Ma del Pilar PERALES VISCASILLAS, ‘Formacio´n del Contrato’ in Gema Botana Garc´ıa (ed),
Comercio Electro´nico y Proteccio´n de los Consumidores (La Ley 2001) 405-460; HERNA´NDEZ
JIME´NEZ-CASQUET (n 5) 454ff; VEGA VEGA (n 2) 224ff; Luis DIEZ-PICAZO, Fundamentos
del Derecho Civil Patrimonial. Vol.1: Introduccio´n, Teor´ıa del Contrato (6th edn, Thomson-Civitas
2007) 366ff; Natalia FERNA´NDEZ PE´REZ, El Nuevo Re´gimen de la Contratacio´n a Distancia
con Consumidores: Especial Referencia a la Relativa a Servicios Financieros ( (La Ley 2009) 35ff;
Pablo Luis GARCI´A MEXI´A, Derecho Europeo de Internet: Hacia la Autonomı´a Acade´mica y
la Globalidad Geogra´fica (Netbiblo 2009) 238ff; FERNA´NDEZ DOMINGO (n 6) 255ff; Christine
RIEFA, ‘The Reform of Electronic Consumer Contracts in Europe: Towards an Effective Legal
Framework?’ (2009) 14 Lex Electronica 1, 26ff; MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) para 894ff.
8 In this study I am referring to the e-commerce as a phenomenon taking place over the open ac-
cess networks, as CATCHPOLE (n 1) 2 highlights: ‘(...) e-commerce is a term that has become
synonymous with commercial transactions involving both organisations and individuals, based
upon the processing and transmission of digitised data, including text, sound, and visual images,
transmitted over open networks such as the Internet’; see also GILLIES (n 7) 24ff; however some re-
searchers give the e-commerce a broader meaning, as DAVIDSON (n 2) 1 and Barry B SOOKMAN,
‘Electronic Commerce, Internet and the Law: A Survey of the Legal Issues’ (1999) 48 University
of New Brunswick Law Journal 119, who also include in their definitions transactions formed over
restricted access networks such as EDI (Electronic data interchange).
9 VEGA VEGA (n 2) 57-58; information society is a relatively new socio-economical and legal context
brought about by an important technological development, one of its manifestations being a major
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only to business-to-consumer contracts. A concept of a more limited scope than the
e-commerce are electronic contracts – contracts formed with the use of electronic
means.10 E-commerce, on the other hand, includes not only contract formation, but
also other forms of economic activity and commercial information exchange based
on the data transmission through communication networks.11In this study I shall
refer to the e-commerce to denote the activity of traders consisting of selling goods
and services online, over the Internet, to consumers.
The Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce12 does not define the e-
commerce, and neither does Spanish nor English legislation.13 However, the e-commerce
belongs to a broader category of the information society services,14 defined in a gen-
eric manner by the legislation of the European Community as: ‘any service normally
provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual
request of a recipient of services’.15 Parts of this definition are further explained by
the Directive 98/34/EC16 – a distance service is provided without the parties being
role played by the e-commerce in all the sectors of contracting, see FERNA´NDEZ PE´REZ (n 7)
26-27.
10 FERNA´NDEZ PE´REZ (n 7) 178ff.
11 VEGA VEGA (n 2) 62.
12 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal
Market [2000] OJ L178/1 (Directive on electronic commerce).
13 See the English Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2013 (E-commerce
Regulations 2002) and the Spanish Ley 34/2002, de 11 de julio, de servicios de la sociedad de la
informacio´n y de comercio electro´nico. Bolet´ın Oficial del Estado, de 12 de julio de 2002, nu´m. 166,
p. 25388 (LSSICE).
14 Information society services comprise e-commerce and electronic content in general, see recital (18)
of the Directive on electronic commerce, which starts in the following words: ‘Information society
services span a wide range of economic activities which take place on-line; these activities can,
in particular, consist of selling goods on-line(...).’; see also Gema Alejandra BOTANA GARCI´A,
‘Nocio´n de Comercio Electro´nico’ in Gema Alejandra Botana Garc´ıa (ed), Comercio Electro´nico
y Proteccio´n de los Consumidores (La Ley 2001) 35ff; VEGA VEGA (n 2) 59; Andrej SAVIN,
‘E-Commerce in the Single Market Context – the Invisible Framework’ in Andrej Savin and Jan
Trzaskowski (eds), Research Handbook on EU Internet Law (Research Handbooks in European
Law, Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 286; MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) para 117.
15 In its Article 2(a) the Directive on electronic commerce defines information society services as ser-
vices within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC as amended by Directive 98/48/EC.
16 Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a
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simultaneously present; ‘electronic means’ makes reference the service being sent
and received at its destination by means of electronic equipment for the processing
of data (which includes digital compression and storage of data) and entirely trans-
mitted, conveyed and received by electromagnetic means; finally the service defined
has to be provided through the transmission of data on individual request. The Dir-
ective refers to a ‘service normally provided for remuneration’, which is considered
to include situations where there is an economic benefit for the provider, albeit not
necessarily coming from the end user, as in the case of the remuneration resulting
from the advertising.17
E-commerce includes not only transactions where contract formation, payment
and performance all happen online, ie direct e-commerce, but also those where only
the contract formation (and sometimes payment) is done through the Internet, whilst
performance is a traditional one, usually fulfilled through goods delivery or service
performance, ie indirect e-commerce.18 Both types of transactions are relevant to the
consumer contracts being the focus of this study, the first one could be exemplified
by the contracts for digital content, the second one includes for instance contracts
for tangible goods, formed online with the goods being delivered to the consumer
some time after the contract formation. The distinction is of significance in what
refers to the legislation potentially applicable, since provisions of pieces of legislation
relative only to online activities, as eg Directive on electronic commerce, will apply
exclusively to the online part of transactions in the indirect e-commerce, all oﬄine
activity staying outside of the scope of that legislation.19
procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations [1998]
OJ L204/37 as amended by the Directive 98/48/EC.
17 Cf BOTANA GARCI´A, ‘Nocio´n de Comercio Electro´nico’ (n 14) 36ff; see also MIGUEL ASENSIO
(n 2) para 112.
18 VEGA VEGA (n 2) 60ff; FERNA´NDEZ DOMINGO (n 6) 253; MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) paras
117, 888.
19 MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) para 117; RIEFA (n 7) 12; any type of the e-commerce is characterised
by certain particularities, which are reflected in the legislation. Nevertheless, online contracts for
digital content -– an example of the direct e-commerce — can be regarded as a certain sub-
category of the e-commerce, hence numerous rules specifically applicable to digital goods, such as
the provisions of the Chapter 3 of Part 1 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA 2015) — s 33(1)
of the Act states: ‘This Chapter applies to a contract for a trader to supply digital content to a
consumer, if it is supplied or to be supplied for a price paid by the consumer.’ or new European
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Distinctive features of the e-commerce, summarised below, make it a form of
trade that on the one hand is currently revolutionising the market of B2C trans-
actions,20 but on the other creates a specific need for consumer protection.21 The
aim of the mechanisms designed to ensure consumer protection in the e-commerce
is not only the safety and well-being of consumers, but also, even more importantly,
the promotion of the e-commerce itself22 by means of encouraging market actors to
participate in electronic transactions, especially through boosting consumers confid-
ence in this form of trade. It is indeed consumers’ lack of trust in the e-commerce
that is believed to be one of the main obstacles to its development.23
Some characteristics of the e-commerce are due to the fact that it is a form of
distance contracting,24 other are specific to the electronic contracting through the
Commission’s initiative — Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content’ COM(2015)
634 final (Proposal for a Directive on supply of digital content). Digital content due to its very
nature is especially suitable to being provided online, nevertheless various new legal issues have
recently arisen and are now being tackled by national and European legislation alike, eg a problem
of conformity of digital content.
20 Due to the Internet being a perfect instrument to form contracts online in a fast, easy and inter-
active way, see: GARCI´A MEXI´A, Derecho Europeo de Internet: Hacia la Autonomı´a Acade´mica
y la Globalidad Geogra´fica (n 7) 238; RIEFA (n 7) 3.
21 GILLIES (n 7) 19‘[t]he consumer is in a contractually weaker position than the seller no matter
whether the consumer contracts with a business by electronic means or not. However, the nature
of the online contract renders the consumer’s already weaker contractual position more acute’.
22 E-commerce development is one of the key priorities of the European Commission and consumer
protection in relation to main policy areas within the e-commerce, see eg COM(2012) 225 final;
Ecommerce Foundation, ‘European B2C E-commerce Report 2015’ [2015] E-commerce: a Priority
for the European Commission <www.ecommerce- europe.eu/facts - figures/free- light- reports>
accessed 10 December 2015, 11.
23 Cf Commission’s communications, among others: Commission, ‘A coherent framework for build-
ing trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce and online services’ (Communication)
COM(2011) 942 final, 2; COM(2012) 225 final; Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy
for Europe’ (Communication) COM(2015) 192 final, 4; see also OECD, ‘Consumers in the On-
line Marketplace: the OECD Guidelines three years later’ (Report by the Committee on Con-
sumer Policy on the Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce)
DSTI/CP(2002)4/FINAL (2003) <www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/
?doclanguage=en&cote=dsti/cp(2002)4/final> accessed 15 July 2016 (OECD Guidelines 3 years
later report).
24 E-commerce is considered both by European legislator and by great majority of academics to be a
form of distance contracting; electronic contracts are distance contracts formed through electronic
means — see for instance art 8.2 of the Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of
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Internet. European legislator considers the lack of simultaneous physical presence of
the contracting parties to be the main feature of a distance contract, for instance in
the article 2(7) of the Directive on consumer rights a distance contract is defined as:
(...) any contract concluded between the trader and the consumer un-
der an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme without the
simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, with the
exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and
including the time at which the contract is concluded;(...).
The lack of simultaneous physical presence of the trader and consumer together
with other features of the Internet brings about various implications, both advant-
ageous and disadvantageous for the contracting parties and more broadly for the
economy of the market as well. First of all, the greatest benefit of the e-commerce
for all the parties and what makes it so revolutionary in comparison with the tra-
ditional trade, as well as other types of distance contracts, is its accessibility —
from practically anywhere in the world,25 without time restrictions, in a fast and
the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and
Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Direct-
ive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2011] OJ
L304/64 (Directive on consumer rights) which starts in the following words: ‘If a distance contract
to be concluded by electronic means (...).’ The Spanish Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2007, de 16 de
noviembre, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de los Con-
sumidores y Usuarios y otras leyes complementarias. Bolet´ın Oficial del Estado, 30 de noviembre
de 2007, nu´m. 287, p. 49181 (TRLDCU) can constitute another example — in its article 92.1 the
Act stays that among others, are to be considered as means of distance communication: mail,
Internet, telephone or fax; see also: BOTANA GARCI´A, ‘Nocio´n de Comercio Electro´nico’ (n 14)
43; Roc´ıo de ROSSELLO´ MORENO, El Comercio Electro´nico y la Proteccio´n de los Consum-
idores (Cedecs 2001) 12ff; Diego CRUZ RIVERO, ‘Contratacio´n Electro´nica con Consumidores’
(2009) 109 Revista de la Contratacio´n Electro´nica 3, 8 who affirms directly that the electronic
commerce is a kind of distance contracting; Patricia MA´RQUEZ LOBILLO, ‘El Consumidor en
la Contratacio´n Electro´nica de Servicios Tur´ısticos’ (2011) 282 Revista de Derecho Mercantil 209,
212 who points out that provisions relative to distance contracts are to be applicable to electronic
contracts; HERNA´NDEZ JIME´NEZ-CASQUET (n 5) 449; nevertheless, some authors believe that
not all electronic contracts can be considered distance contracts, see for example: Yanixet Milagro
FORMENTI´N ZAYAS, ‘La Contratacio´n Vı´a Electro´nica: Algunas Perspectivas Teo´ricas’ (2012)
118 Revista de la Contratacio´n Electro´nica 65; in conclusion, however, it seems that within the
European Union internal market, any ciberconsumer will enjoy the protection established in the
legislation relative to distance contracts.
25 See Diego P FERNA´NDEZ ARROYO, ‘Consumer Protection in Private International Relation-
ships’ in Karen B Brown and David V Snyder (eds), XVIIIth Congress of the International Academy
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immediate way potential buyers can access simultaneously a practically unlimited
range of offers, compare prices, and enter contracts without leaving their homes.26
Moreover, electronic commerce allows traders to lower the prices of products, goods
or services they offer — the reduced costs of operating business come from the
lack of necessity to maintain premises open to public, allowing more small-medium
enterprises (SMEs) to participate in the market and giving the traders access to
unlimited numbers of potential customers practically with no geographical or time
restrictions.27
of Comparative Law (Springer 2012) 143 who points out to the e-commerce as a factor that ‘ha[s]
increased the global volume of consumer operations to such an extent that it is now absurd to con-
sider them exclusively as questions relating to small, individual transactions’; MIGUEL ASENSIO
(n 2) para 891, who underlines especially the cross-boarder potential of online transactions; see
also GILLIES (n 7).
26 Cf OECD Guidelines 3 years later report 5; in United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment, ‘Unlocking the Potential of E-commerce for Developing Countries’ (Information Economy Re-
port 2015) 2 <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ier2015 en.pdf> accessed 15 July 2016,
the benefits of the e-commerce for the economy are noted: ‘[e]-commerce offers potential benefits in
the form of enhanced participation in international value chains, increased market access and reach,
and improved internal and market efficiency, as well as lower transaction costs.’; Norman SILBER,
‘’From The Jungle to The Matrix : The Future of Consumer Protection in Light of its Past’ in Jane
K Winn (ed), Consumer Protection in the Age of the ‘Information Economy’ (Markets and the
Law, Ashgate 2006) 24 notes: ‘[t]he Internet has made many kinds of shopping easier, quicker and
more competitive, and perhaps less susceptible to some kinds of fraud and discrimination.’; DAV-
IDSON (n 2) 1 observes: ‘[t]he advantages of electronic commerce to commercial parties include
ease of access, anonymous browsing of products, larger choice, the convenience of shopping from
the computer and enormous efficiencies’; FERNA´NDEZ PE´REZ (n 7) 27ffpoints out that the main
advantages of the e-commerce over traditional one comprise: savings on premises and distribution
costs, the fact that it allows to enter into transactions without leaving one’s home, thus making
commercial activities faster, it fits perfectly within the progressive internationalization of the com-
merce in general, a simultaneous access to a wide range of offers allowing for a greater choice, it
eliminates time restrictions -– forming contracts online any day of the year at any time becomes
possible, it also reduces geographical restrictions, and allows to reduce costs thanks to savings due
to elimination of premises open to public and intermediaries; see also FERNA´NDEZ DOMINGO
(n 6) 250; ROSSELLO´ MORENO (n 24) 17ff, lists advantages of the e-commerce for traders: it
increases the efficacy of the commercial activities, it promotes the participation of SMEs through
reducing trade barriers, it allows the companies to choose their location freely, it reduces or even
eliminates the need of intermediaries, it opens great marketing possibilities; and for consumers:
it allows to save time and money increasing the choice and comparison possibilities, it makes it
unnecessary to travel to physical locations for shopping, customer help centres are accessible on-
line 24/7, better personalization of products offered is possible due to the companies being able to
adapt their offers to consumers’ preferences much easier, and in what refers to digital content, it
can be accessed immediately after buying.
27 Ibid.
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However, the activities of the e-commerce carried out in the virtual reality, des-
pite the advantages over the traditional trade mentioned above, are also marked
with potential risks and disadvantages, which can even become obstacles to the de-
velopment of the e-commerce itself. The lack of face-to-face contact with the trader
deprives consumers from the key aspects of trade that help to generate trust in com-
mercial relationships.28 There are no physical premises, where not only the business
person or their agents can be identified, but also other customers can be seen, which
has a reassuring, albeit sometimes unfounded, effect on consumers. More import-
antly even, the consumer has no opportunity to physically examine the product they
are buying – in the electronic reality they have to rely on the image or representation,
often inaccurate, provided by the seller, and effectively pay for the product before
receiving it. Moreover, in order to execute payment, consumers have to provide
personal financial data through traders’ websites, which may lack security.29 Also
proliferation of goods and services available on the Internet is not always beneficial
for consumers, as too much choice makes it more difficult to find the right offer,30
28 As FERNA´NDEZ DOMINGO (n 6) 253 aptly points out, consumers start to worry about issues
that were not really problematic in traditional trade, such as ‘is the seller reliable?’, ‘will I be able
to return the product if I don’t like it?’, ‘will the seller use my personal data to spam me with
unwanted advertising?’, ‘will the seller hand over my personal data to other companies?’, ‘is an
electronic contract, invoice, order etc. valid?’ and so on.
29 Ibid 251; GILLIES (n 7) 1; MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) para 891; Sutatip YUTHAYOTIN, Access to
Justice in Transnational B2C E-Commerce: A Multidimensional Analysis of Consumer Protection
Mechanisms (Springer 2015) 15.
30 Barry SCHWARTZ and Andrew WARD, ‘’Doing Better but Feeling Worse: The Paradox of Choice’
in PAlex Linely and Stephen Joseph (eds), Positive Psychology in Practice (John Wiley & Sons
Inc 2004) point to the paradox of choice — the greater the choice, the more difficult it becomes,
and hence the need to use intermediaries, albeit of a different kind than in the traditional trade, eg
price comparison webpages and applications or search tools; FERNA´NDEZ DOMINGO (n 6) 243
also mentions the necessary intermediaries such as certification authorities, electronic commercial
centres that guarantee products quality, mediators for conflict resolution etc. Other drawbacks of
the e-commerce include, according to DAVIDSON (n 2) 1, the potential for invasion of privacy and
security risks, uncertainty in what refers to jurisdiction, standards, protection of intellectual prop-
erty, taxation, trade law and many other issues. Disadvantages specific for consumers comprise,
according to ROSSELLO´ MORENO (n 24) 19ff: lack of knowledge relative to the use of new tech-
nologies and insufficient access to them; issues relative to the insuffient consumer protection in what
refers to private data protection, misleading advertising or spamming, security of online transac-
tions, interoperability of payment technology, illegal activity on the Internet and harmful content;
technical issues including connectivity problems, slowness of the system, network breakdowns and
loss of information; difficulty in localizing the desired information and seller’s trustworthiness; law
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nor for traders, especially in what refers to SME, due to the high costs of market-
ing necessary to make their offers stand out against bigger companies.31 Finally,
what is relevant especially in the context of cross-boarder transactions, is that it
may be difficult for both parties, ie consumer and trader alike, to determine other
party’s identity, location, qualification as consumer or trader, and consequently the
jurisdiction and law governing their contract, due to the fact that the place where
contractual activities occur becomes dematerialised.32
The issues presented above create a significant informational disadvantage on the
side of the consumer33 and influence consumers’ perception of online sales contribut-
ing to one of the most important obstacles to the e-commerce, which is consumers’
lack of trust. Some of the problems mentioned can be remedied through legislat-
ive action, some, being more of a question of technology, might require a combined
approach.34 Nevertheless, it seems that technological issues will be of a lesser im-
portance when it comes to inspiring consumers’ trust in the e-commerce, consumers
rather consider factors such as: trustworthiness of the seller (eg their reputation or
rating and opinions added by other customers) and the possibility of easy and fast
contact, the existence of the right to withdraw from an electronic contract without
excessive return costs, the availability of effective mechanisms of conflict resolution
and jurisdiction applicable in a case of a potential conflict; the lack of possibility to physically
examine the product offered.
31 Also SME operating only locally may find it difficult to compete with global brands operating
through the Internet. E-commerce presents also other possible disadvantages for the traders, as
ROSSELLO´ MORENO (n 24) 19 points out: consumers buying habits, some products may be
unsuitable for electronic sale, traders may lack knowledge and experience in using new technologies,
lack of normalization and legal standards, costs relative to investing in new technologies and setting
up online business.
32 GILLIES (n 7) 1 considers that ‘[t]he combination of the risks consumers experience [ie the poten-
tial disadvantages of the e-commerce mentioned above] and the dematerialised nature of electronic
commerce have increased the need for effective juridical protection for consumers and the improve-
ment of consumer confidence in the electronic marketplace’ (words in brackets added).
33 Cf DCFR art II.–3:103 see Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. Draft
Common Frame of Reference, Outline Edition, Prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil
Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group), edited by Christian von Bar
and others (Munich 2009).
34 RIEFA (n 7) 4 points out that one of the main issues is sellers’ compliance with the regulation in
place.
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and the protection of personal and financial data (including regulations limiting
consumers’ liability if their credit card data was stolen).35
1.1.1.2 E-commerce law as a separate branch of law
E-commerce at first glance seems to be just a different way to form contracts, not
an entire new legal reality.36 Indeed, it was argued in the wider context of ‘cyberlaw’
that there cannot be a separate body of law determined just by some specific tech-
nology being used.37 A parallel was made to ‘the law of the horse’ — in the common
law there is a lot of case law concerning horses — contract law cases often deal with
horses’ sale, tort law cases examine liability for damage caused by horses, etc. This,
however, does not mean that a subject ‘law of the horse’ should be taught at the
university.38 Lawyers should be concerned with general rules that can be applicable
to various contexts, be it sale of a horse or a car or digital content — it remains
the contract of sale and thus contract law will apply. Nevertheless, the law of the
e-commerce is nowadays39 much more than ‘the law of the horse’ — it is not just
the technological common denominator that makes the law of the e-commerce a
separate branch of law. In what refers to the B2C contracts, the e-commerce consti-
tutes a very important part of the economy, and is characterised by various specific
features discussed above — the speed and immediacy of communication combined
with lack of face-to-face on-premises contact and a potential risk of problems with
data privacy. The sheer amount of legislation and soft law rules,40 which required
35 Cf FERNA´NDEZ DOMINGO (n 6) 251-253.
36 Cf Juan Ignacio PEINADO GRACIA, ‘La Edad del Derecho, la Edad de Internet. La Seguridad
Jur´ıdica e Internet’ in Javier Cremades and Enrique Bad´ıa y Liberal (eds), e – Abogac´ıa (La Ley
2007) 163-168; see also FERNA´NDEZ DOMINGO (n 6) 240.
37 See eg Frank H EASTERBROOK, ‘Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse’ [1996] University of
Chicago Legal Forum 207; Joseph H SOMMER, ‘Against Cyberlaw’ (2000) 15 Berkeley Technology
Law Journal 1145.
38 EASTERBROOK (n 37) 207-208.
39 This argument was raised by Easterbrook ibid in 1996, and a lot has changed over the last 20 years
in what refers to the Internet and the e-commerce in particular.
40 See the legislation of the European Union presented in this study (Directive on electronic commerce,
Directive on consumer rights, Proposals for new Directives: Proposal for a Directive on supply of
digital content and Proposal for a Directive on online sales of goods — Commission, ‘Proposal for
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various national and supranational bodies to spend considerable amount of time and
effort to prepare, indicates that the law of the e-commerce is to be taken seriously
as a specialised branch of law due to both its economic importance and specificity
of issues that arise.
One of the issues relative to legislation, and especially when market regulation at
a supranational level is being considered, such as in the case of the European Union,
is the fact that law cannot easily regulate social phenomena41 nor the future,42
and the e-commerce is both — from the point of view of private law it is more of
a social reality than technological process, yet in the end these are individuals and
companies and their relationships that create the e-commerce, and technology is just
a fast developing medium, constantly offering new opportunities and presenting new
challenges.43 The e-commerce should not be regulated just on the basis of technology
being used — it is the social context, in this case — the market, that matters.44 It
is true, more often than not, that such a complex reality as the electronic commerce
is difficult to regulate. Moreover, the legislative response is inevitably marked with
inertia,45 the greater, the higher is the level at which the law is made. In what
refers to the e-commerce, and especially in the context of information duties in the
B2C e-commerce, that there has been a significant amount of legislation enacted, on
many occasions focusing on issues of lesser importance and not really contributing
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects concerning contracts
for the online and other distance sales of goods’ COM(2015) 635 final); UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Commerce; United Nations, Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in
International Contracts (General Assembly Resolution 60/21 of 23 November 2005); for more on
UNCITRAL instruments relative to the e-commerce seeAgust´ın MADRID PARRA, ‘Instrumentos
de la CNUDMI / UNCITRAL sobre Comercio Electro´nico (Contratacio´n, Firma y Comunicaciones
Comerciales)’ in Javier Plaza Penade´s and others (eds), Derecho y Nuevas Tecnolog´ıas de la In-
formacio´n y la Comunicacio´n (Aranzadi 2013) 299ff; OECD Guidelines; WTO ‘Work Programme
on Electronic Commerce’ Adopted by the General Council, 25 September 1998 etc.
41 SOMMER (n 37) 1151ff.
42 EASTERBROOK (n 37) 207-208.
43 See PEINADO GRACIA, ‘La Edad del Derecho, la Edad de Internet. La Seguridad Jur´ıdica e
Internet’ (n 36) 165-166 giving an example of various modifications that were introduced in the
LSSICE over a short period of time in order to adapt the legislation to the reality of the Internet.
44 SOMMER (n 37) 1157ff.
45 See RIEFA (n 7) 5.
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to solving some burning problems.46 Up to a certain extent, the market should be
able to regulate itself,47 and therefore not all the legislation, which is often unable
to keep up with the pace of technology and social changes, is necessary. Sometimes,
on the other hand, the traditional law, because of some specific challenges posed by
the cyberspace, results inapplicable. For instance, in the context of the e-commerce,
consumers experience various risks, which are not present in traditional trade, such
as lack of possibility to examine the good prior to purchasing it. The law then, as put
by Lessig, ‘faces a choice. (...) Should the law change in response to these differences
[between reality and cyberreality]? Or should the law try to change the features of
cyberspace, to make them conform to the law?’48
I believe the e-commerce is complex enough for there to be no simple answer
to this either one or other question. Especially in the context of consumer protec-
tion, the law should adapt to new technologies, maintaining the established level of
protection.49 The present study analyses a specific extract of the e-commerce and
rules governing it, namely the pre-contractual information duties, and some areas
where this regulation fails will be looked at further on. Nevertheless, some legis-
lative intervention is necessary, especially in what refers to the remedies for breach
of information duties, since it is close to impossible to enforce duties unless there
are clear consequences of their breach. Furthermore, consumers need easily available
46 A Directive 2011/83/EU can constitute an example, see A´ngel CARRASCO PERERA, ‘Desarrollos
Futuros del Derecho de Consumo en Espan˜a, en el Horizonte de la Transposicio´n de la Directiva de
Derechos de los Consumidores’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente and Esther Arroyo Amayuelas (eds),
La Revisio´n de las Normas Europeas y Nacionales de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Ma´s Alla´
de la Directiva sobre Derechos de los Consumidores y del Instrumento Opcional sobre un Derecho
Europeo de la Compraventa de octubre de 2011 (Civitas-Thomson Reuters 2012) 311.
47 EASTERBROOK (n 37) 210, where the issue of whether to regulate the e-commerce or not (in
the context of intellectual property law) is considered, the author there observes: ‘Well, then, what
can we do? By and large, nothing. If you don’t know what is best, let people make their own
arrangements.’ An obvious exaggeration but with a lot of common sense wisdom. In the context of
consumer protection, however, some regulation is necessary to avoid situations such as adulterated
food, see eg SILBER (n 26) 17-18.
48 Lawrence LESSIG, ‘The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw might Teach’ (1999) 113 Harvard Law
Review 501, 505.
49 In the context of information duties and its breach, see Hans-W MICKLITZ and Betul KAS,
‘Overview of cases before the CJEU on European Consumer Contract Law (2008–2013) – Part
I’ (2014) 10 European Review of Contract Law 157 commenting on the Case C-49/11 Content
Services Ltd v Bundesarbeitskammer [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:419.
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remedies for breach of their rights for them to trust in the national, as much as
cross-boarder, e-commerce.50
Some basic principles of the e-commerce have been established,51 intended to
uphold a set of values embedded in the law, that are now widely accepted as funda-
mental to the modern e-commerce law. The principle of non-discrimination applies
to the electronic form of documents, which cannot be denied validity only because
of their form.52 It is closely connected to the principle of functional equivalence,
meaning that electronic communications are considered equal to traditional written
or oral communications.53 According to the Guide to Enactment of UNCITRAL
Model Law on Electronic Commerce:
A new approach, sometimes referred to as the “functional equivalent
approach”, (...) is based on an analysis of the purposes and functions
of the traditional paper-based requirement with a view to determining
how those purposes or functions could be fulfilled through electronic-
commerce techniques. For example, among the functions served by a
paper document are the following: to provide that a document would be
legible by all; to provide that a document would remain unaltered over
time; to allow for the reproduction of a document so that each party
would hold a copy of the same data; to allow for the authentication of
data by means of a signature; and to provide that a document would
be in a form acceptable to public authorities and courts. It should be
noted that in respect of all of the above-mentioned functions of paper,
electronic records can provide the same level of security as paper and,
in most cases, a much higher degree of reliability and speed, especially
50 See Hugh COLLINS, The European Civil Code: The Way Forward (Cambridge Studies in European
Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press 2008) 20 on common rules among Member States
(providing safety standards, rights to compensation and remedies) increasing consumers’ confidence
in domestic as well as cross-boarder transactions.
51 Cf UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce; United Nations, Convention on the Use of
Electronic Communications in International Contracts; DAVIDSON (n 2) 26.
52 See United Nations, Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce
1996 with additional article 5 bis as adopted in 1998 (New York 1999) <www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/electcom/05-89450 Ebook.pdf> accessed 16 January 2016 (Guide to Enactment of
the UNCITRAL Model Law) para 46-7; DAVIDSON (n 2) 333; MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) para
870.
53 Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law para 15ff; FERNA´NDEZ DOMINGO (n 6)
246; DAVIDSON (n 2) 26; MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) para 870.
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with respect to the identification of the source and content of the data
(...).54
The principle of functional equivalence shows how the law can adjust to new
technology without the need to force changes or limitations on it. The use of new
technology cannot be ignored and the previously existing traditional law, in order to
be applicable to electronic communications, needs to be adapted. On the other hand,
it was also pointed out, that the existing law, and especially contract law, should not
undergo substantial changes, as far as some new rules specific to electronic contracts
can be just added.55 In the context of consumer electronic contracts this observation
looses somewhat its significance, since the B2C e-commerce is governed by quite a
separate body of law and its provisions have been influencing not only the rules
relative to other distance contracts, but also more general provisions as well.56
Another principle often mentioned in the context of the e-commerce is the one
of technological neutrality.57 The rules governing the e-commerce should be neutral
with respect to technology used, ie established in such a way as not to exclude
any communication technique, including future ones, from their scope.58 A good
example59 of how the principle of technological neutrality operates is regulation
of the electronic signature – no specific technology of electronic signature is to be
54 Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law para 16.
55 MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) para 871; FERNA´NDEZ DOMINGO (n 6) 247ff.
56 Cf eg general rules on information duties and right of withdrawal in the Directive on consumer
rights art 5; cf also Dirk STAUDENMAYER, ‘The Place of Consumer Contract Law Within the
Process on European Contract Law’ (2004) 27 Journal of Consumer Policy 269, who mentiones
the influence of consumer contract law harmonisation on general contract law; Paula GILIKER,
‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspective’ in Stefan
Grundmann and Martin Schauer (eds), The Architecture of European Codes and Contract Law
(Private Law in European Context Series, Kluwer Law International 2006) 307 who discusses the
influence of the consumer acquis communautaire on the general law of contracts.
57 OECD Guidelines, Foreword; Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law para 24;
MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) para 901, 977ff; DAVIDSON (n 2) 26, 43, 333; FERNA´NDEZ DOMINGO
(n 6) 248.
58 Cf Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law para 8 which states: ‘(...) as a matter of
principle, no communication technique is excluded from the scope of the Model Law since future
technical developments need to be accommodated.’
59 DAVIDSON (n 2) 26 gives another example: ‘(...) as “electronic mail” connotes a certain medium,
the Model Law uses the general expression “data message”.’
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preferred by the law over other existing and future methods of electronic signature.60
The rules of the e-commerce law, especially in what refers to the B2C contracting,
relevant to the information duties and their breach, belong to the private law of con-
tracts and other obligations.61 E-commerce is not the same as traditional commerce,
as discussed above, and it is not sufficient to just apply the existing commercial and
civil contract law to the transactions formed online.62 Nevertheless, it results from
the principles of the e-commerce law that the e-commerce is regulated in many as-
pects through more general rules which often existed before even the Internet was
invented. Same general principles that are established in the traditional law will
then continue to apply to the e-commerce. For instance, a principle of good faith
is being highlighted in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce63 and
is also referred to by Spanish legislation.64 Not surprisingly, however, the English
system, to which the concept of good faith is foreign,65 focuses rather on the freedom
of contract principle, which is recognised also by Spanish law.66 This example shows
how the private national law, developed in different legal systems and traditions,
transfers its values to the relatively new body of the e-commerce law. Given the
growing number of cross-boarder electronic transactions, it is interesting to see how
60 Cf United Nations General Assembly, ‘Model Law on Electronic Signatures adopted by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law’ Resolution 56/80 of 12 December 2001; MIGUEL
ASENSIO (n 2) para 977ff; DAVIDSON (n 2) 43, 333.
61 FERNA´NDEZ DOMINGO (n 6) 241; cf HERNA´NDEZ JIME´NEZ-CASQUET (n 5) 448 who
argues that electronic contracting is primarily of civil, not commercial nature.
62 According to DAVIDSON (n 2) 2: ‘The majority of legal problems arising through the use of
electronic commerce can be answered satisfactorily by the application of standard legal principles.
Contract law, commercial law and consumer law, for example, all apply to the internet, email
communications, electronic banking and cyberspace generally. However, cyberspace gives rise to
unique and unusual circumstances, rights, privileges and relationships that are not adequately dealt
with by traditional law. This has necessitated legislation, international agreements and a plethora
of cases before the courts to resolve myriad questions.’
63 See art 3(1): ‘In the interpretation of this Law, regard is to be had to its international origin and
to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith.’
64 Eg art 98(1) TRLDCU; see also FERNA´NDEZ DOMINGO (n 6) 248; MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2)
para 910.
65 See below Subsection 1.2.2.1Good faith, fair dealing and pre-contractual duties of disclosure.
66 Paula GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French
Law’ (2005) 5 European Review of Private Law 621, 623; FERNA´NDEZ DOMINGO (n 6) 249-250.
45
1.1. INFORMATION DUTIES AND THEIR BREACH IN THE B2C
E-COMMERCE
those different legal systems coexist; understanding the rules applicable to electronic
consumer contracts can help remove the obstacles which hinder the development of
the cross-boarder e-commerce in the internal EU market.
The concrete legislation applicable to the B2C e-commerce, which establishes
information duties and remedies for their breach, will be specifically looked at in
more detail further on.67 Here, however, it is worth highlighting that the analysis of
the e-commerce the present study focuses on has to take into consideration general
private and contract law, as well as more specific provisions regulating consumer
contracts broadly, applicable due to the category the contracting parties belong to,
and B2C distance transactions more precisely, including but not limited to provi-
sions targeting issues caused by the very particular character of the electronic means
of communication used to form the contract. The legal framework of the e-commerce
is considered to be incoherent, because it is often necessary to adapt the existing
legislation to the new technologies, applying simultaneously general contract law
rules, new specific provisions of the e-commerce and other rules that can be ap-
plied on the analogy to the e-commerce.68 Various legal frameworks applying to
the e-commerce sometimes overlap but may as well not cover all the problematic
areas.69 This fragmented legislative approach, especially evident within the EU, is
not entirely impracticable however. For example, when the Directive on electronic
commerce was being adopted, the primary consideration for the legislator was to
quickly establish a reasonable framework for the e-commerce within the internal
market, therefore plans involving important intervention into internal contract law
regimes of Member States were abandoned in favour of reaching an agreement.
This decision allowed the Directive on electronic commerce to be adopted without
protracted negotiations, which proved to be a reasonable approach given the pos-
67 See below Chapter 3 Section 3.1 Specific remedies available to consumers.
68 HERNA´NDEZ JIME´NEZ-CASQUET (n 5) 431; OECD, ‘Empowering and Protecting Consumers
in the Internet Economy’ (2013) 216 OECD Digital Economy Papers (OECD Publishing) <http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4c6tbcvvq2-en> accessed 9 June 2016, 5 lists legal frameworks applicable
to the e-commerce as: ‘(...) including general consumer protection and contracts rules, specific
e-commerce rules, legislation combating fraudulent, misleading and unfair commercial practices,
anti-spam, copyright, privacy, and telecommunications rules.’
69 OECD (n 68) 5; see also RIEFA (n 7) 7ff.
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itive effect the Directive had on the e-commerce within the internal market.70 The
e-commerce law can be also described as multidisciplinary, since the issues that ap-
pear in the e-commerce belong to various branches of law, private as much as public,
although public law provisions stay outside of the scope of the present study, and
transnational, due to it being independent from boarders and individual States.71
1.1.2 Pre-contractual information and its breach in the e-
commerce
1.1.2.1 The role of pre-contractual information in the European con-
sumer policy
Consumer protection and the EU internal market
The consumer protection era, which we are still living in, is often said to be started
in the 1960s,72 about the time of the famous speech of American President, John
Fitzgerald Kennedy, to the Congress.73 The President believed that:
70 RIEFA (n 7) 7-8, nevertheless the fragmented approach has also drawbacks, since it is creating a
complex incoherent framework which can be difficult to navigate, see ibid 10ff.
71 Ibid.
72 Jules STUYCK, ‘European Consumer Law after the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer Policy in or
beyond the Internal Market?’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 367, 368ff.
73 John F KENNEDY, ‘Special Message to the Congress on Protecting the Consumer Interest’ [1962]
(The American Presidency Project by John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, President Message from
March 15, 1962) <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9108> accessed 21 April 2016. President
Kennedy’s speech is often cited in works relative to consumer protection and disclosure duties, see
eg Gordon BORRIE, The Development of Consumer Law and Policy – Bold Spirits and Timorous
Souls (The Hamlyn lectures, Stevens & Sons 1984) 101; Pierre LEGRAND, ‘Pre-contractual Dis-
closure and Information: English and French Law Compared’ (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 322; STUYCK, ‘European Consumer Law after the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer
Policy in or beyond the Internal Market?’ (n 72) 369; Ewoud HONDIUS, ‘The Notion of Con-
sumer: European Union versus Member States’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 89, 90; Suzanne
AUGENHOFER, ‘A European Civil Law -– for Whom and What Should it Include? Reflections
on the Scope of Application of a Future European Legal Instrument’ (2011) 7 European Review of
Contract Law 195, 205; Vanessa MAK, ‘The Myth of the “Empowered Consumer”: Lessons from
Financial Literacy Studies’ (2012) 1 Zeitschrift fur Europaisches Unternehmens- und Verbraucher-
recht 254, 254; Stephen WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law and Policy (2nd edn, Elgar European
Law series, Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 6; Hans-W MICKLITZ, ‘Do Consumers and Businesses
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Fortunate as we are, we nevertheless cannot afford waste in consump-
tion any more than we can afford inefficiency in business or Govern-
ment. If consumers are offered inferior products, if prices are exorbitant,
if drugs are unsafe or worthless, if the consumer is unable to choose
on an informed basis, then his dollar is wasted, his health and safety
may be threatened, and the national interest suffers. On the other hand,
increased efforts to make the best possible use of their incomes can con-
tribute more to the wellbeing of most families than equivalent efforts to
raise their incomes.
The EU is following the path laid by President Kennedy in his message and in-
deed the EU is considered nowadays to have a very high level of consumer protection
in many aspects, such as health and safety measures, material harmonisation and
private international law for consumer contracts.74
Consumer protection as an independent principle under European, then – Com-
munity law, was first expressly acknowledged in the Maastricht Treaty,75 albeit with
an auxiliary character in relation to the legislation of internal market76 and policy of
the Member States.77 It was also with the Maastricht Treaty that the concept of con-
sumer policy resting on double foundations — as an internal market policy, as well
Need a New Architecture of Consumer Law? A Thought-Provoking Impulse’ (2013) 32 Yearbook
of European Law 266, 270.
74 Up to a point where ‘the world’s legislators and academics deem the European regulations to
be exemplary models when suggesting laws relating to consumer protection’ – see FERNA´NDEZ
ARROYO (n 25) 146.
75 Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht) [1992] OJ C191/01; see WEATHERILL, EU
Consumer Law and Policy (n 73) 2, who notes that ‘[Maastricht Treaty] added to then-existing
EC Treaty a provision which, for the first time, would explicitly empower EU action in the consumer
protection field’; see also Gunter VERHEUGEN, ‘Consumer Policy and Corporate Policy in the
EU’ (2012) 1 Zeitschrift fur Europaisches Unternehmens- und Verbraucherrecht 134, 134-135.
76 Currently the internal market is defined in the Article 26(2) TFEU as ‘an area without internal
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance
with the provisions of the Treaties’. It was the Single European Act [1987] OJ L169/01 that
‘allowed majority voting in the Council for instruments affecting the establishment of the internal
market’ through the then new Article 100a EEC (now Article 114 TFEU) that grants the EU (then
Community) a possibility to adopt harmonisation measures, ie directives – see Klaus TONNER and
Kathleen FANGEROW, ‘Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights: a new approach to European
consumer law?’ (2012) 1 Zeitschrift fur Europaisches Unternehmens- und Verbraucherrecht 67, 68.
77 Norbert REICH and Hans-W MICKLITZ, ‘Economic Law, Consumer Interests and EU Integration’
in Norbert Reich and others (eds), European Consumer Law (2nd edn, Ius Communitatis Series,
Intersentia 2014) 17.
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as a specific action to support consumer policy measures taken by Member States
was recognised.78 It was not, however, until the Treaty of Amsterdam,79 that the
consumer protection policy emerged to an independent position80 it has today. Fi-
nally, the Lisbon Treaty81 can be said to strengthen the consumer protection within
the EU even more.82
The Article 169 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)83
mbraces consumer protection as an explicit EU competence; its wording echoing
President Kennedy’s propositions:
In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high
level of consumer protection, the Union shall contribute to protecting
the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to pro-
moting their right to information, education and to organise themselves
in order to safeguard their interests.84
The consumer law at the EU level can be characterised by “‘positive” commit-
ment to market regulation (...) and “negative” emphasis on removing trade bar-
riers’.85 Article 12 TFEU reads: ‘Consumer protection requirements shall be taken
into account in defining and implementing other Union policies and activities’, which
78 See REICH and MICKLITZ (n 77) 12; cf Article 169(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU).
79 Treaty of Amsterdam [1997] OJ C340/01.
80 REICH and MICKLITZ (n 77) 19.
81 Treaty of Lisbon [2007] OJ C306/01.
82 Sybe de VRIES, ‘Consumer Protection and the EU Single Market Rules – The Search for the
“Paradigm Consumer”’ (2012) 1 Zeitschrift fur Europaisches Unternehmens- und Verbraucherrecht
228, 236ff lists various instances in which consumer dimension of EU law has been reinforced by the
Lisbon Treaty through a deeper commitment to fundamental rights and social protection, such as
including the concept of ‘social market economy’ in Article 2 TEU, incorporating of the consumer
integration clause in Article 12 TFEU, which places it on an equal footing with the environmental
integration clause or the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391) which states in its Article 38 that ‘Union policies shall
ensure a high level of consumer protection.’
83 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47
(TFEU).
84 Article 169(1) TFEU.
85 WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law and Policy (n 73) 2.
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especially include market integration.86 Consumer protection is connected to har-
monisation policy through Article 169(2)(a), which enables the EU to adopt har-
monisation measures of Article 114 TFEU in execution of the consumer protection
policy.
Consumer protection law is a specific interdisciplinary framework where provi-
sions originating in civil, commercial and administrative law come together forming
a unique set of rules, due to the fact that the nature of issues arising in consumer con-
tracts is ‘at the borderline of private/public problems and social/commercial ones.’87
Consumer law, aiming at consumer protection, combines all those rules without be-
ing precisely delimited from other branches of law.88 In consequence, specific pieces
of legislation in both English and Spanish law: the CRA 2015 and the TRLDCU
regulate consumer contracts.89 Consumer contract law rules, which are the focus of
this study, can be characterised by the use of private law mechanisms to provide con-
sumers with protection in their contractual relationships with businesspersons.90 On
the other hand, however, as already mentioned, the consumer protection law can be
viewed as serving also another aim: market regulation.91 Especially in the context of
86 Ibid 12.
87 Francisca WEBER, The Law and Economics of Enforcing European Consumer Law: A Comparative
Analysis of Package Travel and Misleading Advertising (Markets and the Law, Ashgate 2014) 3.
88 See VEGA VEGA (n 2) 27ff, and the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional ’s decision quoted there.
89 Although there are ideas voiced in the context of the Spanish system to include the (some) rules
relative to the consumer contracts in the Co´digo civil, see eg Exposicio´n de Motivos IX of the
Comisio´n General de Codificacio´n, Seccio´n de Derecho Civil, Propuesta de Anteproyecto de Ley
de Modernizacio´n del Derecho de Obligaciones y Contratos, Bolet´ın de Informacio´n, Ministerio de
Justicia, 2009.
90 Cf however Roger BROWNSWORD, ‘Regulating Transactions: Good Faith and Fair Dealing’ in
Geraint Howells and Reiner Schulze (eds), Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law
(sellier European law publishers 2009) 88 who clearly states that ‘we should stop thinking about
the regulation of consumer transactions as an application of contract law. The reason for this is
not so much that we can no longer tolerate such an exceptional deviation from classical principles
of self-reliance but that, for all practical purposes, consumer transactions are regulated, much as
the law of tort regulates our interactions. There is nothing voluntary about the assumption of
obligation; it is imposed. So far as suppliers, in particular, are concerned this is simply a regime
of command and control regulation.’
91 Geraint HOWELLS, ‘The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information’ (2005)
32 Journal of Law and Society 349, 350; VEGA VEGA (n 2) 27-28; Vanessa MAK, ‘A Shift
in Focus: Systematisation in European Private Law through EU Law’ [2009] Tilburg Institute
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the European market integration, consumer protection rules are often used as a tool
complementing market regulation measures, resulting from competition and admin-
istrative law provisions. Above all, consumer law rules stem from private law and are
designed to correct market functioning without excessive intervention into its free-
dom.92 Internal market development contributes to the consumer protection, since
promoting healthy and efficient market stimulates competition and consequently
provides consumers with an increased choice93 of products of high quality and in
a variety of prices -– ‘[t]he project to construct internal market is in itself a form
of consumer policy.’94 Furthermore, the development of internal market is the main
legal justification for all directives and regulations relative to both e-commerce and
consumer protection; it is hardly surprising bearing in mind that the very project of
the EU, and earlier Community, has always been inspired by the need to facilitate
the trade between European countries.95 The new European Consumer Agenda that
replaced Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-201396 emphasises the role consumers play
in building the internal market and underlines especially the necessity to improve
their confidence in online shopping in order to boost the European economy:
of Comparative and Transnational Law Working Paper 2009/12, <http : / / papers . ssrn . com /
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1511624> accessed 11 May 2016, 8, who points out to the twofold
objective of the European consumer law directives — consumer protection together with internal
market development; cf also VRIES (n 82) 228 noting that the very idea of consumers and the
market itself benefiting together from the removal of trade barriers can be traced back to the
Roman times.
92 Cf Brigitta LURGER, ‘The Future of European Contract Law between Freedom of Contract, Social
Justice, and Market Rationality’ (2005) 1 European Review of Contract law 442, 452ff.
93 Stephen WEATHERILL, ‘The Role of the Informed Consumer in EC Law and Policy’ (1994)
2 Consumer Law Journal 49, 49 notes that ‘[t]he essence of common market theory holds that
market integration serves the consumer. The removal of trade barriers between States induces
fiercer and more efficient cross-boarder competition, yielding enhanced consumer choice.’; VRIES
(n 82) 234 observes that ‘[w]ith respect to the EU competition rules, we see a (...) broad approach,
(...) based on the assumption that competition policy contributes to consumer welfare. After all,
the promotion of efficiencies through competition will ultimately create benefits for the consumer,
including improvements and innovations in costs and prices, quality, choice, and services. This is
reflected in the decision practice of the Commission and the Courts.’
94 WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law and Policy (n 73) 307.
95 See MAK, ‘A Shift in Focus: Systematisation in European Private Law through EU Law’ (n 91)
5ff; SAVIN (n 14) 285ff.
96 Commission, ‘EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013’ (Communication) COM(2007) 99 final.
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Consumer expenditure accounts for 56% of EU GDP and is essential to
meeting the Europe 2020 objective of smart, inclusive and sustainable
growth. Stimulating this demand can play a major role in bringing the
EU out of the crisis. To make this possible, the potential of the Single
Market must be realised. Data show that consumers shopping online
across the EU have up to 16 times more products from which to choose,
but 60% of consumers do not yet use this retail channel. As a result
of this reluctance, they do not fully benefit from the variety of choice
and price differences available in the Single Market. Improving consumer
confidence in cross-border shopping online by taking appropriate policy
action could provide a major boost to economic growth in Europe.97
Nevertheless, there has always been some conflict between the consumer policy,
strongly linked with the economics of internal market, and consumer protection
policy, an approach stemming from the welfare state doctrine.98 Even if the market
functions properly from the economic point of view, the concern is that social justice,
redistribution of wealth, may not be socially desirable.99
In what refers to consumer protection within the European contract law, the
harmonisation measures play a major role.100 Article 26(1) TFEU requires the EU
to ‘adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring the functioning of the
internal market.’ It shall do so ‘in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Treaties’, of which Article 114 confers upon the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil the power to ‘adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.’ Harmonisa-
tion of laws of Member States involves regulatory competence transfer from Member
States to the EU -– as set out in the Article 5(2) of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU):101 ‘[u]nder the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the
97 COM(2012) 225 final pt 1.
98 TONNER and FANGEROW (n 76) 69; this issue will be analysed in more detail in the context
of the model of consumer inspiring protection through information duties, see below Subsection
1.1.2.2 The model of consumer in the e-commerce law.
99 Stephen WEATHERILL, ‘19. Consumer Protection’ in Jan M Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law (2nd edn, Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 243.
100 WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law and Policy (n 73) 2.
101 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/13.
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limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties
to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union
in the Treaties remain with the Member States.’
It is then the internal market, its functioning and development, that justifies har-
monisation of laws of the Member States in the EU. The CJEU case law102 requires
that the legislative measures genuinely serve the internal market functioning, ‘actu-
ally contributing to the elimination of obstacles to the free movement of goods or to
the freedom to provide services, or to the removal of distortions of competition.’103
The Court emphasizes that:
While a mere finding of disparities between national rules and the ab-
stract risk of infringements of fundamental freedoms or distortion of
competition is not sufficient to justify the choice of Article 95 EC (now
Article 114 TFEU) as a legal basis, the Community legislature may have
recourse to it in particular where there are differences between national
rules which are such as to obstruct the fundamental freedoms and thus
have a direct effect on the functioning of the internal market (...).104
Nevertheless, some reservations are voiced regarding the internal market dis-
course being used as justification for harmonisation measures, especially from the
constitutional point of view.105 Weatherill points out that the disparity among Mem-
ber States internal laws in itself does not reach the threshold required by the CJEU
for legal intervention founded on the Article 114 TFEU — there need to be a proof
of the actual contribution of the planned harmonisation action to eliminating mar-
ket obstacles or competition distortion.106 It is also argued that the fragmentation
102 Case C-491/01 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco
(Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2002] ECR I-11453; Case C-217/04 United Kingdom
v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-3771; Case C-58/08 Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary
of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2010] ECR I-04999.
103 British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd para 60.
104 Vodafone Ltd and Others para 32.
105 See eg Leone NIGLIA, ‘Of Constitutionality and Private Consumer Law in Europe’ (2012) 1
Zeitschrift fur Europaisches Unternehmens- und Verbraucherrecht 223.
106 WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law and Policy (n 73) 200, who nevertheless admits that the Court
approved the large majority of legislative interventions.
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of rules in the internal market due to different national laws in place, does not in
itself constitute an obstacle to the smooth functioning of the internal market.107
Another controversial point is the extent of harmonisation,108 ranging from min-
imum, where Member States could increase the required level of consumer protection
to full (or maximum), prohibiting Member States from adopting provisions diver-
ging from the level of protection established in the directive. The latter approach
107 Zofia BEDNARZ, ‘Co´mo Influira´ la Nueva Directiva 2011/83/UE en el Comercio Electro´nico?’ in
A Cerillo i Mart´ınez and others (eds), Retos y oportunidades del entretenimiento en l´ınea: Actas
del VIII Congreso Internacional Internet, Derecho y Pol´ıtica (Universitat Oberta de Catalunya,
Barcelona, 9-10 de julio de 2012, Huygens Editorial 2010) 169-170; Roger HALSON and David
CAMPBELL, ‘Harmonisation and its discontents: a transaction costs critique of a European con-
tract law’ in James Devenney and Mel Kenny (eds), The Transformation of European Private Law
Harmonisation, Consolidation, Codification or Chaos? (Cambridge University Press 2013).
108 Widely discussed in the context of the Directive on consumer rigths and the preparatory work
leading to its adoption, see eg Hans-W MICKLITZ, ‘The Targeted Full Harmonisation Approach:
Looking Behind the Curtain’ in Geraint Howells and Reiner Schulze (eds), Modernising and Har-
monising Consumer Contract Law (sellier European law publishers 2009); Geraint HOWELLS and
Reiner SCHULZE, ‘Overview of the Proposed Consumer Rights Directive’ in Geraint Howells and
Reiner Schulze (eds), Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (sellier European law
publishers 2009); Simon WHITTAKER, ‘Unfair Terms and Consumer Guarantees: the Proposal for
a Directive on Consumer Rights and the Significance of “Full Harmonisation”’ (2009) 5 European
Review of Contract Law 223; Martijn W HESSELINK, ‘The Consumer Rights Directive and the
CFR: Two Worlds Apart?’ (2009) 5 European Review of Contract Law 290; Christian TWIGG-
FLESNER and Daniel METCALFE, ‘The Proposed Consumer Rights Directive: Less Haste, More
Thought?’ (2009) 5 European Review of Contract Law 368; Hans-W MICKLITZ and Norbert
REICH, ‘Cro´nica de una Muerte Anunaciada: The Commission Proposal for a “Directive on Con-
sumer Rights”’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 471; Martijn W HESSELINK, ‘Towards
a Sharp Distinction between B2B and B2C? On Consumer, Commercial and General Contract
Law after the Consumer Rights Directive’ [2009] Centre for the Study of European Contract Law
Working Paper Series No. 2009/06 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1416126> accessed 15 May 2016;
Jan SMITS, ‘Full Harmonisation of Consumer Law? A Critique of the Draft Directive on Consumer
Rights’ (2010) 18 European Review of Private Law 5; Martin EBERS, ‘De la Armonizacio´n Mı´nima
a la Armonizacio´n Plena: La Propuesta de Directiva sobre Derechos de los Consumidores’ [2010]
InDret: Revista para el Ana´lisis del Derecho 1; Geraint HOWELLS and Norbert REICH, ‘The
Current Limits of European Harmonisation in Consumer Contract Law’ (2011) 12 ERA Forum
Journal of the Academy of European Law 39; Luis Mar´ıa MIRANDA SERRANO, ‘La Directiva
2011/83/UE sobre los Derechos de los Consumidores: una Nueva Regulacio´n para Europa de los
Contratos Celebrados a Distancia y Extramuros de los Establecimientos Mercantiles’ (2012) 11
Revista de Derecho de la Competencia y la Distribucio´n 77; Silvia DI´AZ ALABART, ‘Art´ıculo
4 Nivel de Armonizacio´n: Comentario’ in Silvia Dı´az Alabart and Mar´ıa Teresa A´lvarez Moreno
(eds), Contratos a Distancia y Contratos fuera del Establecimiento Mercantil: Comentario a la
Directiva 2011/83 (Adaptado a la Ley 3/2014, de modificacio´n del TRLCU) (Reus 2014).
54
1.1. INFORMATION DUTIES AND THEIR BREACH IN THE B2C
E-COMMERCE
has become more popular with the Commission in the recent years,109 of which the
Directive on consumer rights can constitute an example. However, the level of har-
monisation finally established in that Directive, ‘the targeted full harmonisation’,110
is less strict than the traditional full harmonisation approach – only some key pro-
visions are subject to the full harmonisation.
Finally, harmonisation in general, and in the context of the European consumer
contract law in particular, is a political issue. Approximation of the legal systems
of Member States is a process in which the laws are changed to fit the same model;
the EU effectively re-regulates certain areas of law.111 The choice of standard rules
to which the legal systems of Member States will have to adhere and which will be
incorporated in their national laws is not only a question of legislative technique,
but also, even more importantly, a political one concerning the shape of those rules,
including the influence of different legal families.112 Wilhelmsson and Twigg-Flesner
observe that the legitimacy of European harmonisation policy is of particular interest
in what refers to the area of information duties, since the starting points for various
Member States are profoundly different — with English system regarding disclosure
of essential information in a rather negative way, whilst continental systems tend
to adopt a more positive attitude.113 Moreover, the new, harmonised rules are to
109 Eg in the Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending
Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and
of the Council on unfair commercial practices [2005] OJ L149/22 (Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive) and in the Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC [2008]
OJ L133/66; see also Norbert REICH, ‘From Minimal to Full to “Half” Harmonisation’ in James
Devenney and Mel Kenny (eds), European Consumer Protection: Theory and Practice (Cambridge
University Press 2012) 3.
110 MICKLITZ, ‘The Targeted Full Harmonisation Approach: Looking Behind the Curtain’ (n 108)
65ff; REICH, ‘From Minimal to Full to “Half” Harmonisation’ (n 109) 5; TONNER and FAN-
GEROW (n 76) 77-78.
111 WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law and Policy (n 73) 3.
112 Jules STUYCK, ‘STUYCK, Jules, ’Book Review: The Harmonisation of European Contract Law:
Implications for European Private Laws, Businesses and Legal Practice, by Vogenauer S and
Weatherill S (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006)’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 528, 531.
113 Thomas WILHELMSSON and Christian TWIGG-FLESNER, ‘Pre-contractual Information Duties
in the Acquis Communautaire’ (2006) 2 European Review of Contract Law 441, 446.
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be introduced in the national systems of law, which leads to situations where alien
provisions have to coexist with local legal norms.114
Economically justified need to protect the weaker party
There is little doubt that the EU legal system recognises consumer law as such,
as the numerous directives aiming at consumer protection indicate. Nevertheless,
there is an ongoing debate115 concerning the current and future shape of consumer
law in the EU, where not only the adopted and proposed measures, but also, even
more importantly, the very objectives of the consumer law and the extent of pro-
tection needed are being discussed. Three fundamental questions are being asked:
who should be protected? Why do we want to protect them? And finally how are we
going to do that? On the margin of those issues, one also has to take into account
policy considerations, or -– to put it bluntly — the fact that legislative decisions
made in a political body of a size of the EU are necessarily heavily influenced by
114 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 443 note that maximum harmonisation causes
important invasion into national legal systems and requires them to adapt through deep structural
changes in order to avoid ‘a comple legal mess’; TONNER and FANGEROW (n 76) 75-76; see
also the discussion on legal transplants and their acceptability and utility for the legal systems,
eg Otto KAHN-FREUND, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 The Modern
Law Review 1; Pierre LEGRAND, ‘Against a European Civil Code’ (1997) 60 The Modern Law
Review 44; Alan WATSON, ‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law’ (2000) 44 Electronic
Journal of Comparative Law Law <www.ejcl.org/44/art44-2.html> accessed 16 May 2016; Michele
GRAZIADEI, ‘Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions’ in Mathias Reimann
and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University
Press 2006).
115 Especially in the context of legislative measures recently adopted and/or proposed in the EU,
such as the Directive on consumer rights and CESL (Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law’ COM(2011)
635 final) see eg collection of essays in Geraint HOWELLS and Reiner SCHULZE (eds), Modern-
ising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (sellier European law publishers 2009); Christian
TWIGG-FLESNER, A Cross-Border-Only Regulation for Consumer Transactions in the EU: A
Fresh Approach to EU Consumer Law (Springer Briefs in Business, Springer 2012); essays in Sergio
CA´MARA LAPUENTE and Esther ARROYO AMAYUELAS (eds), La Revisio´n de las Normas
Europeas y Nacionales de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Ma´s Alla´ de la Directiva sobre Derechos
de los Consumidores y del Instrumento Opcional sobre un Derecho Europeo de la Compraventa de
octubre de 2011 (Civitas-Thomson Reuters 2010); MICKLITZ, ‘Do Consumers and Businesses
Need a New Architecture of Consumer Law? A Thought-Provoking Impulse’ (n 73); Ruben de
GRAAFF and others, ‘From Here to Eternity: The Proposal for a Regulation on a Common
European Sales Law (CESL)’ (2013) 21 European Review of Private Law 1145.
56
1.1. INFORMATION DUTIES AND THEIR BREACH IN THE B2C
E-COMMERCE
different political aims of various Member States.116
In its current shape the consumer protection law within the EU aims at pro-
tecting consumers in general — not only the most vulnerable, but all the natural
persons fulfilling the definition of a consumer. Before the consumer protection was
introduced, in what refers to contract law, which is relevant to this study, there had
already been in place some general principles, which, albeit differing among various
national legal systems, were nevertheless guaranteeing a certain level of protection
to all the persons involved in transactions in the market — principles of fairness,
of good faith, liability for negligence and deceit, finally liability for breach of con-
tract.117 However, this protection of general contract law was deemed in the EU
insufficient for certain market players. The very much discussed question is ‘who? ’
those market users that should be protected by the EU private law are – ‘citizens
in general, in their capacity as consumers?’118 At the very beginning the protection
was aiming at consumers regarded as weaker parties, and especially at vulnerable
consumers. However somewhere along the way the distinction between them and
the circumspect, attentive and well-informed individuals became blurred.119 This is
reflected in the protective measures used in the EU legislation, and especially in
the context of information requirements — as I will discuss below.120 Furthermore,
another issue that needs consideration is the objective qualification of the party as
a consumer. What about SMEs121 or independent entrepreneurs without employ-
116 The very process of harmonisation in the context of consumer law can constitute a good example,
cf WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law and Policy (n 73) 204ff; this issue will be also important
in what relates to information duties as consumer protection measures, since in many cases the
choices are made in function of what is politically achievable and not necessarily economically the
best possible option.
117 STUYCK, ‘European Consumer Law after the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer Policy in or beyond
the Internal Market?’ (n 72) 375.
118 Ibid.
119 MICKLITZ, ‘Do Consumers and Businesses Need a New Architecture of Consumer Law? A
Thought-Provoking Impulse’ (n 73) 274 notes: ‘The European legislative authority has, meanwhile,
(...) created a backup category by introducing the concept of “vulnerable consumers”. Thirty years
ago this translation would have been interpreted as a pleonasm, since the consumer was per se
vulnerable.’
120 In Subsection 1.1.2.2 The model of consumer in the e-commerce law.
121 European law in some cases can be found as ‘(...) protecting SMEs as weaker parties to asymmetric
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ees122 – can those subjects be regarded as consumers under certain conditions? It all
boils down to the specific model of consumer, analysed in more detail in Subsection
1.1.2.2 The model of consumer in the e-commerce law below, that has been applied
by the EU legislation and courts for a reason -– the reason which answers the second
pertinent question: ’why? ’.
The rationale of consumer protection in the EU is twofold.123 First of all, con-
sumers are traditionally regarded as weaker party to the contract needing protection
in the context of transactions with professionals.124 On the other hand, it is the eco-
nomic consideration that motivates consumer protection, as expressed by President
Kennedy ‘we (...) cannot afford waste in consumption,’ we do not want consumer’s
‘dollar [to be] (...) wasted’.125 Those two main grounds for protecting consumers
are intertwined and hard to separate -– protecting consumers helps contributing to
promoting consumption which in turn keeps the market healthy and the economy
developing.126
The CJEU127 has always considered consumer protection to be particularly im-
contract relationships with stronger businesses.’ see Vincenzo ROPPO, ‘From Consumer Contracts
to Asymmetric Contracts: a Trend in European Contract Law?’ (2009) 5 European Review of
Contract Law 304, 313.
122 HESSELINK, ‘Towards a Sharp Distinction between B2B and B2C? On Consumer, Commercial
and General Contract Law after the Consumer Rights Directive’ (n 108) 32.
123 WEATHERILL, ‘19. Consumer Protection’ (n 99) 237-238.
124 Stefan HAUPT, ‘An Economic Analysis of Consumer Protection in Contract Law’ (2003) 4 German
Law Journal 1137, 1137; MICKLITZ, ‘Do Consumers and Businesses Need a New Architecture of
Consumer Law? A Thought-Provoking Impulse’ (n 73) 4; also HESSELINK, ‘Towards a Sharp
Distinction between B2B and B2C? On Consumer, Commercial and General Contract Law after
the Consumer Rights Directive’ (n 108) 33-34; Mar´ıa A´ngeles ZURILLA CARIN˜ANA, ‘El Derecho
de Informacio´n del Consumidor en los Contratos con Consumidores y Usuarios en el Nuevo Texto
Refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de Consumidores y Usuarios’ (Universidad de Castilla
La Mancha, Centro de Estudios de Consumo 2009) <www.uclm.es/centro/cesco/pdf/comentarios/
8.pdf> accessed 15 May 2016, 1-2.
125 See KENNEDY (n 73).
126 And the law always needs to be founded on the economic and social needs, see eg Jesu´s ALFARO
A´GUILA-REAL, ‘Los Juristas – Espan˜oles – y el Ana´lisis Econo´mico del Derecho. European Con-
tract Law and Economic Welfare: A view from Law and Economics’ [2007] Indret: Revista para el
Ana´lisis del Derecho 1, 5.
127 Before 1 December 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the Court was referred to as
European Court of Justice (ECJ).
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portant within the legal system of the European Union and previously Community.
The Court on various occasions highlighted the rationale of consumer protection as
‘based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-a`-vis the seller or
supplier, as regards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge.’128 The
rationale for consumer protection certainly has evolved, at first main motivation
was to protect consumers from ‘malevolent trader trying to con consumers.’129 Hes-
selink presents a series of arguments often invoked to justify consumer protection
measures, such as the fact that consumers are economically weaker, they are in-
sufficiently informed, not fully rational, do not pursue a profit and they lack other
options,130 which nonetheless can be reduced to the reasons the CJEU gives for con-
sumer protection. The weaker bargaining position of consumers is related to their
different motivation for entering contracts -– it is not profit, as in the case of traders,
but the utility of goods and services in the everyday life of individuals that mat-
ters.131 Consumers lack other options, since the market is dominated by businesses
providing similar products for similar prices, and again consumers’ weaker position
is both consequence and cause for this. The bounded rationality issue is likewise
relative to the consumers being individuals, and so their contracting decisions are
influenced rather by personal (even psychological) needs than motivation to mul-
tiply their wealth. Also information asymmetry between traders and consumers,
discussed in more detail below, is closely connected to the issues mentioned above.
128 Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Oce´ano Grupo Editorial [2000] ECR I-4963, para 25; Case
C-618/10 Banco Espan˜ol de Cre´dito [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:349, para 39; Case C-415/11, M. Aziz
v Catalunyacaixa [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:164, para 44.
129 HOWELLS, ‘The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information’ (n 91) 352;
however particularly in the context of the e-commerce, such concerns are reocurring nowadays.
130 HESSELINK, ‘Towards a Sharp Distinction between B2B and B2C? On Consumer, Commercial
and General Contract Law after the Consumer Rights Directive’ (n 108) 32 offers a following list of
arguments: ‘consumers are economically weaker, are insufficiently informed, are not fully rational,
do not pursue a profit, lack other options; there is a legal basis in the Treaty for consumer protection;
legal certainty requires categorical protection of a clearly circumscribed group; commercial law is
different’, which the author subsequently analyses in more depth. For the purposes of this study
only some are relevant, as I explain further on.
131 It seems almost trite to note that B2C transactions are repetitive only to one party — the trader,
while for the consumer they are almost always a novelty, see Juan Ignacio PEINADO GRACIA,
‘Consumidores, Contratos, Seguridad y Costes Alternativos’ (2000) 237 Revista de Derecho Mer-
cantil 1109, 1123-1124.
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Nevertheless, there is a lot of criticism regarding the rationale of consumer protec-
tion, especially in relation to consumers being in a weaker position vis-a`-vis traders,
after all ‘consumers’ are simply individuals acting in a certain social role, common
to everyone, and it does not make those individuals particularly more vulnerable.
It is believed, especially in the neoclassical trend in economic analysis of law, that
competitive market should be able to grant sufficient protection from exploitation
to all its participants.132
Moreover, a lot depends on the background reason for consumer protection —
if its primary motivation is economical, ie protection of correct market functioning,
or a more socially — orientated one, focusing on restoring social justice in the
society.133 The latter motivation is more common to the Member States as opposed
to the legislator at the European level. At least partially, this is due to the fact
that, as already mentioned, the EU’s competence to harmonise Member States’
laws can only be justified by improving the functioning of the internal market. The
Commission, when proposing new measures within private law, can therefore only
focus on contract law. Other areas of private law, such as family law, law of tort
or property stay outside of the scope of EU’s competence.134 It explains why the
social dimension to the European consumer contract law is an important, albeit a bit
neglected one, as the Manifesto of the Study Group on Social Justice in European
132 Juan Ignacio PEINADO GRACIA, ‘El Derecho a la Proteccio´n de los Consumidores’ in Jose´
Luis Monereo Pe´rez and others (eds), Comentarios a la Constitucio´n Socio-Econo´mica de Espan˜a
(Editorial Comares 2002) 1879ff; Jesu´s ALFARO A´GUILA-REAL, ‘Proteccio´n de los Consumidores
y Derecho de los Contratos’ (1994) 47 Anuario de Derecho Civil 305, 307ff; see also: Fernando
GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘EC Consumer Protection Law and EC Competition Law: How related are
they? A Law and Economics Perspective’ [2003] InDret: Revista para el Ana´lisis del Derecho
1; Horst EIDENMULLER and others, ‘Towards a Revision of the Consumer Acquis’ (2011) 48
Common Market Law Review 1077, 1082; Franziska RISCHKOWSKY and Thomas DORING,
‘Consumer Policy in a Market Economy: Considerations from the Perspective of the Economics of
Information, the New Institutional Economics as well as Behavioural Economics’ (2008) 31 Journal
of Consumer Policy 285, 286; HESSELINK, ‘Towards a Sharp Distinction between B2B and B2C?
On Consumer, Commercial and General Contract Law after the Consumer Rights Directive’ (n 108)
33.
133 The protection focusing on the weaker or more disadvantaged subjects in the society has a long
history, if one considers employees, tenants or later patient protection and consumer protection
also fits that scheme, see HONDIUS, ‘The Notion of Consumer: European Union versus Member
States’ (n 73) 93.
134 Cf COLLINS, The European Civil Code: The Way Forward (n 50) 33.
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Private Law points out:
A technocratic approach towards the agenda of harmonising European
private law has so far predominated in discussions about the future of the
European Union. The issues raised have been presented by the Commis-
sion as merely concerned with the completion of the Internal Market. Al-
though other groups involved in these discussions, such as the European
Parliament and legal scholars, may well appreciate that broader ques-
tions about European identity and social justice are at stake, as a prac-
tical matter the political process seems likely to be driven by the nar-
rower technocratic agenda of the Commission—unless that agenda is
vigorously challenged. (...)
There is a real danger that, by ignoring these political issues, we will
end up with a lop-sided European contract law: one that furthers market
integration, but is inadequate to secure social justice.135
According to the neoclassical trends in economic analysis of law, the first step
to tackle a market imbalance should be through competition law136 and legal inter-
vention of consumer law should be avoided unless inequality in bargaining power of
the parties cannot be fixed naturally through market forces. The neoclassical theory
is based on a reference point of a perfect market, which in itself protects consumers
through optimal price and quality structures.137 Therefore, the only legal interven-
tion necessary would be the one aiming at creating the perfect competitive market
conditions through competition law, which in theory ought to guarantee adequate
protection for all market users, consumers included.
Nevertheless, consumers do experience problems even in the competitive mar-
ket structures, which points to the other issues causing constraint of consumers’ in-
terests, namely information asymmetries serious enough to lead to market failures.138
135 Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, ‘Social Justice in European Contract
Law: a Manifesto’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 653, 655, 664.
136 See GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘EC Consumer Protection Law and EC Competition Law: How related are
they? A Law and Economics Perspective’ (n 132); RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 33.
137 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 286.
138 Benjamin E HERMALIN and others, ‘Contract Law’ in AMitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
(eds), Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol.1 (Elsevier BV 2007) 34ff; see also RISCHKOWSKY
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Information asymmetry means that one or both parties of a potential contract —
we are talking about a pre-contractual stage — is in possession of information im-
portant to the other party but the incentives to reveal that information are weak;
such situation creates a ‘problem for the market economy [which] is that fears of
being disadvantaged in a transaction because of informational asymmetry prevent
otherwise mutually beneficial transactions from occurring’.139 It needs to be high-
lighted that information asymmetry as such does not have to be negative — in fact
asymmetric distribution of information between contracting parties in the market
is an important incentive to produce information in the first place. The problems
appear when the information asymmetry is of such type that one of the parties is
not able to overcome it at a reasonable cost.140
Market failure due to information asymmetry was first described by Akerlof as
a famous ‘market for lemons’ — based on an example of the automobiles market
(‘lemon’ meaning bad car in America).141 In a situation where buyers cannot evaluate
the quality of products available on the market, they take decisions according to the
prices of the offers. The problem arises because the demand side — consumers —
will generally evaluate the offer below average price, and therefore the costs of better
quality cannot be compensated. Eventually, higher quality products will disappear
from the market.
The problem of Akerlof’s market for lemons constitutes an example of market
failure due to information asymmetry. Ulen identifies three main classes of issues
that arise in connection with information in market economies:
(1) problems of inducing the socially optimal amount of investment in
and DORING (n 132) 286, who observe that ‘the Economics of Information analyses market fail-
ures, which occur due to imperfect information of market processes as well as the corresponding
(inefficient) behaviour of market players’.
139 Other outcome may be that the transactions occurring will be of a wrong kind — eg fraud — or
at the wrong terms: see Thomas S ULEN, ‘Information in the Market Economy - Cognitive Errors
and Legal Correctives’ in Stefan Grundmann and others (eds), Party Autonomy and the Role of
Information in the Internal Market (de Gruyter 2001) 99.
140 Stefan GRUNDMANN, ‘Information, Party Autonomy and Economic Agents in European Contract
Law’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 269, 279.
141 George A AKERLOF, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’
(1970) 84 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 488.
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new, valuable information; (2) problems of inducing information revela-
tion as a part of market transactions; and (3) problems that individuals
and groups have in accurately and appropriately taking information into
account in their decisionmaking.142
The first group of issues is the question of adequate EU policy, the second class of
problems is relative to the information asymmetry marking B2C transactions that
are the focus of this study, which can be illustrated by the Akerlof’s market for
lemons, and the third one is related to consumers’ bounded rationality.
Information asymmetry between consumers and sellers is considered to be the
most important among various market failures.143 Therefore, it also constitutes the
main economic justification for European consumer protection policy,144 in the words
of Ramsay: ‘imperfect consumer information is a fundamental rationale for consumer
protection measures.’145 From the informational economic approach to the analysis
of law standpoint, it is argued that in B2C contracts one party -– the trader -– is in
possession of significantly better information about the product -– good or service
or digital content — being the object of the transaction, because their professional
activity evolves around this product on the one hand,146 and often because they
even created it themselves on the other.147 Information costs are therefore much
higher for the consumers, since they know much less about the product offered by
the trader and because they enter much fewer transaction of a certain kind to which
they have to allot the costs of gathering information.148
142 ULEN (n 139) 98
143 The other market failures being externalities and restriction of competition, see Stefan
GRUNDMANN and others, ‘Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market -
an Overview’ in Stefan Grundmann and others (eds), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information
in the Internal Market (de Gruyter 2001) 20; GRUNDMANN, ‘Information, Party Autonomy and
Economic Agents in European Contract Law’ (n 140) 278; some authors recognise two instances
of restriction of competition: market power and public goods, see WEBER (n 87) 2.
144 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 287.
145 Ian RAMSAY, ‘Framework for Regulation of the Consumer Marketplace’ (1985) 8 Journal of
Consumer Policy 353, 359.
146 PEINADO GRACIA, ‘Consumidores, Contratos, Seguridad y Costes Alternativos’ (n 131) 1124.
147 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 287.
148 GRUNDMANN (n 143) 21; GRUNDMANN, ‘Information, Party Autonomy and Economic Agents
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The consequences of information asymmetry between consumers and business
persons differ importantly depending on the characteristics of the product being the
object of their transaction. This consideration is significant for the policy design and
especially within the context of the e-commerce, where due to the use of electronic
means for contracting, the availability of information about goods and services to
consumers is naturally restricted. Provision of information prior tocontract conclu-
sion can influence consumers’ choices and the ultimately successful outcome of the
transaction to a different extent depending on the category the goods belong to.
According to the economic analysis of law, the goods, or more widely -– products
(a concept including for instance services and digital content as well), can be categor-
ized according to their qualities as ‘search goods’, ‘experience goods’ and ‘credence
goods’.149 The quality and utility of ’search goods’ can be determined by the con-
sumer before purchase, as in the case of a greeting card,150 a chair or a dress151
that can be tried on, inspected, in the physical shop. In what refers to ‘experience
goods’, the consumer will be able to assess their quality after using them for some
time -– think cars,152 canned tuna fish153 or any meal in a restaurant. Finally, the
attributes of ‘credence goods’ cannot be discovered through normal use — an addi-
tional, costly assessment, for example by an expert, is needed. Asbestos insulation
which may pose long-term health hazards,154 the outcome of medical procedures or
in European Contract Law’ (n 140) 280.
149 See eg Michael R DARBY and Edi KARNI, ‘Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud’
(1973) 16 Journal of Law and Economics 67, 69 who observe:‘’We distinguish then three types of
qualities associated with a particular purchase: search qualities which are known before purchase,
experience qualities which are known costlessly only after purchase, and credence qualities which
are expensive to judge even after purchase.’; GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘EC Consumer Protection Law
and EC Competition Law: How related are they? A Law and Economics Perspective’ (n 132) 12.
150 Gillian K HADFIELD and others, ‘Information-Based Principles for Rethinking Consumer Pro-
tection Policy’ (1998) 21 Journal of Consumer Policy 131, footnote 17.
151 Phillip NELSON, ‘Information and Consumer Behavior’ (1970) 78 Journal of Political Economy
311, 312.
152 HADFIELD (n 150) footnote 17.
153 NELSON (n 151) 312.
154 HADFIELD (n 150) footnote 17.
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car repair155 and technological aspects of modern items — computers, tablets and
mobile phones, can constitute examples of credence goods. This division of goods
into three types: search, experience and credence goods, is only theoretical, in the
real life situations the products possess various qualities that match different good
types.156 Moreover, in the context of the e-commerce, it should be noted that some
goods that belong to the category of ‘search goods’ in the traditional trade, as the
example of a dress shows, will not be ‘search goods’ anymore when sold online.157
Information asymmetries present in the B2C e-commerce will influence especially
negatively the experience aspect of goods — consumers who are not sufficiently in-
formed will simply not know if the product offered can satisfy their needs.158 In
addition, the means of distance communication used will convert majority of search
goods into experience goods, therefore it is particularly important to reduce in-
formation costs for the consumer in order to avoid market failure resulting from
adverse selection. Nevertheless, in what refers to credence qualities of goods, in-
formation asymmetries will not be cured even after the conclusion of the contract.
Pre-contractual information duties a fortiori are also ineffective in relation to cre-
dence goods. Consequently, different consumer protection measures will be necessary
to ensure correct market functioning in relation to online sales of credence goods,
especially because many breaches may simply pass undetected by consumers.159
The existence of the information asymmetry and economic weakness of con-
155 DARBY and KARNI (n 149) 69.
156 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 288.
157 Nevertheless, the intervention of legal rules, eg the introduction of the right of withdrawal, can
also influence the categorization of the good, as it allows the consumer to try the product and
decide if it fits their needs. The right of withdrawal will be looked at in more detail in Chapter III
Subsection 3.3.2 Right of withdrawal as an example of a specific remedy.
158 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1099; see also RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 290, who give an
example of market failure when ‘consumers are unable to assess the quality / functionality of the
products at a reasonable cost (or at all).’
159 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 288-289; EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1100; see also
HERMALIN (n 138) 123 who point out that: ‘while reputations can, in many markets, provide
powerful incentives to perform, in some markets they are less likely to be effective. For example,
if performance involves a credence good (the quality of which cannot be observed even after con-
sumption, at least not without expert diagnosis), many breaches may go undetected, with little
harm to the breaching party’s reputation.’
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sumers in relation to traders confirm the need to protect consumers, which brings
us to the third question, ‘how? ’, regarding the shape of consumer protection policy.
The Commission’s focus is on
Well designed and implemented consumer policies with a European di-
mension [that] can enable consumers to make informed choices that re-
ward competition, and support the goal of sustainable and resource-
efficient growth, whilst taking account of the needs of all consumers.160
The very necessity of legal intervention, even in the case of market failures,
has always been subject to discussion.161 ‘Why, the sceptic may ask, might one
suppose that the law should play a role in protecting the consumer? Why not let the
market take the strain?’ begins his essay — one of many — on consumer protection
Weatherill.162 And indeed Ben-Shahar expresses a view that legal intervention would
be in principle fruitless:
Rather than augmenting the legal remedies that consumers have under
contract law (the stated goal of the consumer protection movement), the
social controls of the business-to-consumer deal ought to be restricted to
techniques that, unlike contract law, actually work.163
In his paper, Ben-Shahar describes various ways in which the market, through
innovative transaction types, can actually protect consumers in a much more effi-
cient way than contract law.164 Nevertheless, those market mechanisms may yield
unpredictable results in the first place, and it is also difficult to foresee when and to
160 COM(2012) 225 final pt 1.
161 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 285 note that ‘[t[he question concerning when a gov-
ernmental intervention in the market system is justified has occupied economists from the very
beginning and has been a controversial discussion topic for just as long.’
162 WEATHERILL, ‘19. Consumer Protection’ (n 99) 237.
163 Omri BEN-SHAHAR, ‘One-Way Contracts: Consumer Protection without Law’ (2010) 6 European
Review of Contract Law 221, 223.
164 See ibid 223-224, Ben-Shahar gives five examples of such non-legal protections: different design of
transactions (a lease on a yearly pay of 15% of a price of purchase instead of the sale contract;
protection through bonds and guarantee programs by private market makers and intermediar-
ies; further development of insurance market; reliability of feedback scores, ratings and consumer
surveys; stronger incentives for businesses to offer consumers better contractual conditions.
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what extent they might appear and restore desirable market functioning. Moreover,
the legal system as such would need to be designed in a way that would allow to
promote and control those processes.165
Peinado Gracia agrees that the market itself constitutes the best tool protect-
ing consumers, admits however that the market is not free from inefficiencies, and
therefore legal intervention aiming at consumer protection can be justified.166 Such
intervention, nevertheless, should be primarily concerned with restoring market equi-
librium, preferably through competition law measures, which will ensure correct
market functioning in turn contributing to consumers’ well-being.167 Furthermore,
it has been indicated that ‘the necessity for consumer policy exists even in markets
with complete competition under the assumption of incomplete information.’168 It
is also commonly accepted that legal intervention might not be adequate to the
problem at hand, or as Weatherill puts it: ’[r]egulators, like markets, may fail.’169
In addition, any measures applying to the market are susceptible to creating
costs for traders, who in turn will compensate those costs increasing the price of
their products.170 t is important therefore to consider whether consumers are pre-
165 Ben-Shahar admits that the legal system would have to guarantee the enforceability of insurance
contracts for example -– see ibid 224.
166 PEINADO GRACIA, ‘El Derecho a la Proteccio´n de los Consumidores’ (n 132) 1879; cf ALFARO
A´GUILA-REAL, ‘Proteccio´n de los Consumidores y Derecho de los Contratos’ (n 132) 315ff.
167 Ibid 1881; see also: GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘EC Consumer Protection Law and EC Competition Law:
How related are they? A Law and Economics Perspective’ (n 132); EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1082;
RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 286; HESSELINK, ‘Towards a Sharp Distinction between
B2B and B2C? On Consumer, Commercial and General Contract Law after the Consumer Rights
Directive’ (n 108) 33.
168 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 292-293.
169 WEATHERILL, ‘19. Consumer Protection’ (n 99) 243.
170 Cf Katie MORLEY, ‘“Serial returners” blamed for rising womenswear prices’ The Telegraph (Lon-
don, 30 May 2016) <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/30/serial-returners-blamed-for-rising-
womenswear-prices/> accessed 1 June 2016, who points out that the phenomenon of online shop-
pers returning the goods taking advantage of their right of withdrawal is known in the fashion
industry as ‘reverse logistics’. It is estimated that it cost the UK online shops a total of almost
£96m in 2013, since between 25-40% of all goods bought online are subsequently returned. The
majority of shoppers buying various clothes to then return some or all of them are women, in con-
sequence there is a marked difference in price between men’s and women’s clothing; see also Ashley
ARMSTRONG, ‘The high street is changing – now it comes to your home’ The Telegraph (London,
8 August 2015) <www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/11791316/The-
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pared to pay a higher price for the sake of protection.171 Yet, as discussed above, it
is commonly suggested that at least minimal legal protection of consumers, directed
at the B2C contracts especially in the context of the e-commerce is necessary.172
Lack of legislative intervention contributes to preserving the imbalances in the B2C
contracts rather than curing them. ‘The law intervenes (...) to [grant] the weaker
party the sort of outcomes that might have feasibly been on offer had genuine ne-
gotiation – true freedom of contract in practice – been economically possible.’173
The high level of transaction costs due to imperfect information in the e-commerce
can consequently cause market inefficiencies serious enough to justify consumer law
intervention.174 The market simply cannot provide protection sufficient to further
increase consumers’ trust in the electronic transactions, particularly in the cross-
boarder dimension.
Legal protection offered to consumers can be shaped as ex ante restriction of
possible contracts and/or ex post court control.175 The protective measures in place
tend to be of the former type: in what refers to the consumer protection through
contract law, two main types of measures are considered, which are either substant-
ive mandatory rules or pre-contractual information duties placed on traders dealing
with consumers. Ex post court control can occur as private consumer redress, as
in the case of remedies for breach of information duties or unfair contract terms
control, but it is also present in collective redress mechanisms and competition law
actions, including administrative control of market equilibrium. The choice of pro-
tective measures depends importantly on the model of consumer and their behaviour
high-street-is-changing-now-it-comes-to-your-home.html> accessed 1 June 2016.
171 WEBER (n 87) 3.
172 Since, as SILBER (n 26) 25 points out, ‘[i]t seems highly unrealistic to contend that the tech-
nological advances of the past decades have radically diminished the disadvantages under which
consumers suffer – as unspecialized, atomized, advertising-driven household purchasers’. because
indisputably ‘[t]he Internet is permeated with consumer problems of its own’.
173 Stephen WEATHERILL, ‘Case Note: Use and Abuse of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights:
on the improper veneration of “freedom of contract”. Judgment of the Court of 18 July 2013: Case
C- 426/11, Mark Alemo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd ’ (2014) 10 European Review
of Contract Law 167, 172.
174 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 299, 305.
175 HERMALIN (n 138) 34.
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that constitutes justification for establishing protective provisions. The model of con-
sumer adopted by the EU legislator will be discussed below, nevertheless it can be
noted in general terms that the two main positions are: that of neoclassical trend in
law and economics, which assumes that consumers act rationally and it is enough to
counterbalance the information asymmetry with pre-contractual mandated disclos-
ure, and a more paternalistic view taking into account findings of behavioural eco-
nomics, which allows for consumers’ bounded rationality and advocates for further
restriction of freedom of contract through introduction of substantive mandatory
rules.176
In a more specific context of the e-commerce, consumer protection contract law
rules can be characterised by their purpose going beyond the traditional rationale
of consumer protection. Within the scope of the European Union, consumers are
considered to be protected in various ways in any kind of B2C transaction, however
their position in electronic transactions is deemed to be weaker than in traditional
trade.177 Hence various rules aim especially at creating conditions similar to tradi-
tional trade for consumers in the digital environment, thus extending consumer pro-
tection in the digital environment in comparison to the physical trade. The already
mentioned European Consumer Agenda for years 2013-2020178 underlines the im-
portance of the e-commerce, both in its national and cross-boarder dimensions, to the
development of the internal market of the EU and its contribution to the European
GDP. Nevertheless, it names consumers’ lack of confidence in online shopping as a
main obstacle to its further popularization,179 and calls for ‘adapting consumer law
to the digital age.’180 Achieving a fully functional Digital Single Market is one of
176 MAK, ‘The Myth of the “Empowered Consumer”: Lessons from Financial Literacy Studies’ (n 73)
255.
177 Cf eg GILLIES (n 7) 19.
178 COM(2012) 225 final.
179 Ibid pt 1.
180 Ibid pt 4.4, where the Commission notes that: ‘[i]n today’s changed marketplace it is imperative
to ensure that consumers have the confidence to buy online both traditional, tangible goods and
services as well as digital ones. Consumer laws should therefore be updated to meet the needs of
changing markets and to take account of emerging insights from behavioural sciences about how
consumers behave in practice. (...) To address these economic and societal issues, the Commission
will work towards (...) specific objectives (...)’.
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the EU’s main aims in the context of consumer law.181
Further in the Consumer Agenda for years 2013-2020 document, Commission sets
out how ‘[w]ell designed and implemented consumer policies’182 could remedy the
issues consumers experience in the digital environment and boost the European eco-
nomy, fully realising the potential of the B2C online market. Four key 2020 objectives
named by the Commission are: improving consumer safety, enhancing knowledge,
improving implementation, stepping up enforcement and securing redress, and fi-
nally aligning rights and key policies to economic and societal change.183 Those key
objectives demonstrate that the most prominent component of the consumer policy
at the EU level still is market-related, and that guaranteeing proper functioning and
development of the internal market, especially in its digital aspect, continues to be
the main concern for the EU policy makers.184
Information duties as an important tool in consumer protection in elec-
tronic contracts
The main rationale for consumer protection being information asymmetries between
consumers and traders leading to market failure, information duties imposed on
businesses are supposed be a perfect protective measure correcting those asymmet-
ries.185 Furthermore, information requirements fulfil a multitude of different func-
181 Commission, ‘A Digital Agenda for Europe’ (Communication) COM(2010) 245 final/2; see also
SAVIN (n 14) 295.
182 COM(2012) 225 final pt 1.
183 Ibid pts 4.1 - 4.4.
184 Cf SAVIN (n 14) 311: ‘[T]he Single Market is an invisible framework, a silent operational setting
against which digital trade is taking place. (...) [W]e are often looking at fragmented scenery. There
should be nothing surprising here — it is in the very nature of the Single Market to be an attempt
to bring this fragmentation into a form of unity. But this also gives a somewhat new meaning to
the invisibility suggested [by us]. (...) The EU policy makers should recognize the real limits to
what the Single Market as a paradigm can achieve and accept that, rather than use Digital Single
Market regulation to bring about better Internet, it may make more sense to let the Internet bring
about a more integrated Digital Single Market.’
185 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 452 observe: ‘[T]he imposition of pre-contractual
information duties has been a particularly popular tool in the consumer protection arsenal. The
justification for this seems attractive in its simplicity: starting from the premise that the trader is
better informed than the consumer, and that this informational imbalance should be corrected, an
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tions. Sefton-Green points out to eight — with some subdivision — different values
underlying duties to inform:186
i. Protecting the consent of the parties. ii. Upholding the security of
transactions. iii. Controlling contractual fairness. This can be subdivided
into two parts: a. Controlling procedural unfairness in the event that an
injustice or abuse by one of the parties leads to damage being suffered
by the other. b. Regulating the inequality of exchange through an Ar-
istotelian view of commutative justice which can be referred to as sub-
stantive fairness. iv. Upholding the moral duty to tell the truth. Two co-
rollaries follow: a. Dishonesty should be discouraged and treated severely.
b. It is immoral to hold a mistaken party to the contract. v. Protecting or
compensating the innocent reliance of a mistaken party: this means that
the other party is liable for the consequences of that reliance. vi. Impos-
ing or regulating standards of behaviour expected by contracting parties
for normative purposes. vii. Setting objective standards in relation to
the content of the contract. viii. Allocating risks under the contract.187
Although the primary focus of Sefton-Green’s analysis is general private law and
not the B2C transactions, a specific similarity to the twofold rationale for consumer
protection can be observed — the functions which information duties fulfil can be
allotted to two broad categories: firstly, as a remedy to the issue of potential market
inefficiencies; secondly, as a response to the (moral and/or social) imperative of
protection of the weaker individuals -– or individuals acting honestly, in good faith.
Similarly, Wilhelmsson and Twigg-Flesner distinguish five main purposes of in-
formation, of which first four are market-related, and the last one is clearly linked
to morality and social justice: protection of the real consent of the party; equipment
for rational market behaviour in a more general sense; upholding of informational
obligation is imposed on the seller to make available information which he possesses (or is assumed
to possess) in order to redress this imbalance.’
186 And related legal concepts of fraud and mistake, see more on relationship between information
duties, fraud and mistake in Subsection 1.2.3.1 More general and indirect information duties in
the present Chapter.
187 Ruth SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ in Ruth Sefton-Green (ed), Mistake, Fraud and
Duties to Inform in European Contract Law (The Common Core of European Private Law, Cam-
bridge University Press 2004) 14, it should be noted that the analysis of Sefton-Green focuses
mainly on general private law, hence the inclusion of concepts of mistake and fraud, and not
primarily on B2C contracts.
71
1.1. INFORMATION DUTIES AND THEIR BREACH IN THE B2C
E-COMMERCE
clarity; achievement of the fair content of the contract; and supporting a moral duty
of honesty.188
In what refers to information duties established in the European law, their aim
is predominantly creating a better informed contracting environment, which in turn
helps boosting market economy,189 whilst the disclosure duties190 originating in do-
mestic private law will often focus on promoting of moral and fair contracting be-
haviour,191 especially through forbidding provision of false and deceptive informa-
tion.192
Consumer protection through information is based on a certain model of con-
sumer, which will be analysed below.193 Generally speaking, consumers in order to
be able to influence the market in a desired way must be able to use the inform-
ation provided to them by traders. Only then will the information requirements
provide effective and sufficient protection to the consumers and consequently guar-
antee correct functioning of the market — consumers buying goods and services
transmit accurate messages about their preferences, but only if their purchases are
adequately informed.194 Therefore, information requirements allow the market to
self-regulate, as consumers — the demand side — can choose offers depending on
price and quality.
Information duties as protective measure have a great advantage that consumers
188 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 449-451.
189 Stephen WEATHERILL, ‘Justifying Limits to Party Autonomy in the Internal Market – EC Legis-
lation in the Field of Consumer Protection’ in Stefan Grundmann and others (eds), Party Autonomy
and the Role of Information in the Internal Market (de Gruyter 2001) 177.
190 Which will often be indirect, eg embedded in provisions requiring honest conduct.
191 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 451.
192 SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ (n 187); WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER
(n 113) 451; WEATHERILL, ‘19. Consumer Protection’ (n 99) 240.
193 Subsection 1.1.2.2 The model of consumer in the e-commerce law.
194 WEATHERILL, ‘19. Consumer Protection’ (n 99) 240; WEATHERILL, ‘The Role of the Informed
Consumer in EC Law and Policy’ (n 93) 51 notes also that ‘[t]he Court appears to hold a pre-
sumption that choice, informed where necessary by information disclosure, is a desirable feature of
the integrating market. The Court invests a great deal of faith in the consumer as the pivot of a
supply and demand economy.’ in the context of Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR
1227.
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are free to make their own choices, thus defending their own interests,195 unlike
substantive mandatory rules, such as quality standards, which interfere importantly
with the market substituting legal provisions for parties’ private choice of the con-
tract’s content.196 Mandated information disclosure to consumers is less restrictive
of trade and free movement provisions within the EU internal market than other
contract law measures, not to mention administrative restrictions, such as national
product bans.197 Information duties create a favourable contractual environment
without influencing the contents of the contract to a great extent.198 Moreover, if
the legislator fails, imposing unnecessary obligations on traders, the harm to the
market will be of much lesser extent in the case of information duties, when com-
pared to substantive mandatory rules.199
As already mentioned, consumer protection in the e-commerce is especially dir-
195 Which is true for a certain type of consumers, as in the consumer model adopted in the EU law,
see VRIES (n 82) 231 who observes: ‘[t]he basic notion of consumer in EU law is that the con-
sumer is considered an individual who can, if provided with the necessary information, make his
own choices and defend his own interests.’; see also Annette NORDHAUSEN SCHOLES, ‘Inform-
ation Requirements’ in Geraint Howells and Reiner Schulze (eds), Modernising and Harmonising
Consumer Contract Law (sellier European law publishers 2009) 216.
196 WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law and Policy (n 73) 92; Sergio CA´MARA LAPUENTE and
Evelyne TERRYN, ‘Chapter Three: Consumer Contract Law’ in Hans-W Micklitz and others
(eds), Cases, Materials and Text on Consumer Law: Ius Commune Casebooks for a Common Law
of Europe (Ius Commune Casebooks for a Common Law of Europe, Hart Publishing 2010) para
3.43 (EU) observe: ‘The use of information obligations as a means of consumer protection has
important advantages as it is considered to be the least intrusive instrument to achieve consumer
self-determination and it potentially leads to maximisation of consumer choice. Information remed-
ies moreover allow consumers to protect themselves according to personal preferences rather than
place on regulators the difficult task of compromising diverse preferences with a common standard.’
197 WEATHERILL, ‘The Role of the Informed Consumer in EC Law and Policy’ (n 93) 50.
198 WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law and Policy (n 73) 92 adds that ‘[t]his approach to improving
transparency in the pre-contractual phase has frequently been combined with protection in the post-
contractual phase, most strikingly through the prescription of “cooling-off” period within which
the consumer is entitled to exercise a right to withdraw from an agreed deal. These techniques do
not address directly the content of the bargain between trader and consumer. (...) The assumption
underlying the type of regulatory technique examined (...) is that an imbalance in economic power
can be sufficiently corrected by adjusting the environment within which the bargain is struck by
giving the consumer extra information in advance and extra time to consider the implications.’;
see more on the right of withdrawal in relation to information duties in Chapter III Subsection
3.3.2 Right of withdrawal as an example of a specific remedy.
199 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 291.
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ected at increasing consumers’ confidence and trust in the electronic transactions.200
Nordhausen Scholes observes that continental European jurisdiction once adhered
to the Roman law principle emptor curiosus esse deber, nevertheless, due to the
widespread use of new technologies in the contracting process, consumer protection
measures are trying to tackle issues arising from the fact that consumers are dealing
with remote traders over products they cannot examine or even see until contract
has been performed.201 The role of information requirements in the scope of the
e-commerce is in general quite similar to that played in the context of consumer
protection in general: to remedy market failures due to information asymmetries
between consumers and traders. However, the e-commerce is a particular form of
distance contracting presenting specific challenges for the legal system, especially
due to the lack of simultaneous physical presence of both parties, speed and imme-
diacy of their communication, issues relative to confidentiality, authentication and
security of transactions and their transnational character.202 On the other hand,
as de Miguel Asensio points out, the Internet provides consumers with unpreceden-
ted possibilities of access to information about products offered by traders, including
tools allowing to compare offers from all over the world, which strengthens consumer
position in trade.203
Nevertheless, imperfect information disclosure is common in the world of digital
transactions: information is often presented in an unclear way and consumers find
it difficult to access.204 as one of the major problems reported by online shoppers in
the OECD area, in both domestic and cross-boarder e-commerce, which can result
in a negative outcome of the transaction in the form of:
200 MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) para 892; Giusella FINOCCHIARO, ‘European Law and Consumer
Protection in the Information Age’ (2003) 12 Information & Communications Technology Law
111, 111; see also various Commission Communications as mentioned above in footnote 23.
201 NORDHAUSEN SCHOLES (n 195) 213.
202 HERNA´NDEZ JIME´NEZ-CASQUET (n 5) 432 lists those aspects as main areas of influence of
the e-commerce on the legal system.
203 MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) para 891.
204 OECD (n 68) 5: ‘[information on products, businesses and online transactions] is often long and
complex (...), presented in small size, buried in footnotes, or accessible through a series of web
links or windows.’
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i) dissatisfaction with a product that did not meet expectations; ii) sur-
prisingly high bills (i.e. “bill shock”); as well as iii) frustration with the
procedures and costs that may be incurred in terminating a transaction
and trying to obtain redress.205
Moreover, the OECD study points to the connection between misleading and
fraudulent practices, such as imposing unauthorised charges on consumers, which
importantly undermine trust in the e-commerce, and provision of inadequate in-
formation.206
Information duties aiming at ensuring a correct level of consumer protection
together with the development of Internet economy, if observed by traders, could
constitute one of the possible legislative solutions to the problems consumers exper-
ience while shopping online.207 Various reports consider information provision to be
a possible remedy to consumers’ mistrust in the e-commerce, and especially in what
refers to its cross-boarder aspect.208 Also the Commission notes in the context of
consumer policy key objectives 2020 that: ‘[i]f they are to be properly empowered,
consumers must be provided with clear, reliable and comparable information, and
the tools to understand it.’209
Nevertheless, there are limits to consumer protection through information. First
of all, information duties have to be justified, as they constitute a legislative interven-
tion into the market, putting additional burden on traders — the costs of informa-
tion duties, albeit smaller in comparison to other protective measures210 (substantive
205 OECD (n 68) 6.
206 Ibid 23.
207 FINOCCHIARO (n 200) 111ff notes three main European legislator’s actions directed at increasing
consumers’ trust in the e-commerce and lists providing consumers with relevant information at the
first place, other two actions comprise substantive consumer protection (ie privacy protection and
control of contract terms) and juridical protection (ie easy access to justice in consumer’s legal
system); see also MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) para 982.
208 See eg Commission, ‘Report on cross-border e-commerce in the EU’ SEC(2009) 283 final;
Civic Consulting, ‘Consumer market study on the functioning of e-commerce and Internet mar-
keting and selling techniques in the retail of goods’ (2011) (commissioned by the Executive
Agency for Health and Consmers) <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/consumer research/
market studies/docs/study ecommerce goods en.pdf> accessed 9 June 2016; OECD (n 68).
209 COM(2012) 225 final pt 4.
210 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 292.
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mandatory rules, administrative law provisions) will translate into higher prices for
consumers.211 From the economic standpoint
a duty of disclosure makes sense only if the benefit to be derived by the
obligee from being informed outweighs the obligor’s costs for obtaining
and transmitting the information, and if the transmission of the inform-
ation, therefore, leads to an overall increase of utility.212
Moreover, somewhat surprisingly at first glance, information duties can also cause
significant problems for consumers, such as the issue of information overload or the
no-reading problem, to name just two.213 In consequence, consumer protection and
market functioning improvement through mandated disclosure results limited by
consumers’ ability to understand and act upon the information provided.214
Thirdly, it is commonly accepted that information duties may constitute a relev-
ant protective measure when it is consumers’ economic interest that is at stake. In
the case of health and safety concerns, however, information disclosure alone is not
considered adequate.215 This consideration evidences how limited the information
requirements are as a protective tool, it is even more so if we take into account
the above-mentioned phenomenon of consumers being unable to act upon the given
information. It also clearly shows that the no-reading issue in consumer contracts
211 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1114: ‘The transmission of information is not cost-free. Although the cost
of the transmission itself is often insignificant, a duty to disclose may put a considerable burden on
obligors. Unless they already possess the information, they have to acquire it. If they already have
it, the information may be a valuable asset that may lose its value to them if they have to share it
with the obligee. If the information relates to their private sphere, a duty to reveal it may place a
considerable non-economic burden on them.’; see also WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER
(n 113) 452-453.
212 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1114, further at 1115 Eidenmuller and others present a list of criteria
that should be taken into account in deciding whether or not there is a duty of disclosure in an
individual case, I will look at those in Subsection 1.1.2.4 Finding a balance: optimal information
duties in the B2C e-commerce below.
213 The questions relative to the issues connected to information duties, including problems that the
information provision in its current form is causing to consumers, are discussed below in Subsection
1.1.2.3 Issues relative to information duties in consumer contracts.
214 CA´MARA LAPUENTE and TERRYN (n 196) para 3.43 (EU) point to the ‘fundamental problem
of the effectiveness and efficiency of information requirements as a means of consumer protection
(...).’
215 WEATHERILL, ‘19. Consumer Protection’ (n 99) 241-242.
76
1.1. INFORMATION DUTIES AND THEIR BREACH IN THE B2C
E-COMMERCE
is a fact and whilst it can be tolerated when the risk that individuals incur relates
to their economic interests, the legal system resorts to more powerful measures of
limiting contractual offers available to consumers — excluding those posing risk to
their health or safety — through substantive mandatory rules and administrative
law provisions.
Despite the limitations of information duties as protective measures, the inform-
ation paradigm of EU consumer protection is a fact.216 Information duties, together
with control of fairness of contractual terms and the right of withdrawal, are the
axis of the consumer protection in the contract law area. Information disclosure is
arguably the most commonly used instrument of consumer protection in EU dir-
ectives for various reasons. Apart from the rationale presented above, information
duties are also much easier to introduce than other possible substantive mandatory
rules, since they interfere to a lesser extent with contractual freedom and are easier
to accept by the Member States.217
According to Article 169 TFEU, ‘the Union shall contribute to (...) promoting
[consumers’] right to information.’218 The contents of this subjective right are de-
tailed in secondary provisions of the EU law, and especially consumer contract law
directives.219 The CJEU also notes that: ‘under Community law concerning con-
sumer protection the provision of information to the consumer is considered one of
the principal requirements.’220
216 HOWELLS, ‘The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information’ (n 91) 351;
REICH and MICKLITZ (n 77) 22; see also HADFIELD (n 150) 135 who call information an
‘organizing idea of consumer protection.’; Hans-W MICKLITZ, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices and
Misleading Advertising’ in Norbert Reich and others (eds), European Consumer Law (2nd edn, Ius
Communitatis Series, Intersentia 2014) 79 refers to ‘pivotal position of information paradigm.’
217 WEATHERILL, ‘Justifying Limits to Party Autonomy in the Internal Market – EC Legislation in
the Field of Consumer Protection’ (n 189) 181; cf RIEFA (n 7) 7 in the context of the Directive
on electronic commerce and its failure to regulate issues relative to contract law.
218 See eg Reich and Micklitz (n 78) 46.
219 Cf MICKLITZ, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices and Misleading Advertising’ (n 216) 101.
220 Case C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM v Confe´de´ration du commerce luxemburgeois [1990] ECR 667, para
689; see also Geraint HOWELLS and Thomas WILHELMSSON, ‘EC Consumer Law: Has it come
of age?’ (2003) 3 European Law Review 370, 380 who note that ‘[t]he strong emphasis on trans-
parency and information can be seen both in the practice of the Court of Justice, when outlawing
trade barriers on the basis of the Treaty, as well as in much of the secondary legislation in the
consumer law area.’
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The faith of the European legislator in the information duties as ‘a privileged
instrument of consumer protection’221 is confirmed by the Directive on consumer
rights. The trend is that more duties and of a more detailed character are added in
each new piece of European legislation.222 In what refers to the e-commerce, both
Directive on electronic commerce223 and Directive on consumer rights224 contain
long lists of information requirements that consumers are to be provided with when
shopping online. De Miguel Asensio identifies various provisions typically applying
specifically to the e-commerce that have the purpose of ensuring that consumers’
position in the electronic commerce will be equivalent to that in the B2C traditional,
ie physical, trade;225 he fundamental rules in this context are those regulating the
design and configuration of websites through which traders offer and sell products
to consumers.226 Also the two new Commission initiatives: Proposal for a Directive
on online sale of goods and Proposal for a Directive on digital content contain
information duties, albeit of an indirect character.227 The soft law acts, such as
OECD Guidelines228 likewise dedicate numerous provisions to information duties.
221 Candida LEONE, ‘Transparency revisited – on the role of information in the recent case-law of
the CJEU’ (2014) 10 European Review of Contract Law 312, 321.
222 NORDHAUSEN SCHOLES (n 195) 213-214; Joasia LUZAK, ‘Passive Consumers vs. the New
Online Disclosure Rules of the Consumer Rights Directive’ [2015] Amsterdam Law School Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 2015-02 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=
2553877> accessed 13 June 2016, 1.
223 See especially art 5 on general information to be provided by a service provider, art 6 on information
to be provided in relation to commercial communications and art 10 on information to be provided
prior to concluding a contract by electronic means.
224 See especially art 6 on information requirements for distance and off-premises contracts and art 8
on formal requirements for distance contracts.
225 Such as specific information requirements concerning not only the product description, but also
trader’s contact details and transaction details, see MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) para 892.
226 MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) para 892.
227 For more on direct and indirect character of information duties see Subsection 1.2.3 Relevant
legislation establishing more specific information duties. Information requirements from art 4 of
the Proposal for a Directive on online sales of goods and art 6 of the Proposal for a Directive on
supply of digital content are of such indirect character.
228 OECD Guidelines Part Two, s III (Online Disclosures) indicate a long list of information require-
ments about the business (A), about the goods or services (B) and about the transaction itself
(C).
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Even though one can find endless lists of information duties in the acquis com-
munautaire, the directives rarely harmonise private law remedies for their breach,
leaving this matter to Member States’ internal law.229 The remedies are to be reg-
ulated by the domestic law of Member States, within the limits of the principle of
effectiveness.230
At first glance the lack of consistent approach of the European legislator towards
remedies for breach of information duties established in such numerous quantities
seems surprising, indeed it has raised criticism.231 However, the policy reasons be-
hind such choice of the EU regulator are understandable. Information duties influ-
ence the freedom of contract and the contract law generally up to a limited extent
when Member States regulate the consequences of the breach of those duties separ-
ately within their internal legal systems. The duties imposed by various directives
are supposed to guarantee that the consumer be provided with certain amount of
information prior to entering an electronic contract, however the consequences of
non-fulfilment of those duties vary both among Member States and among different
requirements that were breached.232 For instance, in some national systems breach
of certain disclosure duties may result primarily in institutional consequences of ad-
ministrative or competition law.233 In such cases, consumer may or may not have
229 This was already observed as a general trend more than ten years ago, see Thomas WILHELMS-
SON, ‘Private Law Remedies against the Breach of Information Requirements of EC Law’ in
Reiner Schulze and others (eds), Informationspflichten und Vertragsschluss im Acquis Commun-
autaire (Mohr Siebeck 2003) 247, who explains that ‘(...) remedies for breaches of information
duties are often the responsibility of national law. Usually, the Directives only require Member
States to ensure that adequate and effective means exist to ensure compliance.’; see also NORD-
HAUSEN SCHOLES (n 195) 223; Raquel GUILLE´N CATALA´N, ‘La Directiva sobre los Derechos
de los Consumidores: un Paso hacia Delante, pero Incompleto’ (2012) 7801 Diario La Ley 1, 3ff.
230 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 466.
231 GUILLE´N CATALA´N, ‘La Directiva sobre los Derechos de los Consumidores: un Paso hacia
Delante, pero Incompleto’ (n 229) 3ff.
232 NORDHAUSEN SCHOLES (n 195) 213.
233 In the case of breach of indirect disclosure duties resulting from the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive, in the UK for example only specific criminal law consequences were established in the
legislation: The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1277 (UTR
2008) established in Part 3 offences of which traders engaging in unfair commercial practices are
guilty. It was not until The Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/870
(Consumer Protection Amendment 2014) that private law specific redress for consumers who had
been subjected to unfair commercial practices was granted (in addition to – or even instead of –
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redress rights under the general private law, which in turn also vary among Member
States especially due to different approaches to contractual good faith and failure
to disclose.234
Importance of the pre-contractual information from the perspective of
its breach
One of the main arguments in favour of establishing information duties in consumer
law directives is considering the pre-contractual information as a factor influencing
consumer’s decision whether to conclude the contract, ie helping them make rational
market decision.235 However, as Eidenmuller and others point out, information duties
resulting from provisions of the acquis communautaire usually relate to peripheral
issues, without significant influence on contracting decision.236
Therefore, it is also suggested that the major role of the information provided to
consumers is its utility in a possible case of breach of contract.237 Such consideration
could change the angle at which we look at the information duty — it could be seen
‘as a duty to reach consumers with disclosure’,238 aiming at giving them a potential
source of information should they need it for reference at some point posterior to
general law action for misrepresentation). In what refers to Spanish law on the same matter, only
administrative sanctions are established in specific legislation, see art 49.1 l) TRLDCU.
234 See Subsection 1.2.2 General duty to disclose and its breach in national private law.
235 LEONE (n 221) 322.
236 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1122-1123 analyse influence of the information provided to consumers
according to the information requirements originating in European directives on the possibility to
claim a remedy of avoiding or modifying the contract, if a breach of the information requirements
occurred. The authors observe that a contract can be avoided if it ‘would not have been concluded
at all, or that it would have been concluded on different terms, had the information duty been
fulfilled’, which is difficult to prove in practice in what refers to the specific information duties
applying to consumer contracts, as ‘the relevance of the information required in terms of the
duties established by the acquis is generally not sufficiently significant to support a conclusion
that the contract would not have been concluded if the information had been provided.’; see also
Subsection 1.1.2.3 Issues relative to information duties in consumer contracts where criticism of
information duties in consumer contracts is presented.
237 LEONE (n 221) 322-323 calls this role of the information duties ‘relatively unexplored’, however
indicating the findings of empirical studies which suggest that individuals are more likely to refer to
written contract posterior to its conclusion in a case of an undesired event than before contracting.
238 LUZAK (n 222) 1.
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contract formation. The requirements of providing the information to consumers in a
written form or on a durable medium239 is along these lines designed by the European
legislator with the purpose of preserving the information for the parties. Further-
more, the character of some specific information duties, which provide the consumer
with a reminder of their legal rights,240 seems to confirm the post-contractual role
of pre-contractual information. Wilhelmsson and Twigg-Flesner argue that this may
even be the most important role of pre-contractual information requirements – ‘to
uphold informational clarity.’241
In the context of the remedies for breach of information duties, the post-contractual
role of the information provided requires some clarification. From the perspective
presented above, information duties are an instrument providing consumers with
means of redress in the event of an unsatisfactory performance of their contract by
the trader. In such situation a consumer can refer to the information provided to
them previously to check if the breach of contract actually occurred, if the goods
lacked conformity with the description provided, to look up their rights and rem-
edies available or to search for trader’s contact details. However what happens if
the consumer’s right which was breached by the trader relates to the information
duties? In many instances consumers will not even realise there was a breach, as
239 As it is explained eg in the Recital (23) of the Directive on consumer rights: ‘Durable media should
enable the consumer to store the information for as long as it is necessary for him to protect his
interests stemming from his relationship with the trader. Such media should include in particular
paper, USB sticks, CD-ROMs, DVDs, memory cards or the hard disks of computers as well as
e-mails.’ This requirement is of a particular importance in electronic contracts, see also art 8.7 of
the same Directive. For a definition of ‘durable medium’ see art 2(10) of the same Directive and the
case Content Services Ltd paras 26ff where the Court rules that a hyperlink to a trader’s website
cannot constitute a durable medium. LEONE (n 221) 322 understands the Court’s decision as a
reinforcement of the role of the pre-contractual information at the stage of contract performance.
240 See eg Directive on consumer rights: art 6(h) ‘where a right of withdrawal exists, the conditions,
time limit and procedures for exercising that right in accordance with Article 11(1), as well as the
model withdrawal form set out in Annex I(B);’ or art 6(l) ‘a reminder of the existence of a legal
guarantee of conformity for goods.’; LEONE (n 221) 323 notes that ‘[t]hese rights, again, are likely
to appear of little interest to the consumer when he enters the contract, but if something goes
wrong it becomes important to know what actions can be taken against potential harm arising
from it.’
241 WILHELMSSON, ‘Private Law Remedies against the Breach of Information Requirements of EC
Law’ (n 229) 450: ‘Both pre-contractual and post-contractual duties to inform, in particular if they
are combined with provisions on written form, may have as their main purpose to ensure that
information concerning the contract is preserved for both parties in an adequate manner.’
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without adequate information consumers may sometimes not be even able to assess
if the contract has been performed correctly. How can individuals know if a device
they purchased, such as a smartphone or computer, is exactly what they paid for?
Or if the clothes they bought are effectively made of silk or fair trade cotton?242
Moreover, if the information provided to consumer was false, its utility in the case
of breach is none.
It becomes a kind of a vicious circle very difficult to remedy. In certain cases,
the European legislator tries to introduce remedies to such situations, as when the
trader breaches the information duty on consumer’s right of withdrawal: art 10(1)
of the Directive on consumer rights states that ‘[i]f the trader has not provided
the consumer with the information on the right of withdrawal as required (...),
the withdrawal period shall expire 12 months from the end of the initial withdrawal
period (...)’. It is also important that various types of remedies of different nature will
be appropriate in relation to the breach of different kinds of information duties.243
Nevertheless, an issue of unobservable breach, especially relevant in the context
of credence goods, but also in what refers to experience qualities of goods when
information was not provided, constitutes a pertinent question potentially leading
to undesired consequences, even market failure, in the environment of online B2C
transactions.
1.1.2.2 The model of consumer in the e-commerce law
Model of consumer justifying disclosure duties
At the beginnings of consumer protection policy within the EU, the then Community
in its policy was focusing more on the internal market as such, and the consumer
policy protection was only a sort of a ‘byproduct’ of internal market policy.244 In
the meantime, the Member States in their national policies and legal systems, have
always been more concerned with guaranteeing consumers’, ie citizens’, well-being,
which is understandable especially from the political point of view: consumers are
242 HERMALIN (n 138) 11ff.
243 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1119ff.
244 TONNER and FANGEROW (n 76) 69.
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citizens with voting rights. Such tension between the two most important reasons for
consumer protection — economics of the market on the one hand, and individuals’
safety and prosperity on the other, still exists245 and can be well illustrated by the
model of consumer underlying the EU consumer law.
The neoclassical school in law and economics logic assumes that all individual
market users will take rational decisions,246 their rationality being composed mainly
of two factors: individual preferences and external incentives; their market behaviour
will be predictably influenced by stable preferences on the one hand, and changing
circumstances on the other.247 In the context of contract law, parties’ rationality
is considered to be a twofold concept — rational behaviour implies that no party
would contract voluntarily if expecting worsening of their status quo position and
that the parties are capable of reasonable and objectively correct evaluation of the
consequences of entering a contract.248 Assuming that consumers are rational mar-
ket actors, the law only seeks to restore the contractual balance perturbed by the
information asymmetries between them and traders, particularly through equipping
consumers with pre-contractual information. This approach can be dubbed ‘con-
245 Cf Social Justice in European Private Law (n 135); see also WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law
and Policy (n 73) 28.
246 Richard A POSNER, ‘Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law’ (1997) 50 Stanford
Law Review 1551, 1553-1555, although Posner representing traditional economic analysis accepts
that people may be rational in different ways, eg as individuals composed of different ‘selves’,
the author nevertheless assumes that each of those ‘selves’ is rational (but competing with other
‘selves’ within the individual).
247 Heico KERKMEESTER, ‘Uniformity of European Contract Law: An Economic Study Between
Logic and Fact’ in Jan M Smits (ed), The Need for a European Contract Law. Empirical and
Legal Perspectives (Europa Law Publishing 2005) 75; Klaus MATHIS and Ariel David STEFFEN,
‘From Rational Choice to Behavioural Economics: Theoretical Foundations, Empirical Findings
and Legal Implications’ in Klaus Mathis (ed), European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and
Economics (Springer 2015) 32ff; nevertheless, one has to keep in mind there are various concepts
of ‘rationality’, see: Russell B KOROBKIN and Thomas S ULEN, ‘Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics’ (2000) 88 California Law Review
1051, 1060ff.
248 HERMALIN (n 138) 40ff, the authors offer a vivid example of what rationality means in both
contexts: ‘[f]or instance if you respond to some get-rich-quick spam email, you presumably expect
to enrich yourself, but such expectations are not rational; that is, you are rational in the first sense,
but not the second.’
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sumer empowerment.’249
It is based on the idea that confident consumers contribute to the development of
the internal market.250 As mentioned previously, the EU lawmaker has to invoke the
internal market functioning as a justification for harmonisation of consumer contract
law, and therefore consumer protection is mostly concerned with consumers parti-
cipating in the market and boosting the economy.251 A confident, alert, circumspect
consumer252 is a market player that will use the information provided effectively,
exercising choice and regulating the market. It is the EU’s consistent policy choice
‘to require that the consumer be provided with more and better information so
that he or she may then make a more carefully and fully informed choice.’253 The
Commission states along these lines:
Empowering consumers means providing a robust framework of prin-
ciples and tools that enable them to drive a smart, sustainable and in-
clusive economy. Empowered consumers who can rely on a robust frame-
work ensuring their safety, information, education, rights, means of re-
dress and enforcement, can actively participate in the market and make
it work for them by exercising their power of choice and by having their
rights properly enforced.254
249 MAK, ‘The Myth of the “Empowered Consumer”: Lessons from Financial Literacy Studies’ (n 73)
245-255.
250 Thomas WILHELMSSON, ‘The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC
Consumer Law’ (2004) 27 Journal of Consumer Policy 317, 320.
251 See eg Hans-W MICKLITZ, ‘The Expulsion of the Concept of Protection from the Consumer Law
and the Return of Social Elements in the Civil Law: A Bittersweet Polemic’ (2012) 35 Journal of
Consumer Policy 283, 289, who bitterly observes ‘[t]he European Commission (...) discovered (...)
the concept of the consumer as an important market actor, who played and still plays a central
role with regard to the completion of the single European market. Yet this consumer, or rather the
concept that stands behind this consumer, is no longer the weak, underprivileged consumer in need
of protection. Such a concept would be dysfunctional for the realization of the single European
market. With a weak consumer in need of protection, a single European market is not feasible.
A single European market needs an active, informed and adroit consumer; in short, one that is a
normative optimized, omnipotent consumer.’
252 Or ‘(...) the more aﬄuent, well-educated middle-class consumers’ as observes HOWELLS, ‘The
Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information’ (n 91) 357.
253 WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law and Policy (n 73) 310-311.
254 COM(2012) 225 final pt 1.
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Consumers in the eyes of the EU are consequently regarded as individuals who
are not only able to absorb and understand the information provided, but also act
upon it in a timely manner.255 Although it has been noted that the Treaties do
not explicitly recognise consumers as circumspect and robust individuals, the CJEU
considers a paradigm consumer to be sufficiently savvy and well-informed,256 as
long as they are ‘empowered’ — provided with adequate tools such as information
and means of redress.257 The main goal of the consumer legislation is therefore to
‘empower’ consumers.258
Nevertheless, consumers in the EU are a definitely heterogenous group. Local
consumer attitudes vary259 but also within the same jurisdiction consumers do have
different ability to process information -– as Wilhelmsson and Twigg-Flesner ob-
serve, these are ‘aﬄuent, well-educated middle-class consumers’ who ‘are more likely
to take (...) information into account’ when entering contracts with traders.260 On
the other end of the spectrum there are far more reticent consumers, not able or not
willing to act ‘in a manner that promotes efficiently functioning markets,’261 who
can be called ‘passive’ or ‘vulnerable’ consumers.262
255 MICKLITZ, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices and Misleading Advertising’ (n 216) 78.
256 VRIES (n 82) 236, in the context of GB-INNO-BM.
257 REICH and MICKLITZ (n 77) 45.
258 Cf Jo Swinson (then Consumer Minister) ‘Biggest overhaul of consumer rights in a generation’
Press Release 27 March 2015 as cited by Paula GILIKER, ‘The Consumer Rights Act 2015 — a
Bastion of European Consumer Rights?’ Legal Studies, Record published 17.10.2016 1, 1.
259 WEATHERILL, ‘19. Consumer Protection’ (n 99) 241 gives an example of the UK: ’in the United
Kingdom (...) markets work best when rivalry on the supply side is accompanied by consumer
behaviour which is aggressively intolerant of failure to meet demand. (...)’ however notes that it
will not be true for all the markets, even within the EU.
260 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 453.
261 WEATHERILL, ‘19. Consumer Protection’ (n 99) 241.
262 Vulnerability per se does not necessarily translate into passivity in consumer’s behaviour, how-
ever for the purposes of the present study it is important to distinguish between two groups of
consumers -– those able not only to participate in the market, but also doing so according to EU
legislator’s assumptions, and those not participating so actively in transactions with traders. The
latter group is definitely less active, but also more vulnerable, since they often cannot participate
in the market as much as they would like to, because of physical, intellectual or economic disabil-
ity, see Norbert REICH, ‘Vulnerable Consumers in EU Law’ in Dorota Leczykiewicz and Stephen
Weatherill (eds), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Com-
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It leads to a situation where despite invoking consumers’ transactional weakness
as a rationale for consumer protection, the European law tends to protect active
consumers as opposed to passive ones.263 The protection through contractual meas-
ures — including information duties -– favours consumers participating actively in
the market, and actually willing to conclude those contracts with traders.264 Pass-
ive consumers, on the other hand, do not benefit from such protective measures, as
they do not enter contracts in the first place. Luzak points out that this situation
goes even further — only actively claiming European consumer protection measures
can bring about their operation,265 similarly it is necessary to use the information
available to be granted protection.266
However, that is not to say that European law in all its aspects recognises only
alert, circumspect consumers. The informed consumer standard is the dominant
one without a doubt but there are signs that other consumer models appear in the
consumer policy.267 For instance, in the context of the now-repealed Directive on
distance contracts,268 the CJEU seemed to have been willing to interpret substantive
law on information provision in favour of passive consumers as well:
petition Law (Studies of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law Bloomsbury
Collections, Hart Publishing 2016).
263 Although this is only true for substantive European consumer law -– procedural consumer law
focuses on protecting passive consumers, see LUZAK (n 222) 7-8.
264 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 453 note: ‘if an information-based approach
to regulation is (...) used in preference to more substantive intervention, such [disadvantaged]
consumers would effectively remain without adequate protection.’
265 LUZAK (n 222) 5 cites the CJEU judgment in the case C-32/12 Duarte Hueros [2013]
ECLI:EU:C:2013:637 involving consumer’s right to claim remedies under the Directive on the sale
of consumer goods -– the Court stated that consumers must be able to actively claim the remedies
in the case of non-conformity of goods in order to benefit from them.
266 Ibid 5-6 Luzak explores the standard of an ‘average’ consumer in the CJEU’s case law (case
C-470/93 Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Ko¨ln e.V. v Mars GmbH [1995] ECR
I-01923 and case C-26/13 A´rpa´d Ka´sler and Hajnalka Ka´slerne´ Ra´bai v OTP Jelza´logbank Zrt
[2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:282 noting that ‘a passive consumer who would not try to gather any
information on the transaction she is about to conclude and who would not attempt to protect her
own interests, would be unlikely to benefit from the protection of European consumer law.’
267 REICH and MICKLITZ (n 77) 45.
268 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection
of consumers in respect of distance contracts [1997] OJ L144/19 (Directive on distance contracts).
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It should also be noted in that regard that, whereas the European Union
legislature opted, in Article 4(1) of Directive 97/7, in the vast majority
of the linguistic versions, for a neutral formulation, according to which
the consumer is to be ‘provided’ with the relevant information, it chose,
by contrast, a term with greater implications for the business in Article
5(1) of that directive, according to which the consumer must ‘receive’
confirmation of that information. That term expresses the idea that,
regarding the confirmation of information to consumers, passive conduct
by those consumers is enough.269
Luzak explains that ‘[t]he notions “receive” and “be given” refer to a process of
transmission, in which it is unnecessary for the information’s recipient to take any
particular action to obtain this information, pursuant to the CJEU’.270 However, it
is unclear why consumers are expected to behave actively in the process of obtaining
pre-contractual information, whilst in what refers to receiving confirmation of such
information after the contract has been concluded their passivity is accepted by the
European legislator.
In what refers to the Directive on consumer rights, the wording of Article 8(1),
especially the phrase ‘the trader shall (...) make that information available to the
consumer in a way appropriate to the means of distance communication used’ and
Article 8(7), which refers to the neutral notion of ‘providing’ information: ‘[t]he
trader shall provide the consumer with the confirmation of the contract concluded
(...)’ together with the guidance document concerning adoption of this Directive,271
which demonstrates that the legislator was fully aware of the notions used,272 sug-
gest that again European legislator chose to restrict protective measures to active
269 Content Services Ltd para 35.
270 LUZAK (n 222) 10.
271 Commission, ‘DG Justice guidance document concerning Directive 2011/83/EU’ <http://ec.
europa.eu/justice/consumer-marketing/files/crd guidance en.pdf> accessed 12 June 2014.
272 Commission, ‘DG Justice guidance document’ 36: ‘It should be noted here that Article 8(7) does
not refer to “reception” of the confirmation by the consumer; instead it requires the trader to
“provide” it. The meaning of the terms “provide” and “receive” in the context of the Distance
Selling Directive 97/7/EC was considered by the Court of Justice in case C-49/11 Content Services
Ltd. (...) The Court noted in its judgment that the notions of “given” and “received” are different
from the term “provided”, which are used in other provisions of the Directive and which the Court
regarded as a “neutral” formulation.’
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consumers. The rationale of such policy choice would most definitely be the need to
introduce more trader-friendly rules in order to protect EU internal market.273
Again, vulnerable consumers who do not reach the active and well-informed
standard model stay outside of the focus of the European consumer protection. And
although the concept of vulnerable consumers seems to have been included in the
European consumer policy agenda274 — recital (34) of the Directive on consumer
rights states: ‘(...) [i]n providing (...) [pre-contractual] information, the trader should
take into account the specific needs of consumers who are particularly vulnerable (...)
in a way which the trader could reasonably be expected to foresee.’; this notion of
vulnerable consumers stays nowhere to be found in specific information requirements
resulting from the provisions of the Directive. Moreover, the Directive itself, further
in the recital (34) makes a following reservation: ‘[h]owever, taking into account such
specific needs should not lead to different levels of consumer protection.’ No actual
improvement of the level of protection for certain -– vulnerable -– consumers can
be therefore deduced from these declarations. In addition, also the ‘average con-
sumer’ concept refers to a person who is ‘reasonably well informed and reasonably
observant and circumspect’.275 The case law developed in the context of the Unfair
Commercial Practices Directive, which uses an ‘average consumer’ benchmark in
assessing whether a given practice is unfair, also looks at a well-informed, circum-
spect consumer.276 Nevertheless, as Nordhausen Scholes277 rightly points out, the
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in its art 5(3) takes vulnerable consumers
into account as a specific group, perhaps more prone to some unfair commercial
273 LUZAK (n 222) 12.
274 REICH and MICKLITZ (n 77) 47.
275 Case C-358/01 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-13145 para 53; see also Hugh COLLINS, ‘Har-
monisation by Example: European Laws against Unfair Commercial Practices’ (2010) 73 The
Modern Law Review 89, 99-100.
276 LUZAK (n 222) 5-6 notes in reference to the case Mars GmbH : ‘the CJEU determined in its
judgment (...) that reasonably circumspect consumers should realize that if there is a marking on
the product’s packaging saying that this product is now available in a bigger quantity for the same
price as previously, the marking’s size on the packaging does not need to correspond to the size of
the increase. The court considers, therefore, the average consumer to be an active one, who would
take her time to think this offer through and not merely assume that the marking on the packaging
has a particular meaning.’
277 NORDHAUSEN SCHOLES (n 195) 221.
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practices.278 However, the vulnerability of consumers will affect the threshold for
the misleading practice only if the practice is directed specifically at a clearly identi-
fiable group of consumers with common vulnerability, if it is aimed at all consumers
in general the needs of vulnerable consumers do not have to be considered by the
traders.
The level of consumer protection which rests on information duties as its main
instrument cannot be described as extremely high, since it requires active, confident
consumers for its effectiveness.279 The other end of the spectrum would be a pa-
ternalistic approach, where the law intervenes shifting the responsibility away from
consumers offering them protection even when harm or loss incurred stemmed from
their own actions.280 In reality however, even though the empowered, confident con-
sumer dominates European consumer protective measures, I find Luzak’s conclusion
that the ‘European consumer law measures protect exclusively consumers who have
used the information available to them’281 too strict. There are various instances
of substantive consumer protection in the European law;282 contractual freedom in
the B2C contracts is limited through provisions making unfair abusive terms in
consumer contracts ineffective,283 or through quality standards in relation to con-
sumer goods.284 Furthermore, the Commission itself acknowledges the existence of
278 Cf Stephen WEATHERILL, ‘Empowerment is not the only Fruit’ in Dorota Leczykiewicz and
Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement
and Competition (Studies of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law Bloomsbury
Collections, Hart Publishing 2016) 215-216.
279 VRIES (n 82) 239.
280 MAK, ‘The Myth of the “Empowered Consumer”: Lessons from Financial Literacy Studies’ (n 73)
254-255.
281 LUZAK (n 222) 5.
282 Cf Geraint HOWELLS, ‘Europe’s (Lack of) Vision on Consumer Protection: A Case of Rhet-
oric Hiding Substance?’ in Dorota Leczykiewicz and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Images of the
Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Competition Law (Studies of the Oxford
Institute of European and Comparative Law Bloomsbury Collections, Hart Publishing 2016) 434ff.
283 MAK, ‘The Myth of the “Empowered Consumer”: Lessons from Financial Literacy Studies’ (n 73)
254-255.
284 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain
aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees [1999] OJ L171/12 (Directive on
the sale of consumer goods).
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vulnerable consumers:
(...) our population is ageing, markets are becoming increasingly com-
plex and some people may neither have the opportunity nor the ability
to master the digital environment. The question of accessibility is key
to reaping the benefits of digital change in the physical, digital and eco-
nomic senses. The current context may also exacerbate the disadvant-
aged situation of vulnerable consumers, such as people with disabilities
or with reduced mobility, who face difficulties in accessing and under-
standing information and in finding appropriate products and services
on the market.285
This ‘inattentive (...) vulnerable consumer, the consumer who is bewildered by
the complexity of modern markets and the consumer whose head spins when con-
fronted by a mass of information that is meant to help him or her through the choices
available’,286 although slowly, starts to be, if not included, than at least noticed by
the European consumer policy. Nevertheless, the development of the Digital Single
Market once again requires consumers using the Internet in an active way.287 The
digital environment, however, presents new challenges and new risks for consumers
willing to participate in online shopping — one can easily imagine that even more
vulnerable consumers have got used to traditional physical trade and it is the new
digital reality, with endless possibilities of choice as well as fraud, that makes them
weaker and more vulnerable than ever before.288 There is no doubt that consumers
285 COM(2012) 225 final pt 1.
286 WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law and Policy (n 73) 310.
287 MICKLITZ, ‘The Expulsion of the Concept of Protection from the Consumer Law and the Return
of Social Elements in the Civil Law: A Bittersweet Polemic’ (n 251) 289; see also HOWELLS
and WILHELMSSON (n 220) 381 pointing out to the fact that especially cross-boarder electronic
transactions are probably more often concluded by those more active and stronger, hence the focus
on empowering such group of consumers in the context of digital trans-boarder environment, an
approach which however should not be extended to all consumers acting in all kinds of transactions.
288 In the context of the confident consumer concept arising from the DCFR, MICKLITZ, ‘The Ex-
pulsion of the Concept of Protection from the Consumer Law and the Return of Social Elements
in the Civil Law: A Bittersweet Polemic’ (n 251) 295 contemplates a following scenario referring
to the future of the European consumer law: ‘A “consumer,” that is to say a consumer in terms
of the definition of the DCFR, addresses “his” national law with the argument that he is not a
consumer under the terms of this definition since he cannot fulfil the requirements the legal system
places upon him concerning his intellectual capacity, he has no access to the internet, he cannot
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are a weaker party to a transaction when contracting with traders over the Internet,
this weakness is common to both vulnerable and confident consumers.289 Protection
limited to imposing information duties on traders, however, can only empower, and
remedy the weakness of the latter group. In conclusion, such shape of the consumer
protection policy is not undesirable per se, as long as it forms part of a bigger pic-
ture where different types of consumers find protection in a fast-developing digital
environment of the European Single Market.290
Consumers and traders — subjects of the B2C electronic transactions
Discussed above is the model of consumer used in the EU law, which constitutes a
justification for establishing in such proliferation of information duties in the acquis
communautaire. Now I am going to take a closer look at a definition -– or defini-
tions — of consumers and traders, which in turn allow to determine who are the
subjects of the B2C transactions and at whom the protection and obligations thus
arising are actually aimed.291 The importance of this issue is even greater in the
digital environment, since the protection rules apply to consumers independently of
the fact whether the trader knew that the other party they had been contracting
with had been acting as a consumer.292 Moreover, in what refers to the directives
operate the internet, he can neither read nor properly understand English and thus he is not able
to carry out a price and information comparison. He is a human being who needs protection.’
289 Due to structural reasons for consumer weakness, TONNER and FANGEROW (n 76) 69.
290 WEATHERILL, ‘Empowerment is not the only Fruit’ (n 278) 221.
291 It is crucial to determine if the parties to the contract actually are considered ‘consumer’ and
‘trader’, since the protection rules, and especially those on information duties apply only to B2C
contracts, B2B (contracts between businesses) and C2C (contracts between consumers) do not offer
such protection to any of the parties, cf GILLIES (n 7) 15ff; RIEFA (n 7) 18; MIGUEL ASENSIO
(n 2) para 893.
292 See eg Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona (Seccio´n 15a), Sentencia nu´m. 107/2012 de 13 de marzo
(JUR 2012/169395), Fundamentos Jur´ıdicos, Tercero.–4. where the judge was pondering a question
whether a contract for sale of mobile phone lines was a consumer contract. A lady, whose quali-
fication as consumer was disputed, owned a small business and admitted this fact at the moment
of concluding a contract to the trader’s agent. Nevertheless, the court notes that the fact that a
contract falls within the scope of consumer contracts does not depend on the trader’s knowledge of
the purpose to which the good or service will be used by the other party. It is the actual purpose
and subsequent use of the purchase that deterimines the party’s qualification.
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operating under minimum harmonisation approach, domestic laws without a doubt
may extend consumer definition to other parties that national legislation deems in
the need of protection.293 At first sight, the matters seem more complicated for the
full harmonisation directives, such as the Directive on consumer rights. Neverthe-
less, the mentioned Directive clarifies its position in that aspect, moreover indicating
that Member States are free to adopt measures which fall outside of the scope of
the Directive.294
Ferna´ndez Arroyo points out to three main dimensions — criteria -– that are
used to define consumers: the purpose of the purchase completed, the behaviour of
the person and the type of the person.295 In the area of contract law, the directives
relevant to the B2C online transactions usually define the consumer through the
purpose of their actions — it is any natural person acting for purposes which are
outside of their trade, business, craft or profession.296 Also European procedural
law — and especially Rome I297 and recast Brussels I298 Regulations, applicable to
cross-boarder transactions, at which boosting within the Digital Single Market the
EU is aiming, define consumers in relation to the contract concluded, which ‘can
be regarded as being outside’ consumer’s ‘trade or profession.’299 The consumers
are therefore defined in a negative way through purposes not relating to their pro-
293 REICH and MICKLITZ (n 77) 50.
294 See recital (13) and my comment in respect of that issue in footnote 327 below.
295 FERNA´NDEZ ARROYO (n 25) 149-150 lists those criteria in a different order, discussing first the
type of the person, second, their behaviour and finally, the purpose of the purchase. My analysis
however starts with the purpose of the purchase, as it is the main criterion used by the European
legislator in the directives relative to the B2C online transactions being the focus of the present
study.
296 In what refers to the European directives and other texts pertinent to this study, see eg: art 1.2(a)
of the Directive on the sale of consumer goods; art 2(e) of the Directive on electronic commerce;
art 2(a) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive; art 2(1) of the Directive on consumer rigths;
see also art 2.4 of the Proposal for a Directive on supply of digital content and art 2(b) of the
Proposal for a Directive on online sales of goods.
297 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on
the law applicable to contractual obligations [2008] OJ L177/6 (Rome I Regulation).
298 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December
2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters [2012] OJ L351/1 (recast Brussels I Regulation).
299 art 6.1 Rome I Regulation and art 17.1 recast Brussels I Regulation.
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fessional activities, rather than through a positive list of qualities that a consumer
possesses.300 It is irrelevant whether the consumer is planing to use the product
purchased themselves and whether the trader knows for what purpose the consumer
is entering the contract with them.301
English law follows such pattern, defining consumers negatively. The new CRA
2015 refers to a consumer as ‘an individual acting for purposes that are wholly or
mainly outside that individual’s trade, business, craft or profession.’302 In Spanish
law, according to the art 3 of TRLDCU, consumer is understood as a natural per-
son acting for purposes which are outside of their commercial activity, business,
trade or profession.303 This definition is completed through s III of the Explanatory
Memorandum, which focuses on positive elements of the consumer concept — tak-
ing part in consumer transactions with private, personal aims, purchasing goods and
services as an end user, without then re-using them, neither directly nor indirectly
in production or re-selling or providing services to third parties.304 The Explanat-
ory Memorandum complements the provisions of the Act, it cannot restrict or limit
its application in any way, it provides however indications for interpretation of the
Act.305
300 Margus KINGISEPP and Age VARV, ‘The Notion of Consumer in EU Consumer Acquis and the
Consumer Rights Directive — a Significant Change of Paradigm?’ (2011) XVIII Juridica Interna-
tional 44, 46.
301 However cf HONDIUS, ‘The Notion of Consumer: European Union versus Member States’ (n 73)
94-95.
302 S 2(3); cf also reg 2(1) UTR 2008; reg 4 of the Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013.
303 This definition in its current form was introduced by the Ley 3/2014, de 27 de marzo, por la que
se modifica el texto refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios y
otras leyes complementarias, aprobado por el Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2007, de 16 de noviembre.
Bolet´ın Oficial del Estado, 28 de marzo de 2014, nu´m. 76, p. 26967 (Ley 3/2014 de 27 de marzo)
transposing the Directive on consumer rights into Spanish legal system. The provision previously
in force requirered a consumer to be acting for purposes outside of a commercial or professional
activity -– the indefiinte article ‘a’ had been used in the definition, which could have implied a more
restrictive concept of a consumer, acting not only outside of their professional activity, but outside
any (possible) professional activity. This was nevertheless clarified through the transposition of the
Directive and introduction of the new definition.
304 It is interesting to note, however, that the Explanatory Memorandum in its s III repeats also the
negative consumer definition, this time using the indefinite article ‘a’ instead of possessive ‘their’
when denoting commercial or professional activity, cf footnote 303 above.
305 Even more so as the clarification in the Explanatory Memorandum was inspired by the previous
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As with the model of consumer, the definition of the protected party to the trans-
action is an axiological issue, closely linked to the rationale of the protection. The
consumers are in a weaker position vis-a`-vis traders because of the private purpose
of the transaction. It is the transaction therefore that determines the qualification
of the parties in each case. As CJEU reminds, ‘one and the same person can act as a
consumer in certain transactions and as a seller or supplier in others.’306 The concept
of consumer is construed objectively and ‘is distinct from the concrete knowledge the
person in question may have, or from the information that person actually has.’307
Such understanding of consumer logically leads to protecting individuals who are
professionals, solicitors or sole traders for example, but in a particular transaction
are acting for private purposes not related to their professional activity.308 On the
other hand, such objective construction backfires — the European texts in prin-
ciple exclude the application of the protective measures to inexperienced or weaker
parties,309 who in spite of purchasing products in the course of their profession, know
very little or nothing about the product being the object of the transaction.310 It
is even more important in the context of the e-commerce, as many activities that
one can set up in the Internet, such as blogging for example, may start to generate
income -– when such an individual can be regarded as a ‘professional’ or ‘trader’ as
consumer concept established in the previous Ley General para la Defensa de los Consumidores y
Usuarios del 1984, and was a starting point for a great quantity of court decisions and academic
articles. The legal tradition thus created was therefore incorporated in the new law and combined
with the European, negative definition, see Sergio CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘El Concepto Legal de
“Consumidor” en el Derecho Privado Europeo y en el Derecho Espan˜ol: Aspectos Controvertidos
o no Resueltos’ (2011) 3 Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 84, 96.
306 Case C-110/14 Horat,iu Ovidiu Costea v SC Volksbank Romaˆnia SA [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:538,
para 20.
307 Horat,iu Ovidiu Costea para 21.
308 Ibid; see also eg SAP Barcelona nu´m. 107/2012 de 13 de marzo.
309 See however eg ROPPO (n 121) and HONDIUS, ‘The Notion of Consumer: European Union versus
Member States’ (n 73) arguing that some European measures aim at protecting weaker parties to
the contract regardless of their qualification as consumers or traders.
310 For instance a doctor buying an ultrasound device for their private practice; a shopkeeper having
a security CCTV installed etc; see STUYCK, ‘European Consumer Law after the Treaty of Ams-
terdam: Consumer Policy in or beyond the Internal Market?’ (n 72) 376 who openly asks: ‘[s]hould
small businesses benefit from the same protection as private consumers?’
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opposed to ‘consumer’ needing protection?311 Despite academic criticism,312 as of
now, the definition of consumer needs to be interpreted narrowly as it constitutes
an exception to the general contract law rules.
Many contracts concluded in the course of normal life serve both personal and
professional purposes -– these are so called mixed or dual purpose contracts.313 For
instance, the Directive on consumer rights openly qualifies the definition of consumer
in the recital (17):
The definition of consumer should cover natural persons who are acting
outside their trade, business, craft or profession. However, in the case
of dual purpose contracts, where the contract is concluded for purposes
partly within and partly outside the person’s trade and the trade purpose
is so limited as not to be predominant in the overall context of the
contract, that person should also be considered as a consumer.
This consideration allows to add some flexibility to the definition established
in the provisions of the Directive.314 The problem is that the wording used by the
Directive: ‘so limited as not to be predominant in the overall context of the contract’
is rather unclear. Is it the time, intensity of use or profits obtained from the product
that are taken into account? How much is ‘not predominant’ – just below 50%? The
CJEU in the Gruber case observed:
it is already clearly apparent from the purpose of Articles 13 to 15 of
the Brussels Convention, namely to properly protect the person who is
presumed to be in a weaker position than the other party to the contract,
that the benefit of those provisions cannot, as a matter of principle, be
311 RIEFA (n 7) 17-18 refers to ‘hybrid consumers’ and ‘amateur entrepreneurs’; see also MIGUEL
ASENSIO (n 2) para 893.
312 Eg GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French
Law’ (n 66) 633 notes that often information duties are another mandatory obligation imposed
on traders in a generic manner on the basis of their formal status and ‘irrespective of any real
inequality between them and the perhaps well-informed consumer’; see also LUZAK (n 222) 3.
313 The issue which has always been of interest in the field of consumer protection, see eg STUYCK,
‘European Consumer Law after the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer Policy in or beyond the
Internal Market?’ (n 72) 376.
314 Cf FERNA´NDEZ ARROYO (n 25) 150 who considers the very criterion of the purpose of the
purchase to be allowing for a more ‘flexible appreciation of the notional consumer.’
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relied on by a person who concludes a contract for a purpose which is
partly concerned with his trade or profession and is therefore only partly
outside it. It would be otherwise only if the link between the contract
and the trade or profession of the person concerned was so slight as to
be marginal and, therefore, had only a negligible role in the context of
the supply in respect of which the contract was concluded, considered in
its entirety315
Although this decision concerned Brussels Convention316 which defined con-
sumers, similarly to recast Brussels I Regulation, as persons concluding contracts
‘for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside [their] trade or profession’
and did not contain specific rules for mixed contracts, contrary to the Directive on
consumer rights and its recital (17), it can be clearly seen that the Court expects
the professional purpose of the contract to be importantly restricted, if not -– mar-
ginal, in relation to the contract as a whole. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether this
judgment can be applicable to other consumer definitions originating in the aquis
communautaire317 and if the rules on mixed — dual purpose -– contracts are to be
fully recognised by the EU law.318
In what refers to the national law, English legislation seems to embrace the
concept of the dual purpose contracts. Both CRA 2015 and the Consumer Contracts
Regulations 2013 refer to consumer’s purpose being ‘wholly or mainly outside that
individual’s trade, business, craft or profession’. In the Explanatory Notes to the
CRA 2015 we can read that:
This means, for example, that a person who buys a kettle for their home,
315 Case C-464/01 Johann Gruber v Bay Wa AG [2005] ECR I-00439 para 39.
316 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters. Consolidated version [1972] OJ L299/32 (Brussels Convention).
317 Hans SCHULTE-NOLKE, ‘Scope and Role of the Horizontal Directive and its Relationship to
the CFR’ in Geraint Howells and Reiner Schulze (eds), Modernising and Harmonising Consumer
Contract Law (sellier European law publishers 2009) 37; CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘El Concepto
Legal de “Consumidor” en el Derecho Privado Europeo y en el Derecho Espan˜ol: Aspectos Con-
trovertidos o no Resueltos’ (n 305) 113 argues in favour of the application of this decision to the
European consumer substantive law as well.
318 Also DCFR extends consumer definition into the area of mixed contracts: art I. – 1:105 defines a
‘consumer’ as ‘any natural person who is acting primarily for purposes which are not related to
his or her trade, business or profession.’
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works from home one day a week and uses it on the days when working
from home would still be a consumer. Conversely a sole trader that
operates from a private dwelling who buys a printer of which 95% of the
use is for the purposes of the business, is not likely to be held to be a
consumer.319
Such clarification, however, can be of very little assistance in determining the
subjects to whom the Act applies, since one can easily think of other less clear
examples.320
The position of the Spanish law, on the other hand, is even more unclear. The
legislation does not refer to purposes ‘mainly’ or ‘partially’ outside one’s profession
and courts’ decisions not only are very inconsistent, but also the subject of con-
sumer’s concept and mixed contracts was mainly treated obiter dicta by the judges,
moreover under the old Act.321 At the time of implementation of the Directive on
consumer rights, Spanish legislator had an opportunity to clarify the situation, in-
cluding a similar construction to that used by the Directive and English legislation,
however this opportunity was missed. Before the adoption of the Directive on con-
sumer rights and its implementation into the Spanish system Ca´mara Lapuente
argued that consumer definition from the art 3 TRLDCU had to be interpreted
restrictively, in accordance with the European law, ie CJEU case law, and espe-
cially the Gruber case.322 However now, since the Directive on consumer rights has
incorporated the concept of mixed contracts in its recitals, it would probably be
more appropriate to follow its line and interpret the consumer concept more openly,
including situations where the purpose of the transaction was mainly private. Now,
it is up to the courts to establish more specific criteria for determining how much
time or use is ‘mainly’ or ‘principally’ outside of professional activity.
Another criterion used in defining consumers is the distinction between natural
319 Explanatory note 36
320 Edwin PEEL, Treitel on the Law of Contract (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 1288; GILIKER,
‘The Consumer Rights Act 2015 — a Bastion of European Consumer Rights?’ (n 258) 6.
321 See CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘El Concepto Legal de “Consumidor” en el Derecho Privado Europeo
y en el Derecho Espan˜ol: Aspectos Controvertidos o no Resueltos’ (n 305) 111ff and the judgments
and the local legislation that the author refers to.
322 Ibid 113.
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and legal persons for the purposes of applying protective consumer law provisions.323
Generally speaking, the trend in the European law is that such matters are left to
the discretion of Member States. And so, for example, recast Brussels I Regulations
does not refer to the type of the person considered to be a consumer,324 however
it has to be noted that Rome I Regulation limits the application of specific provi-
sions relating to consumer contracts to consumers being natural persons.325 In what
refers to to Directives, domestic legal system can extend protection thus granted to
other persons deemed worthy of protection, especially in what refers to minimum
harmonisation directives.326 The Directive on consumer rights, which is character-
ised by a targeted full harmonisation approach, expressly notes of the possibility of
expanding its application to legal persons in the recital (13): ‘(...) Member States
may decide to extend the application of the rules of this Directive to legal persons
or to natural persons who are not consumers within the meaning of this Direct-
ive, such as non-governmental organisations, start-ups or small and medium-sized
enterprises.’327
Spanish law extends the consumer protection to legal persons and entities without
323 FERNA´NDEZ ARROYO (n 25) 149.
324 Art 17.1 recast Brussels I Regulation.
325 Art 6.1 Rome I Regulation.
326 REICH and MICKLITZ (n 77) 50.
327 The recital (13) demonstrates the inherent weakness of the full harmonisation approach. It starts
with the following words: ‘Member States should remain competent, in accordance with Union
law, to apply the provisions of this Directive to areas not falling within its scope. Member States
may therefore maintain or introduce national legislation corresponding to the provisions of this
Directive, or certain of its provisions, in relation to contracts that fall outside the scope of this
Directive. For instance, Member States may decide to extend the application of the rules of this
Directive to legal persons (...).’ Full harmonisation was designed as a remedy against the legal
fragmentation of the consumer protection laws among Member States, the fragmentation being one
of the factors if not preventing, then at least making it more difficult for traders to engage in the
cross-boarder (especially online) transactions with consumers. Nevertheless, such approach of the
Directive, allowing Member States to consider a different range of subjects as consumers, actually
contributes to the legal fragmentation. This solution reveals how weak and unstable the foundations
for the full harmonisation are; nonetheless the political reasons for which the European legislator
decided this way are understandable — various EU Member States considered legal persons under
certain circumstances to be consumers and such drastic restriction of the protection granted to
them was not acceptable, see KINGISEPP and VARV (n 300) 45.
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legal personality,328 the fact which the Spanish legislator describes as respecting the
specific trait of the Spanish legal order,329 since already the 1984 Ley General para
la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios recognised legal persons as consumers.
It seems however that only legal persons which are acting not-for-profit can be con-
sidered consumers,330 and only where the purpose of the transaction stays private —
outside of the scope of any professional or commercial activity the person or entity
may be carrying out.
Under English law, on the other hand, only natural persons are considered con-
sumers.331 Both the CRA 2015 and the Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 use
the term ‘individual.’332 The Explanatory Notes to the CRA 2015 insist that the
‘the Act’s protection for consumers does not apply to small businesses or legally
incorporated organisations (eg companies formed by groups of residents).’333 Such
persons or entities have to look to other legislation or common law for protection.
The third characteristic of consumers is their passive economic behaviour. This
is the criterion used by the Explanatory Memorandum to the TRLDCU: the con-
sumer being the end user, purchasing goods and services without then re-using
them, neither directly nor indirectly in production or re-selling or providing services
to third parties. From the economic point of view, it is not the purpose of the trans-
action that really matters, but the position of the consumer in the marketplace –
as Reich and Micklitz put it, a consumer is a passive market citizen, ‘homo oeco-
nomicus passivus ’ who enters transactions to satisfy their needs without producing
328 Although previous wording of the art 3 TRLDCU did not include entities without legal personality,
there had already been a proliferation of judgments including such entities, especially neighbours
committees (comunidades de propietarios), see eg Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a),
Sentencia nu´m. 152/2014 de 11 de marzo (RJ 2014/2114).
329 S III Explanatory Memorandum of the TRLDCU.
330 See CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘El Concepto Legal de “Consumidor” en el Derecho Privado Europeo
y en el Derecho Espan˜ol: Aspectos Controvertidos o no Resueltos’ (n 305) 99-101 who discusses
the issue under the previous wording of the art 3 TRLDCU, ie before the adoption of Ley 3/2014,
nevertheless the arguments used are still relevant.
331 PEEL (n 320) 1288; GILIKER, ‘The Consumer Rights Act 2015 — a Bastion of European Con-
sumer Rights?’ (n 258) 5.
332 S 2(3) CRA 2015 and reg 4 Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013.
333 Note 36.
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the product or service themselves.334 It is this passive position of the consumers
that lies at the heart of consumer protection: consumers are weaker economically
and less informed because they intervene in markets occasionally in order to satisfy
their private, individual needs.
Furthermore, the passivity of consumers can be also understood in a more limited
sense — the consumers as individuals who are targeted by marketing and advertising
campaigns but are not participating themselves in active pursuit or comparison of
available offers.335 Although, as already discussed above, the contractual protection
of consumers is rather directed at active market participants, there are rules eg
on marketing, advertising or product safety that often apply irrespectively of the
formal qualification as consumer of the addressee targeted by the trader.336 Also
procedural European consumer law tends to protect passive consumers granting
them a possibility to raise the claim in their own jurisdiction under the law applicable
to their country of domicile, provided it was the trader who actively targeted them
in their country of domicile, and not vice versa.337
The other party of the B2C contract is the business person, also referred to as
‘trader’, ‘seller’, ‘supplier’ or ‘professional’.338 When contracting with consumers, all
professional parties: not only big corporations, but also SME and even sole traders
are treated as businesses.339 The European law does not provide for any intermediate
334 REICH and MICKLITZ (n 77) 53.
335 FERNA´NDEZ ARROYO (n 25) 149; LUZAK (n 222) 3ff; see also CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘El
Concepto Legal de “Consumidor” en el Derecho Privado Europeo y en el Derecho Espan˜ol: Aspectos
Controvertidos o no Resueltos’ (n 305) 113-114, who discusses the extreme case in which consumer
is so active, as to actually sell goods or provide services to a professional trader — the so called
consumer-to-business, C2B, contracts. It seems that if the activity in question is not a source
of income and is not a professional one for the individual, then they might be considered as a
consumer.
336 See STUYCK, ‘European Consumer Law after the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer Policy in
or beyond the Internal Market?’ (n 72) 376; KINGISEPP and VARV (n 300) 45; TONNER and
FANGEROW (n 76) 73-74.
337 Recast Brussels I Regulation; LUZAK (n 222) 7.
338 cf Directive on electronic commerce which applies to a ‘service provider’ and an ‘established service
provider’ in its arts 2(b) and 2(c).
339 HESSELINK, ‘Towards a Sharp Distinction between B2B and B2C? On Consumer, Commercial
and General Contract Law after the Consumer Rights Directive’ (n 108) 32.
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category between consumer — B2C -– contracts and all the other contracts in which
special protection is not envisaged.340 The Directive on consumer rights defines a
‘trader’ as ‘any natural person or any legal person, irrespective of whether privately
or publicly owned, who is acting, including through any other person acting in his
name or on his behalf, for purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession
(...).’341 Many European legal texts, like directives covering specific type of contracts,
will however use a more specific concept of traders, eg in the Directive on the sale
of consumer goods the consumer’s counterpart is named ‘seller.’342 It seems that
the main characteristic of the business party in the B2C contract is their activity
within their area of expertise, aiming at commercial profit;343 activity which reaches
a certain level of organisation, such as for example a website directed at consumers
in the context of the e-commerce.344
In the English law trader is understood as a ‘a person acting for purposes relating
to that person’s trade, business, craft or profession, whether acting personally or
through another person acting in the trader’s name or on the trader’s behalf,’345 a
definition which includes individual persons as well as legal persons — companies,
charities and public bodies.346 Similarly, the Spanish law considers a ‘business’347 to
340 Ibid, nevertheless it has to be noted that, as already observed, some directives protect the ‘user’ —
as it is the case of the Directive 2015/2302/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
25 November 2015 on package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC)
No 2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and
repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC [2015] OJ L326/1 (Package Travel Directive) where a
‘traveller’ contracting a ‘trader’ is given protection. The concept of ‘trader’ however is very similar
in the majority of European acts.
341 Art 2(2); see similar definitions in Unfair Commercial Practices Directive art 2(b).
342 Art 1.2(b), see also art 1.2(c) defining a ‘producer’; see also art 2(c) of the Proposal for a Directive
on online sale of goods.
343 Cf however DCFR art I. – 1:105(2) defining a ‘business’ noting that it ‘means any natural or legal
person, irrespective of whether publicly or privately owned, who is acting for purposes relating to
the person’s self-employed trade, work or profession, even if the person does not intend to make a
profit in the course of the activity.’
344 Cf art 2(7) of the Directive on consumer rights referring to an ‘organised distance sales scheme.’
345 S 2(2) CRA 2015.
346 PEEL (n 320) 1288.
347 Art 4 TRLDCU refers to a ‘business’ (empresario) while the Spanish Co´digo de Comercio (Real
decreto de 22 de agosto de 1885 por el que se publica el Co´digo de Comercio, Bolet´ın Oficial del
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be a natural or legal person, of private or public law, acting personally or through
another person acting in their name or following their instructions, for purposes
relating to their trade, business, craft or profession.348
1.1.2.3 Issues relative to information duties in consumer contracts
Party autonomy, freedom of contract and the information duties
Party autonomy, meaning ’freedom of contract, or self-arrangement of legal rela-
tions by individuals according to their respective will’ is one of the fundamental
concepts for both national contract laws of Member States and European private
law.349 Neoclassical trend in economic analysis of law points to the party autonomy,
understood as rational individualism, as a tool allowing to identify the optimal al-
location of resources in the market, based on the contract being perfect means of
efficient resource allocation.350 In the discussion concerning the place of information
duties within the contract law a perspective on information duties that is adopted by
some authors considers mandated disclosure as an important and unnecessary inter-
vention into the freedom of contract.351 It is true that European rules of consumer
contract law operate in great majority with mandatory rules restrictive to party
autonomy and individual freedom. This status quo is criticised from the neoclas-
sical economics standpoint as stemming from European Commission’s ‘misguided’
assumption that to reach legal harmonisation among Member States together with
high level of consumer protection, the contract law rules have to be mandatory and
not default.352
Estado, 16 de octubre de 1885, nu´m. 289) in its art 1 uses a concept of a ‘trader’ (comerciante),
both words denote the same type of a subject, leading to a conclusion that they can be treated as
synonyms.
348 Art 4 TRLDCU.
349 GRUNDMANN, ‘Information, Party Autonomy and Economic Agents in European Contract Law’
(n 140) 269.
350 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1080.
351 cf WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 449.
352 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1080ff; however cf SILBER (n 26) 29 expressing an opposite opinion:
‘(...) it would be a category mistake to assert based on the obsolescence of consumer protection
laws that consumer protection laws themselves are an anachronism (...). Neither the Internet nor
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From this point of view, the legal system as such should be mainly concerned
with restoring market balance, eg through competition law measures353 or in the
area of contract law through setting default rules (from which parties can easily
derogate) in order to lower the transaction costs for them.354 Information duties,
although arguably less intrusive in the contractual balance than substantive man-
datory provisions, still influence freedom of contract and parties’ autonomy. In more
individualistic systems, as in the English law, they can be therefore difficult to ac-
cept.355 Moreover, restriction of freedom of contract through information duties can
bring about a potential undesired effect of welfare loss as a consequence of a disrup-
tion of the so-called ‘learning process’. In this process ‘parties discover the best form
of contracting fitting their purposes in the light of their individual preferences,’ and
the freedom of contract constitutes a necessary condition for the learning process to
take place.356
Nevertheless, party autonomy and freedom of contract ceased to be the only
principles governing the law of contract, especially in its current form in Europe -–
the paradigm of protecting a weaker party has gained its place within the private
law provisions.357 The weaker party protection, and especially consumer protection,
other avenues of electronic commerce have narrowed the imbalance between sellers and buyers;
purely private and voluntary responses to consumer protection will continue to be inadequate. In
fundamental respects, the future of consumer protection should resemble the best aspects of its
interventionist past.’
353 PEINADO GRACIA, ‘El Derecho a la Proteccio´n de los Consumidores’ (n 132) 1881; GO´MEZ
POMAR, ‘EC Consumer Protection Law and EC Competition Law: How related are they? A Law
and Economics Perspective’ (n 132).
354 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1080.
355 GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French Law’
(n 66) 623 confirms: ‘English law continues to adhere to freedom of contract principles. Disclosure
is perceived as unduly interventionist.’
356 Christian KIRCHNER, ‘Justifying Limits to Party Autonomy – Mainly Consumer Protection’ in
Stefan Grundmann and others (eds), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal
Market (de Gruyter 2001) 170-171.
357 Ewoud HONDIUS, ‘The Protection of the Weak Party in a Harmonised European Contract Law: A
Synthesis’ (2004) 27 Journal of Consumer Policy 245, 246, Hondius further analyses disadvantages
of the new paradigm of the weak party protection, noting that one of them is the difficulty in
defining the weaker party to the contract. As analysed above (Subsection 1.1.2.2 The model of
consumer in the e-commerce law) this problem is being addressed within the consumer law through
a generic concept of consumers, subjects of B2C transactions, worthy of protective rules; see also
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has become one of the main limits to the party autonomy principle in the European
law in its current shape.358 It seems to be widely accepted, even by authors rep-
resenting neoclassical approach to law and economics, that an unrestricted rule of
party autonomy would not be beneficial in the internal market as ‘it [would] generate
market failure; it [would] generate inequity.’359 The justification for consumer pro-
tection through information is then twofold: on the one hand, the market functioning
is being improved through effective B2C contracting, on the other -– protection of
the weaker parties is improved.360 Logically, both considerations allow for certain
restriction of freedom of contract and party autonomy through establishment of in-
formation duties. Nevertheless, the former standpoint, emphasising the market role
of information duties, calls for limiting public intervention into the law of contract
to the minimum, as already mentioned.361 It is argued that mandatory rules in con-
REICH and MICKLITZ (n 77) 49-50 noting that from the CJEU case law can be deduced ‘a
general approach to the objectives of EU consumer law (...) framing party autonomy in B2C
transactions in favour of the consumer as the typically weaker party in relation to the business
or professional partner who is seen to be regularly in a stronger bargaining position.’; cf Notes to
art 1:102 PECL: ‘[i]n modern law considerations of policy, notably the need to protect the weaker
party to a contract, have led to a restriction of contractual freedom by statute.’ in Ole Lando and
Hugh Beale (eds), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II Combined and Revised
(The Hague 2000) and Ole Lando and others (eds), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III
(The Hague 2003).
358 GRUNDMANN, ‘Information, Party Autonomy and Economic Agents in European Contract Law’
(n 140) 271 points out to three types of limits to the party autonomy principle, consumer protection
being one of them and other being general clauses and regulation restraining party autonomy for
common good, eg stability of the currency which may justify prohibition of index clauses.
359 WEATHERILL, ‘Justifying Limits to Party Autonomy in the Internal Market – EC Legislation in
the Field of Consumer Protection’ (n 189) 173; see also analysis presented by BROWNSWORD
(n 90) 94ff and especially a consideration concerning e-Bay: without contract law framework e-Bay
would be able to exist and function, however in a different, probably much more expensive shape,
as it would be e-Bay’s sole responsibility to guarantee that the contracts would be honoured.
360 Thomas WILHELMSSON, ‘European Rules on Pre-Contractual Information Duties?’ (2006) 7
ERA Forum Journal of the Academy of European Law 16, 17.
361 Cf PEINADO GRACIA, ‘El Derecho a la Proteccio´n de los Consumidores’ (n 132) 1881 and
GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘EC Consumer Protection Law and EC Competition Law: How related are they?
A Law and Economics Perspective’ (n 132) who argue that an intervention through competition law
restoring correct market functioning should have priority before establishing mandatory contract
law provisions; HOWELLS, ‘The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information’
(n 91) 353; see also BEN-SHAHAR, ‘One-Way Contracts: Consumer Protection without Law’
(n 163) 223-224 who questions the very necessity and effectiveness of legal intervention, even in
the case of market failures.
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tract law, which by definition operates rather in the sphere of free consent, have to
be justified as a remedy to very specific market issues.362 Without a doubt, such
justification for establishing mandatory rules in contract law should not be solely
based on the fact that one of the contracting parties happens to be a consumer.363
The discourse presenting information duties in opposition to substantive man-
datory regulation is quite common.364 Along these lines, information duties are often
presented as an intervention into the party autonomy and freedom of contract of
a lesser extent, if compared with substantive mandatory regulation, such as in the
law relative to unfair contract terms.365 Mandatory substantive rules are a case of
a much more important interference with the parties’ agreement and are believed
to reduce variety of offers available in the market. Information duties, on the other
hand, although mandatory, enable the parties to contract freely in substance, thus
preserving the full range of varieties in the market.366 According to such point of
view, mandatory substantive rules can only be justified if an information disclosure
rule cannot satisfactorily prevent market failure.367 Such protection through man-
362 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1082-1083 indicate following objectives as pertinent from the point of
view of economics: ‘– safeguarding rational decision-making by the parties in the course of contract
formation; – internalizing external costs and preventing the externalization of costs in the first place;
– providing incentives for the resolution of informational asymmetries; – avoidance of excessive
signalling; – banning or mitigating monopolies and other distortions of competition.’
363 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1079ff; as discussed above, the European legislator justifies adoption of
consumer protection measures as a necessary improvement to the functioning of the internal market;
however cf GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and
French Law’ (n 66) 633 who notes that often information duties are another mandatory obligation
imposed on traders in a generic manner on the basis of their formal status and ‘irrespective of any
real inequality between them and the perhaps well-informed consumer.’
364 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 449.
365 See eg GRUNDMANN (n 143); Stefan GRUNDMANN, ‘European Contract Law(s) of What
Colour?’ (2005) 1 European Review of Contract Law 184, 194ff;LURGER (n 92); Josep Maria
BECH SERRAT, Selling Tourism Services at a Distance: An Analysis of the EU Consumer Acquis
(Springer 2012) 51.
366 WEATHERILL, ‘Justifying Limits to Party Autonomy in the Internal Market – EC Legislation in
the Field of Consumer Protection’ (n 189) 181.
367 See Cassis de Dijon case – Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, [1979] ECR 649 para 13, where the
Court observed that establishing information duties is to be preferred to a substantive mandatory
rules: ‘[t]his line of argument cannot be taken so far as to regard the mandatory fixing of minu-
mum alcohol contents [ie, the substantive mandatory rule] as being an essential guarantee of the
fairness of commercial transactions, since it is a simple matter to ensure that suitable information
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datory rules, however, needs to be viewed more as a remedy to a concrete market
failure, rather than as a general acceptance of restraining party autonomy in the
name of generic consumers’ weakness.368 Mandated disclosure as consumer protec-
tion measure reduces the roles of legislative intervention to strengthening of the
party autonomy and freedom of contract, nevertheless one has to bear in mind it is
based on a certain model of an active, savvy and circumspect consumer, as already
discussed.369
In conclusion, in its present state, the European contract law imposes certain
restrictions on party autonomy, such as mandated disclosure, right of withdrawal
or control of fairness of contractual terms. Moreover, current consumer protection
rules within the European internal market are mandatory, ie parties to the contract
cannot exclude their application through an agreement.370 Information duties are
one of the most important, if not the most important, mandatory protective rules
in the current European contract law. It is also accepted that an unlimited freedom
of contract may not be the best legislative solution,371 moreover its restrictions can
be viewed as measures improving party autonomy through allowing the other party
— the consumer — to participate in a more informed, efficient and safe manner in
the market.372 As Weatherill puts it:
One scarcely needs to mention the huge and sophisticated literature that
shows how preserving freedom of contract by blocking State intervention
is conveyed to the purchaser [ie, the information disclosure rule].’; GRUNDMANN, ‘Information,
Party Autonomy and Economic Agents in European Contract Law’ (n 140) 280-282; see also
RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 290 who observe: ‘[f]rom the perspective of Economics of
Information (...) Governmental intervention is only justified if market mechanisms fail.’
368 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1082
369 See Subsection 1.1.2.2 The model of consumer in the e-commerce law above.
370 Especially because in the B2C standard form contracts it would probably become a common
practice to exclude the protection rules, which in turn could lead to a ‘market for lemons’ type of
situation and consequently market failure, cf RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 306ff.
371 Filomena CHIRICO and others, ‘A Giant with Feet of Clay: A First Law and Economics Analysis
of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)’ [2010] TILEC Discussion Paper 2010-025
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1628558> acessed 27 April 2016, 3.
372 WEATHERILL, ‘Justifying Limits to Party Autonomy in the Internal Market – EC Legislation in
the Field of Consumer Protection’ (n 189) 180, who notes that ‘[o]ne party’s restricted autonomy
(that of the trader) is the other — the consumer’s — enhanced autonomy’.
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in, for example, cases of sale and supply to consumers (...) consolidates
and strengthens existing imbalances in a way that makes a mockery of
any notion of true freedom in practice.373
Controversies surrounding information duties
There is a growing criticism towards information duties as main means of consumer
protection within the EU.374 The list of concerns regarding the proliferation of in-
formation requirements is extensive, the main being the effectiveness of mandated
disclosure in consumer protection. The issue also raises a considerable amount of
rather emotionally expressed opinions, for instance Carrasco Perera considers the
lists of information duties to be a cancer in the body of consumer law.375
Information duties are being criticised from various angles; first of all authors
representing neoclassical school of economic analysis of law regard information duties
as an unnecessary interference with contractual freedom, as noted above. Although
from the more traditional standpoint information duties are accepted as the lesser of
two evils, when compared to other protective measures that involve further interven-
tion in the freedom of contract, especially involving regulating contracts content,376
there has always been a lot of criticism concerning information duties imposed by
law and the potentially adverse effects they may have on the functioning of the
market.377 It should be noted that markets can autoregulate up to certain extent,
373 WEATHERILL, ‘Case Note: Use and Abuse of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights: on the
improper veneration of “freedom of contract”. Judgment of the Court of 18 July 2013: Case C-
426/11, Mark Alemo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd’ (n 173) 172.
374 Cf eg CA´MARA LAPUENTE and TERRYN (n 196) para 3.43 (EU); LUZAK (n 222) 1; HOWELLS
and WILHELMSSON (n 220) 380-381.
375 CARRASCO PERERA, ‘Desarrollos Futuros del Derecho de Consumo en Espan˜a, en el Hori-
zonte de la Transposicio´n de la Directiva de Derechos de los Consumidores’ (n 46) 314; see also
WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law and Policy (n 73) 316 who calls consumer protection through
information duties ’a sham.’
376 WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law and Policy (n 73) 92.
377 The classical and neoclassical trends in economics of contract law oppose any intervention in the
market, see Alan SCHWARTZ and Louis L WILDE, ‘Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis’ (1978) 127 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 630, 631; Richard A EPSTEIN, ‘The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts’
(2007) 92 Minnesota Law Review 803, 804ff.
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since traders do have economic incentives to share information with consumers —
sellers would want to disclose the quality features of their products and brands so
that consumers could distinguish them from their competitors. Voluntary warranties
granted by manufacturers can constitute an example of such autoregulation.378
Information requirements on the other hand, constitute a significant, yet not
always necessary, intervention into the contractual balance — even though they are
designed to reduce transaction costs of a supposedly weaker, less informed party, in
our case -– a consumer, they will almost certainly increase the costs for the other
party.379 For rational parties to contract, the transaction costs must be smaller
than the benefit expected from the contractual relationship.380 In what refers to
mandatory rules governing the contract, the test is whether rational parties would
want to apply those rules.381 The traders try to compensate the costs resulting from
mandatory rules through an increase of the prices of their products, so consumers
end up paying for their own protection.382 The risk of putting too much burden on
traders, and this is especially true for SME, is also that they could decide to remove
their offer from the market if the costs of complying with legal requirements are too
high.
It has also been pointed out a lot that the duty to disclose discourages parties
from searching for information for themselves and from investing into precautions.383
Moreover, often the market itself creates relevant incentives for traders to transfer
the information to their contracting parties. In such situations, it is argued, inform-
ation duties may cause more harm than good, as any excessive duty contributes to
378 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 289.
379 Goods and services are cheaper when there are fewer mandatory duties imposed on traders, see
eg Hugh COLLINS, ‘Good faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 229, 231-232.
380 Carl J DAHLMAN, ‘The Problem of Externality’ (1979) 22 Journal of Law and Economics 141,
141-142.
381 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1088-1089.
382 Ibid; however HONDIUS, ‘The Protection of the Weak Party in a Harmonised European Contract
Law: A Synthesis’ (n 357) 247 points to empirical research suggesting that the rise of prices of the
products offered by traders is very low, almost negligible.
383 GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French Law’
(n 66) 636-637.
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eventual raise of transaction costs for both parties.384
Another line of criticism towards information duties in the B2C contracts ori-
ginates in the behavioural trend in economic analysis of law. Behavioural law and
economics, basing its findings on empirical research, questions the premise of ra-
tionality, arguing that consumers do not always behave rationally.385 As already
mentioned above,386 rationality of market players is viewed as having two constitu-
ents: the intention of becoming better off complemented by the ability of correct
evaluation of such outcome.387 It is suggested that consumers are not always ra-
tional in the second sense, and that individuals often make mistakes in deciding
whether a certain contract is profitable for them or not.388 Consumers that con-
tract with traders on disadvantageous terms believing that they are profitable are
rational in the sense of wanting to improve their situation, but are na¨ıve in what
refers to evaluating correctly the prospects of such a positive outcome. In what
refers to information duties, they will be of little assistance to irrational consumers
— information paradigm assumes rationality as its basic premise.
Consumers whose rationality is bounded, even when provided with information,
384 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1115.
385 For more on bounded rationality see: KERKMEESTER (n 247) 75; HOWELLS, ‘The Potential
and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information’ (n 91) 358ff; Fernando GO´MEZ POMAR,
‘The Empirical Missing Links in the Draft Common Frame of Reference’ in Hans-W Micklitz and
Fabrizio Cafaggi (eds), European Private Law after the Common Frame of Reference (Edward Elgar
Publishing 2010) 104ff; cf also Martijn W HESSELINK, ‘CFR & Social Justice: A Short Study
for the European Parliament on the Values Underlying the Draft Common Frame of Reference
for European Private Law - what Roles for Fairness and Social Justice?’ [2008] Centre for the
Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series No. 2008/08 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1270575> accessed 15 May 2016, 20, demonstrating that an assumption on consumers’ rationality
is unfounded: ‘(...) the economic analysis of law (...) as is well known, is based on controversial
normative assumptions (the utilitarian idea that the law should aim mainly or even exclusively
at welfare maximisation) and needs empirical data (the “preferences” of individuals and their
relative importance) that are simply not available (and therefore are very often substituted with the
normatively biased empirical assumption that most of the time individuals are actually rationally
pursuing the increase of their own wealth).
386 Subsection 1.1.2.2 The model of consumer in the e-commerce law.
387 HERMALIN (n 138) 40ff.
388 Oren BAR-GILL, ‘The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts’ (2007) 92 Minnesota Law
Review 749, 749.
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will not be able to exercise choice in a desired manner.389 Providing pre-contractual
information cannot really improve consumers’ rationality, as even if consumers ef-
fectively receive and understand certain information, it still does not necessarily
mean they are able to process it and act upon it when contracting with traders.390
Furthermore, B2C electronic contracts are usually standard-form contracts, terms
of which are not negotiable. Evidence suggests that consumers simply do not read
the pre-contractual information and terms of such contracts.391 E-commerce makes
choice available to consumers practically limitless, however ironically the genuine
free consent and choice is impossible also due to oversupply of pre-contractual in-
formation,392 which is especially concerning precisely in the digital environment.393
389 HOWELLS and WILHELMSSON (n 220) 381.
390 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 454 provide an example: ‘a trader who draws
a particular fault in goods about to be purchased to the attention of the consumer can usually
rely on a provision which will remove his liability in sales law for that defect. But does the mere
fact that the consumer now knows of a defect mean that he understands the implications of that
defect, e.g., in terms of lost functionality or reduction in value?’
391 As Omri BEN-SHAHAR, ‘The Myth of the Opportunity to Read in Contract Law’ (2009) 5
European Review of Contract Law 1, 2 points out: ‘Reading is boring, incomprehensible, alienating,
time consuming, but most of all pointless. We want the product, not the contract. (...) And what
if they did read? Surely, there is nothing they can do about the bad stuff they know they will
find.’; LUZAK (n 222) 14ff gives ‘five main reasons why consumers do not notice or do not pay
attention to disclosures: when the disclosure is not personally relevant; when the consumer was
already familiar with the disclosure; when the consumer was distracted from the disclosure; when
the trader did not ensure to capture sufficient attention of the consumer; when the consumer has
become desensitized to the disclosure after repeated exposure to it.’
392 Fernando GO´MEZ POMAR and Juan Jose´ GANUZA, ‘The Role of Choice in the Legal Regulation
of Consumer Markets: A Law and Economic Analysis’ [2014] InDret: Revista para el Ana´lisis del
Derecho 1, 6. In psychology it has been even established that too much choice available to consumers
induces unhappiness and misery, see for instance SCHWARTZ and WARD (n 30) 86ff; see also
NORDHAUSEN SCHOLES (n 195) 214 describing consequences of information overload in this
way: ‘[i]f consumers are overloaded with information, the information obligations may achieve the
exact opposite of what they are intended to achieve: rather than a consumer basing decisions
on rational facts, information overload4 can result in consumers basing decisions on completely
irrational grounds, while possibly even being under the impression that the decision was based on
rational grounds (while in other cases, the consumer may realise he is being overwhelmed with
information and is unable to process the amount of information properly and may then give up
even trying to come to a rational decision).
393 RIEFA (n 7) 38 notes: ‘(...) this policy drive for consumer information is creating perverse effects
transported into an online environment. Many website are suffering from an overdose of contractual
term and information about the transaction which creates confusion and make consumers feel
overwhelmed about the information they receive.’
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Even the Commission admits that:
In today’s fast changing world, consumers are often overloaded with
information but they do not necessarily always have the information
they need. Faced with increasingly complex information and choices,
consumers more and more often rely on labels or turn to intermediaries
and filters such as comparison websites. There is cause for some concern
as to their reliability and accuracy, however.394
Too much information causes adverse effects as consumers are not able to under-
stand and process it.395 Especially under pressure, which may occur if time available
to consumer to spend on their electronic purchasing is limited, and such circum-
stances are usually the case in nowadays society, consumers tend to focus only on
few main characteristics of the product, such as its price and recognizable brand.396
Moreover, online environment is full of distractions and consumers’ exposure to ad-
vertising is also greater than in traditional, physical trade, which makes it even
less likely for the consumers to read the pre-contractual information when shopping
over the Internet.397 It appears therefore that imposing too detailed information
duties, although seems justified by market inefficiencies, rests on false assumptions
concerning the way people make choices and decisions.398
394 COM(2012) 225 final pt 3.3.
395 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1114-1115 observe: ‘these benefits [of receiving free information] may be
significantly reduced if the obligees receive information they do not need: they have to process the
information, especially in order to determine what pieces of information are important to them.
If they receive much information that is of no relevance to them, the amount of time and energy
required for this selection may be considerable, and therefore obligees may be induced to disregard
the information altogether, even those pieces that are important for their decision (information
overload).’
396 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 293-294.
397 LUZAK (n 222) 14ff.
398 Omri BEN-SHAHAR and Carl E SCHNEIDER, ‘The Failure of Mandated Disclosure’ (2011) 159
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 647, 705 note: ‘More fundamentally, mandated disclosure
rests on false assumptions: that people want to make all the consequential decisions about their
lives, and that they want to do so by assembling all the relevant information, reviewing all the
possible outcomes, reviewing all their relevant values, and deciding which choice best promotes
their preferences. These assumptions so poorly describe how human beings live that mandated
disclosure cannot reliably improve people’s decisions and thus cannot be a dependable regulatory
mechanism.’
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Therefore, an informed consent is a myth in B2C online contracts.399 The prob-
lem of consumers not reading their contract terms results in market conditions being
deformed,400 as the traders cannot compete offering better contract terms, if con-
sumers are simply unaware of their existence. In addition, as Carrasco Perera points
out, consumers do not read, do not need and do not even want the information
provided to them by traders under disclosure duties established in European direct-
ives, however in the meantime such information increases the costs for businesses
and therefore the price of the products offered.401 The consumers end up paying for
a service that is of no use to them.
Also, the sensitivity of consumers to information provided differs among Member
States, as comparative studies show.402 Full harmonisation of information require-
ments, as established in the Directive on consumer rights for example, does not take
into account the fact that in the national markets where consumers expect high hon-
esty, the influence of the information provided to them on their contracting decision
can be even less significant, and vice versa.403
Moreover, and somewhat paradoxically, information duties designed to protect
consumers who are less rational and even sometimes na¨ıve in their choices make
individuals’ lives even more complicated.404 Too detailed information duties tend to
become exemption clauses — it is a well-known fact that traders, especially in the
context of the electronic transactions, produce very long lists of pre-contractual in-
formation, used as disclaimers, aiming at excluding or limiting their liability. During
399 Shmuel I BECHER, ‘Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet
to Be Met’ (2008) 45 American Business Law Journal 723, 274.
400 See for instance BEN-SHAHAR and SCHNEIDER (n 398) 705, where the authors conclude that
the very fact of imposing information duties rests on false assumptions and is almost certainly
doomed to be inefficient and consequently fails to contribute to improving market functioning.
401 CARRASCO PERERA, ‘Desarrollos Futuros del Derecho de Consumo en Espan˜a, en el Horizonte
de la Transposicio´n de la Directiva de Derechos de los Consumidores’ (n 46) 314.
402 See eg HOWELLS and WILHELMSSON (n 220) 382; WEATHERILL, ‘19. Consumer Protection’
(n 99) 240-241.
403 HOWELLS and WILHELMSSON (n 220) 382.
404 Legislators try to remedy information asymmetries through information supply, which again is
based on purely impracticable assumptions, see BEN-SHAHAR, ‘The Myth of the Opportunity to
Read in Contract Law’ (n 391) 3.
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the contracting process consumers have to tick a box saying something like ‘I have
read and I accept the terms and conditions of this contract’ in order to proceed
further to order the product. Those terms and conditions are often extremely long
and barely intelligible, reading them therefore is practically impossible.405 This way
traders bury pieces of information that might influence consumers’ contracting de-
cisions, thus making sure they will not pay attention to potential return costs or the
costs of supply of digital content.406 In consequence, information duties are evolving
from consumer protection measures into an instrument limiting traders’ liability,
which is the exact contrary of what they were designed for.407
It is then often argued that not only do information duties not fulfil their role
as consumer protection measure, but also that the very foundations of economics of
information are inaccurate. Consumer policy should not exhaust itself in eliminat-
ing the information asymmetry and transaction costs thus resulting. What should
be taken into account is the totality of transaction costs, including those that arise
from the arrangement, conclusion, and implementation of contracts, which cannot
be satisfactorily lowered through information duties alone.408 This issue, raised by
institutional economics, seems to have been — at least partially — considered by the
European legislator, hence for instance the control of fairness of the terms in con-
sumer contracts. Nevertheless, as information requirements are much less intrusive
into the contractual freedom and contract contents, it seems that they will continue
to prevail as widespread protective measures.409
405 For a real life story on how difficult it is to read and understand the terms and conditions, especially
in the e-commerce see eg Alex HERN, ‘I read all the small print on the internet and it made me want
to die’ The Guardian (London, 15 June 2015) <www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/15/i-
read-all-the-small-print-on-the-internet> accessed 15 November 2015.
406 CARRASCO PERERA, ‘Desarrollos Futuros del Derecho de Consumo en Espan˜a, en el Horizonte
de la Transposicio´n de la Directiva de Derechos de los Consumidores’ (n 46) 135; cf arts 14(1) and
14(4) of the Directive on consumer rights, which enable the trader to avoid bearing certain costs
(eg those of return of the good in the case of consumer’s withdrawal or those of supply of digital
content) provided that they inform the consumer about those.
407 MICKLITZ, ‘Do Consumers and Businesses Need a New Architecture of Consumer Law? A
Thought-Provoking Impulse’ (n 73) 269.
408 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 297.
409 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 455.
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1.1.2.4 Finding a balance: optimal information duties in the B2C e-
commerce
A critical approach to the consumer protection policies in place is definitely needed
— the laws can be improved only when the shortcomings are identified.410 Con-
sumer protection through information duties is a fact; another fact is that consumer
protection, especially in the digital environment is needed.411 Therefore, solutions
improving effectiveness of the information duties in consumer protection, aiming
also at increasing consumers’ confidence in the e-commerce should be explored, to-
gether with measures of legal and non-legal nature that could complement protection
through mandated disclosure.
Professor Weatherill put it simply: ‘If consumers — some consumers, most con-
sumers — simply do not absorb and act on this disclosed information then market
correction through information disclosure is a sham.412 It is often proposed to de-
termine an optimal level of information, which together with effective remedies for
its breach could correct, at least to some extent, undesired asymmetries in bargain-
ing power of the parties. It would be essential to establish what an optimal level
of information requirements is in what refers to quantity as well as quality. From
the economic point of view, the optimal information level should not exceed the
point where marginal costs of additional information duties are greater than their
marginal benefit.413 The regulation is only justified when market fails to achieve
adequate consumers and users protection, since an excessive regulation will only
slow down the desired development of the e-commerce. The legislator should find
a balance between an excessive regulation which hinders the development of the
e-commerce on the one hand, and the absence of adequate legislation aiming at
410 There are academics pointing out that criticising consumer protection based on information duties
became recently somewhat fashionable, whilst no better and more efficient solutions are proposed,
see eg SILBER (n 26) 23.
411 SILBER (n 26) 23 notes: ‘[t]here is (...) solid evidence to support the continuing beneficial impact
of legitimate and well conceived consumer protection rules adopted by courts, legislatures, and
independent agencies.’
412 WEATHERILL, EU Consumer Law and Policy (n 73) 316.
413 For more on optimal information requirements level see HAUPT (n 124) 1143.
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improving consumers’ trust and promoting the use of the e-commerce on the daily
basis on the other.414
Furthermore, especially in the context of new technologies, which evolve at a
rapid pace, one of the problems of casuistic information requirements lists established
in various directives and implemented in national laws is they inflexibility and the
need to add new pieces of information to the lists by legislators.415 In addition, the
lack of compliance mentioned above means that maybe adding more (in quantity)
information requirements is not what is needed, and enforcing sufficient compliance
with previously existing duties would be of more sense.416 Also, more flexibility
could be achieved through less strict approach to correcting deviations from the
perfect information and use of more general clauses instead of casuistic lists.417
Eidenmuller and others propose to assess the existence of a duty to disclose in each
individual case, taking into account various criteria, such as the cost of transmission
of the information or its availability.418 In the context of the B2C standard terms
contracts, such an individual approach seems nevertheless to be rather impractical.
What could be aimed for is more flexibility, and the criteria mentioned would be
of assistance in a case of a conflict between a trader and his counterpart over the
provision of information.
Information duties utility in contract law as an instrument of consumer pro-
414 HERNA´NDEZ JIME´NEZ-CASQUET (n 5) 427ff.
415 KIRCHNER (n 356) 171.
416 RIEFA (n 7) 37.
417 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 289.
418 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1115 state: ‘[t]he general rule should provide a non-exhaustive list of
criteria to be taken into account in deciding whether or not there is a duty of disclosure in an
individual case. Such criteria are: – whether or not the obligor already possesses the information
and, if not, at what cost he may acquire it; – the costs of transmitting the information to the
obligee; – whether or not the obligor has a legitimate interest in keeping the information secret,
either because the information relates to the obligor’s private sphere or because a duty to disclose
would frustrate the obligor’s investment made in acquiring the information; – how important the
information is for the obligee’s decision whether or not to conclude the contract, and whether or
not the obligor should be aware of this importance; – whether or not the obligee is aware of the
information’s importance for his or her decision whether or not to conclude the contract; – whether
or not, and at what cost, the obligee can acquire the information him- or herself, e.g. by asking
the obligor; – the parties’ expertise; – whether or not there are other incentives for the obligor to
transmit the information.’
115
1.1. INFORMATION DUTIES AND THEIR BREACH IN THE B2C
E-COMMERCE
tection and market regulation, however, does not only stem from the influence the
pre-contractual information has on consumer’s contracting decision.419 What is of
equal, if not greater importance nowadays, given all the weaknesses of mandated
disclosure presented above, is the utility of the information provided in the case
of breach or partial breach of contract combined with effective system of remedies,
including private law means of individual redress for consumers.420 Mandated dis-
closure from such a perspective serves market transparency and honesty, not because
the information is read carefully and taken on board by consumers before they enter
a given contract, but due to the fact that they receive the pre-contractual inform-
ation together with contract terms on a durable medium and trader’s compliance
with it is secured thanks to effective remedies for breach in place. Consumers’ trans-
action costs are lowered, since they do not need to read the whole list of information
provided to them, they can only focus on a few variables of special importance,
such as price for example, to compare offers available on the market an choose the
optimal one. Although it is true that to claim their rights after a breach occurred
would require a significant effort and a certain level of knowledge, not only the most
active consumers will be protected this way. The general market transparency and
honesty improvement will guarantee the protection to weaker and less knowledgable
consumers as well. Furthermore, the main criticism regarding information duties —
the information overload and the no-reading problem, become of lesser significance
in the scenario presented.
Another possible practical solution to the excess of information requirements that
consumers have to face would require analysis of consumers’ expectations regarding
contractual terms they receive, especially in the Internet standard form adhesion
contracts.421 The key aspect of such approach would be to draw consumers’ atten-
419 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 454.
420 See more in Chapter II Subsection 2.2.1 Importance of the remedies for breach of information
duties below.
421 See Ian AYRES and Alan SCHWARTZ, ‘The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law’
(2014) 66 Stanford Law Review 545, where the problem of ‘term optimism’ is described. It is a
situation where consumers expect some contract terms to be more favourable to them then they
actually are, but because of ever expanding list of disclosures consumers do not verify the terms for
themselves, as it is simply humanly impossible to read all the information disclosed. Solutions to
this problem proposed by the authors involve researching consumers expectations regarding terms
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tion to the pieces of information of special importance to them,422 and to help them
understand those. For instance, consumers’ attention could be brought to those par-
ticular aspects of the disclosed information that they do not expect or which they
might believe to be more favourable than they actually are. Along these lines states
an OECD document: ‘With a view towards providing consumers with relevant in-
formation that enables them to make informed decisions in e-commerce, work could
be conducted on enhancing consumer access and understanding of such informa-
tion.’423
A shift from quantity to quality of information provision is proposed, for in-
stance through the the way in which the information is presented. The presentation
influences a lot consumers’ understanding of the information provided, and the fact
whether they notice the disclosure at all in the fist place.424 The electronic environ-
ment is particularly complex in this context — it provides traders with practically
infinite options in what refers to information display, which can result both in mak-
ing it easier for consumers to notice and take up the disclosure425 or on the contrary,
to hide the information offering it in an unattractive manner.426
The digital environment also opens new possibilities for consumers who are will-
ing to search for the information for themselves. Nowadays, they do not have to
rely only on traders’ information and product testing, but also, and even more im-
portantly in the context of e-commerce, on the intermediaries — price and quality
comparison websites, websites gathering consumer feedback and opinions on certain
products, even expert, journalists and bloggers posts, which is of special importance
in relation to credence goods for example.427
of standard-form contracts.
422 OECD (n 68) 23.
423 Ibid 6.
424 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 306 propose to use symbolic information instead of textual.
425 LUZAK (n 222) 14 observes: ‘For example, online traders may play around with the disclosure’s
design, position, colour, font, etc. in order to increase the internet users’ chance of actually noticing
and reading [the disclosure].’
426 Such as a button opening a new window full of text that no-one can read or understand, see eg
HERN (n 405).
427 RISCHKOWSKY and DORING (n 132) 289-290.
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A duty to advise, looked at in Chapter II Subsection 2.1.1 Content and scope
of the information duties below, may complement plain information requirements,
flawed especially from the behavioural perspective, giving consumers more person-
alised access to information, thus increasing the chances of it being processed and
understood by recipients and used correctly during the contracting process. Duty
to advise could complement information duties in their current form, however as
requiring personal contract with consumer might result problematic in the context
of the electronic adhesion contracts.
Also, non-legal mechanisms, probably the most adequate in the context of e-
commerce, are being proposed.428 They are already functioning in various con-
texts,429 but nevertheless consumers still need to have access to all the contract
terms before and after contracting, at least to be able to refer to them in a possible
instance of a breach of contract — an already discussed issue of information utility
in the B2C contracts.
Also, competition law measures can be seen as means to decrease the use of un-
necessary information requirements. From the behavioural point of view, the mech-
anisms of competition may promote traders who take advantage of consumers’ lack
of rationality.430 Therefore, dealing with the issue at the level of competition law
through balancing competition and promoting healthy mechanisms therein could
contribute to limiting the necessity to turn to the information requirements. Sim-
ilarly, public enforcement, as for example the new enhanced consumer measures
introduced in the CRA 2015,431 also shifts focus from information requirements to
public enforcement of consumer rights.
428 BEN-SHAHAR, ‘The Myth of the Opportunity to Read in Contract Law’ (n 391) 21ff; see also
RIEFA (n 7) 39.
429 For example rating of buyers, sellers and products on webpages such as e-Bay.
430 Oren BAR-GILL, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics and Psychology in Consumer Markets
(Oxford University Press 2012) 2.
431 As set out in s 219A Enterprise Act 2002, the enhanced consumer measures are: redress, compliance
and consumer information measures.
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1.2 Information requirements — the law applic-
able
1.2.1 Constitutional foundations
The existence of information duties in the B2C e-commerce within the European
internal market is an undisputed fact; they are introduced by numerous legal rules,
both at European and national level. The laws establishing disclosure duties and the
duties themselves are of varied character: generally applicable to all contracts or spe-
cific only to consumer contracts, directly imposing detailed lists of pre-contractual
information requirements or introducing an indirect obligation of certain behaviour
in the contracting process.
At the European Union level, ‘[t]he Treaties establish the overarching framework
for the constitutional assessment of European contract law.’432 The primary role
of information in the area of consumer protection at the constitutional level in the
EU433 is guaranteed by the Article 169 TFEU:434 ‘the Union shall contribute to (...)
promoting [consumers’] right to information.’ The objective which is being attained
through: ‘measures adopted pursuant to Article 114 in the context of the completion
of the internal market; [and] measures which support, supplement and monitor the
policy pursued by the Member States.’435
These are the secondary provisions, such as consumer contract law directives,
432 Kathleen GUTMAN, The Constitutional Foundations of European Contract Law: A Comparative
Analysis (Oxford University Press 2014) 280.
433 See eg FERNA´NDEZ ARROYO (n 25) 145 who confirms that ‘[d]espite the failure of the so-called
“European Constitution” and its ensuing criticism, it is obvious that the regulations concerning
the EU’s treaties, as a “super State”, fulfill a constitutional function inasmuch as they guide and
limit for all the regulations and decisions of the EU and its member States.’
434 For a detailed history of development of consumer protection, also through information, at the level
of European Treaties see eg STUYCK, ‘European Consumer Law after the Treaty of Amsterdam:
Consumer Policy in or beyond the Internal Market?’ (n 72); Leire ESCAJEDO SAN EPIFANIO,
‘La Base Jur´ıdico-Constitucional de la Proteccio´n de los Consumidores en la Unio´n Europea’ (2007)
70 Revista de Derecho Pol´ıtico 225.
435 Article 169.2 (a) and (b); see also Subsection 1.1.2.1 The role of pre-contractual information in the
European consumer policy above.
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together with the CJEU judgments436 that detail the contents of the consumer’s
right to information.437 Especially in the area of the contract law, which is the
focus of the present study, consumer’s right to information translates into trader’s
respective duty to provide this information in the pre-contractual phase of their
relationship.438 The main activity of the EU in the area of protecting consumers
within the contract law provisions concentrates on the establishment of information
duties weighing on traders contracting with consumers.
It is can be noted that the concept of constitutional foundations in the con-
text of the European contract law serves to denote EU’s competence, its existence
and extent, in this area.439 Principles of conferral,440 subsidiarity,441 proportional-
ity442 and sincere cooperation443 regulate the exercise of Union’s competences. The
European contract law evolves currently around the acquis communautaire relating
to consumer protection,444 as the initiatives such as PECL and DCFR remain in the
sphere of soft law provisions.445 Consequently, the European contract law is mainly
436 See eg Case GB-INNO-BM para 689; see also HOWELLS and WILHELMSSON (n 220) 380.
437 MICKLITZ, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices and Misleading Advertising’ (n 216) 101.
438 See eg ZURILLA CARIN˜ANA (n 124) 2; MICKLITZ, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices and Misleading
Advertising’ (n 216) 101.
439 GUTMAN (n 432) 14-15.
440 Article 5(2) TEU states: ‘Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the
limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the
objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with
the Member States.’
441 Article 5(3) TEU states: ‘Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional
and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved at Union level.’
442 Article 5(4) TEU: ‘Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action
shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.’
443 Article 4(3) TEU: ‘Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member
States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the
Treaties.’
444 See eg STAUDENMAYER (n 56); Gema TOMA´S, ‘Harmonisation of European Contract Law:
Slowly but Surely?’ (2013) 20 Lex et Scientia International Journal 7.
445 GUTMAN (n 432) 277ff.
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concerned with information duties, given the prevalence of information paradigm in
consumer protection.
In what refers to the national constitutional law, these are the most modern
constitutions that establish rules specifically applicable to consumers, guaranteeing
their protection and the right to information.446 British constitution, an unwritten
constitution, is an uncodified, flexible set of different documents447 that contain ‘the
most important rules that regulate the relations among the different parts of the
government (...) and also the relations between the different parts of the government
and the people of the country.’448 It will be right to say, however, that none of those
documents explicitly deals with consumer contractual right to information. But since
European Union and Community laws also form part of the English constitutional
law, therefore consumer protection and especially consumer contractual rights, in-
cluding the right to information, can be understood to belong therein. That is not
to say, however, that the consumer protection in the area of contract law originated
in England solely as a consequence of the European influence; one can identify con-
sumer protection in common law decisions such as Donoghue v Stevenson,449 decided
already in 1932.450
In what refers to the Spanish legal order, contrary to the English one, it is
based on the principle of the hierarchy of norms with the 1978 Constitution being
the supreme law, which determines the rest of the norms in Spain that have to be
compatible with the Constitution. Therefore, the Article 51 of the Constitution is the
446 FERNA´NDEZ ARROYO (n 25) 145.
447 Anthony KING, Does the United Kingdom still have a constitution? (The Hamlyn Lectures, Sweet
& Maxwell 2001); the documents forming the UK constitution are for example: Magna Carta 1297,
Bill of Rights 1688, Crown and Parliament Recognition Act 1689 or Supreme Court Act 1981,
Human Rights Act 1998 and Northern Ireland Act 1998, to cite a few — see eg Joint Committee
on Draft Civil Contingencies Bill – First Report, HL 184 HC 1074, 28 November 2003, para 183
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200203/jtselect/jtdcc/184/18402.htm> accessed 16 June
2016.
448 KING (n 447) 1.
449 [1932] UKHL 100, the case where a duty of care of the manufacturer of not dangerous goods
towards a consumer was established.
450 BORRIE (n 73) 8ff.
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superior law within the Spanish system of consumer law.451 The 1978 Constitution
is historically the first piece of legislation in Spain that expressly mentions consumer
protection.452
The Article 51 is placed within the Chapter Three of the Constitution entitled
Governing Principles of Economic and Social Policy and it is considered to be one
of the real principles governing the economic model of the State adopted by the
Constitution.453 The Spain’s economic model is based on the freedom of enterprise,
recognised in Article 38, which nevertheless is not absolute, consumer protection
being one of the principles limiting its exercise.454
No fundamental right can be construed as arising from the Article 51,455 con-
sumer protection should rather be qualified as a policy principle – necessary feature
of a social and democratic State, which in turn is a basic concept on which Spanish
legal order and political system is founded, according to the Article 1.1 of the Con-
stitution. Consumer protection through information is expressly established in the
Article 51.2 of the Constitution, which reads:
The public authorities shall make means available to inform and educate
consumers and users, shall foster their organisations, and shall provide
hearings for such organisations on all matters affecting their members,
under the terms to be established by law.456
This provision belongs to the Chapter Three of the Constitution and Article
451 Jordi FAUS SANTASUSANA, ‘Spain’ in Dennis Campbell (ed), International Consumer Protec-
tion, Vol. 2 (Center for International Legal Studies, Springer Science + Business Media 1995)
SPA-II-1.
452 Carlos LASARTE A´LVAREZ, ‘La Proteccio´n del Consumidor como Principio General del Derecho’
in Antonio Monserrat Quintana (ed), Nuevos Derechos Fundamentales en el A´mbito del Derecho
Privado (Cuadernos de Derecho Judicial VI – 2007, Consejo General del Poder Judicial 2007) 64.
453 Asuncio´n GARCI´A MARTI´NEZ, ‘Constitucio´n Espan˜ola: Sinopsis Art´ıculo 51’ (Congreso de los Di-
putados 2003, updated by Sieira S 2011) <www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/imprimir/
sinopsis pr.jsp?art=51&tipo=2> accessed 1 February 2016.
454 PEINADO GRACIA, ‘El Derecho a la Proteccio´n de los Consumidores’ (n 132) 1879.
455 Ibid 1877, where various judgements of the Constitutional Court of Spain are quoted confirming
this point of view.
456 The Spanish Constitution, Agencia Estatal Bolet´ın Oficial del Estado (translated into English)
<www.congreso.es/constitucion/ficheros/c78/cons ingl.pdf> accessed 1 July 2016.
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53.3 states clearly that it can be invoked in courts only when developed by ordin-
ary legislation. This matter has never been looked at in practice given numerous
provisions guaranteeing consumer rights in Spanish law, nevertheless the theoret-
ical question concerning direct applicability of the Article 51 of the Constitution
divides Spanish academics. The discussion evolves around the notion of the general
principles of law, which according to the art 1 of the Spanish Co´digo Civil (Civil
Code) constitute sources of law and should be directly applicable in the absence of
relevant legislation (statute) or custom.457 Some authors consider the Article 51 of
the Constitution and consumer protection as such to be one of the general prin-
ciples of law and consequently assert its direct applicability in ordinary courts.458
Nonetheless, this point of view seems to be rather far-fetched, as Article 53.3 of the
Constitution treats consumer protection as a governing principle of economic and
social policy, which clearly does not lead to its recognition as a general principle of
law. Furthermore, Article 53.3 expressly limits its applicability to only where and
when it is developed by ordinary legislation.459
The Act of Parliament primarily dealing with consumer protection and devel-
oping constitutional provisions, TRLDCU, recognises fundamental consumer rights
in its art 8. Right to information is one of them, consumers are entitled to receive
457 Article 1.4 of the Spanish Civil Code — Real Decreto de 24 de julio de 1889 por el que se publica el
Co´digo Civil. Bolet´ın Oficial del Estado, 16 de agosto de 1889, nu´m. 206, p. 249 (Co´digo Civil) -–
establishes that general legal principles shall apply in the absence of applicable statute or custom,
without prejudice to the fact that they contribute to shape the legal system.
458 See eg LASARTE A´LVAREZ (n 452) 68ff, where the direct applicability of the Art 51 of the
Constitution is argued on a basis mainly of the wording of the art 1 TRLDCU, which states that
consumer protection shall take place within the context of the economic system designed in the
Articles 38 and 128 of the Constitution and be subject to the provisions established under Article
139; see also Alberto BERCOVITZ RODRI´GUEZ-CANO, ‘La Proteccio´n de los Consumidores, la
Constitucio´n Espan˜ola y el Derecho Mercantil’ in Toma´s R Ferna´ndez Rodr´ıguez (ed), Lecturas
Sobre la Constitucio´n Espan˜ola, Vol. 2 (Universidad Nacional de Educacio´n a Distancia 1978)
18ff, who considers that the first part of the Article 53.3 stating that ‘[t]he substantive legislation,
judicial practice and actions of the public authorities shall be based on the recognition, respect
and protection of the principles recognised in Chapter Three.’ indicates that consumer protection
is a principle that can be invoked directly in courts, and therefore the second part of this provision,
which requires the principles to be developed by the ordinary legislation in order to be directly
applicable, is merely an unfortunate wording, as the first sentence of the Article 53.3 implies that
judicial practice has to take into account the principles of Chapter Three, regardless of the fact
that they are or not actually developed by the ordinary legislation.
459 PEINADO GRACIA, ‘El Derecho a la Proteccio´n de los Consumidores’ (n 132) 1892.
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correct information on various goods or services, as well as education and other meas-
ures that promote knowledge about the appropriate use, consumption or enjoyment
of the goods and services.460
Constitutional right to receive information translates into an aforementioned
obligation to provide consumers with appropriate information, which rests on the
one hand on public bodies, State administration and consumer associations, and
on the other on the manufacturer, as well as on the consumer’s contractor, the
businessperson.461
In the Spanish legal order the central government of the State shares with
autonomous communities competences regarding consumer protection. According
to the Article 149.3 of the Constitution, ‘[m]atters not expressly assigned to the
State by virtue of the present Constitution may fall under the jurisdiction of the
Autonomous Communities by virtue of their respective Statutes’, and since con-
sumer protection is not mentioned as the State’s exclusive competence, practically
all Spanish autonomous communities have established their own consumer protec-
tion laws.462 Nonetheless, the Spanish State holds exclusive competence over con-
tract law.463 Therefore all the provisions dealing with contracting parties’ rights and
obligations, even though they might belong to the branch of consumer protection
law, will constitute Spanish State’s exclusive competence. Legislation establishing
and shaping the features of the pre-contractual duty to inform, which rests on a
businessperson entering a contract with a consumer, can be consequently only ad-
opted at the level of the State.464 More importantly, the Constitutional Court of
Spain confirms that if the contract is formed between a consumer and a trader, and
if damage due to misinformation occurs, the issue will be dealt with according to
the general law of the State and remedies established in the general Spanish law will
460 Art 8.d) TRLDCU.
461 Tribunal Constitucional (Pleno), Sentencia nu´m. 71/1982 de 30 de noviembre, Fundamento jur´ıdico
18.
462 Benjamin PEN˜AS MOYANO, ‘El Derecho Protector de los Consumidores y Usuarios en la
Comunidad Auto´noma de Castilla y Leo´n’ (2006) 9 Revista Jur´ıdica de Castilla y Leo´n 43, 47.
463 Article 149.1 viii).
464 See STC 71/1982 de 30 de noviembre, Fundamento jur´ıdico 18.
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be applicable.465
Information duties as an instrument of consumer protection are established at
the constitutional level both in England and in Spain -– in England through the
European Treaties and in Spain in the written Constitution. Nevertheless, con-
sumer’s constitutional right to information needs to be developed, specifically de-
termined and interpreted by the national legislation and courts in order to translate
into an effective trader’s duty to provide information. The applicable legislation ex-
ists both in England and in Spain, and in its great majority, due to the European
harmonisation measures, is quite similar. Nevertheless, some profound differences
between those two legal systems exist, especially in what refers to the general private
law, applicable to the B2C contracts, as I am arguing below.
1.2.2 General duty to disclose and its breach in national
private law
1.2.2.1 Good faith, fair dealing and pre-contractual duties of disclosure
Another issue, apart from formal regulation of consumer protection through inform-
ation requirements at the constitutional level, is the existence of general principles
of private law relative to the information duties, and especially the duty to act
in good faith, as the pre-contractual good faith, referred to in Spanish as buena
fe precontractual, is closely linked to the duties of disclosure, as we shall see below.
Such general rules are of primary significance, as they determine not only the way in
which the specific information duties are applied and what remedies are available for
their breach in each national system, but also, even more importantly, they provide
guidance to the European legislator about the existing laws and the necessity — or
lack thereof — to establish specific information duties together with remedies for
their breach in the consumer acquis.466
465 STC 71/1982 de 30 de noviembre, para 7, where the Court confirms that if the contract was formed
and damage occurred due to either lack of information or defective information that was provided,
the general law of the State and the remedies that it establishes will be applicable.
466 Cf DCFR Outline edition para 72 note that the European legislator ‘needs information about what
is in the existing laws and what can be omitted from the acquis because, in one form or another,
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The notion of good faith is present in the majority of the continental European
private law systems.467 The contractual good faith — the duty to act in good faith
when forming a contract, but also when performing it, might seem to be nevertheless
a rather vague and imprecise concept.468 Nevertheless, one has to remember that
in both civil and common law such concepts are abundant, and can be specified
through practice.469
First of all, good faith has two aspects — a subjective one and an objective
one. Subjectively, it refers to the state of mind of the contracting party, their in-
ternal intentions and thoughts; objectively good faith describes the behaviour of
the parties, their conduct observable from outside.470 Hence sometimes a distinction
between ‘good faith’ and ‘fair dealing’ is made: the former meaning honesty and
fairness in mind, the latter – observance of fairness in conduct.471 In many systems,
however, only the notion of ‘good faith’ is used, and it then covers both dimensions.
Nevertheless, even the subjective aspect of good faith is a certain standard that is
externalised through party’s actions. If a party does not have any other interest in
exercising a remedy, but to harm the other party, then they should not be entitled
to do so. Yet, the law can only regulate the way we act — the duty of good faith
is no exception, it is a certain standard that allows us to evaluate parties’ external
behaviour.472 The said standard being an abstract concept, it needs specification in
all Member States already have it.’
467 Martijn W HESSELINK, ‘The Concept of Good Faith’ in Arthur S Hartkamp and others (eds),
Towards a European Civil Code (4th edn, Kluwer Law International 2011) 619.
468 Ewan MCKENDRICK, Contract law (11th edn, Palgrave 2015) 214 points to English law being
‘reluctant to embrace broad general principles’.
469 See BROWNSWORD (n 90) 89 stating: ‘[i]f good faith and fair dealing is a bit hazy as a general
unspecified requirement, regulators can ease that concern by giving more particular guidance -–
after all, we get along perfectly well with a tort regime that hinges on a test (for a duty of care)
of what would be fair, just and reasonable.
470 HESSELINK, ‘The Concept of Good Faith’ (n 467) 619-620.
471 See Comment to Article 1:201: Good Faith and Fair Dealing of PECL.
472 See Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 37/2003 de 30 de enero (RJ
2003/2024), Fundamentos de Derecho, Cuarto, where the court state that good faith is an objective
concept; see also Pablo VALE´S DUQUE, La Responsabilidad Precontractual (Editorial Reus 2012)
110-112.
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order to be applied to a concrete singular situation.473 What should be taken into
consideration is therefore for instance the inequality of bargaining power between
the contracting parties, their relationship and the professional character of one of
the parties.
Is there a good faith principle in the European law? European contract law can
be understood in various ways – it may refer to contract law of Member States
of the European Union, and more specifically to some common rules and values
shared by those legal systems.474 European contract law is also used to describe
soft law instruments, such as PECL or DCFR.475 Finally, there are provisions, es-
pecially concerning consumer contracts, that established in the European directives
and implemented in national contract law of Member States form the acquis com-
munautaire. Both PECL476 and DCFR contain provisions relative to good faith, as
do international instruments, such as United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (CISG).477
Article 1:102 PECL establishes the principle of freedom of contract. Parties are
free to enter a contract on whatever terms they please, they can shape their con-
tractual relationship freely as well. However, this is true only to a certain extent –
the PECL clearly state that there are provisions which are mandatory and parties
can never exclude their application. The duty of good faith and fair dealing is con-
sidered to be of such importance as to be mandatory in character, art 1:201(2)
says that ‘[t]he parties may not exclude or limit this duty’ when referring to the
duty to act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing. Freedom of contract is
473 HESSELINK, ‘The Concept of Good Faith’ (n 467) 623.
474 JHM van ERP, ‘The Pre-contractual Stage’ in Arthur S Hartkamp and others (eds), Towards a
European Civil Code (4th edn, Kluwer Law International 2011) 494. Rules on the general duty to
disclose in national law are the focus of the Subsection 1.2.2.2 General duty to disclose in national
private law below.
475 Jan SMITS, ‘The Principles of European Contract Law’ in Antoni Vaquer Aloy (ed), La Tercera
Parte de Los Principios de Derecho Contractual Europeo (Tirant lo Blanch 2005) 567ff.
476 Although it is worth remembering that PECL are designed as model rules for international com-
mercial contracts, not purely domestic and not consumer contracts, see ERP (n 474) 498.
477 Vienna, 1980, in its art 7(1) refers to the observance of good faith in international trade. Never-
theless, the CISG is concerned strictly with business contracts, consumer contracts being excluded
from its scope of application, see arts 1, 2.
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definitely one of the core concepts of the PECL, but the approach adopted in the
provisions is encouraging the co-operation of the parties478 and their acting in good
faith. The concept of good faith is prevalent in the whole instrument, art 1:106(1)
establishes that promoting good faith and fair dealing is of particular importance
when interpreting the Principles. Remedies for mistake, incorrect information and
non-performance can only be excluded or restricted when doing so would not be not
contrary to good faith and fair dealing.479
One of the fundamental principles of the DCFR is that of good faith and fair
dealing – art I. — 1:102(3)(b) states that ‘[i]n [the] interpretation and development
[of the model provisions] regard should be had to the need to promote (...) good
faith and fair dealing (...).’ The instrument explains how ‘good faith and fair dealing’
should be understood in its art I. — 1:103:
(1) The expression “good faith and fair dealing” refers to a standard
of conduct characterised by honesty, openness and consideration for the
interests of the other party to the transaction or relationship in question.
(2) It is, in particular, contrary to good faith and fair dealing for a
party to act inconsistently with that party’s prior statements or conduct
when the other party has reasonably relied on them to that other party’s
detriment.
There can be no doubt that European soft law instruments recognise the good
faith principle. Nevertheless, those sets of rules are designed not only as model rules,
but also as a recapitulation of principles common to laws of European states. The
pertinent question is then whether the good faith provisions are a real principle
forming part of the common core of European contract law, or are they only found
in national systems of private law of some Member States but not in others?480 It
seems that the philosophy of the European contract law is strongly influenced, at
478 See art 1:202: Duty to co-operate.
479 See arts 4:118 and 8:109.
480 Simon WHITTAKER and Reinhard ZIMMERMANN, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law:
Surveying the Legal Landscape’’ in Simon Whittaker and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Good
Faith in European Contract Law (The Common Core of European Private Law, Cambridge studies
in international and comparative law, Cambridge University Press 2008) 14.
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least in some of its aspects, by civilian law systems to which points the inclusion of
good faith principle in its current shape.481
Also in the acquis communautaire examples of the use of the good faith principle
can be found. The Directive on unfair terms482 introduced the notion of good faith
in all Member States, including those that did not have this concept in their national
law. Although it was not the first directive to use the standard of good faith,483 it
was the first on such importance for the contract law in general and consumer law
specifically.
Introduction to the DCFR Outline edition describes the current position of the
good faith principle in the European contract law:
In many laws the principle is accepted as fundamental, but it is not
accorded the same recognition in the laws of all the Member States. In
some systems it is not recognised as a general rule of direct application. It
is true that such systems contain many particular rules which perform the
same function as a requirement of good faith, in the sense that they are
aimed at preventing the parties from acting in ways that are incompatible
with good faith, but there is no general rule.484
The position of English and Spanish law towards the good faith as a standard of
behaviour of contracting parties needs to be looked at when the information duties
are analysed. The pre-contractual duty to disclose is closely related to the philosophy
underlying national contract law485 and especially to the duty to act in good faith.
481 That is not to say, however, that the common law has no representation in the European contract
law -– the definitions clarified as one of the first rules in a legal instrument are characteristic feature
of the English law legislation, which has been adopted by the European contract law, including
the acquis communautaire.
482 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ
L095/29 (Directive on unfair terms).
483 WHITTAKER and ZIMMERMANN, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law: Surveying the Legal
Landscape” (n 480) 13.
484 para 72.
485 ‘An investigation of the “duty to disclose” on a comparative law basis is most rewarding; it leads us
straight to the philosophy underlying the law of contracts’ -– Friedrich KESSLER and Edith FINE,
‘Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study’
(1964) 77 Harvard Law Review 401, 438; see also GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour:
The Duty to Disclose in English and French Law’ (n 66) 623; WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-
FLESNER (n 113) 446.
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This is where the divide between civil and common law systems becomes apparent.486
It also shows how traditional perception of contract law, including especially contract
formation process,487
In what refers to English law, it is often said that the concept of the duty to
act in good faith is foreign to English system,488 which is mainly concerned with
freedom of contract.489 An English judge, Bingham LJ observed: ‘In many civil law
systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside the common law world, the law
of obligations recognises and enforces an overriding principle that in making and
carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith.’ and continued ‘English law
has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle (...).’490
The consumer’s right to be informed and corresponding information duties in
Spanish legal system reach beyond the contract law as already discussed – they are
established in the supreme set of norms, the Spanish Constitution. Moreover, the
Spanish law is generally based on the principle of good faith – the art 7.1 of the
Co´digo civil states that rights must be exercised in conformity with the requirements
of good faith.491 In what refers specifically to contract law, in article 1258 of the
Co´digo civil we can find another provision saying that contracts bind the parties not
486 WHITTAKER and ZIMMERMANN, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law: Surveying the Legal
Landscape” (n 480) 15.
487 ERP (n 474) 495.
488 Despite the concept of good faith introduced into English contract law for example through the
Directive on unfair terms; it was called a ‘legal irritant’ for English law, and the House of Lords twice
refused to make reference to the CJEU for clarification of this concept — see Hans-W MICKLITZ
and Norbert REICH, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty: the Revival of the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive (UCTD)’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 771, 785.
489 See WHITTAKER and ZIMMERMANN, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law: Surveying the
Legal Landscape” (n 480) 15, who quote Niall Whitty saying ‘[Scots law] has not accepted the
civilian doctrine that the exercise of contractual rights is subject to the principles of good faith.
The better view is that like English law it requires strict adherence to contracts’.
490 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 433, 439; a position which
has been confirmed recently eg in Monde Petroleum SA v WesternZagros Ltd [2016] EWHC 1472
(Comm), 249ff and MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company SA v Cottonex Anstalt [2016] EWCA
Civ 789, 45.
491 Note, nevertheless, that Article 7 of the Co´digo civil was introduced in the early 1970s, much later
than the subsequent article 1258 which establishes the duty to act in good faith within the realm
of contract law.
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only to fulfil what they have expressly agreed upon, but also to comply with all the
consequences that, according to their nature, result from good faith, custom and the
law. Although there is no specific provision requiring the parties to act according to
the principle of good faith during the pre-contractual negotiations, Spanish courts
do accept the existence of such a duty.492 According to the Tribunal Supremo good
faith mentioned in the article 1258 of the Co´digo civil is an objective duty to act
honestly, justly and loyally. Good faith implies a coherent conduct of the parties
protecting the trust of others.493
The duty to act in good faith at the pre-contractual stage is a twofold concept –
on the one hand, parties should not behave contrary to the good faith and therefore
it is forbidden to deceive the other party, on the other hand there is a positive duty
to act in good faith. Under Spanish law the parties are therefore bound to disclose
material information to each other -– to omit information that should be disclosed
in good faith can amount to misrepresentation (fraud or induced mistake).494 As
observed by Bingham LJ, acting in good faith at the pre-contractual stage:
This does not simply mean that they should not deceive each other, a
principle which any legal system must recognise; its effect is perhaps
most aptly conveyed by such metaphorical colloquialisms as ‘playing
fair,’ ‘coming clean’ or ‘putting one’s cards face upwards on the table.’
It is in essence a principle of fair and open dealing.495
The duty to disclose arising from the good faith principle emphasizes the role
of informed consent in the contract formation process.496 The freedom of contract
principle is based on the assumption that each party decides for themselves whether
to enter or not a contractual relationship and become bound by an enforceable
agreement. Nevertheless, surrendering this freedom by both parties acting in good
492 See for instance Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 263/2009 de 24
de abril (RJ 2009/3167), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero, Cuarto.
493 STS nu´m. 37/2003 de 30 de enero, Fundamentos de Derecho, Cuarto.
494 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 747/2007 de 3 de julio (RJ
2007/747), Fundamentos de Derecho, Quinto; STS nu´m. 263/2009 de 24 de abril, Fundamentos de
Derecho, Cuarto.
495 Interfoto Picture Library 439.
496 ERP (n 474) 497.
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faith has to be conscious, hence the duty of disclosure. On the other hand, in some
contracts information may potentially have financial value, and when contracting
process is regarded as adversarial rather than co-operative, disclosure is not man-
datory.497 Hesselink observes that European legal systems that contain a good faith
provision will usually recognise various functions of it, such as: supplementation of
duties, limitation of rights, interpretation of law and contracts. The duty of good
faith in those systems translates into various more specific sub-duties.498 In Span-
ish law, the duty to inform is arguably the most important one. The principle of
good faith is interpreted in this way that it gives rise to a duty to disclose material
information before the conclusion of a contract.499 The Spanish Tribunal Supremo
highlights the need of the pre-contractual conduct of the parties to be coherent
with the requirements of good faith, closely linked to the protection of the trust in
relationship of the contracting parties.500
Not only does the principle of good faith in Spanish law gives rise to a duty to
disclose material information before the conclusion of a contract, but also Spanish
courts recognise a concept of a fraud by non-disclosure – negative fraud due to omis-
sion501 – when good faith requires the parties to provide such piece of information to
497 See GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French
Law’ (n 66) 629.
498 HESSELINK, ‘The Concept of Good Faith’ (n 467) 624, in the context of the French system sub-
duties such as duty of loyalty and duty to cooperate are identified; duty to inform being a sub-duty
of the duty to cooperate.
499 See Julio PICATOSTE BOBILLO, ‘El Derecho de Informacio´n en la Contratacio´n con Consum-
idores’ [2011] Actualidad Civil 372, 392 who considers that the pre-contractual duty to inform
was implicitly included in the Civil code, long before the adoption of information duties from the
EC directives, in the theory of the vices of consent and as an obligation to act accordingly to the
principle of good faith; see also Raquel GUILLE´N CATALA´N, El Regime´n Jur´ıdico de la Oferta
Contractual Dirigida a los Consumidores (Adaptada al Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2007, de 16 de
noviembre, por el que se aprueba el TRLGDCU) (Colegio de Registradores de la Propiedad y Mer-
cantiles de Espan˜a, Centro de Estudios 2010) 28ff; along the same lines ZURILLA CARIN˜ANA
(n 124) 1ff.
500 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia de 16 de noviembre de 1979 (RJ 1979/3850) 4.
501 Francisca SANCHEZ HERNANZ, ‘Discussions - Spain - Case 2: Celimene v. Damien’ in Ruth
Sefton-Green (ed), Mistake, Fraud and Duties to Inform in European Contract Law (The Common
Core of European Private Law, Cambridge University Press 2005) 157-158.
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the other side.502 In this context the information duties established in the Spanish
legislation implementing European directives can be seen as a specific application
of general principles — that of the good faith and of the theory of the vices of con-
sent.503 The wording of the art 65 TRLDCU seems to confirm such consideration.504
Interestingly however, Spanish courts are reluctant to award damages for breach of
the general duty of pre-contractual good faith, instead it is often found that an oral
contract made by the parties was breached.505
Those differences in existence and application of the good faith principles among
Member States have important implications for the European consumer contract
law. The European legislator cannot rely on a general requirement of good faith in
parties pre-contractual behaviour to supplement the protective measures, such as
information duties, established in the directives – the good faith principle has to
be incorporated expressly in a directive, as in the Directive on unfair terms, to be
applicable in all jurisdictions.506
1.2.2.2 General duty to disclose in national private law
The requirement of acting in good faith in the process of forming a contract is
closely linked to the existence of the duty to disclose material information to the
other party. As Wilhelmsson and Twigg-Flesner observe, the correct approach when
analysing the information duty is not whether or not it does exist in the legal system,
502 STS nu´m. 263/2009 de 24 de abril (RJ 2009/3167), Fundamentos de Derecho, Cuarto where the
words ’reticencia dolosa por ocultacio´n de una informacio´n que la buena fe le impone suminis-
trar(...)’ are used; see also art 65 TRLDCU: consumer contracts shall be complemented by re-
quirements resulting from the principle of the objective good faith to consumer’s benefit, also in
the cases of the omission of the relevant pre-contractual information, says the legislation expressly
invoking good faith principle in the case of information omission.
503 PICATOSTE BOBILLO (n 499) 392.
504 The art 65 reads: ’Los contratos con los consumidores y usuarios se integrara´n, en beneficio del
consumidor, conforme al principio de buena fe objetiva, tambie´n en los supuestos de omisio´n de
informacio´n precontractual relevante.’
505 A´ngel CARRASCO PERERA, ‘Case 3: Breaking off Negotiations. SPAIN’ in Simon Whittaker
and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Good Faith in European Contract Law (The Common Core
of European Private Law, Cambridge studies in international and comparative law, Cambridge
University Press 2008) 244-245; see also eg STS nu´m. 263/2009 de 24 de abril (RJ 2009/3167).
506 DCFR Outline edition, Introduction para 72.
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but rather when and how it is used, as all the European systems do recognise a
duty to disclose information to the other party, however to different extents.507 The
spectrum is broad -– from a general duty to honestly inform the other party about
all material facts they might find useful when taking their contractual decision, to
the requirement of not lying — ie of not providing false information spontaneously
in order to induce the other party to enter the contract.
Eidenmuller and others note that it is
essential to distinguish two categories [of information duties]: (i) a gen-
eral standard which must be specified according to the circumstances of
the case at hand (general duty of disclosure), and (ii) statutory regula-
tions that define the information to be disclosed with regard to a certain
transaction (specified duties of disclosure). While a general standard
leaves the courts a wide discretion to define the duty in a given case,
the specified duties are more foreseeable and can usually be fulfilled in
a standardized manner.508
It is also of crucial importance in what refers to the breach of information re-
quirements, precisely for the reasons the quoted authors point to. Firstly, I will look
at the general information duty, and then in the following section at more specific
duties, which can be further divided into indirect, wider in scope obligations intro-
duced rather through the consequences of breach, and direct ones, established in
long lists of detailed requirements present both in European and national law.
In what refers to the soft law provisions for consumer contracts, the DCFR does
not contain a general disclosure duty, although s I (Information duties) of Ch 3,
Book II, arts II.–3:101ff establish rather detailed and comprehensive information
requirements, especially in the context of consumer contracts. However, rules relat-
ive to mistake in art II.–7:201 -– especially II.–7:201(1)(b)(ii) and (iii) allow for a
possibility to avoid a contract on the grounds of mistake, if the other party:
(...) (ii) caused the contract to be concluded in mistake by leaving the
mistaken party in error, contrary to good faith and fair dealing, when
the other party knew or could reasonably be expected to have known
507 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 455.
508 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1113.
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of the mistake; (iii) caused the contract to be concluded in mistake by
failing to comply with a pre-contractual information duty or a duty to
make available a means of correcting input errors (...).
Similarly, provisions on fraud (art II.–7:205) read:
(1) A party may avoid a contract when the other party has induced the
conclusion of the contract by fraudulent misrepresentation, whether by
words or conduct, or fraudulent non-disclosure of any information which
good faith and fair dealing, or any pre-contractual information duty,
required that party to disclose (...).
Those provisions actually establish a general disclosure duty, categorising a
breach of such duty as a mistake or fraud.509 As already mentioned in the context
of the adoption of the good faith principle, the DCFR provisions seem to represent
rather civil law vision on the legal nature of the pre-contractual information duties,
taking into consideration the common law one only up to a limited extent.510
Apart from the DCFR provisions discussed above, which at least theoretically
represent the European common core laws, other model rules also consider disclosure
duties.511 In the context of B2C online contracts, in addition to specific information
requirements, general duty to disclose information is also introduced in an indirect
way in the OECD Guidelines — Part Two, s II. concerning fair business, advertising
and marketing practices: ‘(...) Businesses should not make any representation, or
omission, or engage in any practice that is likely to be deceptive, misleading, fraud-
ulent or unfair.’ The duty not to make a misleading omission can be understood as
509 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1113.
510 The differences between common and civil law positions regarding information duties in general are
presented below in the current section of the present study; cf also ERP (n 474) 513 who suggests
to adopt an approach focusing on avoidance of bad faith, which is common (up to certain extent)
to both legal traditions, as is discussed in more detail below and in Chapter 3 Section 3.2 General
private law and remedies it offers.
511 See eg PECL art 4.107(3) which under the head of fraud considers disclosure duties: (3) In determ-
ining whether good faith and fair dealing required that a party disclose particular information,
regard should be had to all the circumstances, including: ‘(a) whether the party had special ex-
pertise; (b) the cost to it of acquiring the relevant information; (c) whether the other party could
reasonably acquire the information for itself; and (d) the apparent importance of the information
to the other party.’
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a duty to provide clear, relevant and material information to the consumer before
the contract is formed.512 Such provision is similar to the DCFR rule introducing
the general disclosure duty via mistake and fraud concepts.513
The consumer acquis communautaire focuses on various specific issues through
different directives, information duties there imposed form a lengthy list of casuistic
requirements. As there is no comprehensive set of rules for all contracts in the acquis,
there neither is a general disclosure duty.514 The directives aim only at regulating
certain aspects of contracting, and usually are without prejudice to the national
general contract law, which is why the remedies for breach of the pre-contractual
information duties have to be sought in the national law when directives fail to
impose harmonised ones. Furthermore, the lack of overarching disclosure principle
in the acquis, which cannot be generalised from casuistic duties,515 also means that
the duties established in the directives cannot be seen as specific applications of a
general principle at the European level. However within the national law, where a
general duty to disclose exists, specific duties implemented in the national law are
regarded as coherent with that principle, benefit from the remedies thus resulting
and courts’ interpretation, often favourable for the existence and extent of the duties.
The spectrum of possible different approaches to the general disclosure duty in
512 See MICKLITZ, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices and Misleading Advertising’ (n 216) 101-103; WIL-
HELMSSON, ‘European Rules on Pre-Contractual Information Duties?’ (n 360) 22.
513 The relationship between direct disclosure duty and indirect duties resulting from other provisions,
eg on mistake or fraud, will be discussed in more detail further in Subsection 1.2.3.1 More general
and indirect information duties below.
514 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 456; cf however MICKLITZ, ‘Unfair Commer-
cial Practices and Misleading Advertising’ (n 216) 101 considering that ‘[t]he Directive on unfair
commercial practices pushes the development into the direction of a general information duty.’ and
WILHELMSSON, ‘European Rules on Pre-Contractual Information Duties?’ (n 360) 22 stating,
also in the context of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, ‘Article 7 of the Unfair Com-
mercial Practices Directive forbids the misleading omission of information and thereby contains an
indirect duty to disclose information, even though the Commission has preferred not to describe
the provision in such language. The purpose of providing the consumer with relevant information
in the pre-contractual stage has indeed been seen as one of the central aspects of the Directive.’
515 EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1113; cf however WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 456
noting that ‘[w]hat we can do, therefore, is to identify a number of circumstances where the acquis
imposes an obligation to provide information before a contract is concluded, and consider whether
there are particular principles which could be said to underpin the imposition of such duties in
specific contexts.’
136
1.2. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS — THE LAW APPLICABLE
the general contract law is determined by balancing potentially conflicting values
-– freedom of contract and social protection, similarly to the rationale and shape
of consumer protection, as discussed above in Subsection 1.1.2.3 Issues relative to
information duties in consumer contracts. Common and civil law concerns are differ-
ent.516 Pre-contractual disclosure constitutes a field in which the difference between
civil and common law is particularly evident.517 English and Spanish law are situated
on the opposite ends of the spectrum of possible attitudes towards pre-contractual
information duties.518 Generally speaking, English law approaches information du-
ties with scepticism,519 whilst Spanish private law provides for exchange of essential
information by the contracting parties at the pre-contractual stage.
The analysis of the information duties in English law should start from the basic
premise that English law, in contrary to Spanish system, recognises no general duty
to disclose.520 Mandated disclosure is regarded as an interventionist approach that
cannot be easily reconciled with caveat emptor principle, insisting on both parties
protecting their own interests in the contracting process, and other general rules
governing English contract formation process.521
516 Cf GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French
Law’ (n 66) 636 who observes that the art 4.107(3) PECL -– quoted above in footnote 511 tries
to reconcile common and civil law concerns through the factors that influence the existence of the
disclosure duty.
517 Along these lines WILHELMSSON, ‘Private Law Remedies against the Breach of Information
Requirements of EC Law’ (n 229) 247.
518 See GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French
Law’ (n 66) 623 where the author compares English and French law, noting that German and
Italian system are situated somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, not as hostile to the concept
of pre-contractual disclosure as the English law is, but not as enthusiastic as the French law is
either; see also WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 455 who observe that ‘(...) there
is a fairly broad variation in the attitudes towards the duty to disclose in the European legal
systems. What is more important in this context, however, is the fact that European legal systems
can be placed on a spectrum rather than within a strict dichotomy. No legal system lacks a duty
of disclosure altogether, and in all systems there are limits to the duty as well.’
519 Or even hostility, WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 455.
520 GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspective’
(n 56) 303.
521 GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French Law’
(n 66) 623; from the law and economics point of view mandated disclosure ‘dilutes incentives
to acquire information, which can be socially undesirable’ – see Steven SHAVELL, ‘Economic
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In the pre-contractual phase, contracting parties are regarded as being in ad-
versarial positions and there is no obligation on them to disclose any information to
the other party. The fact that non-disclosure is not viewed negatively does not mean
however, that the parties can mislead each other providing false information.522 In
Walford v Miles523 the court clearly stated that:
(...) the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inher-
ently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved
in negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his
(or her) own interest, so long as he avoids making misrepresentations.524
In Keates v Cadogan525 Maule J illustrates this common law rule with an ex-
ample:
If a horse-dealer contracts to sell a gentleman a horse fit to carry him,
and he sells him one which he knows to be unfit for the purpose, he does
not perform his contract. But, if a man buys a horse generally, the seller
will not be responsible, although, knowing that his customer wanted the
horse for his own riding, he sells him one which will not carry him.526
Parties in English law are allowed to protect their own position, providing they
do not actively mislead the other party — the law stays indifferent towards a fault
Analysis of Contract Law’ [2002] National Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers 9696
<www.nber.org/papers/w9696> accessed 15 January 2016, 4; WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-
FLESNER (n 113) 446 note that ‘the issue [of pre-contractual information duties] is sensitive from
the point of view of legal policy. There are profound differences between the Member States -– with
the main contrast being the rather negative stance towards a duty to disclose essential information
in common law and a more positive attitude in many continental legal systems and those differences
seem to reflect deeper differences in the understandings of the institution of contract.’
522 See GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French
Law’ (n 66) 624 who clarifies that ‘[t]he courts will not permit statements which actively mislead
the other party, but this does not extend to a duty to disclose information which would influence
the other party’s position.’
523 [1992] 2 AC 128.
524 Walford v Miles at 138.
525 (1851) 10 CB 591.
526 Keates v Cadogan at 596.
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of omission, it is only the commission, active conduct aimed at misleading the other,
that may be actionable.527
Spanish law views pre-contractual stage rather differently -– the active co-operation
between the contracting parties is promoted. Both parties are bound to communic-
ate to each other all the circumstances known to them — or even more broadly, that
should be known to them — that, if were known to the other party as well, would
influence their decision as to the contract itself or at least as to some of its terms.528
In any contractual relationship, as the Tribunal Supremo states, it is fundamental to
protect the trust the parties have in each other’s conduct. The parties shall not take
advantage of each other, conduct going against the good faith and trust between
the parties is inadmissible.529 Such conduct might comprise ’encouraging misplaced
reliance’ or ’securing an unduly advantageous transaction.’530
English law admits that in some specific situations the duty to disclose might ex-
ist. Nevertheless, as Fry J stated in Davies v London & Provincial Marine Insurance
Co:531
Where parties are contracting with one another, each may, unless there
be a duty to disclose, observe silence even in regard to facts which he
believes would be operative upon the mind of the other, and it rests upon
those who say that there was a duty to disclose, to shew that the duty
existed.532
The caveat emptor principle operates therefore as a general rule to which ex-
ceptions are rare and must be established in law.533 The judgement in Sykes v
527 John CARTWRIGHT, ‘Defects of Consent and Security of Contract: French and English Law
Compared’ in Peter Birks and Arianna Pretto (eds), Themes in Comparative Law: In Honour of
Bernard Rudden (Oxford University PRess 2002) 157.
528 Ester GO´MEZ CALLE, Los Deberes Precontractuales de Informacio´n (La Ley 1994) 11.
529 STS de 16 de noviembre de 1979 (RJ 1979/3850), 4.
530 COLLINS, ‘Good faith in European Contract Law’ (n 379) 250.
531 (1878) 8 Ch D 469.
532 Davies v London & Provincial Marine Insurance Co at 474.
533 However, there is a growing number of exceptions, as GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract and Pre-
Contractual Information from an English Perspective’ (n 56) 303 puts it: ‘[t]he English position
thus lies as much with the exceptions as the basic rule.’, major exceptions in the field of information
duties are introduced into the English law through consumer law.
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Taylor-Rose534 confirmed that when asked for opinion before contracting, parties
are not under duty to disclose any more information than legally required.535 In
contrast, in theory pre-contractual duty to act in good faith recognised in Spanish
law requires the parties to disclose all material information. Would the case of Sykes
v Taylor-Rose have been decided differently, had it happened in Spain? The facts of
this case were following: a couple purchased a property, on which a horrible murder
had been committed some 20 years earlier. They sold the house less than two years
after learning about the murder. When selling the house they were asked by the
buyers if there was any other information (apart from all legal and technical things
previously discussed by the parties) which they thought the buyer might have a
right to know. And their answer was ‘no,’ they did not tell the buyers about the
murder that had taken place on the property. A year after the property transfer,
the new owners saw a documentary on TV detailing all the circumstances of the
horrible crime, including the fact the victims body had been dismembered and body
parts might have still existed within the property. After seeing that documentary,
the couple moved out of the house and put it on sale. They disclosed the information
on the murder to prospective buyers and subsequently sold the property for 25,000
less than its market value. They sued the previous vendors (that had sold the house
to them) for not informing them about property’s history, and more importantly
for responding ‘no’ to the question about any other possibly important information.
The English court, as we know, decided that there was no duty to disclose that par-
ticular piece of information to the other party.536 On the other hand, the Spanish
Tribunal Supremo notes that ‘malicious conduct’ of contracting parties is contrary
to the requirements of good faith, the ‘malicious conduct’ being non-disclosing or
omitting certain pieces of information that would influence the will of the other
party to enter the contract.537 Such a point of view might in this case translate
into an obligation to mention the fact of the murder having been committed at the
534 [2004] EWCA Civ 299.
535 See Sykes v Taylor-Rose at 584-585.
536 As GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspect-
ive’ (n 56) 305 notes, an issue of a general disclosure duty was not even argued in the court at this
instance, it had been raised at first instance and was rejected.
537 STS nu´m. 747/2007 de 3 de julio (RJ 2007/747), Fundamentos de Derecho, Quinto.
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property, especially when specifically asked about any other relevant information
concerning the property.
Not only does English law not require parties to disclose material information,538
but also there is no duty to tell the other party they are mistaken. The authority
can be found in the classic case Smith v Hughes539 where Blackburn J explained that
‘there is no legal obligation on the vendor to inform the purchaser that he is under
mistake, not induced by the act of vendor’.540 Nevertheless, this position is not as
strict as it may seem — if buyer’s mistake concerns terms of the vendor’s offer, then
the latter is bound to inform the buyer of the true nature of his offer.541 Spanish
law is neither that strict on the duty to correct the mistaken party assumptions as
it might seem, the Tribunal Supremo has emphasized that in some circumstances
there is no obligation to reveal to the other party their mistake consisting in their
lack of awareness concerning some qualities of the good.542
There are various reasons for rejection of the general duty to disclose by Eng-
lish law. Beale points to the ‘the fact that English law is very heavily influenced
by the heavy diet of commercial cases that are heard in English courts.’543 The
potential financial value of the information is definitely one of them,544 especially
important in B2B contracts, as companies invest their resources in order to acquire
information. Secondly, the vagueness of the general disclosure duty would make it
hard to determine in each case what is the exact scope of the duty,545 which in
538 Apart from the case law mentioned above, see also Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161.
539 [1871] LR 6 QB 597.
540 Smith v Hughes at 597.
541 See MCKENDRICK, Contract law (n 468) 214, who points out to a more recent case confirming
the proposition in law from Smith v Hughes -– Statoil ASA v Louis Dreyfus Energy Services LP
[2008] EWHC 2257 (Comm).
542 See STS nu´m. 263/2009 de 24 de abril (RJ 2009/3167), Fundamentos de Derecho, Cuarto.
543 Hugh BEALE, ‘Pre-contractual Obligations: The General Contract Law Background’ (2008) XIV
Juridica International 42, 47.
544 See GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspect-
ive’ (n 56) 302; MCKENDRICK, Contract law (n 468) 213.
545 GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French Law’
(n 66) 629.
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turn could undermine transactional certainty.546 Finally, contractual obligations are
voluntarily assumed by the parties, hey are said to be ‘seeking to make the best bar-
gain they can,’ which according to McKendrick explains why they are not expected
to share information with each other.547 Nevertheless, although Spanish companies
and individuals are also looking for the best possible bargain and invest into ob-
taining information, the Spanish law sees the solution rather differently. It is the
co-operation of the parties at the pre-contractual stage that is supposed to guar-
antee the best outcome. Their consent should be as informed as possible, so that
neither party could take unfair advantage of the concealed information that would
be of importance to the other. Also, traditionally, the Spanish contract law is based
on the freedom of contract principle,548 the parties enter the contract surrendering
their freedom, therefore they should be fully aware of all the circumstances. Spanish
law aims at limiting litigation and increasing general welfare through encouraging
information exchange, as parties conclude contracts knowing all the relevant cir-
cumstances and therefore, at least theoretically, only exchanges beneficial for both
parties take place. The good faith principle is understood as an objective criterion
used to evaluate the behaviour of the contracting parties.549 However, this very gen-
eral statement will need to be specifically applied in each situation,550 and this is
when concrete information duties will receive precise scope and meaning.
As mentioned above, in some specific situations, such as some special contracts
or duties imposed by legislation, English law recognises various information duties
of different types.551 Uberrimae fidei contracts, contracts of ‘utmost good faith,’ can
546 See GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspect-
ive’ (n 56) 301 observing that ‘a desire for certainty (...) plays a significant role, requiring security
of transactions and clear and predictable rules which the courts are able to apply.’
547 MCKENDRICK, Contract law (n 468) 214.
548 Luis DI´EZ-PICAZO, ‘La Propuesta de Modernizacio´n del Derecho de Obligaciones y Contratos
(una Presentacio´n)’ (2011) 2130 Bolet´ın del Ministerio de Justicia 1, 2-3.
549 VALE´S DUQUE (n 472) 114.
550 HESSELINK, ‘The Concept of Good Faith’ (n 467) 623.
551 GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspective’
(n 56) 306 points to six main heads under which pre-contractual disclosure is recognised in English
law: ’(1) contractual warranties; (2) misrepresentation; (3) tort law; (4) special types of contract
which require disclosure; (5) custom; and (6) statute.’
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constitute a good example. In an insurance contracts the parties, and especially the
insured, are bound to disclose all facts material to the risk before the contract is
made.552 As observed in this context in Carter v Boehm:553 ‘[t]he governing principle
is applicable to all contracts and dealings. Good faith forbids either party by con-
cealing what he privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance
of that fact, and his believing the contrary.’554
Disclosure duties that are introduced in consumer contracts are not directly
based on the notion of good faith, nevertheless they also constitute an exception
to the general rule of non-disclosure. Those exceptions have different rationales —
mandated disclosure is sometimes necessary when one of the parties cannot access
relevant information, in other cases it is the protection of a weaker, underinformed
party.555 Still, these are exceptions — apart from specific applications the general
duty of disclosure is not accepted. This position was confirmed in a relatively recent
case National Westminster Bank v Utrecht — America Finance Co.,556 where it was
stated again that ‘in England a contract like TOA is not a contract uberrimae fidei
and neither party owes a duty to disclose material facts to the other.’557
However, is English law really that distant from continental systems, such as the
Spanish? There are various indications which show that although the pre-contractual
duty to inform and more generally to act in good faith is not operative under English
law, the result of application of different rules and principles may be similar to that
of good faith in Spanish law.558
Whittaker and Zimmermann present four solutions that English law offers in
552 WHITTAKER and ZIMMERMANN, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law: Surveying the Legal
Landscape” (n 480) 42.
553 (1766) 3 Burr 1905.
554 At 1910.
555 GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French Law’
(n 66) 629.
556 [2001] EWCA Civ 658.
557 At 51.
558 MCKENDRICK, Contract law (n 468) 219 observes that ‘(...) civilian lawyers may well use the
doctrine of good faith to reach results which English law would reach by a more narrowly defined
doctrine. (...) The difference may be more one of technique than result.’; see also BEALE, ‘Pre-
contractual Obligations: The General Contract Law Background’ (n 543) 44ff.
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response to the consequences of contractual unfairness.559 First, contract terms and
parties’ intentions can be interpreted in a manner leading to results comparable
to good faith. Potter LJ in Cargill International SA v Bangladesh Sugar and Food
Industries Corp.560 confirmed that:
(...) modern principles of construction require the court to have regard to
the commercial background, the context of the contract and the circum-
stances of the parties, and to consider whether, against that background
and in that context, to give the words a particular or restricted meaning
would lead to an apparently unreasonable and unfair result.561
Secondly, some specific contracts, such as above mentioned uberrimae fidei, im-
pose on the contracting parties various duties linked to fairness and good faith.562
Thirdly, Whittaker and Zimmermann point to statutory intervention introducing
control on the exercise of contractual rights. In what refers to the duty to disclose
material information, this is especially relevant in the case of consumer contracts
and numerous information duties established in the directives implemented in the
national law. Where there was no general duty to inform, now various specific pro-
visions exist, listing endless information requirements that traders have to comply
with in consumer contracts. Finally, English courts adopted various doctrines, such
as that of economic duress or of frustration, which also govern the behaviour of
contracting parties.563 Along these lines Bingham LJ noted:
English law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding
principle [that of good faith] but has developed piecemeal solutions in
response to demonstrated problems of unfairness. Many examples could
559 WHITTAKER and ZIMMERMANN, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law: Surveying the Legal
Landscape” (n 480) 45ff.
560 [1998] 1 WLR 461.
561 At 468.
562 See GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspect-
ive’ (n 56) 306ff for other instances of disclosure duties in English law.
563 As to economic duress see North Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co. Ltd [1979]
QB 705; in what refers to the doctrine of frustration see Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham U.D.C.
[1956] AC 696.
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be given. Thus equity has intervened to strike down unconscionable bar-
gains. Parliament has stepped in to regulate the imposition of exemption
clauses and the form of certain hire-purchase agreements. The common
law also has made its contribution, by holding that certain classes of
contract require the utmost good faith, by treating as irrecoverable what
purport to be agreed estimates of damage but are in truth a disguised
penalty for breach, and in many other ways.564
The very concept of acting in good faith may not be as alien to the English law
as we are used to thinking. In Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corpora-
tion Ltd565 Leggatt J gave various reasons for which he believes that the duty of
good faith and fair dealing can actually be compatible with the English system. In
particular, he observed that:
(...) in so far as English law may be less willing than some other legal
systems to interpret the duty of good faith as requiring openness of the
kind described by Bingham LJ in the Interfoto case as ‘playing fair,’
‘coming clean’ or ‘putting one’s cards face upwards on the table,’ this
should be seen as a difference of opinion, which may reflect different
cultural norms, about what constitutes good faith and fair dealing in
some contractual contexts rather than a refusal to recognise that good
faith and fair dealing are required.566
Nevertheless, the attempts to combine all the above mentioned exceptions and
form a general duty of fairness in contracts where there is a significant inequality of
bargaining power and the contract cannot be struck down for fraud, misrepresenta-
tion or mistake,567 were unsuccessful so far.
English law does not recognise a duty to disclose acting in good faith, whilst
Spanish law, together with other civil law systems, contain such provisions. Nev-
ertheless, there is a common rule for both legal traditions — active deception is
564 Interfoto Picture Library at 439.
565 [2013] EWHC 111 (QB).
566 At 151.
567 See Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1974] EWCA Civ 8 at 337 per Denning LJ; see also GILIKER,
‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspective’ (n 56) 314-
315 observing that ‘(...) in the absence of a contractual warranty or misrepresentation, a pure
obligation to disclose will arise only rarely in English law.’
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regarded equally negatively and party acting in bad faith, actively deceiving the
other party will not receive any legal protection.568 In certain situations it might
be desirable to let the parties not disclose information, creating socially desirable
incentives for the parties to acquire information themselves or when the information
is of private value. Common law and civil law systems may, however, understand the
desirable effects of disclosure differently, hence different approaches discussed above.
Nevertheless, it is common for both legal traditions not to allow non-disclosure in the
context of mistake or fraud, since this would only lead to undesirable consequences,
such as attempts to carry out fraud on the one hand, and unnecessary costs focused
on avoiding being cheated on the other.569
1.2.3 Relevant legislation establishing more specific inform-
ation duties
1.2.3.1 More general and indirect information duties
It is important to distinguish between direct information duties, which I will return
to below,570 usually introduced in lists starting with phrases such as ‘[b]efore the
consumer is bound by a distance or off-premises contract, or any corresponding of-
fer, the trader shall provide the consumer with the following information in a clear
and comprehensible manner (...)’571 followed by various specific pieces of informa-
tion, and indirect information requirements. The latter are obligations arising from
vaguer terms, not laid down as positive, clearly specified duties.572 Often, the indir-
568 GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French Law’
(n 66) 626.
569 SHAVELL (n 521) 7.
570 In Subsection 1.2.3.2 Overview of concrete information requirements in B2C electronic contracts.
571 Art 6.1 Directive on consumer rights.
572 Cf WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 446-447, who give an example of a standard
quality requirement in the sales contract, which ‘[t]o some (...) may appear to be a clear obligation
to disclose information, whereas others might prefer to describe it merely as an “indirect informa-
tion requirement” or a simple “encouragement to provide information”.’; see also WEATHERILL,
‘19. Consumer Protection’ (n 99) 240 noting that ‘[i]nformation disclosure may also be achieved in
indirect fashion. For example, a requirement that traders acquire a licence before they may parti-
146
1.2. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS — THE LAW APPLICABLE
ect information duties will arise from the legal rules that establish some negative
consequences of the non-disclosure, thus encouraging information disclosure.573
As mentioned previously, there is no clearly identifiable general disclosure duty
in the acquis communautaire. However, there is one directive — not even a contract
law one — pushing the development of the information paradigm in the EU law
towards such duty: the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.574 The Directive is
‘without prejudice to contract law’ according to its art 3.2 — nevertheless ‘it seems
obvious that it will have an indirect impact on contract law in various ways,’575 for
instance Member States are free to establish private right of redress, based on a
contract law action, for violations of the prohibitions of unfair practices laid down
by the Directive.576 Moreover, the detailed information requirements resulting from
other specific directives are complemented by an almost general one stemming from
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive — in its arts 6 and 7, misleading com-
mercial practices are prohibited. The relationship between misleading advertising
and the need to disclose information is unclear,577 however art 7 of the Directive
cipate in a market can be analysed as a means of signalling to consumers that particular quality
standards will be observed. More subtly still, the possibility — but not the requirement — that
a trader may secure some form of certification form a relevant public authority will permit the
consumer to choose between certified traders and those who choose not to acquire such authorisa-
tion and who will (one may suppose) charge a lower price.’ In the present study, however, I am
mainly looking at contractual information duties, therefore such provisions of administrative law
for example stay outside of the scope of this study; also BEALE, ‘Pre-contractual Obligations: The
General Contract Law Background’ (n 543) 48 who identifies indirect disclosure duties in rules on
unfair exploitation, as well as provisions on conformity of contract.
573 See Sergio CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘La Nueva Proteccio´n del Consumidor de Contenidos Digitales
Tras la Ley 3-2014, de 27 de Marzo’ [2014] Centro de Estudios de Consumo CESCO Working Paper
<http://blog.uclm.es/cesco/files/2014/10/La-nueva-protecci\%C3\%B3n-del-consumidor-de-
contenidos-digitales-tras-la-Ley-3-2014-de-27-de-marzo.pdf> accessed 15 March 2016, 62-63, who
identifies various possible legal classifications of the breach of information duties.
574 MICKLITZ, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices and Misleading Advertising’ (n 216) 101.
575 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 456; see also MICKLITZ, ‘Unfair Commercial
Practices and Misleading Advertising’ (n 216) 92 pointing to ‘the intention of ensuring the con-
sumer’s autonomy during pre-contractual negotiations’ underlying the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive.
576 As did the English legislator through the Consumer Protection Amendment 2014.
577 MICKLITZ, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices and Misleading Advertising’ (n 216) 101 points to vari-
ous decisions of the CJEU, which failed to deliver an opinion whether and when ‘the term “mis-
leading” establishes a “requirement to inform”.’ – see C-220/98 Lifting [2000] ECR I-117; C-373/90
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links the misleading character of a commercial practice with the omission of material
information:
A commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if, in its factual
context, taking account of all its features and circumstances and the
limitations of the communication medium, it omits material information
that the average consumer needs, according to the context, to take an
informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely to cause
the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not
have taken otherwise.578
The indirect, albeit ample disclosure duty there established covers the informa-
tion that the consumer needs for the informed decision, thus being complementary to
the information paradigm and consumer model adopted by the European law.579 In
this way, with the help of unfair commercial practices, violations of pre-contractual
information obligations are to be sanctioned, which is where contract law is mixed
with unfair commercial practices.
The material information that the Directive refers to is information relative to,
among others, the main characteristics of the product, the identity of the trader,
the price inclusive of taxes and generally information requirements established by
Community law in relation to commercial communication including advertising or
marketing.580 The CJEU however interprets the provisions of art 7 in a restrictive
manner, inviting national courts
Nissan [1992] ECR I-131; GB-INNO-BM ; Mars GmbH ; Micklitz concludes that the prohibition
of misleading advertising could not be condensed into a requirement to inform, at least prior to
adoption of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.
578 Art 7.1.
579 MICKLITZ, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices and Misleading Advertising’ (n 216) 101-102.
580 See art 7.5 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive; MICKLITZ, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices and
Misleading Advertising’ (n 216) 103-104 notes that ‘only the violation of the duties based on
Community law counts as misleading. Therefore if Member States have established information
requirements that go further than Community law requirements, based on minimal harmonisation,
a violation of these rules does not count as misleading omission under EC law.’; moreover it should
be noted that the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive constitutes a lex generalis in relation to
the provisions of Community law regulating specific aspects of unfair commercial practices (see art
3.4 of the Directive), which applies to, among others: Directive on consumer rights, Directive on
the sale of consumer goods and Directive on electronic commerce.
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to assess, on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the context
of the invitation to purchase, the medium of communication used and
the nature and characteristics of the product, whether a reference only
to certain main characteristics of the product enables the consumer to
take an informed transactional decision.581
The influence on the private national law of England and Spain of the Unfair
Commercial Practices Directive in the context of indirect information duties is com-
plex, since the Directive theoretically should not influence the contractual rights
of the parties.582 It is transposed into the Spanish legal system mainly through
TRLDCU583 and Ley de Competencia Desleal.584 The rules of TRLDCU do not
impose pre-contractual duties on traders, since the law in its art 19.2 expressly
excludes the application of provisions relative to commercial communications to
contractual relationships between traders and consumers. In what refers to the Ley
de Competencia Desleal, arts 5 (misleading actions) and 7 (misleading omissions)
can be regarded as establishing indirect information duties. Their breach gives rise
primarily to remedies in two regimes: commercial law, providing remedies which
are by no means contractual,585 and administrative law of consumer protection of-
fences.586Furthermore, the general law liability for misleading actions and omissions
also needs to be taken into account; the rules applicable will be those relative to the
law of defects of consent and breach of contract, of course if the conditions necessary
for those actions are met.
In what refers to the English law, the Consumer Protection Amendment 2014
581 Case C-122/10 Konsumentombudsmannen v Ving Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-3903 para 59.
582 Private law remedies and individual redress rights resulting from contract law rules being the focus
of this study, I will not analyse in great detail other consequences of breach of information duties,
and instances of information duties not giving rise to individual redress.
583 See arts 19, 20 and 49.
584 Ley 3/1991, de 10 de enero, de Competencia Desleal. Bolet´ın Oficial del Estado, 11 de enero
de 1991, nu´m. 10, p.959 (Ley de Competencia Desleal), see especially art 19 referring to unfair
commercial practices.
585 See CARRASCO PERERA, ‘Desarrollos Futuros del Derecho de Consumo en Espan˜a, en el Ho-
rizonte de la Transposicio´n de la Directiva de Derechos de los Consumidores’ (n 46) 318-322;
commercial law remedies indicated in art 32 of the Ley de Competencia Desleal.
586 Art 49 TRLDCU.
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modified the unfair commercial practices system of remedies introduced first through
the UTR 2008 and to the offences there established the Consumer Protection Amend-
ment 2014 added private, contractual means of redress for consumers who were vic-
tims of some of the unfair commercial practices. Regs 5 and 6 UTR 2008 define the
indirect information duties: misleading action and misleading omission. Misleading
action is a commercial practice containing false information regarding matters spe-
cified in reg 5(4),587 likely to cause an average consumer to take a transactional
decision they would not have taken otherwise588 or concerning any marketing of a
product and creating confusion with that of a competitor.589 The former case of
a false information inducing consumer’s transactional decision contains a clear ex-
ample of an indirect information duty, which could be formulated in a direct manner
for example as ‘trader shall provide consumer with truthful information regarding
matters specified in reg 5(4).’ Reg 6 introduces a concept of a misleading omission -–
a commercial practice consisting of, for example, omitting or hiding material inform-
ation and as a result causing the average consumer to take a transactional decision
they would not have take otherwise.590 Material information refers to the informa-
tion needed by the average consumer to take an informed transactional decision and
to information requirements applicable in relation to commercial communications,
resulting from the Community law.591 Similarly to the indirect information require-
ment stemming from the Directive, reg 6 translates into an obligation to provide
consumer with material information before they enter into a contract with trader.
Initially, the indirect information duties resulting from reg 5 and 6 had not been
of contractual character, as the only remedies available for breach were of public law
nature. It has been changed by the Consumer Protection Amendment 2014. The
contractual remedies for breach of indirect information duties resulting thereof are
limited to those resulting from misleading action of reg 5 UTR 2008, ie provision of
587 Such as the main characteristics of the product, the nature of the sales process, the price or the
manner in which the price is calculated, the need for a service, part, replacement or repair or the
consumer’s rights or the risks he may face, etc.
588 Reg 5(2).
589 Reg 5(3).
590 See reg 6 for all the instances of misleading omissions.
591 Reg 6(3).
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false information likely to cause an average consumer to take a transactional decision
they would not have taken otherwise and actually constituting a significant factor in
the aggrieved consumer’s decision to enter into the contract or make the payment.592
Also, seller’s liability for latent defects, a concept known both to English and
Spanish law, can be regarded as an indirect introduction of a disclosure duty on the
defects of the good being sold. Clearly, such classification requires a certain flexib-
ility of the legal reasoning, however it can be deduced from various provisions of
the general law, especially those contained in the Spanish Co´digo Civil593 and in
the Sale of Goods Act 1979.595 Nevertheless, although these provisions are relev-
ant from the point of view of information duties, they do not apply to consumer
contracts: in the Spanish law, art 117 of the TRLDCU relative to the remedies for
the lack of conformity, excludes the possibility to apply for general contract law
remedies concerning latent defects; in the English law, the CRA 2015 replaces for
the B2C contracts provisions of the previously applicable legislation,596 therefore for
592 See reg 27A UTR 2008 as amended by the Consumer Protection Amendment 2014; in more detail
the specific remedies thus established are discussed in Chapter III Section 3.1 Specific remedies
available to consumers.
593 Arts 1484ff regulate the so-called acciones edilicias — remedies available to the buyer when the
good purchased turns out to be faulty. From the point of view of information duties, those provisions
are relevant, since the seller is only liable for the faulty goods if the buyer is not aware of the defects
and art 1484 specifies that the liability arises if the defects affect the product purchased to the
extent that the buyer, had they known about them, would not have decided to purchase the goods
or would have agreed only to a lower price. It results therefore that the seller can avoid the liability
if they disclose the defects to the other party; for more on acciones edilicias and their place in the
system of contractual remedies in the Spanish law see 594.
595 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SGA 1979), see especially s 14 of the SGA 1979.
596 Note 24 of the Explanatory Notes to the CRA 2015 states in relation to different pieces of legislation
that:
– in what refers to the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973: ‘For business to consumer
contracts the provisions of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 (“SGITA”) will be
replaced by the Consumer Rights Act 2015. It will be amended so that it covers business to
business contracts and consumer to consumer contracts only.’
– Sale of Goods Act 1979: ‘For business to consumer contracts this will mainly be replaced by the
Consumer Rights Act 2015 but some provisions of SGA will still apply, for example, rules which
are applicable to all contracts of sale of goods (as defined by that Act -– essentially these are sales
of goods for money), regarding matters such as when property in goods passes. The SGA will still
apply to business to business contracts and to consumer to consumer contracts.’
– Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982: ‘For business to consumer contracts, this Act’s pro-
visions will be replaced by the Consumer Rights Act 2015. The SGSA will be amended so that it
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the products (goods or digital content) purchased from the 1 October 2015 only the
provisions of the CRA 2015 apply.
There are however various specific to consumer contracts indirect information
duties established through provisions relative to the consumer sales law. Generally
speaking, the seller does not have to disclose all the information they possess about
the goods being sold, although they might be held liable for the lack of conformity
of the goods with the contract of sale,597 unless the consumer was aware of the lack
of conformity. According to the Directive on the sale of consumer goods, ‘[t]here
shall be deemed not to be a lack of conformity for the purposes of this Article
if, at the time the contract was concluded, the consumer was aware, or could not
reasonably be unaware of, the lack of conformity (...).’598 The logic of this provi-
sion is an indirect disclosure duty -– if the trader does inform the buyer about the
non-conformity of goods, then they can avoid liability.599 The Spanish law in art
covers business to business contracts and consumer to consumer contracts only.’
– Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994: ‘This Act amended the SGA and the SGSA and as
such will be superseded by provisions in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 for business to consumer
contracts.’
– Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002: ‘These will be replaced by provisions
in the Consumer Rights Act 2015.’
597 Cf WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 446-447 referring to an indirect information
obligation resulting from the provisions of sales law that regulate the quality of goods: ‘It is
generally the case in sales law that there is no obvious obligation on a seller to disclose to the
buyer all the information he may have about the quality of the goods he sells; yet, if the goods
fall below a standard which the buyer in entitled to expect, the seller will be liable in breach of
contract. Had the seller disclosed the relevant information about any shortcomings in quality, then
the buyer could no longer claim that he expected a higher standard.’; see also EIDENMULLER
(n 132) 1112-1113.
598 Art 2.3 of the Directive on the sale of consumer goods.
599 See WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 458-459 noting however that ‘a general
statement that the goods do not conform to the tests [the “fit for normal purposes test” and
the “normal quality and consumer expectations test”] is not sufficient in this respect. The lack of
conformity can be avoided only with the help of specific information concerning the actual problem
of quality or performance. Therefore it seems quite natural to speak about an indirect information
requirement following from the provisions on conformity in the Consumer Sales Directive.’ Further
at 460 Wilhelmsson and Twigg-Flesner formulate a general duty of disclosure that could be derived
from the provisions of the acquis in what refers to the consumer sales law: ‘Before the conclusion of
a contract, a party has a duty to give to the other party such information concerning the goods or
services to be provided as the other party can reasonably expect, taking into account the standards
of quality and performance which would be normal under the circumstances.’
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116.3 TRLDCU practically reproduces the provisions of the Directive, while the
English CRA 2015 also establishes various indirect information duties in relation
to conformity of goods, albeit using different wording.600 The conformity of goods
with the contract includes:601 the requirements for the goods to be of satisfactory
quality,602 fit for particular purpose603 and as described.604
Also the Directive on unfair terms can be regarded as containing an indirect
information requirement resulting from the transparency requirement.605 The Dir-
ective requires the language in which the term was drafted to be transparent, ac-
cording to the art 5: ‘[i]n the case of contracts where all or certain terms offered
to the consumer are in writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, in-
600 See s 19(3) CRA 2015 relative to the lack of conformity due to a breach of certain information
requirements, resulting from s 9(2) (satisfactory standard, taking into account eg description: s
9(2)(a) and advertising s 9(2)(c); s 10(1) (goods fit for particular purpose, if purpose is made
known to the trader) and s 11(4) (any information provided about the goods relative to main
characteristics of goods becomes term of the contract in relation to Schedule 2(a) to The Consumer
Contracts Regulations 2013).
601 Apart from the provisions mentioned relative to the satisfactory quality, fitness for purpose and
goods as described, other aspects of the conformity of goods with the contract are also included
in the relevant legislation, such as goods matching a sample seen (s 13 CRA 2015, art 116.a)
TRLDCU) or a model examined by a consumer (s 14 CRA 2015, art 116.a) TRLDCU) before
the contract is formed. Those provisions are only very distantly related to the information duties:
the information is provided through objects — samples or models; these are not words, written or
said, and not the behaviour of the trader that influences consumer’s contracting decision. Those
provisions stay outside of the scope of the analysis presented in this study, although it should be
kept in mind that they are not completely irrelevant. Moreover, the remedies available for their
breach are the same as for the provisions listed above.
602 S 9 CRA 2015, art 116.1.d) TRLDCU.
603 S 10 CRA 2015, art 116.1.b), c) TRLDCU.
604 S 11 CRA 2015, art 116.1.a) TRLDCU.
605 See Edoardo FERRANTE, ‘Contractual Disclosure and Remedies under the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive’ in Geraint Howells and others (eds), Information Rights and Obligations: A Challenge for
Party Autonomy and Transactional Fairness (Markets and the Law, Ashgate 2005); see also LE-
ONE (n 221) 323 citing Norbert Reich and Hans-W. Micklitz, ‘Von der Klausel- zur Marktkontrolle’
[2013] Europa¨ische Zeitschrift fu¨r Wirtschaftsrecht 457, 460: ‘(...) Micklitz and Reich’s conclusion
that the recent case law has brought about a “revaluation” (“Aufwertung”) of the transparency
requirement into “a positive and effective information requirement”.’; NORDHAUSEN SCHOLES
(n 195) 217 considers the transparency obligation to be ‘other contract-related information’ which
‘is not strictly speaking an information obligation, but deriving from the transparency requirement
in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (...).’
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telligible language.’606 I will look at the transparency requirement in more detail
further in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.1.2 Requirements relative to the way of providing
information, however here it could be observed in general terms that the transpar-
ency requirement seeks to allow the consumer to make use of his rights, through
including ‘(...) the duty of the provider to inform the consumer about certain es-
sentialia negotio, like criteria for price increases, modification of the content of the
contract’:607 transparency of contract terms allows the information there contained
to be communicated effectively. Therefore, the manner in which determined inform-
ation is to be provided -– clear, comprehensible, easily accessible — constitutes one
of the aspects of the information duty. In itself it can be also regarded as a separate
duty for the trader, the breach of which leads to defective fulfilment or full breach
of the trader’s information duties.608
In what refers to the indirect information duties introduced at the European
level, the right of withdrawal, or cancellation, is also worthy of mentioning. I will
look at the right to withdraw from a B2C online contract in more detail in Chapter
3 Subsection 3.3.2 Right of withdrawal as an example of a specific remedy, as it is
closely connected to the remedies for breach of information duties.
Some authors consider the right of withdrawal to be an extension of the right to
information, as it makes it possible for consumers to experience the goods before the
purchase becomes irrevocable.609 Consumers now have a possibility to withdraw from
an online contract within 14 days of entering it in a majority of cases,610 thanks to
the art 9 of the Directive on consumer rights. The provisions of the Directive relative
to the cancellation right are subject to the full harmonisation regime, therefore are
implemented with no divergence into Spanish (arts 102ff TRLDCU) and English law
606 Art 5; see also art 4(2) that requires the courts to take the transparency of the term into account
in assessing its fairness.
607 MICKLITZ and REICH, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty: the Revival of the Unfair Contract
Terms Directive (UCTD)’ (n 488) 786ff.
608 FERRANTE (n 605) 130.
609 HOWELLS, ‘The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information’ (n 91) footnote
21.
610 See the exceptions to the right of withdrawal out of art 16 of the Directive on consumer rights and
exceptions as to the whole regime relative to the online contracts out of art 3.3.
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(regs 27ff Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013).611
Finally, the general national contract law also imposes some indirect disclos-
ure duties on the contracting parties.612 First of all, there is the obligation of the
parties to act in accordance with the principle of good faith and fair dealing, which
is discussed above. Nevertheless, more specific, but still quite general rules of the
national private law also establish some indirect information duties through a num-
ber of different doctrines, such as the vitiating factors (or defects of consent) -–
mistake, misrepresentation and fraud. Wilhelmsson and Twigg-Flesner contrast a
duty to inform with those concepts, pointing out that the law of mistake and fraud
is majorly concerned with the consequences of providing false information, and not
the duty to inform as such.613 However, those doctrines are very closely linked to
the information duty: some authors consider them to be forming a coherent rules
governing pre-contractual information obligations,614 others imply that a general
disclosure duty could replace vitiating factors doctrines, such far reaching is the link
between the two concepts.615
As already noted, mistake, misrepresentation and fraud deal with consequences
of giving false or inaccurate information, rather than establish a straightforward
disclosure duty, which is why I will discuss those concepts in the Chapter 3 where
the consequences of breach of information duties are analysed. Nevertheless, as with
other indirect information duties mentioned above, rules which set out the con-
sequences of some pre-contractual behaviour can be also regarded as incentives to
act differently. Information duties in consumer contracts are aimed at allowing con-
611 The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013,
SI 2013/3134 (Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013), subsequently amended by the Consumer
Contracts (Amendment) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1629.
612 SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ (n 187) 10-12.
613 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 448.
614 See eg Hans Christoph GRIGOLEIT, ‘Irrtum, Tauschung und Informationspflichten in den
European Principles und in den Unidroit-Principles’ in Reiner Schulze and others (eds), Informa-
tionspflichten und Vertragsschluss im Acquis Communautaire (Mohr Siebeck 2003); cf GILIKER,
‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspective’ (n 56) 310ff.
615 See Gerrit de GEEST and Mitja KOVAC, ‘The Formation of Contracts in the Draft Common
Frame of Reference – A Law and Economics Perspective’ in Filomena Chirico and Pierre Larouche
(eds), Economic Analysis of the DCFR : the Work of the Economic Impact Group within CoPECL
(Sellier European Law Publishers 2010) 72; see also EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1112ff.
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sumers to take rational contracting decisions, the doctrine of defects of consent
provides remedies where that contractual decision was based on false information.616
How close these two concepts are can be illustrated with examples from both Span-
ish and English law. Art 1269 of the Spanish Co´digo Civil defines dolo (fraud) as a
situation where one of the parties, because of other parties insidious -– false, inaccur-
ate -– words or machinations is induced to enter into a contract, which they would
not have entered into, had the other party not induced them to do so. Similarly,
in English law fraudulent misrepresentation is referred to as ‘a false statement, by
words or conduct (but not silence), of fact which is sufficiently certain to be relied
upon by the representee.’617 The differences in application of the doctrines in both
systems are looked at in Chapter 3 Section 3.2 General private law and remedies it
offers ; the overarching general indirect duty resulting from those laws is a negative
duty not to provide the other party with false information in order to induce them
to contract.618 The existence of such duties resulting from the rules on misrepres-
entation or mistake cannot be in any case generalised into a general disclosure duty
from which specific duties could be deduced in individual cases. On the other hand,
however, the indirect duties need to coexist with specific, detailed duties established
especially through the implementation of European directives, often not only apply-
ing to the same factual situations, but also, even more importantly, providing the
remedies to the aggrieved consumer.619
616 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 448.
617 John CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (3rd edn, Contract Law
Library, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 352.
618 Cf WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) footnote 49 citing Spice Girls Ltd v Aprilia
World Service BV [2000] EWHC Ch 140 and in the context of this case observing that ‘[e]ven in
English law indirect duties of disclosure are constructed, for example, with the help of the concept
of misrepresentation; the courts have been willing to hold that a misrepresentation can arise where
the conduct of one of the contracting parties suggests something which is not, in fact, true (...).’
619 Cf EIDENMULLER (n 132) 1112-1113 pointing out to the fact that ‘as far as these doctrines
[of misrepresentation, fraud and mistake] protect the interest of one party in receiving certain
information from the other, it would be redundant to introduce additional information duties into
contract law and to establish additional remedies for breach of such duties. More importantly, the
establishment of additional information duties may give rise to inappropriate remedies.’
156
1.2. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS — THE LAW APPLICABLE
1.2.3.2 Overview of concrete information requirements in B2C elec-
tronic contracts
Specific information duties are a tool used by the European legislator in a quantity
often described as excessive.620 Their general aim is to protect consumers as weaker
market players in their relationships with traders, more specifically however inform-
ation duties are being established by the directives in situations where consumers
find themselves at a particular disadvantage621 -– either because of the context in
which the contract is concluded, or due to a particular nature of the transaction.622
The former factor — the context of the transaction -– is relevant to the present
study, the context being digital environment, which affects consumer’s ability to
take informed decision due to various characteristics of the e-commerce, such as
unlimited availability of offers or impossibility of inspecting the product prior to
purchase. The latter criterion of the nature of the transaction refers to particular
types of contracts, where the legislator deems necessary that consumers be given
specific information,623 as in a case of contracts for financial services or package
holiday. Those transactions can also be concluded (or advertised) online and then
apart from the laws applicable because of the digital environment context of the
transaction, also provisions specific for such type of contracts will apply.624
620 See eg CARRASCO PERERA, ‘Desarrollos Futuros del Derecho de Consumo en Espan˜a, en el
Horizonte de la Transposicio´n de la Directiva de Derechos de los Consumidores’ (n 46) 314.
621 Compare eg how the Directive on consumer rights deals with the trader’s information obligation in
general in any consumer transaction (art 5) and in off-premises and distance contracts (arts 6ff):
firstly, the former situations are regulated to a much lesser extent, secondly, only the latter are
covered by the full harmonisation principle.
622 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 461-462.
623 Ibid.
624 The abundant European legislation concerning specifically certain transaction types (and national
laws implementing European rules) is not the focus of the present study, which is aiming at showing
general mechanisms governing the information duties in online B2C transactions and their breach
under English and Spanish law, therefore specific information duties established in the following
directives and their transposition to the Spanish and English law stay outside of the scope of this
study and are not analysed in more detail: Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general product safety [2001] OJ L011/4 (Directive
on product safety); Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
September 2002 concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services and amending
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It will be only little exaggeration to say that the lists of information requirements
on the B2C e-commerce are almost endless and it is not possible to comprehensively
present in this study the countless information duties that the current legislation
contains. Different provisions apply to sale of goods or supply of services contracts,
various goods are excluded from the scope of application of certain statutes, whilst to
others, such as to digital content, other provisions apply.625 Moreover, transactions
concluded with the use of credit card may benefit from consumer credit protection
rules. Nevertheless, the aim of this study is to present certain mechanisms that guide
the application of remedies for breach of the duties, and compare their functioning
in two different legal systems, English and Spanish. Therefore, the main focus will
be the placed on the operation of remedies and on comprehensible presentation of
the complex system of remedies that originate both in specific legislation and in
general national private law.
The complexity of consumer law is also closely intertwined with the fact that case
law is considerably sparse.626 The meaning of various provisions was therefore never
tested and interpreted by courts. Moreover, partly due to new directives adopted at
the European level, such as the Directive on consumer rights, but also because of
increasing complexity of consumer law and national legislator’s attempts to clarify
existing rules, which was the origin of the CRA 2015 in the UK, many new statutes
and statutory instruments have recently been adopted both in England and Spain.
Council Directive 90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC [2002] OJ L271/16 (Direct-
ive on distance marketing of financial services); Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council
Directive 87/102/EEC [2008] OJ L133/66 (Directive on consumer credit); Directive 2008/122/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on the protection of consumers
in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale and exchange con-
tracts [2009] OJ L33/10 (Timeshare Directive); Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and
amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC [2013] OJ L165/63 (Directive
on consumer ADR); Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4
February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and
amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 [2014] OJ
L60/34 (Directive on credit agreements relating to immovable property); Package Travel Directive.
625 Also the issue of the level of harmonisation applied by various directives adds to the complexity of
the legal landscape, see HOWELLS and REICH (n 108) 52-53 52-53.
626 Geoffrey WOODROFFE and Robert LOWE, Woodroffe & Lowe’s Consumer Law and Practice
(9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 9.
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Therefore, not only are consumers deterred from bringing proceedings to courts
because of their length and high costs, but also conflicts relative to analysed rules
have not had a chance to potentially reach litigation yet.
I will centre my analysis primarily on online sale of goods contracts,627 although
other relevant rules will also be mentioned. The specific direct duties that are of a
particular interest for the present study are established mainly in two directives: the
Directive on electronic commerce and the Directive on consumer rights; information
duties resulting thereof nevertheless need to be viewed in light of more general,
indirect duties. The following overview of concrete information duties applicable to
the B2C e-commerce is of a general nature,628 nevertheless in order to be able to
analyse the issue of breach of the duties and its consequences, it is necessary to
identify those duties first.
The Directive on electronic commerce is not restricted to B2C contracts, however
the legislative technique it uses in relation to information obligations is characteristic
of consumer contracts.629 Moreover the information provisions that it contains are
not expressed in terms of pre-contractual information, as Wilhelmsson and Twigg-
Flesner observe, however it appears to be evident that the information required by
those provisions should be made available to the other party prior to the contract
conclusion.630 The main goal of the information duties laid down in the Directive
on electronic commerce is to improve the confidence of the Internet users in the
e-commerce:631 art 5 is relative to the information necessary to allow the service
627 Hence the references made in the present study to the Services Directive (Directive 2006/123/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal
market [2006] OJ L376/36), which also establishes information duties, will be limited.
628 For a more detailed study of concrete information duties in the B2C contracts see eg Chris-
tian TWIGG-FLESNER, The Europeanisation of Contract Law: Current Controversies in Law
(Routledge-Cavendish 2008) 63ff; Arno R LODDER, ‘Information Requirements Overload? Assess-
ing Disclosure Duties under the E-Commerce Directive, Services Directive and Consumer Directive’
in Andriej Savin and Jan Trzaskowski (eds), Research Handbook on EU Internet Law (Research
Handbooks in European Law, Edward Elgar 2014).
629 FINOCCHIARO (n 200) 114.
630 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 113) 457.
631 Patricia MA´RQUEZ LOBILLO, Empresarios y Profesionales en la Sociedad de la Informacio´n
(Cuadernos Mercantiles, Editoriales de Derecho Reunidas, SA 2004) 288ff; LODDER (n 628) 362.
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recipients, ie in our case consumers, to identify the service provider -– the trader;632
art 6 aims at making commercial communications clearly recognisable; finally art 10
requires the service provider to give the other party information regarding various
technical matters relating to order placement in order to make up for a technological
asymmetry between the contracting parties.633
In what refers to the Directive on consumer rights, it is also designed with in-
creasing consumer confidence in the e-commerce in mind, more precisely following
the steps of the European distance selling legislation aiming at putting consumers
acting in the digital environment in a similar position to those purchasing products
in the course of traditional, physical trade.634 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that
the Directive in its art 3 excludes from the scope of its application numerous con-
tracts, including those for passenger transport services, for the supply of foodstuffs
and for package holiday, therefore considerably limiting the application of the rules
relative to the pre-contractual information and withdrawal rights. Art 6 deals with
information duties in distance contracts — art 6.1 in its letters (a) to (t) names vari-
ous information requirements, which can nevertheless be put in groups according to
the type of information that is required: characteristics and price of the product -–
art 6.1(a), (e); trader’s data allowing their identification and contact — art 6.1.(b),
(c), (d);635 information on costs — of using the means of communication 6.1.(f) and
of returning the goods in a case of withdrawal 6.1.(i) and on deposits or financial
guarantees to be paid by the consumer in art 6.1.(q); information relative to the
contract itself -– arrangements for payment, delivery and performance 6.1.(g), for
632 And to allow the customer to contact the trader, see LODDER (n 628) 365, 375ff.
633 FINOCCHIARO (n 200) 114.
634 Cf Jorg BINDING and Kai PURNHAGEN, ‘Regulations on E-Commerce Consumer Protection
Rules in China and Europe Compared – Same Same but Different?’ (2011) 2 Journal of Intellectual
Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law 186, 191; MIGUEL ASENSIO (n 2) para
892; for a detailed analysis of the Directive and information duties there established see MIRANDA
SERRANO (n 108); see also Esther ARROYO AMAYUELAS, ‘La Contratacio´n a Distancia en
la Directiva de Proteccio´n de los Derechos de los Consumidores’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente and
Esther Arroyo Amayuelas (eds), La Revisio´n de las Normas Europeas y Nacionales de Proteccio´n de
los Consumidores: Ma´s Alla´ de la Directiva sobre Derechos de los Consumidores y del Instrumento
Opcional sobre un Derecho Europeo de la Compraventa de octubre de 2011 (2nd edn, Civitas-
Thomson Reuters, Intersentia 2012).
635 LODDER (n 628) 365, 375ff.
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post-sale service 6.1.(m), the duration of the contract 6.1.(o), the minimum dura-
tion of consumer’s obligation under the contract 6.1.(p); information relative to the
right of withdrawal -– art 6.1.(h), (j), (k); information with reference to consumer’s
redress rights -– art 6.1.(t) and 6.1.(n) relative to professional codes of conduct.
A novelty introduced by the Directive on consumer rights is the information duty
relative to the digital content -– which when sold on-line constitutes an example of
the direct e-commerce -– its functionality in art 6.1.(r) and its interoperability with
hardware and software of the consumer in art 6.1.(s). Finally, art 6.1.(l) constitutes
a link to the law of sale of consumer goods, as it requires the trader to provide ‘a
reminder of the existence of a legal guarantee of conformity for goods.’
The Directive on consumer rights also contains some more indirect information
requirements relevant for the electronic transactions, expressed rather as trader’s ob-
ligation to seek consumer’s express acknowledgement – art 8.2 (formal requirements
for distance contracts):
(...) The trader shall ensure that the consumer, when placing his order,
explicitly acknowledges that the order implies an obligation to pay. If
placing an order entails activating a button or a similar function, the
button or similar function shall be labelled in an easily legible manner
only with the words ‘order with obligation to pay’ or a corresponding
unambiguous formulation indicating that placing the order entails an
obligation to pay the trader.
Similar expression is used by art 22 (additional payments): ‘Before the consumer
is bound by the contract or offer, the trader shall seek the express consent of the
consumer to any extra payment in addition to the remuneration agreed upon for the
trader’s main contractual obligation. (...)’ Consumer giving their express consent or
acknowledgement need to be informed first that the order implies an obligation to
pay or about any additional payments. Moreover, the trader cannot infer consumer’s
consent through so-called ‘pre-ticked boxes’: ‘default options which the consumer is
required to reject in order to avoid the additional payment (...).’636
What is the relationship between the information duties established in the Dir-
ective on electronic commerce and the Directive on consumer rights? Art 6.8 of the
636 Art 22 in fine.
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Directive on consumer rights states that the ‘[t]he information requirements laid
down in this Directive are in addition to information requirements contained in (...)
Directive 2000/31/EC [on electronic commerce] (...).’ The information duties from
the Directive on consumer rights complement those established in the Directive on
electronic commerce, however the provisions of the Directive on consumer rights
prevail should there be any contradiction between the two acts.637
At the national level, the laws implementing the aforementioned directives are
where the specific information duties applicable in B2C electronic contracts can be
found. In what refers to the Spanish law, the LSSICE should be briefly looked at638 -–
its art 10 requires information relative to the service provider to be easily available
to the service recipients; arts 19–22 referring to the commercial communication
establish various duties linked to those; finally article 27 imposes on a trader a duty
to inform consumers about the technical issues involved in entering an electronic
contract.639
This study is concerned with pre-contractual information duties, however it is
worth noting that the following art 28 establishes some post-contractual information
obligations, relating mainly to the confirmation of the contract concluded. The E-
commerce Regulations 2002 implement the Directive on electronic commerce into
the English law, and reg 6 deals with general information concerning the service
provider, regs 7 and 8 are relative to the commercial communications, and reg 9
sets out the ‘technical’ information to be provided before conclusion of an electronic
contract.
In what refers to strictly consumer contract law, the main piece of legislation
in Spain is TRLDCU and in the UK -– the new CRA 2015. The status quo in the
English law is quite complex: first, the Directive was implemented via the Consumer
637 Klaus TONNER, ‘The Consumer Rights Directive and its Impact on Internet and other Distance
Consumer Contracts’ in Norbert Reich and others (eds), European Consumer Law (2nd edn, Ius
Communitatis Series, Intersentia 2014) 411-412.
638 Although the LSSICE does not affect the level of consumer protection, it does effectively impose
information requirements aimed at completing information requirements in B2C distance contracts
for the special case of electronic contracts, see HERNA´NDEZ JIME´NEZ-CASQUET (n 5) 474.
639 The LSSICE, similarly to the Directive on electronic commerce is directed not only at B2C transac-
tions, hence art 27 allows to exclude the information duty when the other party is not a consumer.
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Contracts Regulations 2013,640 then in 2015 the CRA 2015 was adopted. The re-
cently enacted Act 2015 introduces a new system of remedies available to consumers
in the case of breach of their rights, including the right to receive information. Ac-
cording to the British Department for Business, Innovation and Skills:
Because of the act, the law will be clearer and easier to understand,
meaning that consumers can buy and businesses can sell to them with
confidence. (...) UK consumers spend £90 billion a month. Transparent
rights will help them to make better choices when they buy, generating
the opportunity for businesses to compete, innovate and grow. With
these changes in place, businesses and consumers will create an economy
based on productive relationships and fairly won business reputations.641
The CRA 2015 consolidates consumer law legislation, replacing various relevant
Acts and Regulations (but only in the extent applicable to B2C contracts),642 such
as Sale of Goods Act 1979 (although some provisions of SGA 1979 will still ap-
ply), Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977643 and Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
Regulations 1999.644 Nevertheless, there are still in force other pieces of legislation
that apply to B2C on-line transactions and contain provisions relevant to the provi-
sion of pre-contractual information, and especially the aforementioned E-commerce
Regulations 2002 and Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013.645
The Directive on consumer rights was transposed into the Spanish law through
the modification of the TRLDCU by the Ley 3/2014, which has introduced various
640 For more on the implementation of the Directive on consumer rights into English law see Paula
GILIKER, ‘The Transposition of the Consumer Rights Directive into UK Law: Implementing a
Maximum Harmonization Directive’ (2015) 23 European Review of Private Law 5.
641 See Policy paper Consumer Rights Act 2015, from Department for Business, Innovation and Skills,
published on 14 August 2015 <www.gov.uk/government/publications/consumer-rights-act-2015/
consumer-rights-act-2015> accessed 15 May 2016.
642 For complete list of legislation replaced by the Act see note 24 in Explanatory Notes to CRA 2015.
643 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA 1977).
644 The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, SI 1999/2083.
645 The UK consumer law therefore stays highly complex and technical despite the adoption of the
CRA 2015, see GILIKER, ‘The Consumer Rights Act 2015 — a Bastion of European Consumer
Rights?’ (n 258) 2.
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changes to the text of the TRLDCU.646 The issue of implementation of the Directive
into the Spanish law had been widely discussed,647 finally the legislator opted for
an almost literal inclusion of the text of the Directive into the existing statute on
consumer protection — the TRLDCU.648
The information duties in distance contracts are covered by the full harmonisa-
tion principle established in the art 4 of the Directive on consumer rights, meaning
that ‘Member States shall not maintain or introduce, in their national law, pro-
visions diverging from those laid down in this Directive, including more or less
stringent provisions to ensure a different level of consumer protection (...).’ In con-
sequence, information duties both in Spanish and English law need to be the same
as in the text of the Directive, which indeed they are: art 97 of the TRLDCU in-
troduces information requirements in distance contracts, art 98 formal requirements
for distance contracts; reg 13 of the Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 makes
reference to the Schedule 2 which lists the information items to be provided before
646 See eg Vicente MAGRO SERVET, ‘Ana´lisis de la Ley 3/2014, de 27 de marzo, por la que se
modifica el texto refundido de la Ley general para la defensa de los consumidores y usuarios’ [2014]
Pra´ctica de Tribunales 1; Ana Isabel BERROCAL LANZAROT, ‘L´ıneas Maestras de la ley 3/2014,
de 27 de marzo por la que se modifica el Texto Refundido de la ley general para la defensa de los
consumidores y usuarios’ [2014] Actualidad Civil 1.
647 See Encarna CORDERO, ‘Co´mo Transponer la Directiva de Consumidores al Derecho Espan˜ol?’
(2012) 1 Revista CESCO de Derecho de Consumo 108; Ana Isabel MENDOZA LOSANA, ‘Obser-
vaciones, Comentarios y Propuestas de Mejora del Anteproyecto de Ley por el que se modifica el
Texto Refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios y otras leyes
complementarias aprobado por el RDL 1/2007’ (2013) 6 Revista CESCO de Derecho de Consumo
308.
648 Cf Ley 3/2014 Explanatory Memorandum s I in fine where the legislator confirms that the main
criterion followed in the implementation of the Directive on consumer rights was to keep the Spanish
legislation as close to the Directive as possible, minimising the impact on the existing legislation to
the minimum; see also GILIKER, ‘The Transposition of the Consumer Rights Directive into UK
Law: Implementing a Maximum Harmonization Directive’ (n 640) 11-12, who analyses the ‘copy
out’ implementation technique in the context of the transposition of the Directive on consumer
rights into the English law:‘ “Copy out” requires the draftsman whenever possible to reproduce
the wording of the directive (with suitable adjustments to integrate elements of the recitals when
necessary). This avoids adding any extra rights, but also may be consistent with broader European
goals. Following the exact wording of the directive is likely to minimize the risk of infringement
proceedings under Article 258 TFEU (...). “Copy out” may also reduce the possibility of state
liability for breaching EU law under Francovich. [And] (...) has the desirable effect of making the
transposed law more visible. Where the EU provisions are simply integrated into national law,
there is a danger that they disappear into national legislation, their European origins forgotten.’
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making a distance contract, reg 14 is relative to the requirements for distance con-
tracts concluded by electronic means. The same applies to the exclusions from the
scope of the application of the rules, relevant to this study, on pre-contractual in-
formation and withdrawal right. Art 93 of the TRLDCU and reg 6 of the Consumer
Contracts Regulations 2013 indicate that various types of contracts are not included
in the scope of the consumer law relative to distance contracts.649
649 A solution which has been criticized especially in what refers to the contracts for passenger trans-
port services, eg plane tickets, of indisputable significance for the e-commerce as such, see Patricia
MA´RQUEZ LOBILLO, ‘Contratacio´n Electro´nica de Viajes Combinados: Reflexiones tras la Prop-
uesta de Directiva de julio de 2013 y el Proyecto de Reforma del TRLGDCU de octubre 2013 sobre
el <<Derecho de desistimiento>>’ [2015] La Proteccio´n de los Consumidores en Tiempos de Cam-
bio. Ponencias y Comunicaciones del XIII Congreso de la Asociacio´n Sainz de Andino; Lu´ıs Mar´ıa
Miranda Serrano and others (eds) 141.
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2 Information duties, their
fulfilment and breach —
general analysis
2.1 Characteristics of the duty to inform and its
breach
2.1.1 Content and scope of the information duties
In order to be able to analyse the breach of information duties, it is necessary not
only to establish what duties are imposed on traders, but also their content and
scope. Pre-contractual information duty is an obligation on the side of the trader -–
an obligation that can be contrasted with an incentive or choice whether to provide
or not some information to the consumer1 -– resulting from legal rules requiring in
a direct or indirect manner2 that information be provided to the other party. Such
consideration implies that breach of the duty will result in some legal consequences,
as there is no legal obligation when there are no consequences of its breach; that
would be merely an encouragement.
1 Thomas WILHELMSSON and Christian TWIGG-FLESNER, ‘Pre-contractual Information Duties
in the Acquis Communautaire’ (2006) 2 European Review of Contract Law 441, 446.
2 As noted above in Chapter 1 Subsection 1.2.3.1 More general and indirect information duties.
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Secondly, the very notion of ‘pre-contractual duties’ indicates that the obligation
arises in the pre-contractual stage of the parties’ contractual relationship, ie before
the parties conclude the contract,3 as opposed to the contractual information duties,
requiring the information to be given once the contract has been concluded.4 At this
point, the notion of ‘pre-contractual information duties’ needs some clarification also
in what refers to its relation to other concepts, such as contract terms, advertisements
and commercial communications. First of all, pre-contractual information as such
subsequently becomes a part of the contract, according to art 6.5 of the Directive on
consumer rights: ‘[t]he information referred to in paragraph 1 shall form an integral
part of the distance (...) contract and shall not be altered unless the contracting
parties expressly agree otherwise.’ The Directive however also refers to ‘contractual
terms’, eg in the recital (15): ’(...) Member States may maintain or introduce in their
national law language requirements regarding contractual information and contrac-
tual terms’ suggesting therefore that although the information becomes an ‘integral
part of the contract’ it is still different from contractual terms.5 The use of varying
terminology creates some confusion, nevertheless it seems that the pre-contractual
information can be treated as contract terms, clearly after (and if) the contract is
formed;6 a possible explanation as to the use of different concepts in the Directive
might be that the contract terms describe parties’ rights and obligations under a
contract, and some items of the information do not really shape parties’ relationship,
eg those relating to a reminder of the existence of a legal guarantee of conformity
3 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 1) 446 describe this time period in the following
words: ‘(...) during the negotiations which may eventually result in a binding contract, or when a
party has indicated his willingness to enter into a contract but the necessary formalities have not
yet been completed.’
4 Annette NORDHAUSEN SCHOLES, ‘Information Requirements’ in Geraint Howells and Reiner
Schulze (eds), Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (sellier European law pub-
lishers 2009) 217.
5 See ibid 234-235, where in the context of the Proposal for the Directive on consumer rights Nord-
hausen Scholes notes: ‘[i]t could be said that all that forms part of a contract will be the terms of
the contract, but why would different terminology be used in different parts of the same legislative
document? Should the term “integral part” mean something different from “contract terms”?’
6 This consideration, ie pre-contractual information as contract terms will be explored in more detail
in the context of remedies for breach of information duties in Chapter 3 of the present study.
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for goods7 or the existence of relevant codes of conduct.8 The Spanish legislation,
TRLDCU, which as already mentioned practically copies the text of the Directive,
also refers to both concepts: an integral part of the contract -– ‘parte integrante del
contrato’9 and contract terms — ‘cla´usulas del contrato.’10 The English legislation
makes it clear: the CRA 2015 in ss 11(4), 11(5) and 12 in relation to goods; 36(3),
36(4) and 37 in relation to digital content and s 50(3) and (4) in relation to services
requires ‘[a]ny information that is provided by the trader (...) [that] is information
mentioned in (...) Schedule 2 to the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation
and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3134) (...) is to be treated as
included as a term of the contract.’11
Also a reversed situation should be considered: can contract terms, to which eg
refers the Directive on unfair terms in the transparency requirement,12 as well as
the TRLDCU13 and the CRA 2015,14 be regarded as pre-contractual information?
Contract terms, especially in the electronic B2C contracts, are usually provided to
consumers before the conclusion of the contract; moreover as the pre-contractual
information becomes contract terms, then requirements regarding contract terms
result applicable to the pre-contractual information as well.
Commercial communications and advertising15 can amount to pre-contractual
information,16 as they contain information about the trader’s product and they are
7 Art 6.1.(l) of the Directive on consumer rights.
8 Art 6.1.(n).
9 Art 97.5 TRLDCU.
10 See eg art 102.2 TRLDCU.
11 Cf ss of the CRA 2015 listed.
12 Art 5 of the Directive on unfair terms reads: ‘In the case of contracts where all or certain terms
offered to the consumer are in writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible
language.(....)’
13 Art 80 TRLDCU.
14 S 68 CRA 2015.
15 See eg art 2.(f) of the Directive on electronic commerce or 2.(d) of the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive considers commercial communications to be a type of commercial practice.
16 However cf art 14 CISG whch treats advertisements as invitations to treat, therefore not included
in contract contents.
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logically provided to the consumer before the contract conclusion. Main aim of both
commercial communications and advertisements is to promote trader’s products
and therefore induce the consumers to enter into contract with the trader. Under
the Spanish law advertising is considered to constitute part of the contract -– art 61
of the TRLDCU states that the contents of an advertisemen17 become part of the
contract, even if the written contract does not expressly state that.18 Commercial
communications used in distance communication however, are included expressly in
art 96 of the TRLDCU, which does not specify their character -– they can be treated
as either offers, which form part of the contract, or invitations to treat, invitatio
ad offerendum, which are only aimed at raising consumers’ curiosity regarding the
trader’s products and invite consumers at offering contract conclusion to the trader.
Under the Spanish law, the commercial communication in order to be considered an
offer needs to be sufficiently precise and contain all the necessary elements of the
contract, at least: the offeror’s identity, main characteristics of the good or service
offered, price or the manner in which it is to be calculated, payment and performance
arrangements and the time period for which the offer is valid.19
In English law advertising may only in some limited circumstances be considered
to be an offer, it will then naturally form part of the subsequent contract (if formed)
— especially when the statement made in the advertisement is sufficiently precise.20
Nevertheless, in English law traditionally a concept of ‘mere puffs’ is recognised21 —
sales talk which is an acceptable exaggeration, of no legal effect: a statement which is
too vague to be considered either a contractual promise, subsequently incorporated
17 The provision refers to ’oferta, promocio´n y publicidad ’ that is different kinds of commercial com-
munications directed at consumers.
18 Raquel GUILLE´N CATALA´N, El Regime´n Jur´ıdico de la Oferta Contractual Dirigida a los Con-
sumidores (Adaptada al Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2007, de 16 de noviembre, por el que se aprueba
el TRLGDCU) (Colegio de Registradores de la Propiedad y Mercantiles de Espan˜a, Centro de
Estudios 2010) 29 notes that even before the TRLDCU was adopted, Spanish courts treated ad-
vertisements as binding, basing such requirement on the art 1258 of the Co´digo civil and the good
faith principle resulting thereof.
19 Natalia FERNA´NDEZ PE´REZ, El Nuevo Re´gimen de la Contratacio´n a Distancia con Consum-
idores: Especial Referencia a la Relativa a Servicios Financieros ( (La Ley 2009) 228-229.
20 Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] 1 QB 256.
21 Advertising puffs will also be mentioned further in Chapter 3 Section 3.2 General private law and
remedies it offers.
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into the contract as a term, or a representation understood as a statement of fact
intended to be relied upon.22 In consumer contracts, the CRA 2015 in its s 9(6)
relative to the quality of goods, states that in assessing if the quality of goods is
satisfactory, any public statements made by the trader, including advertising, are to
be taken into account.
In conclusion, it can be assumed that commercial communications and advert-
ising may be considered pre-contractual information, if they are sufficiently precise
and the trader’s intention for them to be relied upon can be demonstrated. Moreover,
specific Spanish legislation – art 61 TRLDCU – expressly considers advertising to
form part of the contract. Therefore information included in advertising and commer-
cial communications can relatively often be considered pre-contractual information,
as it is aimed at inducing the consumer to contract on the one hand, and it might
subsequently be included in the contract as terms on the other.
In the case of the pre-contractual duties we also need to specify the moment in
time from when the disclosure duties and their fulfilment are viewed and the func-
tion that they are intended to perform. As already discussed, the main role of the
specific information duties established in the European directives is to allow con-
sumers to take informed contracting decisions. Logically, the trader’s information
duty should therefore arise irrespective of whether the contract with consumer is
subsequently entered into or not. Moreover, some provisions applicable also to the
online contracts require the information to be always available — eg art 5 of the
Directive on electronic commerce: ‘[i]n addition to other information requirements
established by Community law, Member States shall ensure that the service provider
shall render easily, directly and permanently accessible to the recipients of the ser-
vice (...) at least the following information (...).’23 Nevertheless, individual, private
law remedies will arise only in limited cases if the parties finally decide not to enter
22 See Dimmock v Hallett (1866) LR 2 Ch App 21 at 27 where Turner LJ observed: ‘(...) I think
that a mere general statement that land is fertile and improvable, whereas part of it has been
abandoned as useless, cannot, except in extreme cases—as, for instance, where a considerable part
is covered with water, or otherwise irreclaimable—be considered such a misrepresentation as to
entitle a purchaser to be discharged. In the present case, I think the statement is to be looked at
as a mere flourishing description by an auctioneer (....).’
23 See Patricia MA´RQUEZ LOBILLO, Empresarios y Profesionales en la Sociedad de la Informacio´n
(Cuadernos Mercantiles, Editoriales de Derecho Reunidas, SA 2004) 288ff.
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into the contract with each other24 -– this generally speaking belongs to the realm of
competition law and administrative law sanctions. Also, especially in the electronic
transactions, traders provide consumers with the contract terms before the conclu-
sion of the contract; the terms constitute the information about consumer’s rights
and obligations under the contract.25 Therefore, although the intrinsic character-
istic of the pre-contractual duties is that they concern the stage prior to contract
formation, their significance from the perspective of their breach and availability
of potential private law remedies depends on the very fact of the contract having
been concluded. The information provided gains then some new value. Now this
consideration needs to be contrasted with the nature of the remedies for the breach
of information duties, analysed further, which might be contractual, pre-contractual
or both.26 It can be concluded that for the purposes of the analysis of the private law
consequences of the breach of information duties, they arise at the pre-contractual
stage but are assessed from the perspective of the posterior contract formation.
The scope of the information duty can vary from a plain duty to provide truth-
ful information to an obligation to advise the other party taking into account their
specific needs. First of all, the scope of the duty depends on its effect on the party
providing information — the trader in the consumer law context -– here some authors
distinguish two concepts: a duty to ‘inform’ and a ‘disclosure’ duty.27 The inform-
ation duty requires the party to provide certain pieces of information to the other
party, and its predominant aim is to improve market transparency thus encouraging
informed transactional decisions; it is also closely linked to the weaker party protec-
24 On the basis of the so-called culpa in contrahendo, cf egRuth SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Intro-
duction’ in Ruth Sefton-Green (ed), Mistake, Fraud and Duties to Inform in European Contract
Law (The Common Core of European Private Law, Cambridge University Press 2004) 12.
25 This consideration is of primary importance for the analysis of breach of information duties, as the
pre-contractual information can be in many instances reduced to contract terms.
26 Paula GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Per-
spective’ in Stefan Grundmann and Martin Schauer (eds), The Architecture of European Codes and
Contract Law (Private Law in European Context Series, Kluwer Law International 2006) 313; for
more detailed analysis of the nature of the remedies for breach of the pre-contractual information
duties see below Subsection 2.2.3.2 Nature of remedies: contractual, tortious or other?
27 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 1) 451-452; SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduc-
tion’ (n 24) 1-2.
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tion. The great majority of the consumer acquis contains provisions of such kind.28
On the other hand, the duty to disclose information implies that the informing party
might prefer to hide some information from the other party but is obliged to reveal
it.29 The disclosure duty is present in general contract law both in England and
Spain, although to a different extent. The duty to disclose is aimed against dishon-
est parties with an intention to induce the other party to form a contract they would
not have entered into, had they known all the material information. It corresponds
to the general private law and brings to mind the duty to act in good faith, entailing
in Spanish law the requirement of an honest behaviour towards the other party.30
English law does not recognise the duty to act in good faith, however there is a link
between the disclosure duty and the law of misrepresentation, where remedies are
available to the misrepresentee induced into the contract through provision of false
information. Of course, the law of misrepresentation for it to be actionable requires
the representation that was actually made to be truthful, while disclosure duty is
imposed at an earlier stage — before any representation was provided, however the
main rationale of such general duty is similar: upholding the moral duty of honesty
translating into protection of a real consent of the other party, rather than market
transparency in itself. Nevertheless, the difference between those two concepts of in-
formation and disclosure is far from striking, and indeed both duties aim at allowing
the other party to take an informed decision. Moreover, the plain information duty
may often become a disclosure obligation, when the provisions require to provide
information about something the party would prefer to hide.31 In the present study I
28 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 1) 452.
29 SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ (n 24) footnote 3.
30 See above Chapter 1 Subsection 1.2.2.1 Good faith, fair dealing and pre-contractual duties of dis-
closure.
31 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 1) 446 and footnote 21, who observe that the distinc-
tion between the duty to inform and the duty to disclose information ‘(...) should not be overstated,
because even a simple obligation to provide information may cause a person to reveal something
that he might have preferred to keep to himself and thereby become a duty of disclosure.’ and
further provide an example in the pertinent to the present study consumer law context: ‘[f]or ex-
ample, in the consumer context, a trader is often required to provide information about complaints
handling procedures. Where a trader only has basic procedures, or none at all, he might prefer
not to reveal this to a consumer. What may look like a simple requirement to provide information
becomes a duty to disclose.’
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am treating those two notions as synonyms and I am using them interchangeably,32
however I am aware of their potentially different significance.
The scope of information duty can vary also from the point of view of their in-
tended effect on the information addressee, namely the consumer. Plain information
duty, consisting just of provision of various items of information required by law is
subject to a lot of criticism, especially from the behavioural economics perspect-
ive. Nevertheless, there are certain types of information duties, which go further
than plain information requirements: a duty to advise and a duty to warn. A duty
to advise is an obligation going beyond a mere duty to inform — the information
addressee should receive personalised information indicating the consequences of
the future contract for their situation and needs, thus being put in a better pos-
ition to take adequate contracting decision.33 I argued elsewhere that in the B2C
e-commerce a duty to advise may constitute a better solution than plain inform-
ation requirements,34 especially given the problems consumers experience due to
the nature of online transactions.35 The scope of a duty to advise, in what refers
to different information items to be provided, is not necessarily broader than that
of a mere information duty, however it reaches much deeper and requires the in-
forming party to dedicate personalised customer care to the other party. Some form
of personal communication between trader and consumer is necessary, so that the
trader is made aware of the personal circumstances and needs of the customer. In
the e-commerce context it could happen through e-mails for example, which is fairly
common, nevertheless difficult and impractical to enforce on a broader scale. Advice
32 As does eg Stephen WEATHERILL, ‘19. Consumer Protection’ in Jan M Smits (ed), Elgar En-
cyclopedia of Comparative Law (2nd edn, Edward Elgar Publishing 2012).
33 Duty to advise is present for example in consumer insurance law, see Piotr TERESZKIEWICZ,
‘The Europeanisation of Insurance Contract Law: the Insurer’s Duty to Advise and its Regulation
in German and European Law’ in James Devenney and Mel Kenny (eds), The Transformation of
European Private Law Harmonisation, Consolidation, Codification or Chaos? (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 2013) 238ff; see also observations on such duty in French law, where it is well established
in Hans-W MICKLITZ and others (eds), Cases, Materials and Text on Consumer Law (Ius Com-
mune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe, Hart Publishing 2010) para 3.48 (FR).
34 Zofia BEDNARZ, ‘Breach of Information Duties in the B2C E-Commerce: Adequacy of Available
Remedies’ (2016) 22 IDP. Revista d’Internet, Dret i Pol´ıtica 2, 8.
35 See Chapter 1 Subsection 1.1.1.1 Characteristics of the e-commerce on drawbacks of online trans-
actions.
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duties cannot replace information duties in their current form, but rather comple-
ment them. Duties to advise can be found for example in the rules on goods fit for
particular purpose in the English CRA 201536 or in the Spanish law provisions of
TRLDCU relative to conformity of the goods with the contract,37 that implement
the art 2 of the Directive on the sale of consumer goods.38
It is also possible to deduce the existence of a duty to advise from provisions of the
Directive on unfair terms. Wilhelmsson notes that from the Annex(1)(i), requiring
that the consumer have a real opportunity to become acquainted with the terms of
a standard form contract before signing it, read in relation to art 5 on transparency
an obligation ‘(...) to explain the content of the terms for example to consumers
36 S 10 CRA 2015 relative to the goods fit for particular purpose states in subsection (3) that ‘[t]he
contract is to be treated as including a term that the goods are reasonably fit for that purpose,
whether or not that is a purpose for which goods of that kind are usually supplied.’ This provision,
according to subsection (1) ‘applies to a contract to supply goods if before the contract is made
the consumer makes known to the trader (expressly or by implication) any particular purpose
for which the consumer is contracting for the goods,’ however it will not be applicable ‘if the
circumstances show that the consumer does not rely, or it is unreasonable for the consumer to rely,
on the skill or judgment of the trader or credit-broker.’ Therefore, a duty to advise is implied — if
the consumer tells the trader what they need the goods for, the trader is under obligation to advise
the other contracting party if the goods they want to purchase are fit for that purpose, such duty
is limited by consumer’s reliance -– if it is not reasonable for them to rely on the trader’s advice,
then the trader will not be liable for the personalised information provided. Case law on a related
provision of s 14(3) Sale of Goods Act 1979 seems to confirm this consideration, see eg BSS Group
Plc v Makers (UK) Ltd (t/a Allied Services) [2011] EWCA Civ 809, 34ff, where it was held that
a specialist dealer is required to exercise its skill and judgement in assessing whether valves that
were being purchased were fit for a specific purpose for which they were intended to be used, even
if the purpose had been made known to the vendor only impliedly.
37 Art 116.1.c) of the TRLDCU states that products are presumed to be in conformity with the
contract if they are fit for any particular purpose needed by the consumer as long as they had made
this purpose known to the trader at the time of conclusion of the contract, under the condition
that the trader has accepted the product to be fit for that particular purpose. In a manner similar
to the provisions of the English CRA 2015, the trader is under a duty to advise the consumer on
the fitness of the product they are purchasing for a particular purpose they want to use it for; the
duty arises when the personal information about the purpose the consumer needs the goods for is
communicated to the trader.
38 Article 2 (Conformity with the contract) reads:
‘1. The seller must deliver goods to the consumer which are in conformity with the contract of
sale.
2. Consumer goods are presumed to be in conformity with the contract if they: (...)
(b) are fit for any particular purpose for which the consumer requires them and which he made
known to the seller at the time of conclusion of the contract and which the seller has accepted;’
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who do not master the language of the terms well, even if they are written in the
language of the country where the contract is made,’ may arise on the side of the
trader.39
As one can see, duties to advise are actually established in certain situations in
B2C, also online, contracts. They constitute a welcomed complement to the mere
information duty, especially from the consumer’s point of view. They remove the
burden of absorbing, processing and understanding large quantity of information
items from a consumer. On the other hand, a duty to advise, in order to be effect-
ive, requires communication between the contracting parties, which may often be
inconvenient in electronic transactions, especially because it slows down the con-
tracting process and is more problematic for the trader who has to engage greater
resources in order to be able to attend to customers’ inquiries.
Another instance of a type of information duty is a duty to warn, which can
also be considered to be a subtype of a duty to advise — a duty to warn requires
the trader to give notice to the consumer of a possible negative occurrence resulting
from their contract, in which consumer’s personal circumstances may play a role.
Therefore it also implies a certain degree of communication between the contracting
parties. As Beale observes, such a duty relating to services contracts is included
in the DCFR,40 although it cannot be said to be recognised by all European legal
systems.
In the context of consumer’s right to information, aiming at protecting con-
sumers’ economic interests, rather than safety or health, duties to warn are scarcely
present. Nevertheless, in what refers to the e-commerce, and more precisely to its
direct type, an information duty regarding contract for supply of digital content is
close to a duty to warn. Arts 6.1.(r) and (s) of the Directive on consumer rights
39 Thomas WILHELMSSON, ‘European Rules on Pre-Contractual Information Duties?’ (2006) 7
ERA Forum Journal of the Academy of European Law 16, 25, who construes a possible wording
of a duty to advise in consumer acquis as: ‘A business is required to explain to a consumer the
content of the terms of a contract to be concluded with that consumer if this is the only opportunity
for the consumer to become sufficiently acquainted with these terms.’
40 In the words of Hugh BEALE, ‘Pre-contractual Obligations: The General Contract Law Back-
ground’ (2008) XIV Juridica International 42, 49: in the Art IV.C–2:102 ‘(...) there is a general
duty set forth for the service provider to warn the client if there is a risk that the service requested
may cause damage or injury to the client’s other property or interests, and even to warn that the
service may not achieve the results the client wants.’
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require the trader to inform their contracting party about:
(...) (r) where applicable, the functionality, including applicable technical
protection measures, of digital content;
(s) where applicable, any relevant interoperability of digital content
with hardware and software that the trader is aware of or can reasonably
be expected to have been aware of; (...).
The recital (19) of the Directive explains:
In addition to the general information requirements, the trader should
inform the consumer about the functionality and the relevant interoper-
ability of digital content. The notion of functionality should refer to the
ways in which digital content can be used, for instance for the tracking
of consumer behaviour; it should also refer to the absence or presence of
any technical restrictions such as protection via Digital Rights Manage-
ment or region coding. The notion of relevant interoperability is meant to
describe the information regarding the standard hardware and software
environment with which the digital content is compatible, for instance
the operating system, the necessary version and certain hardware fea-
tures.
The information about functionality and interoperability of the digital content
serves to warn the consumer, for example about a possible tracking of their behaviour
or any technical interactions that the purchased software will enter into with the
hardware and software already being used by the consumer. The main aim of such
information therefore is to help the consumer to make an informed decision, taking
into account potentially unwanted consequences of the contract for supply of the
digital content. 41 The results of a possible breach of an information duty expressed
as a duty to warn may be more severe for consumers, and therefore the remedies
available in such occurrence should also be adequate.
Information duties vary also in what refers to the way in which they are ex-
pressed: we can distinguish positive and negative information duties. Information
41 For instance, leisure applications, such as games, might automatically post content to the user’s
social network account. In such case, it is easy to imagine the unwanted consequences, which
may involve for example an employer realising that his employee, ie the game’s user, is spending
time playing rather than working. The consumer should therefore be warned, rather than merely
informed, about the interoperability of the digital product.
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duties in a direct form are usually positive – the trader is obliged to provide the
consumer with a list of specified information items.42 The indirect duties, which can
be deduced from other provisions, not necessarily establishing disclosure duties, will
on the other hand constitute information duties in a negative form. An example of
negative information duties are the indirect duties resulting from the rules on unfair
commercial practices, mentioned above.43 Those provisions are based on a negative
trader’s duty not to mislead the consumer, however they can be expressed in a form
of a positive information duty as well,44 requiring the trader to provide consumers
with all material information they need to make an informed choice. Nevertheless,
such interpretation in which a prohibition is reversed to a positive information duty
will be hard to accept in English law. For instance, the rules on misrepresentation
require one party not to lie to the other party, to put it bluntly.45 It does not mean
however, that a prohibition of lying translates into a duty to tell the truth; the
parties are allowed to keep silent. It needs to be noted therefore that inferring dis-
closure duties from other provisions is possible only within the limits that a certain
legal system sets; in the English law those limits go much further than in Spanish
law.
42 Geraint HOWELLS, ‘The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information’ (2005)
32 Journal of Law and Society 349, 353.
43 See Chapter 1 Subsection 1.2.3.1 More general and indirect information duties.
44 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 1) 463 deduce a following, positive in scope, rule
from the prohibitions established in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive:
‘(1) Where a business is marketing goods and services to a consumer, the business must, with
due regard to all the circumstances and the limitations of the communication medium employed,
provide such material information as the average consumer needs in the given context to take an
informed decision on whether to enter into a contract.
(2) Where a business uses a commercial communication which enables a consumer to make a
purchase, the following information must be provided to the consumer where this is not already
apparent from the context of the commercial communication:
– the main characteristics of the goods or services; the address and identity of the business; the
price (including charges and taxes), and, where it exists, the right of withdrawal;
– peculiarities related to payment, delivery, performance, complaint handling, if they depart from
the requirements of professional diligence.’
45 Defects of consent and their relationship with the disclosure duties will be analysed further in
Subsection 2.1.3.2 Possible classifications of breach of information duties; see also Chapter 3 Section
3.2 General private law and remedies it offers where the defects of consent and their role as remedies
for breach of information duties is discussed in more detail.
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2.1.2 Requirements relative to the way of providing inform-
ation
Various provision regulate the manner in which the information needs to be provided.
It is perfectly understandable, as information needs to be provided in a way allowing
it to play the role it was designed for -– primarily the one of enabling consumers
to make informed choices, but also as a mean of facilitating posterior use of the
information when necessary.46 There are various issues concerning the manner in
which the information is provided, the main being the clarity of the information,
and especially the language used,47 however other questions, such as the way and
the moment of information provision should also be considered.
The already mentioned transparency requirement laid down in art 5 of the Dir-
ective on unfair terms48 requires the terms of the contract49 to be ‘drafted in plain,
intelligible language.’50 This provision is paired with the contra proferentem inter-
46 For an example of a real life story demonstrating the importance of the information being presented
in a way that makes it possible for consumers to absorb, process and understand it see eg Alex
HERN, ‘I read all the small print on the internet and it made me want to die’ The Guardian
(London, 15 June 2015) <www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/15/i-read-all-the-small-
print-on-the-internet> accessed 15 November 2015.
47 Here I am referring to the language meaning the wording used, and not the national language in
which the information is delivered, as ‘(...) it may be suggested that there are no simple answers
in a multilingual Community to the question of language and the communication of information
to consumers.’ as observed by John A USHER, ‘Disclosure Rules (Information) as a Primary Tool
in the Doctrine on Measures Having an Equivalent Effect’ in Stefan Grundmann and others (eds),
Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market (de Gruyter 2001) 161.
48 Edoardo FERRANTE, ‘Contractual Disclosure and Remedies under the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive’ in Geraint Howells and others (eds), Information Rights and Obligations: A Challenge for
Party Autonomy and Transactional Fairness (Markets and the Law, Ashgate 2005) 124 observing
that the Directive introduces two separate regimes: courts’ control of contractual content and
protection of transparency.
49 Contract terms that are provided to consumers before the conclusion of a contract, as it always
happens especially in the electronic transactions, become therefore pre-contractual information.
50 In the case C-26/13 Ka´sler [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:282 the CJEU interpreted this provision, in the
context of a mortgage loan in a foreign currency, analysing the transparency of a term establishing
the calculation method and the interest rate. The Court stated that it is from the perspective of
an average, reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect consumer that the terms need to
be assessed, in more detail see Joasia LUZAK, ‘Passive Consumers vs. the New Online Disclosure
Rules of the Consumer Rights Directive’ [2015] Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research
178
2.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DUTY TO INFORM AND ITS
BREACH
pretation rule: ‘[w]here there is doubt about the meaning of a term, the interpretation
most favourable to the consumer shall prevail.’51 Wilhelmsson and Twigg-Flesner
note that these provisions indicate an existence in the acquis of a following sup-
port provision: ‘[a] duty to provide information imposed on a business is not fulfilled
unless the information is clear and precise, and expressed in plain and intelligible
language.’ Such an interpretation of the transparency requirement is close to a duty
to explain or even advice, the main objective of those provisions is to make the
information understandable for the consumer, and it rests on the trader to ensure
it.
Both Spanish and English law contain the transparency requirement in their
respective consumer law provisions: art 80 of the TRLDCU and s 68 of the CRA
2015. Both provisions aim at achieving transparency in consumer contracts, however
the Spanish provision is limited only to standard-form contracts, where the terms
were not individually negotiated, while provisions of the CRA 2015 apply to all B2C
contracts. On the other hand, the TRLDCU is more elaborate than the English
legislation – the Spanish law not only requires the terms to fulfil requirements such
as precision, clarity and plainness, but also makes sure that the terms are easily
accessible52 and legible, so that the consumer is able to familiarise themselves with
the terms before entering into the contract.53 Moreover, the size of the letters and
colour of font used in the contract terms is also determined: letters cannot be smaller
than 1,5 mm and the contrast between the font and the background should be
Paper No. 2015-02 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2553877> accessed 13
June 2016, 6; recently in the case C-96/14 Jean-Claude Van Hove v CNP Assurances SA [2015]
ECLI:EU:C:2015:262 the CJEU confirmed the meaning of the ‘plain and intelligible language’
requirement, noting that a ‘term is drafted in plain, intelligible language, (...) [if] it is not only
grammatically intelligible to the consumer, but also (...) [when] the contract sets out transparently
the specific functioning of the arrangements to which the relevant term refers and the relationship
between those arrangements and the arrangements laid down in respect of other contractual terms,
so that that consumer is in a position to evaluate, on the basis of precise, intelligible criteria, the
economic consequences for him which derive from it.’
51 Art 5 in fine Directive on unfair terms.
52 Including possible cross-references to other documents, which in any case need to be provided
before the contract is formed – art 80.1.a) TRLDCU.
53 Art 80.1 TRLDCU.
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sufficient, so to make reading easy enough.54 The CRA 2015 in its s 68 is primarily
concerned with a language used in the contract – the terms need to be transparent,
ie ‘expressed in plain and intelligible language’ and legible.
Other directives also refer to the language of the information, the Directive on
consumer rights mentions trader’s obligation to ‘provide the consumer with the (...)
information in a clear and comprehensible manner’55 and to ‘make that information
available to the consumer in a way appropriate to the means of distance communica-
tion used in plain and intelligible language. In so far as that information is provided
on a durable medium, it shall be legible.’56 The use of various different typifications:
‘clear and comprehensible’ and ‘plain and intelligible,’ in the Directive is criticised as
lacking consistency.57 From a linguistic point of view, ‘clear’ describes information
that is evident, obvious, transparent;58 ‘comprehensible’ means ‘capable of being
understood’59; information provided in a clear and comprehensible manner will be
unambiguous and easy to understand. ‘Plain’ refers to something that is obvious
and clear, while ‘intelligible’ is ‘able to be understood, clear.’ ‘Plain and intelligible’
again denotes information expressed in an unambiguous and easily understandable
way. It appears that all those adjectives are actually synonyms, which makes it even
more obscure as to what the legislator’s rationale for such choice of words was.
The Directive is also concerned with the manner in which the information is to
be provided, not only with the legibility of its content, hence the reference to the
appropriateness of the way of information provision to the contracting means. This
is also reflected in the wording of the art 8.4 of the Directive: ‘[i]f the contract is
54 Art 80.1.b) TRLDCU.
55 Art 6.1 of the Directive on consumer rights.
56 Art 8.1 of the Directive on consumer rights.
57 Arno R LODDER, ‘Information Requirements Overload? Assessing Disclosure Duties under the
E-Commerce Directive, Services Directive and Consumer Directive’ in Andriej Savin and Jan Trza-
skowski (eds), Research Handbook on EU Internet Law (Research Handbooks in European Law,
Edward Elgar 2014) 368ff.
58 For the definitions of adjectives I used Chambers 21st Century Dictionary Online, accessed 20 July
2016, <www.chambers.co.uk/dictionaries/the-chambers-dictionary.php>.
59 Cf Norbert REICH and Hans-W MICKLITZ, ‘Economic Law, Consumer Interests and EU Integ-
ration’ in Norbert Reich and others (eds), European Consumer Law (2nd edn, Ius Communitatis
Series, Intersentia 2014) 23.
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concluded through a means of distance communication which allows limited space
or time to display the information (...)’ (then the trader should only provide the
consumer with the most relevant information items, listed further in the same art).
Some provisions of the Directive, specifically applicable to electronic contracts, also
require certain manner of providing information: for example in the art 8.2 the Dir-
ective refers to ‘a clear and prominent manner’ in which certain information items60
need to be provided, before an electronic contract is ormed; art 8.3 establishes some
information requirements concerning delivery and payment restrictions for trading
websites, those information items have to be indicated ‘clearly and legibly.’ Without
a doubt, in the case of electronic contracts, as special subtype of distance contracts,
the legislator is aiming at making some terms, which are of major importance for the
consumer’s decision, communicated to them in a conspicuous way — hence the ad-
jectives ‘clear and prominent’, meaning ‘unambiguous,’ ‘evident,’ ‘easily noticeable,’
‘standing out.’ ‘Clear and legible’ indication, on the other hand, will be an easily
readable one; here again it is unclear why the legislator opted for this particular
wording, and why ‘clear and comprehensible’ expression was not repeated.
The requirement of a durable medium61 points to the utility of the pre-contractual
information both prior to contract conclusion – so that the consumer can look
through the information provided in a moment they choose without being hur-
ried, and posterior to entering the contract – when they need the information for
reference.62 In practice, consumers usually receive a confirmation e-mail, where the
pre-contractual information should be provided.63 In what refers to the information
60 Resulting from art 6.(1) points (a), (e), (o) and (p) of the Directive on consumer rights: the main
characteristics of the goods or services; the total price of the goods or services inclusive of taxes;
the duration of the contract and the minimum duration of the consumer’s obligations under the
contract.
61 ‘Durable medium’ meaning ‘instrument which enables the consumer or the trader to store inform-
ation addressed personally to him in a way accessible for future reference for a period of time
adequate for the purposes of the information and which allows the unchanged reproduction of the
information stored’ according to the art 2(10) of the Directive on consumer rights; see also LUZAK
(n 50) 8.
62 However, it seems to be somewhat repetitive when considered together with art 6.5 of the same
Directive which requires the information to become an integral part of the contract.
63 LODDER (n 57) 368ff notes that it is accepted since the now-repealed Directive on distance
contracts that the concept of durable medium includes e-mail.
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provided through a link to the website where it is stored, the CJEU ruled in the
Content Services Ltd case that such means of providing information are not durable
enough.64
Spanish TRLDCU in its art 60, relating to consumer contracts in general, requires
the trader to provide the consumer with relevant, truthful and sufficient informa-
tion in a clear and comprehensible manner. In what refers specifically to distance
contracts, art 97 adds various information requirements to the art 60, again asking
for provision of information items in a clear and comprehensible manner. The provi-
sion of the information and contract terms on a durable medium is also established,
especially in arts: 63.2, requiring contract confirmation in writing or on a durable
medium and 98.1, relating to information requirements in distance contracts, requir-
ing provision -– adequate to the means of distance communication used -– of certain
information items before the contract is concluded; if such provision is carried out
through a durable medium the information needs to be legible.
In what refers to the English legislation, it is in the Consumer Contracts Regu-
lations 2013 – secondary legislation implementing the Directive on consumer rights
– that requirements regarding the manner of information provision are established.
Reg 13.(1) states: ‘[b]efore the consumer is bound by a distance contract, the trader–
(a) must give or make available to the consumer the information listed in Schedule
2 in a clear and comprehensible manner, and in a way appropriate to the means of
distance communication used, (...).’; reg 14.(2) relative to requirements for distance
contracts concluded by electronic means repeats the wording used by the Directive
on consumer rights, mentioned above: ‘clear and prominent manner’ and reg 14.(6)
concerning trading websites sets out the need to indicate clearly and legible whether
any delivery or payment restrictions apply. The reg 8 of the Consumer Contracts
Regulations 2013 provides some clarity in what refers to the verbs denoting informa-
tion provision: ‘something is made available to a consumer only if the consumer can
reasonably be expected to know how to access it.’ This would suggest that ‘making
64 Case C-49/11 Content Services Ltd v Bundesarbeitskammer [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:419 paras
26ff; see also LODDER (n 57) 368ff; Candida LEONE, ‘Transparency revisited – on the role of
information in the recent case-law of the CJEU’ (2014) 10 European Review of Contract Law
312, 10ff; LUZAK (n 50) 10ff; Hans-W MICKLITZ and Betul KAS, ‘Overview of cases before the
CJEU on European Consumer Contract Law (2008–2013) – Part I’ (2014) 10 European Review of
Contract Law 157.
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information available’ implies a possibility for the trader to, for example, display
the information on their website, and not only give it directly to the consumer in a
written form, as in an email for instance.
As we can see, similarly to the Directive, the national legislation deals both
with the form of the content information, including comprehensibility, and with the
manner in which it should be provided. It is not always clear however, why some
provisions only list the information items to be provided, others make reference to
the form and others still establish requirements relative to the language and com-
prehensibility.65 Without a doubt, such status quo, of a rather chaotic character, as
one might want to describe it, was initiated at the European level. To the provisions
mentioned above we need to add other requirements relative to the provision of in-
formation laid down by the Directive on electronic commerce and national legislation
implementing it.
The Directive on electronic commerce requires the information to be ‘easily, dir-
ectly and permanently accessible’ in its art 5.1. Such provision implies therefore that
the information should be accessible in a straightforward way, not requiring much ef-
fort or any additional actions. In the current digital world, such provision translated
into the service provider’s obligation to provide information on their website – in-
formation cannot be provided only through e-mail or a pop-up window, as these are
transitory ways, and a good practice is to provide information on each of the pages
of the website through a link to a page with the information.66 Furthermore, art
10.1 of the Directive on electronic commerce lays down a requirement for the service
provider to give information ‘clearly, comprehensibly and unambiguously prior to
the order being placed by the recipient of the service (...).’ Regs 6(1) and 9(1) of the
E-commerce Regulations 2002 practically repeat the wording of the Directive, refer-
ring respectively to ‘a form and manner which is easily, directly and permanently
accessible’ and ‘a clear, comprehensible and unambiguous manner.’ Spanish LSSICE
in its art 10.1 requires the information to be accessible permanently, easily, directly
and for free – the last criterion having been added by the Spanish legislator. The art
65 Christian TWIGG-FLESNER, The Europeanisation of Contract Law: Current Controversies in
Law (Routledge-Cavendish 2008) 64.
66 LODDER (n 57) 367.
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27 of the LSSICE regulates that the information, which is to be made available be-
fore the parties enter into the contract in a permanent, easy and free manner, should
be clear, comprehensible and unambiguous – again Spanish legislator imposing rules
more elaborated than those set out in the Directive.
The question arises however, what is the rationale of so many slightly different
requirements? An information item, such as information on the main characteristics
of goods (art 6.1.(a) of the Directive on consumer rights), needs to be provided
in a clear and comprehensible manner before the consumer is bound by a distance
contract (art.6.1), in plain and intelligible language (art 8.1) and the consumer needs
to be made aware of it, directly before they place the order, in a clear and prominent
manner (art 8.2)! Not to mention the fact that such information will have to be easily
and directly accessible at any time for the consumer (art 5.(1) of the Directive on
electronic commerce). When analysed separately, the requirements seem perfectly
justified: eg the provision on easy and direct accessibility of the information (art
5.(1) of the Directive on electronic commerce) or the rule relative to the clear and
prominent manner in which consumer needs to be informed about certain aspects
of an electronic contract before placing their order (art 8.2 of the Directive on
consumer rights). However when looked at together, the use of the adjectives –
‘clear’, ‘prominent’, ‘comprehensible’, ‘intelligible’ – appear to be a little repetitive
at best, without good reason for it. Nevertheless, the notions mentioned here are
of relevance in the process of determining whether the trader has fulfilled their
information duties, and if not, what is the extent of breach.67
Another factor relevant for the assessment of the extent of fulfilment (or breach)
of the information obligation is the moment in time when the information is re-
quired. The rules relative to the e-commerce, ie mainly Directive on the electronic
commerce and national legislation: LSSICE and E- commerce Regulations 2002, es-
tablish that the general information be made permanently available by the service
provider, as already mentioned, respectively in art 5.1, art 10.1 and reg 6(1). How-
ever, some specific information items should also be given to the service recipient
prior to their placing the order, as laid down by the Directive on electronic commerce
in art 10.1, requirement which is reproduced by the E-commerce Regulations 2002
67 See Subsection 2.1.3.1 Full and partial breach of information duties below.
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in reg 9(1). The Spanish legislator opted for a different moment of pre-contractual
information provision, again requiring it to be available permanently, according to
the art 27 LSSICE. There is no doubt that the permanent availability of information
is a broader concept that its provision prior to the order being placed -– information
available permanently will necessarily be available also prior to the contract forma-
tion. However, a question arises as to the verbs denoting service provider’s activity,
as‘’giving information’ (art 10.1 of the Directive on electronic commerce), ‘providing
information’ (reg 9(1) of the E-commerce Regulations 2002) and ‘making informa-
tion available’ (art 27 of the LSSICE).68 As noted above, the Consumer Contracts
Regulation 2013 clarify when the information is considered to be ‘made available’,
and I believe it to be a sensible consideration. The notions of ‘giving’ and ‘provid-
ing information’ are therefore synonymic, whilst ‘making information available’ has
a broader scope, and can be fulfilled either through direct information provision
or through indicating where the information can be obtained, clearly in an easily
accessible manner.69
The required moment of information provision is an issue worth separate con-
sideration. As already discussed at the beginning of this Chapter, pre-contractual
information needs to be provided before the contract is entered into by the parties.
The Directive on electronic commerce requires general information to be available
permanently, as noted above, and its art 10.1 asks for some specific information
items to be given to the service recipient before they place their order. The Direct-
ive on consumer rights however, instead of using neutral wording of the Directive
on the electronic commerce – ‘prior to the order being placed by the recipient of the
service’ – insists that the information be provided ‘[b]efore the consumer is bound
by a distance (...) contract, or any corresponding offer (...).’70 The phrase used in
the Directive, ‘any corresponding offer’ raises doubts: can consumer be bound by an
68 LSSICE uses wording of ‘poner a disposicio´n’, the exact wording being: ‘(...) el prestador de servi-
cios de la sociedad de la informacio´n que realice actividades de contratacio´n electro´nica tendra´ la
obligacio´n de poner a disposicio´n del destinatario, antes de iniciar el procedimiento de contratacio´n
(...).’
69 See also observations made in Chapter 1 Section 1.1.2.2 The model of consumer in the e-commerce
law on the active and passive consumers, where the CJEU judgment in the case Content Services
Ltd concerning the notions of providing, giving and making information available is cited.
70 Art 6.1 of the Directive on consumer rights.
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offer?71 It seems to be a rather unfortunate wording creating confusion, but clearly
the legislator was trying to accommodate the English law concept72 of ‘invitation
to treat’: items displayed on the website are not considered to be offers, it is the
buyer who places the offer which is then subsequently accepted by the trader.73
The problem arising from the wording of the Directive on consumer rights, which
the Directive on electronic commerce managed to avoid through the use of neutral
concept of ‘the order being placed’ is that the moment of contract formation can be
understood differently in various legal systems. Nevertheless, it should be clear for
both traders and consumers that the information provision has to take place before
the contract is concluded, so as Nordhausen Scholes notes, ‘[t]his must mean that
a provision of the required information with the acceptance would be too late.’74
71 LODDER (n 57) 373ff.
72 Also present in the Spanish, as well as international law, see eg art 14 CISG
73 In the context of the traditional, physical trade, the general rule is that a display of goods in a
shop is not an offer, but an invitation to treat: in Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots
Cash Chemists [1953] 1 QB 401 Somervell LJ stated that a display of goods in a self-service shop
is ‘a convenient method of enabling customers to see what there is and choose, and possibly put
back and substitute, articles which they wish to have, and then to go up to the cashier and offer
to buy what they have so far chosen.’; later confirmed in Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394 at 400
where the judge considered it to be ‘quite impossible to say that an exhibition of goods in a shop
window [with price tags attached] is itself an offer for sale.’ Nevertheless, advertisements, in some
particular circumstances, can be considered offers that only need to be accepted by a client for the
valid contract to be formed, see the classic case of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company. In what
refers to the websites, it seems that ‘[w]ithin the e-commerce context, a website selling goods or
services can easily be equated to a shop window display or the shelves of a self-service shop.’ see
Christine RIEFA, ‘The Reform of Electronic Consumer Contracts in Europe: Towards an Effective
Legal Framework?’ (2009) 14 Lex Electronica 1, 28; similarly Ewan MCKENDRICK, Contract
Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 69 observing that ‘the
potential range of liability may in fact make judges reluctant to conclude that an advertisement
on a website is an offer.’, especially because of a limited stock that might not be updated live on a
website – if the display of goods on a website was considered to be an offer, and consumer’s order
an acceptance, then the trader is bound by a contract formed, which they cannot fulfil if they are
out of stock, conversely if the consumer’s order is an offer, the trader has a possibility to refuse it.
However, in the continental law in general, and in Spanish law in particular, the display of goods
on a trader’s website will be considered to be a valid offer, under the condition that the product
ordered is available – the trader can refuse to sell a product if they are out of stock and it does
not imply that they are under a breach of contract – see Luis DIEZ-PICAZO, Fundamentos del
Derecho Civil Patrimonial. Vol.1: Introduccio´n, Teor´ıa del Contrato (6th edn, Thomson-Civitas
2007) 283ff.
74 NORDHAUSEN SCHOLES (n 4) 221.
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The Spanish TRLDCU requires the information in distance contracts to be provided
before the consumer is bound by any distance contract or any corresponding offer –
as already observed, the Spanish legislator simply copied the exact wording of the
Directive. The provision of the reg 13 of the Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013
establishes that the information be given or made available ‘[b]efore the consumer
is bound by a distance contract.’
2.1.3 Types of breach of information duties
2.1.3.1 Full and partial breach of information duties
In order to correctly fulfil their duty to provide information, the trader needs to
comply with various sub-duties; specific items of information are required to be
provided at a certain – pre-contractual – stage of their transactional relationship
with the consumer in a certain form, sometimes an additional obligation to advise
or warn is established.
The most obvious way in which information duties can be breached by a trader
is when the information is simply not provided. Nowadays however, such a case
will only occur rarely – consumers are used to having various rights in electronic
transactions, and often are actively checking some information items, such as those
regarding the right to withdraw or delivery costs. It will be much more common
therefore for traders to provide some information, but nevertheless omit some other
information items. This might be done by traders either on purpose, in order to hide
some fact they do not want to reveal for some reason, or just because there are so
many different information requirements established in various pieces of legislation,
that sometimes even a well-wishing professional, which may especially the case for
some SME with limited resources, may simply forget to transmit some information
items to the consumers.
Another instance of breach of information duties is provision of false or inaccurate
information, which again may happen accidentally or in an organised, intended way.
This definitely occurs quite often, particularly on purpose, as logically it is easier
for a dishonest trader to provide consumers with all the information items required,
but falsify some, so that the consumers realise they had been tricked only once they
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have received their order.
Furthermore, the manner of provision of information also matters in the context
of breach of information duties: if the information given is incomprehensible or
illegible, then effectively its provision is flawed up to the extent comparable with
information omission, as at least some part of the information was not in reality
communicated to the other party.75
For the purpose of analysing the breach of information duties and available
remedies, it is necessary to establish the extent of the breach. It is not an all-or-
nothing type of problem, as all the pre-contractual information requirements cannot
be treated as some kind of entity.76 Therefore it is not necessary for the trader
to breach their duty through provision of no information at all – which would be
extremely rare, as observed above – for the consumer to be able to claim their rem-
edies. Furthermore, some of the information requirements are definitely treated by
the legislator as more important than others, for instance the Directive on consumer
rights in its art 8.4 states:
If the contract is concluded through a means of distance communication
which allows limited space or time to display the information, the trader
shall provide, on that particular means prior to the conclusion of such
a contract, at least the pre-contractual information regarding the main
characteristics of the goods or services, the identity of the trader, the
total price, the right of withdrawal, the duration of the contract and, if
the contract is of indeterminate duration, the conditions for terminat-
ing the contract (...). The other information (...) shall be provided by
the trader to the consumer in an appropriate way in accordance with
paragraph 1 of this Article.
It can be therefore logically assumed, that the information listed in this provi-
sion is regarded as particularly important for the consumer, especially in the pre-
75 FERRANTE (n 48) 125 noting in the context of transparency requirement that provision of obscure
information will actually amount to ‘an omission rather than a positive course of action, (...) [which]
also contravenes the duty of transparency.’
76 Horst EIDENMULLER and others, ‘Towards a Revision of the Consumer Acquis’ (2011) 48 Com-
mon Market Law Review 1077, 1117ff point to different types of information duties, which influence
on the contract vary: information duties relating to the process of contract formation or the con-
tent of the contract, information duties relating to the motivation to enter into a contract and
information duties concerning rights available to the other party.
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contractual phase. The information items named here seem to be considered by
the legislator to be necessary for the consumer to take their contractual decision,77
and that is why they are treated differently than others. It is trite to note that
such information items play a very different role in the parties’ relationship than
for example information relative to the contract formation itself – technical steps
necessary to form an electronic contract and other related information (as in art
10 of the Directive on electronic commerce).78 Also, some information is commonly
referred to as ‘material information’ – it is the information of essential importance
for the other contracting party.79
Whilst it cannot be accepted that some duties are only incentives, not actual
obligations (of contractual or other nature, as discussed below), because then their
breach would have no legal consequence at all, it is nevertheless possible to talk
about total breach and contrast it with defective fulfilment of information duties.
Total breach takes place when material information is not given at all, is false or is
provided in a way that makes it accessing or understanding impossible. Defective ful-
filment could be constituted by breach of other information requirements, especially
when the influence on the contract formed is marginal, as for example when the
information on technical steps leading to contract formation is inaccurate, but the
consumer managed to enter into the contract anyway. However, such considerations
are of rather theoretical interest, as in each case, where there are no specific con-
sequences of breach established by the law, the court or a corresponding institution
77 Which raises the question: what is the purpose of other information duties? As discussed in Chapter
1 Subsection 1.1.2.1 The role of pre-contractual information in the European consumer policy, the
main rationale for information duties is exactly this -– restoring the information balance in the
relationship of the parties, of which one is a professional and the other a consumer. Nevertheless,
pre-contractual information plays also an important role in the period posterior to contract form-
ation, especially through providing the consumer with knowledge regarding their contract and its
potential breach.
78 Cf EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1117ff.
79 References to ‘material information’ or ‘material facts’ can be found in case law, see eg Bell v
Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161 at 227, where Lord Atkin stated that ‘the failure to disclose a
material fact which might influence the mind of a prudent contractor does not give the right to
avoid the contract.’ and are very commonly used in academic writing, see eg Pierre LEGRAND,
‘Pre-contractual Disclosure and Information: English and French Law Compared’ (1986) 6 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 322; Paula GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to
Disclose in English and French Law’ (2005) 5 European Review of Private Law 621.
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(eg mediators in the context of ADR procedures) will need to individually assess
each case, the damage that the aggrieved party suffered and available remedies.80
2.1.3.2 Possible classifications of breach of information duties
Ca´mara Lapuente points to various different legal consequences that a breach of
information duties can entail, such as: breach of good faith principle, specific rem-
edies available for breach of some information duties expressly established in the
specific legislation, remedies for lack of conformity with the contract, trader’s liab-
ility for defective goods, general contract law including remedies applicable in cases
of defects of consent, classification as unfair commercial practice and administrative
sanctions.81 All these possible classifications of the breach that occurred should be
taken into account in each individual case in order to provide the aggrieved party
with adequate remedies.
Breach of good faith principle can be discussed both in the context of the general
contract law and specific consumer legislation, and is relevant only for the Spanish
law, as English law is reluctant to recognise the principle of good faith and fair
dealing.82 In what refers to the Spanish consumer law, art 65 of the TRLDCU states
that consumer contracts shall be complemented by requirements resulting from the
principle of the objective good faith to consumer’s benefit, also in the cases of the
omission of the relevant pre-contractual information. Thus, the legislation expressly
invokes good faith principle in the case of omission of pre-contractual information
in consumer contracts.
The next possible consequence of the breach of information duties is the most
80 As EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1121 point out ‘[i]t is not advisable to set up uniform remedies for
the infringement of all information duties (...). Such uniformity is inconsistent with the diverse
functions and significance of the information duties within a system of contract law (...). Rather,
the consequences of an infringement should be specifically defined with regard to the respective
purpose of the duty in question, and with due consideration of the (national) contract law doctrines
that may come into play.’
81 Sergio CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘La Nueva Proteccio´n del Consumidor de Contenidos Digitales
Tras la Ley 3-2014, de 27 de Marzo’ [2014] Centro de Estudios de Consumo CESCO Working
Paper <http://blog.uclm.es/cesco/files/2014/10/La-nueva-protecci\%C3\%B3n-del-consumidor-
de-contenidos-digitales-tras-la-Ley-3-2014-de-27-de-marzo.pdf> accessed 15 March 2016, 62-63.
82 See Chapter 1 Subsection 1.2.2.1 Good faith, fair dealing and pre-contractual duties of disclosure.
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obvious one – the application of specific remedies resulting directly from the specific
consumer legislation, such as withdrawal period extension, if the consumer is not
informed about their right to withdraw83 or consumer not being bound by their
order, if the trader failed to make them aware that the order implies an obligation
to pay.84 Specific consumer legislation also provides remedies for lack of conformity
of the products – under Spanish law – and goods and digital content – under English
law, with the contract,85 which is of relevance if the information consumer received
was false and the product does not conform to the contract. Trader’s liability for
defective goods86 should also be considered; although it seems to be of a limited
relevance for the breach of information duties in practice, some situations, eg when
the digital content purchased caused damage to the consumer’s hardware because
of incomplete information they had received, can actually occur. The remedies for
unfair commercial practices are also established in specific legislation and are only
relevant under the English law, which provides individuals with civil law rights of
private redress.87
In what refers to general private law consequences of breach of information du-
ties, two broad classifications need to be taken into account: breach of contract
and defects of consent. Breach of contract is closely linked to the specific legisla-
tion, which stipulates whether the information provided can be considered contract
terms,88 which is of relevance for situations where the information consumer re-
ceived was false, or whether the very duty to provide information can be considered
a contract term89 – especially important in the cases of information omission.
The defects of consent, or vitiating factors, have already been mentioned in the
context of indirect information duties in Chapter 1 Subsection 1.2.3.1 More general
and indirect information duties above. They were looked at as a potential source
83 See reg 31 Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 and art 105 TRLDCU.
84 See reg 14 Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 and art 98.2 TRLDCU.
85 See ss 9ff (goods) 34ff (digital content) and arts 114ff TRLDCU.
86 S and arts 128ff TRLDCU.
87 See ss 27Aff UTR 2008.
88 As do eg s 11(4) CRA 2015 and arts 61.2 and 97.5 TRLDCU.
89 See eg reg 18 Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013.
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of disclosure duties arising in general private national law of England and Spain.
However, their main significance lies in a reverse context – not as laws establishing
information duties as such, but as rules providing the aggrieved party, whose right
to pre-contractual information was breached, with remedies.90
Arguably, contrary to the Spanish legal system, English law does not recognise
a general theory of defects of consent.91 Two categories of defects of consent92 are
linked to the issue of information: mistake and fraud. The law of mistake aims at pro-
tecting the party to the contract that acts under misapprehension as to some facts
relative to the contract; the concept of fraud on the other hand not only protects the
mistaken party even further, but also, even more importantly, punishes the beha-
viour of the party that causes the misapprehension in order to induce the other party
to contract. The duty to inform, as Sefton-Green observes, ‘clearly straddles these
two identifiable objectives of defects of consent.’93 There is no doubt that duties to
inform are intended as a protection for the contracting parties – indeed this is the
main aim of information duties in consumer law. It is also submitted that disclosure
duties go further than fraud, as they cover both passive and active behaviour of the
party causing misapprehension, as well as fraudulent and negligent behaviour. It is
therefore submitted that ‘[r]ecognising duties to inform may be an admission that
mistake and fraud are insufficient to remedy all types of behaviour.’94 Asymmetric
information issues can be addressed in a more complete manner through establishing
a duty to disclose that can be equated to ‘a more refined fraud doctrine.’95 The un-
derlying values of defects of consent and disclosure duties are also similar: protection
90 Cf DCFR art II.–3:109: Remedies for breach of information duties, especially subsection (4) which
reads: ‘The remedies provided under this Article are without prejudice to any remedy which may
be available under II.–7:201 (Mistake).’
91 SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ (n 24) 3.
92 John CARTWRIGHT, ‘Defects of Consent in Contract Law’ in Arthur S Hartkamp and others
(eds), Towards a European Civil Code (4th edn, Kluwer Law International 2011) 537.
93 SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ (n 24) 11.
94 Ibid.
95 Gerrit de GEEST and Mitja KOVAC, ‘The Formation of Contracts in the Draft Common Frame
of Reference – A Law and Economics Perspective’ in Filomena Chirico and Pierre Larouche (eds),
Economic Analysis of the DCFR : the Work of the Economic Impact Group within CoPECL (Sellier
European Law Publishers 2010) 72.
192
2.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DUTY TO INFORM AND ITS
BREACH
of the party’s real consent and upholding the moral duty to tell the truth.96 Further-
more, the moment of the contracting process the defects of consent and information
duties are both concerned with is the pre-contractual stage.
Although it is common for European legal systems to forbid the supply of de-
ceptive information97 – a positive duty not to actively mislead the other party is
recognised in both English and Spanish law and referred to as misrepresentation
and dolo and error provocado respectively – clearly there is an important differ-
ence between those concepts and disclosure duties: the latter require provision of
information without prior demand,98 they therefore respond to the issue of lack of
knowledge of the other party, as contrasted with the need to remedy the, possibly
induced, false knowledge.99
Nevertheless, the significance of the defects of consent in the context of inform-
ation duties lies primarily in the remedies the legal systems analysed – English and
Spanish – provide when the defects occur. The perspective of the defects of con-
sent is remedial – ie these concepts relate to pre-contractual stage, but only operate
posterior to contract formation, thus overlapping also with contractual remedies
for breach of contract, or contractual non-performance.100 Depending on the legal
system in question, the defects of consent can provide remedies not only once the
(false) information has been provided, but also in situations of non-disclosure.101 The
96 SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ (n 24) 12ff.
97 WEATHERILL, ‘19. Consumer Protection’ (n 32) 240.
98 EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1113 who also note that establishing information duties in law is only
justified under particular circumstances, no such special justification is needed for forbidding fraud,
as this is a generally undesired type of contracting behaviour, therefore the distinction between
those concepts should be clearly accentuated in any comprehensive regulation of information duties;
see also WEATHERILL, ‘19. Consumer Protection’ (n 32) 240 who describes information duties
as ‘[a] more imaginative response to the disabling effect on the efficient functioning of markets
of the under-informed consumer’ comparing disclosure duties to the commonly present rules on
misrepresentation and fraud.
99 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 1) 448.
100 SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ (n 24) 2 notes that mistake, fraud and duties to inform
are not limited to contract formation, but they cross the conceptual bridge between pre-contractual
and contractual remedies, and often overlap with the remedies under the heads of breach of contract.
101 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 1) 448; see Chapter 3 Section 3.2 General private
law and remedies it offers below.
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Spanish law, as already noted, relies on the goods faith principle and deduces the
existence of a negative fraud thereof; the English law in general recognises no such
general disclosure duty, however it can be noted that the law of misrepresentation
often provides more flexibility than could be expected, indirectly approximating the
operation of defects of consent to the pre-contractual disclosure duty.102
2.1.3.3 Breach of information duties depending on the remedies: inform-
ation omission and provision of false or inaccurate information
The instances of breach of information duties can be categorised in the function
of the remedies available in both legal systems analysed: English and Spanish.103
Those remedies will differ depending on the way in which the information duty was
breached, especially if the information item that was required by law to be provided
was not given at all (information omission) or if it was provided, but its content
was false, inaccurate. It can be noted here that defective fulfilment of disclosure
duty resulting from information having been provided in a faulty manner104 can be
also equated to one of the two instances proposed: for example if the information
is illegible it can be deemed omitted, if it is difficult to understand or ambiguous it
can be considered false.105
102 GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspective’
(n 26) 310.
103 Clearly, other possibilities to group the relevant rules can be also considered, see for instance
BEALE, ‘Pre-contractual Obligations: The General Contract Law Background’ (n 40) 43 who
proceeds to analyse the remedies available for the party who has entered into the contract on
the basis of inaccurate or incomplete information according to how the ‘misapprehension’ of the
facts occurred, ie if it was induced by the other party (or a third party) or self-induced; whilst
SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ (n 24) 26 suggests to examine four distinct foundations
of the duty to inform: fraud, precontractual liablity, duty to disclose arising from operation of law
and mistake.
104 More on the manner of providing information see Subsection 2.1.2 Requirements relative to the way
of providing information above.
105 Nevertheless, it is not always that easy to determine the type of breach of the disclosure duty, for
instance if the information is not directly accessible it can be considered to have been omitted,
but what if the consumer managed to effectively access the information, despite difficulties? Each
case in practice will need to be considered individually, in the present study I am focusing on some
general mechanisms and the main aim is to point out legal rules and provisions that should be
taken into consideration when a breach of information duties occurred.
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Information omission is the first type of breach of information duties that comes
to mind. In such case, the duty to provide information is breached; the duty arising
especially from legislation in the context of consumer electronic contracts. When
the information which was provided is inaccurate, the situation is quite different.
In such case, not only the duty to provide information is breached (as in the case
of omission), but also, the information itself is breached. What I mean by this last
consideration, is that according to various rules, information can become part of
the contract – in such case the term of the contract will be false; breach of some
information items about the goods will result in the non-conformity of contract,
and so on. The distinction between omission of certain information, misinformation
and provision of information in a wrong way may be sometimes challenging. Traders
often provide false information to make their offer of a product or service seem
more attractive to consumers and consequently induce them to enter the contract.
However, omitting some material information about the product or service may
have exactly the same purpose.106 Moreover, it is argued that from the economics
standpoint, there is not much difference between omitting information and providing
false information, since both lead to inefficient allocations.107
Nevertheless, in the context of the B2C e-commerce there is a noticeable differ-
ence between information omission and non-disclosure. The latter will constitute an
incentive for the consumer to search for the missing information item, on the trader’s
website or on the Web in general. Provision of false information entails a greater
risk for the individual consumer and for the market as such: the consumer will have
106 GEEST and KOVAC (n 95) 71-72, rightly point out that information omission can be easily
transformed into an explicit lie, when the trader is asked ‘to explicitly state that there is nothing
that has been concealed.’, cf however Sykes v Taylor-Rose [2004] EWCA Civ 299 – the facts and
judgment are commented in Chapter 1 Subsection 1.2.2 General duty to disclose and its breach in
national private law.
107 GEEST and KOVAC (n 95) 71-72 note: ‘One of the most important findings of economic scholarship
is the notion that to tell nothing is always to tell something. What that something is depends on
the type of market. In some markets, consumers who get no information on the quality of a product
will presume it is of an average quality. In other markets (like in Akerlof’s market for ‘lemons’),
consumers will presume the lowest quality. Whichever presumption is made, the distinction between
explicitly lying and just concealing information (by saying nothing) is less relevant than lawyers
tend to believe. Both activities are intrinsically costly and wasteful (the liar invests in misleading
through words, the concealer invests in non-detection, and in both cases the non-liar invests in
detection) and both lead to inefficient allocations.’
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no motivation to check the truthfulness of information received, in consequence will
end up purchasing a product that quite possibly will not satisfy their needs.
Furthermore, consequences of providing consumers with false information are
usually different to those of omitting pieces of information. This is true especially
under English law. It has been pointed out that under English law there is a distinc-
tion between ‘positive action (to which liability may attach) and pure omission (to
which no liability will attach in the absence of special circumstances).’108 Further-
more, English system treats providing false information much more harshly than
even taking advantage of other party’s mistake, if the mistake was spontaneous.109
This stems from the individualistic position of English law, which values reliance
of the contracting parties in each other’s promises over the protection of the mis-
taken party.110 Such approach promotes certainty of transactions and finally has
some justification in economics – ie promotes buyers that are diligent, careful and
willing to search for the information for themselves. Moreover, sanctions which can
be described as extra-compensatory are desirable in the case of intentional misin-
forming as deterrents;111 also from the point of view of the aggrieved party if the
other party’s fraudulent behaviour – lying – was intentional, then easier availability
of further reaching remedies restores the sense of justice and security of transactions.
The clear divide between an omission of information items and positive provision
of misleading information is also the case for specific remedies, which are examined
in Chapter 3 Section 3.1 Specific remedies available to consumers. The solutions
established in the general private law are probably the source of such legislative
choices in specific legislation. It therefore appears appropriate to adopt the analysed
division as a basis for the organisation of the analysis of the instances of breach and
108 Simon WHITTAKER and Reinhard ZIMMERMANN, ‘Coming to Terms with Good Faith’ in
Simon Whittaker and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Good Faith in European Contract Law (The
Common Core of European Private Law, Cambridge studies in international and comparative law,
Cambridge University Press 2008) 656.
109 See Hugh BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (Claren-
don Law Lectures, Oxford University Press 2012) Preface v-vii who notes that English law actually
allows one party to take deliberate advantage of the other party’s mistake.
110 See Chapter 3 Section 3.2 General private law and remedies it offers for mistake, where the issue
will be covered in more detail.
111 GEEST and KOVAC (n 95) 72.
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remedies available.
2.2 General remarks on remedies available
2.2.1 Importance of the remedies for breach of information
duties
Various information duties are established both at the European law and at the na-
tional law level. It is not always clear however, what, if anything, happens when the
disclosure duties are breached by the trader, either through omitting some informa-
tion items or providing inaccurate or illegible information. The issue is of importance
for the B2C e-commerce: traders often fail to comply with their disclosure duties
towards consumers112 and cyberconsumers report it to be a major issue resulting
in various undesirable consequences.113 The Commission estimates that for instance
in 2010 ‘total detriment European consumers incurred from problems amounted to
about 0.4% of EU GDP.’114 Clearly, the issues consumers experience in the context
of the e-commerce constitute a fraction of those occurring in all B2C transactions;
moreover, not all the problems are due to misinformation. Nevertheless, it can be
safely assumed that breach of information duties in the B2C e-commerce is a reality
that generates significant costs for the European economy.
Weatherill observes that: ‘(...) it is a precondition of effective competition that
producers face damaging consequences should they fail to satisfy consumer demand
112 OECD, ‘Empowering and Protecting Consumers in the Internet Economy’ (2013) 216 OECD Di-
gital Economy Papers (OECD Publishing) <http : / / dx . doi . org / 10 . 1787 / 5k4c6tbcvvq2 - en>
accessed 9 June 2016, 6: ‘[information on products, businesses and online transactions] is often
long and complex (...), presented in small size, buried in footnotes, or accessible through a series
of web links or windows.’
113 Ibid 5-6; ibid 23 it is noted that there is a connection between misleading and fraudulent prac-
tices, such as imposing unauthorised charges on consumers, which importantly undermine trust
in the e-commerce, and provision of inadequate information; see also The European Consumer
Centres’ Network, ‘Online Cross-Border Mystery Shopping – State of the e-Union’ (2011) <http:
//ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/docs/mystery shopping report en.pdf> accessed 9 June 2016.
114 Commission, ‘A European Consumer Agenda – Boosting confidence and growth’ (Communication)
COM(2012) 225 final.
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(...)’115 in the context of consumer protection and correct market functioning. If,
for some reason, this market mechanism fails, eg because producers agreed between
themselves to behave in the same way through fixing prices, then consumers’ de-
mand cannot influence the market in a desired way. It is the law that would have
to intervene in order to restore the balance. Now, in what refers to the remedies for
breach of information duties, the situation can be understood as similar, at least up
to certain extent. If traders do not comply with information requirements, which is
often the case, then this may lead to market failure, especially in combination with
consumers’ bounded rationality and information overload. Traders offering correct,
up-to-standard information about their products will have to bear the costs of com-
plying with information requirements and will face competition from those who
breach information duties, whilst consumers, unable to distinguish between both
groups of businesses, will not be able to promote the former group of traders. Even-
tually, good (honest) offers, ie those where full information is disclosed correctly,
may be driven out of the market.116
An effective system of remedies for breach of information duties promotes mar-
ketplace honesty and transparency.117 Consumers, knowing that the legal system
guarantees the information and its truthfulness, do not need to spend more time and
effort (transaction costs) than absolutely necessary on reading the pre-contractual
information, in order to choose the best possible offer that matches their needs.
Should something go wrong in their contractual relationship with the trader, thanks
to the information saved on a durable medium and the system of remedies in place,
they are protected. This is even more important, if we consider all the shortcomings
of the consumer protection through information duties, as analysed in Chapter 1
Subsection 1.1.2.3 Issues relative to information duties in consumer contracts.
Authors involving economic analysis of law in their analysis differ in what refers
to determining best possible solutions to such market problems.118 Some argue in
115 WEATHERILL, ‘19. Consumer Protection’ (n 32) 238.
116 George A AKERLOF, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’
(1970) 84 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 488.
117 From a comparative perspective see similar observations of Geraint HOWELLS and Thomas WIL-
HELMSSON, ‘EC Consumer Law: Has it come of age?’ (2003) 3 European Law Review 370, 382.
118 See discussion in Chapter 1 Subsection 1.1.2.1 The role of pre-contractual information in the
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favour of non-legal protection of consumer rights;119 others however support legal
intervention:120 for instance Ferrante rightly observes: ‘[t]he sanction – it helps to re-
peat it – cannot consist of the spontaneous competitiveness of the market, or even ra-
tional choices of the consumer, which are capable of expelling the “non-transparent”
professional actor from the commercial arena. This just does not happen.’121
European Directives require Member States to implement the European texts in
an effective way, this includes establishing in their national law effective sanctions
and remedies for the breach of information duties. Art 20 of the Directive on elec-
tronic commerce for instance requires the Member States to determine the sanctions
applicable to infringements of national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive
and to take all measures necessary to ensure that they are enforced. The sanctions
shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The Directive on consumer rights
refers to enforcement of the duties there established in its art 23, which reads: ‘Mem-
ber States shall ensure that adequate and effective means exist to ensure compliance
with this Directive.’122
The enforcement of consumer rights needs to be carried through legal interven-
tion. Such legal intervention should consist of competition or administrative law
provisions sanctioning traders not complying with information requirements123 –
according to Eidenmuller and others:
(...) non-compliance with information duties may be sanctioned by in-
junctions or fines which are imposed by collective organizations or public
European consumer policy on rationale of consumer protection and necessity of legal intervention
in to the market.
119 See eg a no doubt controversial view expressed by Omri BEN-SHAHAR, ‘One-Way Contracts:
Consumer Protection without Law’ (2010) 6 European Review of Contract Law 221, 223: ‘A (...)
way to address the weakness of contract law in the consumer area is to abandon contract law as the
locus of consumer protection, and to seek protection from alternative sources, which do not rely
on private enforcement of the contract by aggrieved consumers.’ In his paper, Ben-Shahar seeks
‘to describe the value of alternative, non-legal protections of consumer rights.’
120 See eg RIEFA (n 73) 36-37 pointing out that: ‘better enforcement of the current requirements
would be a first step in the right direction.’
121 FERRANTE (n 48) 119.
122 Art 23.1.
123 As required by the provisions of the Directives mentioned above; see also EIDENMULLER (n 76)
1118.
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authorities (institutional remedies). The general effectiveness require-
ment for implementing EU directives (effet utile) is met by the recog-
nition of institutional remedies. Hence, from the European perspective,
it is not normally necessary to provide contract law remedies for non-
compliance with information duties established by the acquis.124
Detailed analysis of this solution stays nevertheless outside of the scope of the
present study.125
Another possibility would be that of private law granting individual consumers
right to redress in the case of breach of their right of information.126 As pointed out
above, it is not an express requirement of the European law to establish private law
redress for breach of information duties.127 Nevertheless, individual redress rights
are needed too because information duties are not only relevant in the context of
124 Ibid.
125 Eidenmuller and others ibid argue in favour of institutional sanctions: ‘[w]hile contract law sanc-
tions provide individual protection, institutional sanctions also have preventive effects where indi-
vidual incentives to enforce the former are too weak. Furthermore, private organizations as well as
public authorities are able systematically to monitor the market and to enforce regulations.’; see
also Chapter 1 Subsection 1.1.2.3 Issues relative to information duties in consumer contracts and
especially footnote 361 and views there expressed.
126 BEN-SHAHAR, ‘One-Way Contracts: Consumer Protection without Law’ (n 119) 223 identifies
two ways of improving consumers’ possibilities to legally enforce terms of the caontracts: ‘[o]ne way
is to strengthen contract rights and contract law’s involvement. In this spirit, consumer protection
oriented reforms that are often advocated include better disclosures, more effective rituals of assent,
stronger remedies for breach of contract, and mandatory substantive terms to assure minimum
standards.’ The second way is the one already mentioned above: ‘[a] second way to address the
weakness of contract law in the consumer area is to abandon contract law as the locus of consumer
protection, and to seek protection from alternative sources (...).’; also EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1118
point to private law remedies:‘[i]t is possible (...) to incorporate the specified information duties
of the acquis into the regime of general contract law. This would mean that an infringement will
give rise to one or several remedies within the individual contractual relationship.’
127 See the wording of the provisions of the directives mentioned above: art 20 of the Directive on
electronic commerce talks about sanctions – naturally belonging to the realm of administrative or
even criminal law, art 23.2 of the Directive on consumer rights reads: ‘The means referred to in
paragraph 1 shall include provisions whereby one or more of the following bodies, as determined
by national law, may take action under national law before the courts or before the competent
administrative bodies to ensure that the national provisions transposing this Directive are applied:
(a) public bodies or their representatives;
(b) consumer organisations having a legitimate interest in protecting consumers;
(c) professional organisations having a legitimate interest in acting.’,
whilst art 24 refers to ‘penalties’.
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consumers’ contracting choices, but also, as already noted, they play an important
role in the case of a breach of contract, as they provide consumers with means to
enforce their individual rights. The existence and usefulness of contracts depend on
how efficiently a party can enforce them together with all their terms and conditions.
From an economic point of view, the remedies available to the aggrieved party,
ie the contract enforcement, together with administrative sanctions provided for
infringement of consumers’ rights is what really matters much more than doctrinal
issues of how, and if, the valid contract was formed.128
Adequate remedies are of major significance also in the context of experience
and, maybe even more importantly credence goods – consumers need private law
remedies in order to have means of individual redress if the pre-contractual inform-
ation duties had been breached, especially through provision of false information,
sometimes long before the consumers were able to realise that the breach had oc-
curred. Consumers may sometimes not be even able to assess if the contract has been
performed correctly. How can individuals know if a device they purchased, such as
a smartphone or a computer, is exactly what they paid for? Or if the clothes they
bought are effectively made of silk or fair trade cotton?129 As already pointed out,
European law established numerous detailed information requirements, however in
many cases without introducing specific remedies in the case of breach of the duty to
disclose by traders. Therefore it is the general contract law, or put more widely, the
general law of obligations, that can be also of tortious nature,130 that comes into play
providing consumers with remedies against traders’ failure to disclose. Grundmann
observes that sufficient liability rules, together with certified information, constitute
an adequate response to the problem of search and credence goods and unobservable
breach.131
128 Benjamin E HERMALIN and others, ‘Contract Law’ in AMitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
(eds), Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol.1 (Elsevier BV 2007) 99.
129 Cf ibid 11ff.
130 See Subsection 2.2.3.2 Nature of remedies: contractual, tortious or other? below.
131 Stefan GRUNDMANN, ‘Information, Party Autonomy and Economic Agents in European Contract
Law’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 269, 285: ’[t]he equivalent [to personal inspection
and use] is information which is certified, eg via inspection by a third and neutral party and/or
sufficient liability rules.’
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The traditional private national law rules provide remedies for breach of inform-
ation duties, nevertheless they are not regulated in any way by European law, as
already noted, and therefore they are not harmonised. Eidenmuller and others point
out that ‘[t]he Member States should, however, be cautious about incorporating the
European information duties into their general contract laws and thus subjecting
them to the standard contractual remedies. It is by no means obvious that the ap-
plication of such remedies fulfils a meaningful function.’132 From the economic point
of view in a broader perspective concerned above all with market and its function-
ing, the private law remedies are not necessary; more – they seem to be inadequate
due to the costly and lengthy court proceedings and need to demonstrate the dam-
age caused by the breach, to name just a few reasons.133 The institutional remedies
of administrative and competition law allow to correct the market functioning and
fulfil the requirement of effective directives implementation.134
Nevertheless, both English and Spanish systems do have traditional doctrines
which recognise some forms of mandated disclosure, and information duties in con-
sumer contracts are introduced into the general contract law system.135 Clearly, there
is some risk involved in such approach to information duties and general contract
law remedies. For example Carrasco Perera points out to the problem related to es-
tablishing the ever-expanding lists of information requirements – in some situations
consumers may abuse the remedies resulting from breach of those requirements by
traders, in order to free themselves from contracts that turned out to be a poor
deal, on the basis of not receiving certain pieces of information.136 Nevertheless,
132 EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1118
133 The issue of adequacy of private general law remedies will be explored further in Chapter 3 Section
3.3 Problem of adequacy of general remedies to particularities of B2C contracts.
134 EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1118.
135 Various provisions of TRLDCU cross reference to the Co´digo civil, the Act which is of application
to all the private law contractual relationships; similarly CRA 2015 makes references to the tra-
ditional private law, noting that consumers can claim traditional law remedies in addition to or
instead of specific remedies – see s 19(10)-(11); it is therefore evident that both systems recognise
application of general private law to the consumer contracts, which includes also the application
of the individual remedies.
136 A´ngel CARRASCO PERERA, ‘Desarrollos Futuros del Derecho de Consumo en Espan˜a, en el
Horizonte de la Transposicio´n de la Directiva de Derechos de los Consumidores’ in Sergio Ca´mara
Lapuente and Esther Arroyo Amayuelas (eds), La Revisio´n de las Normas Europeas y Nacionales
202
2.2. GENERAL REMARKS ON REMEDIES AVAILABLE
such situations are scarce – it is more a question of judges finding a way to restore
some equilibrium in the contractual relationship between big companies, especially
banks, and individual clients, than a real issue of relevance to the remedies for breach
of information duties in the electronic contracts of usually low value.
2.2.2 Major problematic issues related to the remedies for
breach
2.2.2.1 Dual nature of information duties and remedies for their breach
Despite the undisputed importance of information duties in the e-commerce and the
need for effective remedies for their breach that would constitute on the one hand
an incentive for traders to comply with the duties, and on the other a reliable tool
that would ensure consumers’ interests protection, no clear list of specific remed-
ies applicable to the breach of information duties exists at any legislative level –
neither in the European Union law, nor in the Member States’ national systems.
European soft contract law instruments offer some suggestions, nevertheless they
have not been adopted by any applicable biding hard legislation. The numerous dir-
ectives that impose information duties to be implemented in the national internal
legal systems usually leave the remedies available for breach of those duties to the
Member States’ internal law.137 Directives on electronic commerce and on consumer
rights can serve as an example. Both Directives require Member States to take
de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Ma´s Alla´ de la Directiva sobre Derechos de los Consumidores
y del Instrumento Opcional sobre un Derecho Europeo de la Compraventa de octubre de 2011
(Civitas-Thomson Reuters 2012) 314.
137 The fact that there is no clear list of specific remedies applicable to the breach of info duties, which
brings about the need to look for remedies in general private law, was already observed as a general
trend more than ten years ago, see Thomas WILHELMSSON, ‘Private Law Remedies against the
Breach of Information Requirements of EC Law’ in Reiner Schulze and others (eds), Informationsp-
flichten und Vertragsschluss im Acquis Communautaire (Mohr Siebeck 2003) 247; and is considered
by various authors to be a long-standing problem, see Christian TWIGG-FLESNER and Daniel
METCALFE, ‘The Proposed Consumer Rights Directive: Less Haste, More Thought?’ (2009) 5
European Review of Contract Law 368, 381; see also: Sergio CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘Art´ıculo
60: Comentario’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente (ed), Comentarios a las Normas de Proteccio´n de los
Consumidores: Texto Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y Otras Leyes y Reglamentos Vigentes en Espan˜a
y en la Unio´n Europea (Editorial Constitucio´n y Leyes COLEX 2011) 508.
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all measures necessary to ensure the implementation of their provisions, including
information requirements, however the Directive on electronic commerce does not
provide for any specific contractual remedies for breach of the duties, and in Dir-
ective on consumer rights only some specific information requirements, particularly
those regarding the right of withdrawal138 and costs,139 are also directly protected by
the Directive through rules establishing specific consequences of breach.140 Therefore
the effectiveness of the rest of the information requirements must be guaranteed by
the national law,141 which is not surprising as a policy choice: information duties are
relatively small intervention into the national contract law and freedom of contract,
which makes it easier at the European level to adopt directives that only refer to
the duties, but leave remedies to the national laws.142 Moreover, as already noted,
Member States are only under an obligation to provide institutional remedies of
administrative and/or competition law for breach of information duties by traders
in order to guarantee effectiveness of the European directives, therefore in a great
majority of cases the private law individual remedies depend on each Member State
and the national law in question.
Due to the fact that European directives establish only some specific remedies
applicable to the breach of information duties other consequences of breach must
be sought in general national private law or in specific national legislation not ori-
ginating in European directives. Furthermore, consumer protection provisions that
introduce some specific remedies for breach of information duties do not exclude
138 Art 10 of the Directive on consumer rights.
139 Art 6.6.
140 See Elizabeth HALL and others, ‘The Consumer Rights Directive – An Assessment of its Contri-
bution to the Development of European Consumer Contract Law’ (2012) 8 8 European Review of
Contract Law 139, 152; this is also true for other Community documents, see for example Twigg-
Flesner’s comments on the Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis 2007 – Christian
TWIGG-FLESNER, ‘No Sense of Purpose or Direction? The Modernisation of European Consumer
Law’ (2007) 3 European Review of Contract Law 198, 210.
141 A solution which was criticized as leading to market fragmentation and incoherence, see TWIGG-
FLESNER and METCALFE (n 137) 381; Raquel GUILLE´N CATALA´N, ‘La Directiva sobre los
Derechos de los Consumidores: un Paso hacia Delante, pero Incompleto’ (2012) 7801 Diario La Ley
1, 3ff.
142 Per analogy see RIEFA (n 73) 7ff.
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application of general private law rules.143 On the contrary, consumer law’s aim is
to provide individuals with additional rights and remedies.144 This creates a special
situation in which rules that apply to the pre-contractual information duties in the
B2C e-commerce in the scope of the European internal market originate on two
different levels, in the European law and in the national law. The scope and type
of remedies available will be different in each national legal system,145 due to the
influence of the traditional contract law on the effectiveness of information duties.
At the national level there will be various different pieces of legislation, both primary
and secondary, applicable together with the established case law; in England mainly
the CRA 2015 and regulations: especially the Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013
and the UTR 2008 as amended by the Consumer Protection Amendment 2014, and
also general contract-related law: legislation – the Misrepresentation Act 1967 and
case law relative to the contractual and tortious remedies. In what refers to the
Spanish law, the remedies are mainly established in the TRLDCU and Co´digo civil,
provisions of which are interpreted by the courts.
An issue regarding the hierarchy of applicable provision may arise. Under the
English law, consumers will benefit from the general private law remedies in addition
to specific consumer law remedies, however clearly not so as to recover twice the same
loss,146 or instead of specific consumer law remedies, and also when no such remedy is
provided.147 Sometimes, the provisions will expressly exclude application of general
law remedies – for instance s 2(4) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 reads:
143 See Chapter 3 Section 3.2 General private law and remedies it offers.
144 See BEALE, ‘Pre-contractual Obligations: The General Contract Law Background’ (n 40) footnote
3.
145 The Member States’ legal systems represent different legal traditions, such as civil law, common
law or Germanic law, which is especially important in the context of cross-border contracts. The
duties of information are an important element of the European contract law, and the research
in this field represents not only practical interest, but also theoretical: ‘[a]n investigation of the
scope of the “duty to disclose” on a comparative law basis is most rewarding; it leads us straight to
the heart of the philosophy underlying the law of contracts.’ – see Friedrich KESSLER and Edith
FINE, ‘Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative
Study’ (1964) 77 Harvard Law Review 401, 438.
146 See eg reg 27L CPUTR 2008 as amended by the Consumer Protection Amendment 2014.
147 Cf eg s 19(10) CRA 2015.
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This section does not entitle a person to be paid damages in respect of
a misrepresentation if the person has a right to redress under Part 4A
of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (SI
2008/1277) in respect of the conduct constituting the misrepresentation.
This means that the availability of specific remedy resulting from consumer law
legislation excludes application of the general law remedies, but only if the law
explicitly states so.
In what refers to the Spanish law, art 59.2 of the TRLDCU148 states that con-
sumer contracts are governed by the general contract law in all the aspects that are
not expressly covered by the TRLDCU or other specific laws, following the prin-
ciple of lex specialis derogat legi generali. Therefore, when no specific remedy for
breach of information duties is established in specific consumer legislation, the gen-
eral contract and obligations law will apply. However, it does not mean that the
Spanish legislator excludes the application of general private law remedies when
specific remedies arising from TRLDCU and other specific legislation are available.
It is still quite a controversial issue under the Spanish law,149 however generally
speaking the choice of remedies is of the aggrieved party.150 Moreover, some specific
law provisions, as for instance art 61.2 of the TRLDCU on inclusion of the content
148 This provision was recently changed by the Ley 3/2014, de 27 de marzo, for a detailed analysis of
the reform see eg Encarna CORDERO, ‘Proteccio´n Sectorial y Proteccio´n Consumerista General?
De Minimis y de Maximis. Sobre la Reforma del Art´ıculo 59.2 del TRLCU’ (2014) 9 Revista
CESCO de Derecho de Consumo 1.
149 Cf Fernando GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’ [2007] In-
Dret: Revista para el Ana´lisis del Derecho 1, 13-14 mentioning the issue in the context of the
concurrent actions of general remedies for breach of contract and those arising out of the latent
defects of the goods purchased, and noting that the Tribunal Supremo has been pronouncing it-
self in favour of not excluding – ie allowing the application for – the general law remedies in the
cases of availability of more specific remedies for latent defects, however the Court has been us-
ing a variety of arguments in a rather inconsistent manner, therefore there still arises litigation
around this issue, cf eg Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 781/2005
de 21 de octubre (RJ 2006/1689), Fundamentos de Derecho, Segundo; see also case note: Mar´ıa
MARTI´NEZ MARTI´NEZ, ‘Comentario a la STS, 1a, 21.10.2005’ (2006) 71 Cuadernos Civitas de
Jurisprudencia Civil 1107; see also Esther TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 114: Comentario’
in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente (ed), Comentarios a las Normas de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores:
Texto Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y Otras Leyes y Reglamentos Vigentes en Espan˜a y en la Unio´n
Europea (Editorial Constitucio´n y Leyes COLEX 2011) 1059; see also below .
150 GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 149) 14.
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of the advertisement into the contract, art 65 of the TRLDCU on incorporation of
the pre-contractual information, also in the cases of omission, into the contract to
the benefit of the consumer in accordance with the good faith principle, or finally
art 97.5 of the TRLDDCU do not specify remedies for their breach. It can be there-
fore understood that the general contract law remedies will be applicable in such
cases.151
Another example of an explicit exclusion of the application of the general law
remedies can be found in the art 117 of the TRLDCU relative to the remedies for
the lack of conformity, which may be available in some instances of breach of inform-
ation duties.152 This provision excludes the possibility to apply for general contract
law remedies concerning latent defects.153 The text of the art 117, however, does
not pronounce itself on the compatibility with other general law doctrines that are
also of interest in the context of a breach of information duties. First of all, lack
of conformity may imply breach of contract – the majority of the academics be-
151 See Sergio CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 61: Comentario’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente (ed),
Comentarios a las Normas de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Texto Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y
Otras Leyes y Reglamentos Vigentes en Espan˜a y en la Unio´n Europea (Editorial Constitucio´n y
Leyes COLEX 2011) 515 and Sergio CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 65: Comentario’ in Sergio
Ca´mara Lapuente (ed), Comentarios a las Normas de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Texto
Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y Otras Leyes y Reglamentos Vigentes en Espan˜a y en la Unio´n Europea
(Editorial Constitucio´n y Leyes COLEX 2011) 581-582.
152 See CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘La Nueva Proteccio´n del Consumidor de Contenidos Digitales Tras
la Ley 3-2014, de 27 de Marzo’ (n 81) 62-63, who names six different legal consequences of the
breach of information requirements established in the arts 60 and 97 of the TRLDCU, of which
four are of contractual nature: breach of good faith principle of art 65 of the TRLDCU; specific
remedies available for breach of some information duties expressly established in the TRLDCU,
as eg extention of the withdrawal period; remedies for lack of conformity arts 114ff TRLDCU and
trader’s liability for defective goods; and general contract law including remedies applicable in cases
of defects of consent; other non-contractual being: classification as unfair commercial practice and
administrative sanctions of art 49 TRLDCU.
153 Along these lines Nieves FENOY PICO´N, El Sistema de Proteccio´n del Comprador (Col Nal
Registradores Propiedad y Mercantiles 2006) 1081; however there is a minority opinion that art
117 TRLDCU requires the consumer to opt for one of the regimes of remedies: for non-conformity
or for latent defects, with the impossibility of claiming both at once – see Rodrigo BERCOVITZ
RODRI´GUEZ-CANO, ‘La Ley de Garant´ıas en la Venta de Bienes de Consumo y la Defensa del
Consumidor’ [2003] Aranzadi Civil 1892, 1893; for more on the issue of the coexistence in the
Spanish law of the scheme of remedies for the latent defects of the Co´digo civil with provisions
on non-conformity in consumer sales: FENOY PICO´N, El Sistema de Proteccio´n del Comprador
(n 153) 149ff.
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lieve the two regimes to be incompatible, the aggrieved consumer having to claim
non-conformity rather than breach of contract;154 nevertheless the courts seem to
allow the application of general law remedies despite the availability of the specific
statutory remedies.155 Although from a practical point of view, the specific remedies
for non-conformity fit consumers’ needs much better than the general law remedies,
the choice should be that of the aggrieved consumer, as the specific consumer law
remedies are intended to add to consumer protection rather than simply substitute
one regime for another.156 Secondly, the same set of facts can give rise to a claim for
both non-conformity and defects of consent, especially those of importance in the
context of breach of information duties: mistake (error) and fraud (dolo). In what
refers to the possibility of opting for contract avoidance due to mistake or remedies
for the lack of conformity, Torrelles Torrea rightly observes that the regime of rem-
edies for non-conformity is more beneficial for the aggrieved party,157 so in practice
consumers will be inclined to claim lack of conformity anyway.158 The majority view
is that consumers are free to opt either for the action for non-conformity or for
mistake.159 The claim for fraud is nevertheless in many instances more attractive to
the aggrieved consumers than the non-conformity regime, the two being also com-
154 See FENOY PICO´N, El Sistema de Proteccio´n del Comprador (n 153) 172; Esther TORRELLES
TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 117: Comentario’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente (ed), Comentarios a las Normas
de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Texto Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y Otras Leyes y Reglamentos
Vigentes en Espan˜a y en la Unio´n Europea (Editorial Constitucio´n y Leyes COLEX 2011) 1081-
1082 and the literature there cited.
155 See Audiencia Provincial de Pontevedra (Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m.337/2009 de 9 de julio (AC
2009/1840), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero where the court observes that availability of the
specific law remedies for the non-conformity of the product with the contract does not exclude a
possibility to claim other general law remedies, as for example damages, as it is expressly noted
in the art 117 second para; TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 117: Comentario’ (n 154) 1082 also
cites Audiencia Provincial de Pontevedra (Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m.95/2007 de 15 de febrero
(AC 2007/1432).
156 BEALE, ‘Pre-contractual Obligations: The General Contract Law Background’ (n 40) footnote 3;
however see also observations made in Chapter 3 Subsection 3.2.1 Overview of the analysis of the
general private law remedies.
157 Except for the limitation period of four years ex art 1301 Co´digo civil as opposed to two years for
non-conformity (see art 123 TRLDCU), which is the main advantage of the claim for mistake.
158 TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 117: Comentario’ (n 154) 1082.
159 Ibid; see also FENOY PICO´N, El Sistema de Proteccio´n del Comprador (n 153) 247ff.
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patible with an action for breach of contract (aggravated by fraudulent intention of
the trader).160
Art 117 in its second para allows consumers who suffered loss due to the lack of
conformity to seek damages in accordance with the general private law. The damages
are available to the aggrieved consumers in addition to the other remedies for non-
conformity,161 similarly to the provision of s 19(10)(a) of the CRA 2015. There is no
indication as to the kind of damages – in contract or tort – but it seems that the
facts of the non-conformity instances are of a definitely contractual nature, so arts
1101ff of the Co´digo civil will be applicable.162 Nevertheless, the claim for damages
under the regime of latent defects ex art 1486 of the Co´digo civil is understood to
be excluded, as the whole regime of latent defects is incompatible with an action for
the lack of conformity.163
In conclusion, it can be understood that in both Spanish and English law, when
the specific consumer law statute does not rule out application of the general law
remedies, they are available.164 The possibility of application of general law remedies
when specific ones are available has various consequences. It has been pointed out
that from the economic perspective it would be redundant for both types of rem-
edies for breach of information duties to be available at the same time.165 It seems
that if the national contract law provides information duties (including general or
indirect ones) that provide sufficient incentive for parties to exchange information
and protect the party who is weaker in the situation of information asymmetry,
160 TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 117: Comentario’ (n 154) 1083.
161 SAP Pontevedra 337/2009 de 9 de julio, Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero; TORRELLES TOR-
REA, ‘Art´ıculo 117: Comentario’ (n 154) 1083.
162 Along these lines various courts on multiple occasions, see eg Audiencia Provincial de Alicante
(Seccio´n 7a), Sentencia nu´m.118/2002 de 4 de marzo (AC 2002/825); Audiencia Provincial de Bar-
celona (Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m.650/2007 de 18 de diciembre (AC 2008/334); Audiencia Pro-
vincial de Ourense (Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m.340/2008 de 22 de septiembre (JUR 2009/81438);
Audiencia Provincial de Granada (Seccio´n 3a), Sentencia nu´m.485/2008 de 21 de noviembre (JUR
2009/60612).
163 TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 117: Comentario’ (n 154) 1083.
164 Although a reservation needs to be made regarding the right to rescind the contract for breach
when the remedies for the lack of conformity are available — see below Chapter 3 Subsection 3.2.1
Overview of the analysis of the general private law remedies.
165 EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1113.
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the additional specific duties are simply not necessary, in addition to potentially
bringing about undesirable consequences. Nevertheless, specific information duties
are established by the European directives which are transposed into the national
legal systems. Another issue thus arises – some of the directives, as for example
Directive on consumer rights, are of full harmonisation. This notably means that
the consumer protection in the national law resulting from the transposition of the
directive cannot be higher than that established in the directive. In the context of
information duties full harmonisation logically translates into prohibition of intro-
ducing additional duties. Theoretically, it should therefore result in exclusion of the
application of general private law information duties and remedies for their breach,
as they differ among the Member States and may cause protection level to be higher
than that established in the Directive. Nevertheless, such consequences of the full
harmonisation principle are simply impossible from the politics point of view – that
is why the Directive is without prejudice to the national contract law, including rules
on validity of contracts and consent: ‘[t]his Directive shall not affect national general
contract law such as the rules on the validity, formation or effect of a contract’;166
rules which provide the aggrieved party with remedies for breach of disclosure duties!
Furthermore, information duties can be of different nature that usually correlates
with their different origin. Duties of more general scope, often clause-like167 will be
usually established in general private law at national level. Embedded deeply into
the system of private law, they tend to reflect moral principles and values governing
the traditional regulation contract formation, as does the principle of pre-contractual
good faith in Spanish law, or law of misrepresentation limiting the action to cases
of explicit lies in English law. On the other hand, information requirements intro-
duced into national law through European directives can be usually characterised
as casuistic and very detailed.168 Such is the list of information items established in
166 Art 3.5 of the Directive on consumer rights, see also its recital (14).
167 WILHELMSSON, ‘European Rules on Pre-Contractual Information Duties?’ (n 39) 19.
168 However, this is not always the case, see for example art 2 of the Directive on the sale of consumer
goods (on conformity with the contract), which, as WILHELMSSON, ‘European Rules on Pre-
Contractual Information Duties?’ (n 39) 20 points out, does not contain a direct duty to inform,
however such a duty can be inferred from the provisions on conformity of the goods; see also
Chapter 1 Subsection 1.2.3.1 More general and indirect information duties.
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the Directive on consumer rights,169 transposed into national laws in art 97 of the
TRLDCU and Schedule 2 of the Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013. The dis-
crepancy in character between the information duties established at the European
and national level may have various consequences.
First of all, an important issue, already mentioned above, is the full harmonisa-
tion approach used in the Directive on consumer rights. The problems may arise
when the general duty of fair dealing and good faith present in the national internal
legal system implies a wider than the Directive scope of the duty to inform. Such a
situation may be even considered a violation of the full harmonisation principle.170
Secondly, the nature of the information duties, that is whether they are obliga-
tions of a contractual or different character, also poses a problem, as internal systems
may catalog them differently. It would then influence for instance jurisdictional rules
applicable,171 as well as lead to other important consequences.172
The character of the remedies for breach of the duties sometimes depends on the
origin of the duty that was breached. More specific remedies, such as extension of
the period of time to exercise a right, as in the case of the right of withdrawal,173
may accompany detailed information requirements. Nevertheless, as I pointed out
169 See art 6.1 of the Directive that contains 20 information requirements in letters (a) to (t).
170 See observations expressed by Vanessa MAK, ‘Full Harmonization in European Private Law: A
Two-Track Concept’ (2012) 20 European Private Law Review 213, 213ff, who points out that the
CJEU in the context of the Directive on unfair terms decided to apply the ‘result – oriented’ ap-
proach to the full harmonisation in the cases: C-261/07 VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium NV [2009]
ECR I-02949, C-304/08 Zentrale zur Beka¨mpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV v Plus Warenhandels-
gesellschaft mbH [2010] ECR I-00217 and C-540/08 Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag
GmbH & Co. KG v “O¨sterreich”-Zeitungsverlag GmbH [2010] ECR I-10909. This approach to full
harmonisation means that Member States are not allowed to apply the internal law, even if it is
general contract law, to the matters covered by the directive.
171 See for instance CJEU case C-26/91 Jakob Handte & Co. GmbH v Traitements Me´cano-chimiques
des Surfaces SA [1992] ECR I-03967.
172 For example, under English law damages are measured differently for contractual and tortious
liability. Under Spanish law, the time to present an action for damages in tort is 1 year, whilst for
breach of contract it is up to 15 years.
173 Art 10.1 of the Directive on consumer rights reads: ‘If the trader has not provided the consumer with
the information on the right of withdrawal as required by point (h) of Article 6(1), the withdrawal
period shall expire 12 months from the end of the initial withdrawal period, as determined in
accordance with Article 9(2).’, if the information is provided correctly the withdrawal period is of
14 days – see art 9.1.
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above, this is not always a case. If an information duty originating directly in a
European directive is not protected by a specific consequence of its breach, then the
national private law comes into play. In both English and Spanish general private
law we can distinguish a number of doctrines, which are of relevance in the context
of transmission of information between the contracting parties:174 especially defects
of consent, norms relative to the breach of contract, eg based on failure to conform
to the description of products, and tort law rules – particularly such as the rules on
negligence and culpa in contrahendo.175 It seems however, that from the perspective
of the national internal law of England or Spain, if the general private law doctrines
mentioned are successful in achieving a sufficient protection of the interest of the
contracting parties in receiving certain information from the other party, it would
be redundant176 to establish additional information duties in the contract law sys-
tem and consequently to create additional remedies for breach of such duties.177
Nevertheless, such a situation occurs with the implementation of consumer law dir-
ectives which introduce additional disclosure rules; the fact which is understandable
from the EU point of view, but may result in unexpected and potentially undesir-
able consequences for national legal systems of the Member States. Eidenmuller and
others note that establishment of superfluous information duties may give rise to
inappropriate remedies.178
Nevertheless, the general contract law rules, such as the law of misrepresentation
174 Cf EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1112-1113 who note that: ‘[t]he most significant of these are the rules on
the formation and interpretation of contracts, on the incorporation of standard terms of business,
on mistake, misrepresentation, undue influence and fraud, and finally on breach of contract based
on failure to conform to the description of the goods or services.’
175 See Subsection 2.2.3 Types of remedies available below; see also GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract
and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspective’ (n 26) 314-315; Paula GILIKER, ‘A
Role for Tort in Pre-contractual Negotiations? An Examination of English, French, and Canadian
Law’ (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 969, 972ff.
176 Sergio CA´MARA LAPUENTE and Evelyne TERRYN, ‘Chapter Three: Consumer Contract Law’
in Hans-W Micklitz and others (eds), Cases, Materials and Text on Consumer Law: Ius Commune
Casebooks for a Common Law of Europe (Ius Commune Casebooks for a Common Law of Europe,
Hart Publishing 2010) para 3.43 (EU) point out to ‘a problem of unnecessary overlap and a
lack of consistency in the existing national and Community instruments imposing information
requirements.’
177 EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1112-1113.
178 Ibid.
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or mistake, will usually require a justification that the contract would not have been
entered into, or would have been concluded on different terms, had the party been
provided with correct information;179 such condition might be difficult to prove in
consumer contracts, which is an argument in favour of establishing specific remedies
for breach of specific information duties. Moreover, specified pre-contractual inform-
ation duties and remedies, established in abundance in the acquis communautaire,
are more foreseeable and easier for traders to fulfil in a standardised manner.180
A particular issue linked to the dual nature of information duties and remedies
for their breach is the integration of the information items provided into the contract
– art 6.5 of the Directive on consumer rights states that ‘[t]he information referred
to in paragraph 1 shall form an integral part of the distance (...) contract (...).’; this
provision is further repeated by national legislation: art 97.5 of the TRLDCU and
various ss of the CRA 2015.181 The information will therefore become terms of the
contract formed between the trader and the consumer. Nevertheless, the question
arises regarding the status the information will assume within the contract, as the
remedies will depend on whether the information is considered essentialia negotii,
which would then imply that breach of information duties hinders the valid formation
of the contract.182 On the other hand, the Directive on consumer rights in its recital
(14) states that:
This Directive should not affect national law in the area of contract law
for contract law aspects that are not regulated by this Directive. There-
fore, this Directive should be without prejudice to national law regulating
179 Cf in the context of the law of misrepresentation, as described eg by John CARTWRIGHT, Mis-
representation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (3rd edn, Contract Law Library, Sweet & Maxwell
2012) 91ff, 139ff the courts will always require representee’s reliance on the statement made -– the
reliance has to be reasonable and must have influenced the decision-making process of the repres-
entee, ie induced them to enter into the contract; Spanish Co´digo civil art 1269 on fraud (dolo)
states that there is fraud when one of the contracting parties, using deceptive words or acting in
such manner, induces the other party to enter into the contract they would not have concluded
otherwise.
180 EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1113.
181 See ss 11(4) and (5) and 12, in relation to goods; ss 36(3) and (4) and 37, in relation to digital
content; and s 50(3) and (4) in relation to services, that require the pre-contractual information to
be treated as included as a term of the contract.
182 NORDHAUSEN SCHOLES (n 4) 223.
213
2.2. GENERAL REMARKS ON REMEDIES AVAILABLE
for instance the conclusion or the validity of a contract (for instance in
the case of lack of consent). Similarly, this Directive should not affect
national law in relation to the general contractual legal remedies (...).
This consideration implies that no qualification of essentialia negotii can be es-
tablished for the information items at the European level, and it depends purely on
the national law application. It seems logical to assume therefore that the informa-
tion items required by the Directive on consumer rights are not essentialia negotii,
unless the national law considers them so.183 The importance of the information
items is also pertinent in the context of the defects of content as possible remedies –
as already mentioned, generally speaking only information of a significant meaning,
such as to induce the consumer into the contract they would not have concluded,
had they been provided with correct information, can give rise to remedies linked to
the defects of consent.184 The information items which are required to be provided
by the European law need to be therefore looked at also from the perspective of the
national law in question in order to be able to determine remedies available; this
needs to be done individually in each case.
2.2.2.2 Casuistic nature of information duties
Casuistic character of information duties leads to market fragmentation, due to the
proliferation of information requirements in the acquis communautaire on the one
hand, and the aforementioned problem of implementing them differently by the
Member States on the other.185 Furthermore, it is also an important issue further
hindering the effective and logical application of remedies for breach of those du-
183 Ibid.
184 EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1122-1123 observe that ‘[t]his requirement is not met with regard to most
information duties of the acquis, as they generally relate to peripheral issues.’ Nevertheless, I am
inclined to argue the contrary: many acquis information requirements, such as those relating to
main characteristics of the product, trader’s identity, costs of delivery and return, existence of the
right of withdrawal do in fact concern material issues and are important enough for the consumer
to be able to claim that they would not have concluded the contract knowing the truth and/or
breach of contract.
185 HALL (n 140) 152-153.
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ties.186 In the context of the B2C electronic contracts it is impractical to assess the
existence and extent of the duty to disclose in each individual case, as already ob-
served.187 In a similar way, the proliferation of information duties makes it difficult
to propose an adequate remedy for breach of each of them. However, information
items are of different importance for the parties’ relationship and play a different
role in the contract. This means they can be organised in groups, breach of which
will give rise to similar remedies, for instance: information relative to the contract
contents (ie main characteristics of the product, identification of the parties, dura-
tion of the contract, price etc), information relative to consumer rights (especially
information on the right of withdrawal), information relative to the contract forma-
tion process (technical steps needed for the contract to be concluded), information
relative to dealing with complaints (eg trader’s geographical address, possibility of
having recourse to ADR schemes, existence and availability of codes of conduct
etc).188
It should be noted however, that some of those remedies will be so closely linked
to the core contract law concepts, as discussed below in Chapter 3 Section 3.2
General private law and remedies it offers, that their establishment at the European
level is politically impossible. Such remedies originate in general national contract
law; they are available in particular for breach of information duties relative to the
content of the contract.189 Each case of breach of information duties established by
legislation should be assessed individually, the importance and the character of the
duties breached needs to be evaluated in order to apply adequate remedies and/or
sanctions on the trader. This way consumers’ interests are secure and, on the other
186 Hans-W MICKLITZ and others, ‘An Introduction to the Special Issue on “Behavioural Economics,
Consumer Policy, and Consumer Law”’ (2011) 34 Journal of Consumer Policy 271, 272 note that
‘[n]owadays, the consumer legal system is saturated with information duties, duties that tend to
produce high costs for suppliers and also inundate the legal system. The result is an ever-growing
enforcement deficit.’
187 See Chapter 1 Subsection 1.1.2.4 Finding a balance: optimal information duties in the B2C e-
commerce.
188 Cf EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1119-1121 who distinguish three main groups of information duties in
the function of available remedies: information duties relating to the process of contract formation
or the content of the contract, information duties relating to the motivation to enter into a contract
and information duties concerning rights available to the other party.
189 Ibid 1119-1120.
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hand the efficient and individual assessment of each case is beneficial for traders as
well: first, because the honest traders fulfilling their duties are promoted, second,
due to the fact that consumers will not abuse their rights avoiding contracts for
breach of the duties of lesser importance.190
2.2.3 Types of remedies available
2.2.3.1 Main remedies to be considered
First of all, the remedies available for breach of information duties can be divided into
specific consumer law remedies and general private law remedies; sometimes remedies
from those two different groups can be combined.191 The specific remedies for breach
of information duties are those transposed into national laws as a consequence of
a European directive, due to this fact they belong to a sort of an additional layer
of law within the national system; general private law remedies on the other hand
originate in the national law, which they have been evolving with for centuries.
In order to introduce some clarity in the present analysis, remedies for breach
of information duties should be differentiated from the consequences of breach. I
am using the concepts of the consequences of breach or possible classification of
breach when I am referring to legal rules applicable in the given case; the remedies
result from those legal rules. For instance, if a breach of an information duty oc-
curred through a false representation having been made to a consumer, the possible
consequence of such breach could be an action in misrepresentation in English law
or dolo (fraud) in Spanish law, the potentially available remedies will comprise a
possibility to avoid the contract and damages.
The DCFR in its art II.–3:109 proposes a set of uniform remedies for the breach
of information duties; the remedies include liability for non-performance, liability
190 CARRASCO PERERA, ‘Desarrollos Futuros del Derecho de Consumo en Espan˜a, en el Horizonte
de la Transposicio´n de la Directiva de Derechos de los Consumidores’ (n 136) 314 pointing out
to the issue of consumers claiming contract avoidance when information duties breached were
insignificant, in order to find a way out of a bad deal.
191 See eg s 19(10) CRA 2015, see also observations made above in Subsection 2.2.2 Major problematic
issues related to the remedies for breach.
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for damages and a right to avoid the contract due to mistake.192 Such a uniform set
of remedies however, is neither desirable193 nor actually present in the legal systems
analysed, as English and Spanish law combine both specific and general private law
remedies. There is no doubt that the remedies, in order to be effective, need to
be adapted to the contractual relationship in question – a B2C electronic contract
– and adequately respond to the consumer’s interests prejudiced by the breach of
the concrete duty. Therefore, two considerations need to be explored: the types
of remedies adequate for consumer contracts194 and purposes of each information
duty.195
The adequacy of remedies for breach of information duties is discussed in more
detail further in Chapter 3 Section 3.3 Problem of adequacy of general remedies to
particularities of B2C contracts, here it is appropriate only to note that main issues
192 Art II.–3:109 ‘Remedies for breach of information duties’ DCFR reads:
‘(1) If a business has a duty under II.–3:103 (Duty to provide information when concluding con-
tract with a consumer who is at a particular disadvantage) to provide information to a consumer
before the conclusion of a contract from which the consumer has the right to withdraw, the with-
drawal period does not commence until all this information has been provided. Regardless of this,
the right of withdrawal lapses after one year from the time of the conclusion of the contract.
(2) If a business has failed to comply with any duty imposed by the preceding Articles of this
Section and a contract has been concluded, the business has such obligations under the contract
as the other party has reasonably expected as a consequence of the absence or incorrectness of
the information. Remedies provided under Book III, Chapter 3 apply to non-performance of these
obligations.
(3) Whether or not a contract is concluded, a business which has failed to comply with any duty
imposed by the preceding Articles of this Section is liable for any loss caused to the other party
to the transaction by such failure. This paragraph does not apply to the extent that a remedy is
available for non-performance of a contractual obligation under the preceding paragraph.
(4) The remedies provided under this Article are without prejudice to any remedy which may
be available under II.–7:201 (Mistake).
(5) In relations between a business and a consumer the parties may not, to the detriment of the
consumer, exclude the application of this Article or derogate from or vary its effects.
193 EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1122 observe ‘uniform regulation which does not take account of the
characteristics of the individual duty in question leaves a wide discretion to the courts and may
even lead them to the conclusion that all the remedies listed are available for the infringement of
any information duty. In addition, a uniform list of remedies in contract law disregards the fact
that the infringement of information duties may be appropriately and sufficiently addressed by
institutional sanctions.’
194 See observations made by me in BEDNARZ, ‘Breach of Information Duties in the B2C E-
Commerce: Adequacy of Available Remedies’ (n 34).
195 EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1119ff.
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concern the need to engage in court proceedings in order to enforce the remedies,
difficulties connected to the burden of proof and a limited deterrent effect of general
law remedies in the context of standard form contracts.196
In what refers to purposes of information duties, as already noted in Subsec-
tion 2.2.2 Major problematic issues related to the remedies for breach, information
requirements can be divided in groups depending on the function of the duty in ques-
tion; the remedies for breach of the duties having the same purpose will be similar
and should be adequate to the specific purpose of the duty. Therefore, information
relative to the contract contents – the most important information items describing
main characteristics of the object of the contract, making the identification of the
parties possible, explaining main obligations of the parties under the contract, such
as the price to be paid and the duration of the contract – is often protected through
remedies influencing the validity or enforceability of the very contract in question.
This is true both for general private law – which does so for example through de-
fects of consent and in specific consumer regulations – for instance when consumer
is not informed about some additional costs, ie does not know the total price of
the product ordered, they will not have to bear that costs according to the art 97.6
of the TRLDCU or reg 40 of the Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013. Breach of
information relative to consumer rights, such as notably information on the right
of withdrawal, will result in the consumer rights being extended, as in the case of
withdrawal period extension from art 105 TRLDCU and reg 31 Consumer Contracts
Regulations 2013. Logically, the assumption is that the consumer cannot lose – or
miss the time limit to exercise – their right just because they were not informed
about it: the very purpose of the information duty relative to the other party’s legal
right is based on the idea to make it easy for them to exercise it in time.
However, it is less clear what remedies are available in the case of breach of
information requirements covering the information relative to the contract formation
process, such as technical steps needed for the contract to be concluded.197 The
problem with private law redress is that if the contract was effectively concluded,
196 BEDNARZ, ‘Breach of Information Duties in the B2C E-Commerce: Adequacy of Available Rem-
edies’ (n 34) 10-11.
197 See eg art 27 of the LSSICE and reg 9 of the E-commerce Regulations 2002.
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despite the fact that information relative to the contract formation process was
missing, then the individual consumer incurred no actual damage and the purpose
of the duty – contract formation – has been fulfilled. The institutional sanctions198
are needed only to reinforce market auto-regulation in such cases: consumers will
probably be willing to avoid websites where it is unclear how to order the products.
Nevertheless, private law remedies might be available if due to poor information
relative to the technical steps required to enter into the contract, the consumer
actually places an order they did not intend to. In such case, both general private
law remedies, especially resulting from the rules on defects of consent, and specific
provisions, such as art 98.2 of the TRLDCU or reg 14(4) and (5) of the Consumer
Contracts Regulations 2013 will come into play. From such perspective, information
relative to the contract formation process in the context of the electronic commerce
is actually protecting consumer’s real consent.
Information requirements concerning the way in which complaints are dealt with
and making it easier for consumers to bring a complaint – for example trader’s
geographical address, possibility of having recourse to ADR schemes, existence and
availability of codes of conduct are aiming at giving consumers a real possibility to
enforce their contractual rights. Breach of such duties is aggravating trader’s breach
of contract, if it occurred, or can be even treated as an instance of contractual
breach in itself: reg 18 of the Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 requires every
distance contract to be treated as including a term that the trader has complied
with information duties, including those on filing complaints. The Spanish TRLDCU
does not offer a similar protection, however general law remedies will be available,
including those relative to the breach of contract.
Remedies available to consumers for breach of pre-contractual information re-
quirements vary according to purposes the different duties intend to attain. The
remedies will also have their own aims, from improving the aggrieved party’s eco-
nomic situation (ie through compensating the damage incurred) to deterring the
traders from breaching the duties.
The specific remedies, established in the consumer legislation, are numerous and
quite varied. Moreover, some remedies are often available only for breach of one
198 EIDENMULLER (n 76) 1119ff.
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concrete duty, as for instance the extension of a time limit to exercise the right of
withdrawal in the case of the omission of information relative to that right. The
remedies resulting from specific legislation are presented in Figures 1. and 2. re-
lative to English law and Figures 3. and 4. relative to Spanish law. In the great
majority the remedies are similar, as they originate in the EU law and the national
legislation is just a transposition of those rules. However, some differences can be
observed and are analysed further in Chapter 3 Remedies for breach of information
duties available to consumers in English and Spanish law. Within the specific law
of remedies available to consumers some general types of remedies can be noted:
remedies linked to ineffectiveness of the contract (or payment); monetary remedies;
remedies forcing the trader to do something.199 In addition, a remedy sui generis of
the withdrawal period extension200 should be mentioned.
Traditionally, remedies under English law can be divided into two groups: legal
remedies and equitable remedies.201 Although this distinction concerns mainly the
general law, still it is deeply embedded into the fabric of the English law and has
some influence especially on the consumers’ expectations as to the statutory rem-
edies.202 The most significant remedies under the English general law are damages
and termination,203 which is in stark contrast to the Spanish law, where similarly to
other continental legal systems more emphasis is put on maintaining the contractual
relationship of the parties, even if fictitious because of the breach, hence the prom-
inence of the specific performance as remedy.204 The statutory remedies are in a
199 Cf GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 149) 13 referring
to general law remedies available under the Spanish law.
200 Reg 31 Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 and art 105 TRLDCU.
201 See eg MCKENDRICK, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (n 73) 924ff.
202 Traditionally, under the concept of breach of contract in common law there is no possibility of
‘saneamiento’ – ‘repairing’ of the contract, as the English law sees contracts as guaranties of a
certain outcome, contrary to the Spanish law where more emphasis is put on the parties obliga-
tions towards each other arising from the contract. Hence, the English law is not concerned with
maintaining the parties’ relationship when a breach occurs – the logic is that if the outcome is
flawed, the parties need to look for another contract, cf TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 114:
Comentario’ (n 149) 1060.
203 MCKENDRICK, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (n 73) 796-798.
204 See the Tribunal Supremo obiter : Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m.
601/2005 de 13 de julio (RJ 2005/5098), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero; Tribunal Supremo (Sala
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great majority inspired by the European law – often they are a direct transposition
of the EU law rules – and they often follow the continental law spirit, putting the
remedies aiming at maintaining the contract first.205 It all boils down to the values
and policy decisions underlying the choice of the available remedies: ‘[w]hat should
be the aim of a remedial regime for breach of contract? Should it be to encourage
parties to continue their relationship and resolve their difficulties or should it encour-
age parties to walk away from a deal when things go wrong and seek performance
elsewhere?’ asks McKendrick, noting that ‘English law appears to tend towards the
latter model.’206 It should be noted that in the context of consumer contracts, as
I argued elsewhere,207 consumers whose contractual right of information has been
breached, would often benefit from simple contract rescission.208 As far as the mar-
ket efficiency is concerned, this solution allows consumers to allocate their resources
again in a better way, and leaves dishonest traders eventually out of the market.
In what refers to the consumer law remedies for breach of information duties,
de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 704/2005 de 10 de octubre (RJ 2005/8577), Fundamentos de
Derecho, Sexto; nevertheless some academics believe that the specific performance is not in reality
a preferred remedy in the Spanish system, see GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual
en Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 149) 16; FENOY PICO´N, El Sistema de Proteccio´n del Comprador (n 153)
171.
205 For instance, the hierarchy of the remedies for non-conformity is the following: first, the consumer
has to opt for repair or replacement, and only if those fail to make the good conforming to the
contract, can the consumer ask for a discount or contract rescission (rejection), although there is a
‘short-term right to reject’ available to English consumers for a limited period of time, 30 days, after
the goods delivery, see ss 19ff CRA 2015 and arts 119ff TRLDCU; see also Esther TORRELLES
TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 118: Comentario’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente (ed), Comentarios a las Normas
de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Texto Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y Otras Leyes y Reglamentos
Vigentes en Espan˜a y en la Unio´n Europea (Editorial Constitucio´n y Leyes COLEX 2011) 1087
noting that from the moment the Directive on the sale of consumer goods was adopted, there
has always been a conflict between the hierarchy of remedies established in the Directive, and
the English legislation allowing for the first short-term right to reject. The CRA 2015 maintained
such solution, being in stark contrast with the continental spirit of the remedies offered in the
Directive, which aim primarily at upholding the contractual relationship of the parties and letting
the trader repair or replace the non-conforming product first; see also Chapter 3 Subsection 3.1.2.1
Information duty breached relative to the main characteristics of goods.
206 MCKENDRICK, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (n 73) 796.
207 BEDNARZ, ‘Breach of Information Duties in the B2C E-Commerce: Adequacy of Available Rem-
edies’ (n 34) 11.
208 ‘Rescission’ meaning ‘termination for breach’ – for more on those two terms and problems of
terminology see footnote 259 below.
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which are linked to ineffectiveness of the contract (or payment), especially consumer
not having to bear some additional costs or charges and delivery costs,209 or even
consumer not being bound by the order they placed210 should be mentioned. Fur-
thermore, various remedies resulting from the rules on non-conformity, applicable to
some situations of breach of information duties, also belong to this group of remedies:
the right to reject in the CRA 2015211 and contract rescission in the TRLDCU.212
Also, the Spanish TRLDCU in its art 100 establishes that a consumer can avoid
the contract, if the trader failed to provide them with a confirmation of the pre-
contractual information on a durable medium.213 Finally, and only in the English
law, consumers have the right to unwind the contract set out in the regulations
relative to the unfair commercial practices.214 Rejecting the goods,215 unwinding
the contract,216 as well as contract rescission available for non-conformity under the
TRLDCU,217 all mean treating the contract as at an end: the trader is under a duty
to refund the consumer, and the latter has to make the goods – if the contract was
for the sale or supply of goods218 – available for collection by the trader.
209 Art 97.6 in relation to art 97.1.e) and 97.1.j) of the TRLDCU and regs 35(5)(b) and 40 of the
Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013, cf also regs 36 on supply of service in the cancellation
period and 37 on supply of digital content in the cancellation period of the Consumer Contract
Regulations 2013 and art 108.4 of the TRLDCU on the supply of water, gas, electricity or heating
through the town systems and of digital content in the cancellation period.
210 Art 98.2 second para TRLDCU and reg 14(3)-14(5) Consumer Contract Regulations 2013.
211 Ss 20ff CRA 2015.
212 Arts 118, 121 TRLDCU.
213 A similar provision found in reg 16 of the Consumer Contracts Regulations does not provide for
the contract being voidable if the information was not confirmed on a durable medium. Moreover,
this remedy is not strictly speaking a remedy for breach of the pre-contractual information duties,
as the provisions refer to the confirmation of the concluded contract.
214 Regs 27E-27H UTR 2008.
215 See s 20 CRA 2015.
216 See reg 27F UTR 2008.
217 See eg Audiencia Provincial de A Corun˜a (Seccio´n 3a), Sentencia nu´m.112/2008 de 25 de marzo
(JUR 2008/172437), Fundamentos de Derecho, Sexto, where the court reminds that the contract
rescission ex art 121 TRLDCU is of retroactive character, intended at putting the parties in the
position they had been before the contract was concluded.
218 Cf regs 27E and 27F.(c) UTR 2008.
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Monetary remedies comprise the right to a price reduction, established both in
the CRA 2015219 and in the TRLDCU220 and two more remedies resulting from
the UTR 2008, described below. In what refers to the price reduction, s 24(1)-(2)
explains what this right consists of:
(1) The right to a price reduction is the right—
(a) to require the trader to reduce by an appropriate amount the
price the consumer is required to pay under the contract, or anything
else the consumer is required to transfer under the contract, and
(b) to receive a refund from the trader for anything already paid or
otherwise transferred by the consumer above the reduced amount.
(2) The amount of the reduction may, where appropriate, be the full
amount of the price or whatever the consumer is required to transfer.
Art 122 of the TRLDCU describes the right to a price reduction stating that: it
will be proportional to a difference between the value the product would have had at
the time of delivery had it been conforming with the contract and the actual value
of the product at the time of delivery. The English statute refers to an ‘appropriate’
price reduction, which according to the Explanatory Notes:
(...) will depend on the circumstances and the remaining functionality
of the goods. It is intended that the reduction in price should reflect the
difference in value between what the consumer paid for and the value of
what they actually receive, and could be as much as a full refund or the
full amount already paid.221
The amount of the reduction is therefore similar under both Spanish and English
statutes, however the TRLDCU does not refer to a possibility of the reduction
reaching the full amount of the price. In fact, under Spanish law it is considered
impossible for the amount of the reduction to be a full refund or even to constitute
a great part of the price, since this would equal to the contract rescission.222
219 S 24 CRA 2015.
220 Arts 121-122 TRLDCU.
221 Note 139.
222 Along these lines Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona (Seccio´n 16a), Sentencia nu´m.100/2008 de 22
de febrero (AC 2008/660), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero.
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Moreover, as already mentioned, only under the English law of unfair commercial
practices, consumers have two more rights available: the right to a discount,223 and
the right to damages.224 The right to a discount comprises four instances depending
on the seriousness of the prohibited practice, for goods or services that cost £5,000
or less:225
(1) A consumer has the right to a discount in respect of a business to
consumer contract (...)
(4) (...) the relevant percentage is as follows—
(a) if the prohibited practice is more than minor, it is 25
(b) if the prohibited practice is significant, it is 50
(c) if the prohibited practice is serious, it is 75
(d) if the prohibited practice is very serious, it is 100
(5) The seriousness of the prohibited practice is to be assessed by
reference to—
(a) the behaviour of the person who engaged in the practice,
(b) the impact of the practice on the consumer, and
(c) the time that has elapsed since the prohibited practice took
place.226
It is with mathematical precision that the UTR 2008 specifies the amount of the
discount, however leaving the assessment of the seriousness to the courts. It can be
presumed that higher amount of discount will be available in cases where traders
engage in misleading actions fraudulently – in relation to reg 27I.(5)(a), or when
the consumer files for the redress quickly after they realised they had been subject
to such practice – in relation to reg 27I.(5)(c). The role of the criterion of the reg
27I.(5)(b) – the impact of the practice on the consumer – is nevertheless less clear.
On the one hand, the prohibited practice in order to be actionable already needs
to have constituted a significant factor in the consumer’s decision to enter into the
223 Reg 27I UTR 2008.
224 Reg 27J UTR 2008.
225 See reg 27I.(6)(a), for products exceeding the value of £5,000 the right to a discount works dif-
ferently: ‘[i]n such a case, the relevant percentage is the percentage difference between the market
price of the product and the amount payable for it under the contract.’ – reg 27I.(7).
226 Reg 27I UTR 2008.
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contract.227 On the other hand, there is a right to damages, that consumers can
claim ‘if they have suffered losses that exceed the price paid for the relevant goods
or service. Damages can cover distress and inconvenience, as well as losses suffered
by the consumer because of the contract or payment they made as a result of the
misleading (...) practice.’228 The impact of the practice on the consumer prior to the
contract conclusion is therefore included in the conditions that must be fulfilled when
claiming the redress; the impact of the practice on the consumer posterior to entering
into the contract seems to be covered by the right to damages. Nevertheless, this
right is quite limited, as explained below, and this is where the criterion of 27I.(5)(b)
comes into play, allowing the judge to grant a greater discount to a consumer who
is not allowed to recover some loss through the right to damages.
The right to damages of the reg 27J UTR 2008 covers both damages for financial
loss229 and alarm, distress or physical inconvenience or discomfort,230 which the
consumer would not have incurred or suffered if the unfair commercial practice of
the trader had not taken place. The right to be paid damages covers only loss that
was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the prohibited practice. Reg 27J.(3) sets
out another limit to the financial loss recoverable under the UTR 2008: ‘[t]he right
to be paid damages for financial loss does not include the right to be paid damages
in respect of the difference between the market price of a product and the amount
payable for it under a contract.’231
227 S 27A.(6); see also Chapter 3 Subsection 3.1 Specific remedies available to consumers.
228 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Misleading and Aggressive Commercial Practices
– New Private Rights for Consumers (Guidance on the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Reg-
ulations 2014) 2014 para 57.
229 Reg 27J.(1)(a).
230 Reg 27J.(1)(b).
231 The amount of the price difference is not recoverable in damages, however it is taken into account
in the right to a discount, as the provision of reg 27I.(7): ‘(...) the relevant percentage is the
percentage difference between the market price of the product and the amount payable for it under
the contract.’ in cases where ‘the amount payable for the product under the contract exceeds
£5,000’; ‘the market price of the product, at the time that the consumer entered into the contract,
is lower than the amount payable for it under the contract;’ ‘and there is clear evidence of the
difference between the market price of the product and the amount payable for it under the
contract.’ – see reg 27I.(6).
In many cases, this amount might also be recovered under the rules of non-conformity of regs
19ff CRA 2015 and arts 114ff TRLDCU, where the consumer is given the right to price reduction
225
2.2. GENERAL REMARKS ON REMEDIES AVAILABLE
In addition, it should be noted that the right to damages under general law can
be made available by the specific consumer law,232 as for example in the art 117
of the TRLDCU, which indicates in the second para that consumers have the right
to damages in accordance with the general civil and commercial legislation for any
damage incurred due to the lack of conformity. Also, the s 19(10) and (11) of the
CRA 2015 reminds that it is open for the consumer to claim damages for the lack
of conformity.
The third group of remedies are those akin to the specific performance: the
right to repair and the right to replacement,233 both originating in the law of non-
conformity. These remedies are preferred under the Spanish law,234 but the CRA
2015 allows to apply for a short-term right to reject prior to claiming the repair or
replacement. Torrelles Torrea notes that the choice of the Spanish legislator to make
only those two remedies primarily available to the consumer – and only when those
fail to restore conformity the consumer might claim rescission – shows the emphasis
put on the transactions security and maintaining the contract which prevail over
consumers’ trust in the market, also aiming at protecting SME for whom contract
rescission might turn out too burdensome.235
The number of statutory consumer law remedies is limited, the remedies are very
specifically described by legislation. Is there a need to open the list of the remedies,
reflecting the difference between the price paid and the value of the product which was actually
delivered. Nevertheless, the prohibited practice of a misleading action does not have to be neces-
sarily based on misrepresenting the characteristics of the product – for instance, the trader may
claim that the price for a certain product he is offering is the lowest on the market, whilst it is not.
If in such case, given all the other circumstances, the trader’s behaviour amounts to a prohibited
practice, the consumer will not be able to recover the price difference under the non-conformity
rules.
232 In the sense that it is the specific statute that grants the right to damages, but the general private
law rules determine how this right works, as opposed to the case of the right to damages such as
eg the one established in the reg 27J UTR 2008, where its operation is detailed by the specific
legislation.
233 S 23 CRA 2015 and art 119 TRLDCU.
234 Esther TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 119: Comentario’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente (ed),
Comentarios a las Normas de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Texto Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y
Otras Leyes y Reglamentos Vigentes en Espan˜a y en la Unio´n Europea (Editorial Constitucio´n y
Leyes COLEX 2011) 1091.
235 Ibid 1091-1092.
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letting the aggrieved consumers apply for other remedies, more appropriate in given
circumstances? Spanish litigation under the law of non-conformity provides examples
of consumers claiming remedies not listed by the legislation236 – either TRLDCU
or the previous law, which was incorporated into the TRLDCU.237 A consumer
claimed from the trader the difference in price the consumer paid for a car and the
price for which they managed to sell the car, alleging they had to sell the car due
to its unsatisfactory quality.238 In another case a consumer paid for repairing the
product themselves, instead of demanding the trader to do so, and then claimed price
reduction, which was granted by the court.239 Similarly, a consumer takes the car
bought to the seller asking for its repair, which was denied, therefore goes to another
mechanics and subsequently claims price reduction equal to the costs of repair.240
Those examples show that courts need more discretion as strictness of the consumer
law remedies can easily have an adverse effect of limiting the aggrieved consumer’s
possibilities of redress. On the other hand however, the hierarchy of remedies aims
at protecting traders and especially SME; the balance must be sought between
consumers’ redress rights and market functioning.
In various cases of breach of information duties, consumers will also have general
law remedies available. Generally speaking, specific statutory remedies are, or should
be, more attractive to consumers, as they are intended to be adapted specifically
to consumer, often electronic, contracts. Nevertheless, consumers might want to
claim general law remedies in addition to specific remedies – for example damages
236 TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 118: Comentario’ (n 205) 1088-1090.
237 Ley 23/2003, de 10 de julio, de garant´ıas en la venta de bienes de consumo. Bolet´ın Oficial del
Estado, de 11 de julio de 2003, nu´m. 165, p. 27160, repealed by the TRLDCU.
238 A claim which was dismissed as not belonging to the scheme of remedies for the non-conformity,
see Audiencia Provincial de A Corun˜a (Seccio´n 5a), Sentencia nu´m.404/2007 de 24 de septiembre
(AC 2008/435).
239 Intrestingly, the product in this case was a pet, and repair consisted in veterinary treatement –
Audiencia Provincial de Granada (Seccio´n 3a), Sentencia nu´m.485/2008 de 21 de noviembre (JUR
2009/60612).
240 Audiencia Provincial de A´vila (Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m.179/2007 de 18 julio (AC 2007/2087);
Audiencia Provincial de Ma´laga (Seccio´n 4a), Sentencia nu´m.89/2009 de 12 febrero (AC 2009/735);
TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 118: Comentario’ (n 205) 1089 notes that both these decisions
are in line with the Co´digo civil, which in its art 1098.1 establishes that if a person under a duty
to do something does not do it, it will be done at their cost.
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caused by a lack of conformity of the product with the contract, as mentioned
above. Also, in some situations, general law remedies could be more beneficial to
consumers, who will then claim them instead of specific remedies, eg because of
more generous limitation periods.241 Finally, sometimes consumers will have only
general law remedies available to them, as when the benchmark set by the specific
rules is too high for a vulnerable consumer.242 However, the general law remedies
will always play secondary role in comparison to the specific statutory remedies in
consumer contracts, and especially in what refers to the electronic commerce, hence
the specific remedies are mentioned first.
In the context of the breach of information duties, the remedies available under
the doctrine of defects of consent and of the breach of contract should primarily be
taken into account. As in the case of specific remedies, general law remedies can
be divided into three main types:243 remedies relative to the ineffectiveness of the
contract; monetary damages and specific performance.244
In what refers to the ineffectiveness of the contract, both the terminology and
practical implications of various concepts are of high complexity. Generally speak-
ing, the defects of consent may result in the contract being void, voidable245 or
241 Eg in Spanish law limitation period for a mistake claim to avoid a contract is 4 years as opposed
to 2 years for claim for non-conformity – see art 1301 Co´digo civil and art 123 TRLDCU.
242 Especially in the context of the private redress for unfair commercial practices under the English
UTR 2008; for more on vulnerable consumers and average consumer benchmark established in the
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive see Chapter 1 Subsection 1.1.2.2 The model of consumer in
the e-commerce law.
243 To be precise, the division comes from the general law and can also be applied to the specific
remedies, however the specific remedies were presented first, and as was the division.
244 Cf GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 149) 13 referring
to general law remedies available under the Spanish law for the breach of contract.
245 For the sake of clarity, I will refer to those two possibilities of contract being void or voidable.
However, in both English and Spanish laws and court decisions those concepts are often mixed,
sometimes other notions are used, for instance in Spanish legal documents one can find reference to
terms such as: ‘ineficacia’ and ‘inexistencia’ – contracts not producing any effects, or non-existent,
see eg Jose´ Ramo´n GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1290’ in Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodr´ıguez-Cano
(ed), Comentarios al Co´digo Civil. Vol. VII (Tirant Lo Blanch 2013) 9199ff, also ‘invalidez’ (eg art
1301 Co´digo civil), ‘nulidad’ (eg arts 1302ff Co´digo civil, arts 53, 78 TRLDCU), ‘anulabilidad’ (eg
art 1300 Co´digo civil, art 53 TRLDCU), ‘rescisio´n’ (eg arts 1290ff Co´digo civil, art 53 TRLDCU)
and ‘resolucio´n’ (eg art 1124 Co´digo civil, arts 53, 78 TRLDCU), most importantly however the
concepts of a contract being void (nulo) and voidable (anulable) are confused in the very Co´digo
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unenforceable;246 breach of contract will sometimes give the other party the right
to terminate the contract.247 The contract being void means that in reality there
is no contract and the agreement is flawed to such extent that in the eyes of law
it has never actually existed.248 It is set aside for all purposes and produces no
legal effects at all, the court only declares such status quo ex tunc,249 although third
parties acting in good faith are protected in Spanish law.250 Voidable contracts can
be pronounced invalid in a retroactive manner: they can be rescinded at the option
of the party entitled to exercise the right to set the contract aside, the contract
itself is considered to have existed until the moment when it was rescinded.251 The
distinction is important especially because of the effect on property rights of a third
party both concepts have: if the good being the subject matter of the contract was
subsequently sold to a third party, if the first contract was void, that party never
acquired the property of the good. However if it was merely voidable, the rights
of the third party will not be affected, provided they acquired the good in good
faith.252 Moreover, while the rescission of a voidable contract may be barred by the
civil – see Jose´ Ramo´n GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1301’ in Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodr´ıguez-Cano
(ed), Comentarios al Co´digo Civil. Vol. VII (Tirant Lo Blanch 2013) 9251.
246 Strictly speaking, in the realm of general law remedies for breach of information duties, neither
Spanish nor English law provide for the contract being unenforceable, nevertheless, as already
mentioned, it is one of the specific statutory remedies, see above; see also WILHELMSSON and
TWIGG-FLESNER (n 1) 468 who note that ‘(...) we may observe that some Member States
provide that a contract cannot be enforced against a consumer if there has been non-compliance
with pre-contractual information duties.’
247 For distinction between contract termination and contract rescission, see footnote 259 below.
248 Guenter TREITEL, The Law of Contract (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2003) 286.
249 MCKENDRICK, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (n 73) 523 and Ana COLA´S ES-
CANDO´N, ‘Art´ıculo 1301’ in Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodr´ıguez-Cano (ed), Comentarios al Co´digo Civil
(3rd edn, Thomson Reuters Aranzadi 2009) 1545; Spanish law arguably refers also to ‘contratos
inexistentes’ (inexistent contracts), which are more than void – they simply do not exist, which is
the case when the requirements necessary for the contract to be formed ex art 1261 Co´digo Civil are
not fulfilled, see Ana COLA´S ESCANDO´N, ‘Art´ıculo 1300’ in Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodr´ıguez-Cano
(ed), Comentarios al Co´digo Civil (3rd edn, Thomson Reuters Aranzadi 2009) 1543.
250 COLA´S ESCANDO´N, ‘Art´ıculo 1301’ (n 249) 1545.
251 MCKENDRICK, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (n 73) 523 and COLA´S ESCANDO´N,
‘Art´ıculo 1300’ (n 249) 1544.
252 Edwin PEEL, Treitel on the Law of Contract (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 452.
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lapse of time, there is no limitation period for claiming that a contract is void.253
The concepts of contracts being void or voidable are of special importance for
the law of defects of consent.254 Under the Spanish law, the defects of consent, and
especially mistake (error) and fraud (dolo), relative to the present study, result in the
contract being voidable;255 under the English law, contracts are void for mistake256
and voidable for misrepresentation.257
In both cases of contract being void or voidable, the contract ‘disappears’ – it is
either declared invalid by the court or rescinded retroactively, the parties are under
a duty to return what they have already obtained under the contract and restore
the situation they had been in before the contract was concluded.258
Another similar remedy, which also results in ‘unmaking’ of the contract is con-
tract termination for breach of contract.259 The aggrieved party is entitled to rescind
253 For English law see eg CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 179)
5944; for Spanish law see Jose´ Ramo´n GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1303’ in Rodrigo Bercovitz
Rodr´ıguez-Cano (ed), Comentarios al Co´digo Civil. Vol. VII (Tirant Lo Blanch 2013) 9251ff; the
art 1301 Co´digo Civil which establishes the limitation period of 4 years for an action for avoiding
a contract does not however distinguish between a contract being void and voidable – the art 1301
Co´digo Civil refers to ‘nulidad ’ – ‘nullity’, which can mean both, see also Tribunal Supremo (Sala
de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 843/2006 de 6 septiembre (RJ 2006/8008), Fundamentos
de Derecho, Tercero where the court observes that the limitation period of art 1301 applies only to
voidable contracts, as the contracts which are void are void ab inicio and produce no legal effects,
therefore the lapse of time cannot bar the declaration that a contract is void.
254 CARTWRIGHT, ‘Defects of Consent in Contract Law’ (n 92) 539.
255 See eg COLA´S ESCANDO´N, ‘Art´ıculo 1301’ (n 249) 1545 who also points out to the fact that the
mistake can be so serious as to make contract void due to the lack of consent; considering contracts
voidable for defects of consent is characteristic for continental legal systems, see CARTWRIGHT,
‘Defects of Consent in Contract Law’ (n 92) 537ff.
256 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 179) 585.
257 MCKENDRICK, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (n 73) 595ff.
258 For Spanish law see the art 1303 Co´digo civil, see also GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1303’ (n 253)
9263; for English law see eg Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1, see also MCKENDRICK, Contract
Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (n 73) 519ff and cases there cited.
259 The equitable remedy of contract rescission is not to be confused with contract termination for
breach: ‘[t]ermination operates prospectively, but not retrospectively. Thus termination operates
to release both parties from their future obligations to perform their primary obligations under the
contract, but it leaves intact rights which have accrued prior to the termination of the contract
(Photo Production Ltd v. Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827). In this sense termination for
breach differs from rescission of the contract [as in the law of misrepresentation] (...). Rescission
(...) sets aside a contract for all purposes (that is to say the contract is set aside both retrospectively
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the contract, untying themselves from the obligations taken on under the contract
and requiring return of what has already been paid or provided under the contract
to the party in breach, seeking to be put in a position they would have been had the
contract not been made.260 All the remedies belonging to this group: contract being
void,261 contract rescission and termination for breach are linked to contract loosing
its effectiveness, and they have a common aim: to put the parties in the position
they were before entering into the contract.
On the other hand, other groups of remedies: compensation and specific perform-
ance, have the object of putting the injured party in the position they would have
been in, had the contract been performed.262 Damages are one of the main remedies
of general private law, both in English and Spanish systems.
Damages might be available both in the case of defects of consent and for breach
of contract; in both cases might be combined with contract rescission or termination.
Damages are a form of monetary compensation for loss or injury: ‘the pecuniary re-
and prospectively). Termination for breach, by contrast, does not have retrospective effect: there
is no attempt to unwind the contract. Indeed, it is possible for a term in a clause to survive
termination.’ see MCKENDRICK, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (n 73) 7999; see also
observations made by TREITEL (n 248) 760, who chooses to refer to a contract ‘rescission’ for
breach, however pointing out it is a different remedy to the rescission of a voidable contract in the
law of vitiating factors, notably misrepresentation: ‘(...) the courts (and contractual draftsmen)
have commonly used words such as “rescission” and “termination”. This traditional terminology
has attracted judicial criticism. In the Photo Production case, Lord Wilberforce said that the use
of “rescission” in this sense “may lead to confusion”; and Lord Diplock described the usage as
“misleading” unless it was borne in mind that, in cases of breach, such rescission did not deprive
the injured party of his right to claim damages for the breach. (...) Recent amendments to the Act
[Sale of Goods Act 1979] likewise refer to the right of a buyer who deals as consumer to “rescind” the
contract for breach of an express term and of certain implied conditions; and judges (including Lord
Diplock) have continued to use the same terminology since the Photo Production case. This usage
is certainly more convenient than the somewhat clumsy circumlocution of “treating a contract as
repudiated (or discharged) for breach (or excused non-performance).” In the following discussion
we shall therefore continue to use the term “rescission” to refer to the remedies described above,
bearing in mind that such rescission does not deprive the injured party of his claim for damages
where the failure in performance amounts to a breach. In this respect rescission for breach differs
fundamentally from rescission for misrepresentation (...).’
260 GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 149) 30; TREITEL
(n 248) 759.
261 As far a declaring a contract void can be considered a remedy, since it is merely a statement of
fact.
262 TREITEL (n 248) 759.
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compense given by process of law for an actionable wrong.’263 Various categories of
damages are recognised under the English264 and Spanish law;265 the main distinc-
tion of primary importance is between damages for breach of contract and in tort,
as availability and measure of those two forms of damages differs importantly.266
Finally, and only in the context of a breach of contract,267 below for more detail
on the difference between contract and tortious measure of damages. the remedy of
specific performance is available. Specific performance is a remedy in which the party
in breach is compelled to actually perform a contractual obligation;268 traditionally
in the English system, specific performance is a remedy available in equity.269 There
is little doubt that the specific performance is much more important a remedy for
the Spanish legal system than for the English system, as already noted above. Nev-
ertheless, there is a trend observable in both systems of a certain approximation;
the remedy of specific performance is losing somewhat its significance in the Spanish
263 Sirko HARDER, Measuring Damages in the Law of Obligations: The Search for Harmonised Prin-
ciples (Hart Publishing 2010) 3.
264 Such as: compensatory damages, aggravated damages, exemplary (punitive) damages, nominal
damages, gain-based damages, vindicatory damages – see ibid 3-4.
265 Especially ‘patrimoniales’, ‘personales’ and ‘morales’ – referring to economic loss, physical injury
and suffering – see GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 149)
19ff.
266 See Subsection 2.2.3.2 Nature of remedies: contractual, tortious or other?
267 Logically, since there is a contract to be performed, the court can possibly order its performance.
268 In both English and Spanish law, various types of specific performance are distinguished, see
eg GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 149) 15 and arts
571ff Ley 1/2000, de 7 de enero, de Enjuiciamiento Civil. Bolet´ın Oficial del Estado, 8 de enero de
2000, nu´m. 7, p.575 (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil); and TREITEL (n 248) 1019 referring to various
remedies that all are treated as types of a ‘specific relief in equity’: specific performance, injunction,
damages and specific performance or injunction; in both English and Spanish system the specific
performance can be distinguished from an action for an agreed sum, where the claimants asks for
the specific enforcement of the defendant’s primary obligation to perform what he has promised,
which is the price, thus it is simply an action for money, see: TREITEL (n 248) 1013; GO´MEZ
POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 149) 15.
269 MCKENDRICK, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (n 73) 924.
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law,270 and gaining recognition in the English system.271
2.2.3.2 Nature of remedies: contractual, tortious or other?
Firstly, it needs to be noted that private redress rights for the breach of information
duties, be it available through the operation of the specific consumer law rules or
based on the general law, actually depend on the subsequent contract formation. It
does not mean that there cannot be a breach of information duties if the contract
does not materialise – in such situations however private law of England and of Spain,
both specific and general, usually will not intervene, mainly under assumption that
the individual consumer in such case incurred no or little harm.272
270 See FENOY PICO´N, El Sistema de Proteccio´n del Comprador (n 153) 171; GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El
Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 149) 16-18 who notes that there is a common
belief that the remedy of specific performance is a preferred one, however no clear confirmation of
such belief in courts’ decisions can be found, as monetary damages are often granted even in cases
where the claimant opted for specific performance.
271 MCKENDRICK, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (n 73) 945-948.
272 Information duties that are the focus of this study belong to the realm of pre-contractual oblig-
ations, their breach might belong to the so-called cases of ‘culpa in contrahendo.’ The concept of
culpa in contrahendo in the broad sense refers to a duty to carry out negotiations prior to a possible
contract conclusion with care. Mar´ıa Paz GARCI´A RUBIO and Marta OTERO CRESPO, ‘La Re-
sponsabilidad Precontractual en el Derecho Contractual Europeo’ [2010] InDret: Revista para el
Ana´lisis del Derecho 1, 33 note that culpa in contrahendo denotes three groups of outcomes: (1)
breaking off negotiations, (2) concluding a contract which is voidable due to a violation of the
pre-contractual good faith principle and (3) concluding a contract which is valid, but disadvant-
ageous to one of the parties due to the other acting contrary to the fair dealing principle in the
pre-contractual phase. The first possible outcome – breaking off negotiations, in bad faith, prior to
contract conclusion, rests primarily outside the scope of this study: neither Spanish, nor English law
establish actual consequences of breaking off negotiations (and especially in the context of B2C elec-
tronic contracts), see GARCI´A RUBIO and OTERO CRESPO (n 272) 40-44 and CARTWRIGHT,
Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 179) 538ff. However, situations in which some
kind of remedy for pre-contractual fraudulent behaviour of a trader would be justified, even if no
contract ha been concluded. For instance, Geraint HOWELLS, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices –
Future Directions’ in Reiner Schulze and Hans Schulte-Nolke (eds), European Private Law - Cur-
rent Status and Perspectives (sellier European law publishers 2011) 140 notes in the context of a
remedy of damages for consumers victims of unfair commercial practices that ‘there may need to be
clarity as to whether it is considered desirable to include (...) claims (...) for small amounts – such
as wasted trips to shopping malls due to the use of bait and switch tactics.’ In the e-commerce
context similar situations may occur, eg when a consumer is baited into spending considerable
amount of time on the search and then contracting process, for example registering on the trader’s
website, only to find out at the end that the price is higher than advertised or the product is not
what was seemingly offered before, and so realising this the consumer decides not to enter into the
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Although we can therefore consider that currently in both English and Span-
ish law the conclusion of the contract is a necessary condition for the remedies for
breach of information duties to become available to consumers, it does not auto-
matically imply that the remedies will be of contractual nature: both contractual
(responsabilidad contractual) and tortious (responsabilidad extracontractual) nature
of the remedies should be considered.273 Determining whether contract or tort law
applies might be of significance for the length of limitation periods,274 for the law
applicable in the case of potential cross-boarder dispute,275 or for the measure of
damages.276 Generally speaking, the contractual damages aim at putting the ag-
contract, although after losing considerable amount of time and effort – scarce resources to many
middle-class consumers these days. WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 1) 467 consider,
although not without hesitation, that it may be possible to state an acquis principle in a following
form: ‘A party is liable for damage caused by its breach of information duties, even if no contract
has been concluded.’ Wilhelmsson and Twigg-Flesner base such consideration on the the case law of
the CJEU: ‘(...) we can see in the case-law of the ECJ a nascent principle whereby damages might
generally be available for a failure to comply with an obligation under European law, based on
the general principle of effectiveness. Thus, in Courage v Crehan, Case 453/99 [2001] ECR I-6297,
the Court established an entitlement to damages where there has been a breach of Article 81 EC.
More significantly, in Antonio Munoz Cia SA v Frumar Limited, Case 253/00 [2002] ECR I-7289
the ECJ held that regulations could be enforced in civil proceedings even though the claimant had
no specific right under that regulation where another party had acted in contravention of the rules.
Although both cases involved directly applicable provisions (ie, a Treaty Article and a Regulation
respectively), and this fact was emphasised by the ECJ in its decisions, it does not seem beyond
the realms of possibility that the Munoz principle might one day be extended to cover directives,
at least where these have been properly implemented into domestic legislation. That would mean
that domestic courts might have to accept claims for damages where there has been a breach of
domestic legislation implementing a directive, and thereby effectively create a new form of action
for “breach of EC statutory duty”.’ Nevertheless, it seems it is still not the case in the current
state of the law, and therefore consumers, especially in relation to claims of very small amounts,
will not have individual redress rights under private law when no contract has been entered into.
273 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 1) 466.
274 For instance, according to the art 1968 Co´digo civil the limitation period for an action in tort from
art 1902 is of one year, whilst an action for breach of contract can be barred after fifteen years,
which is due to change to five years as a consequence of the law reform through the Ley 42/2015, de
5 de octubre, de reforma de la Ley 1/2000, de 7 de enero, de Enjuiciamiento Civil. Bolet´ın Oficial
del Estado, 6 de octubre de 2015, nu´m. 239, p.90240 (Ley Reforma de Enjuiciamiento Civil) see
art 1964 Co´digo civil.
275 Hans-W MICKLITZ and Norbert REICH, ‘Cro´nica de una Muerte Anunaciada: The Commission
Proposal for a “Directive on Consumer Rights”’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 471, 488.
276 Under the English law damages in contract are awarded to put the claimant in the position
they would be in, had the contract been performed correctly, and in tort the claimant is put
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grieved party in a position they would be in, had the contract been performed
correctly, whilst tortious damages, being independent from the contractual relation-
ship of the parties, are designed to restore the position of the party that they had
been in before the tort was committed. Howells argues that the tortious measure of
damages is the one best fitting consumer interest, since they are put into a position
before the contract conclusion277 and are able to allocate they assets again: pur-
chasing a similar product, but from a different trader, therefore keeping the market
functioning.
In many Member States pre-contractual information and their breach are re-
garded as a matter of contract, in others as a tort law issue; the question is not
resolved at the European level either.278
through the damages in a position he would have been in, had they not entered the contract, see
CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 179) 459ff; GILIKER, ‘Form-
ation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspective’ (n 26) 309ff;
under the Spanish law, similarly to the English law, damages in contract law cover the ‘positive
interest’ (intre´s positivo) – the position in which the aggrieved party expected to be, had the
contract been performed correctly, and in tort – the ‘negative interest’ (intre´s negativo), ie the
position they would be in, had they not entered into the contract, see Jose´ Ramo´n GARCI´A VI-
CENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1270’ in Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodr´ıguez-Cano (ed), Comentarios al Co´digo Civil.
Vol. VII (Tirant Lo Blanch 2013) 9134; GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en
Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 149) 20; see also Chapter 3 Subsection 3.2.3.1 When misinformation amounts
to breach of term and remedies resulting from contractual liability.
277 HOWELLS, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices – Future Directions’ (n 272) 140 notes in the context of
unfair commercial practices that: ‘(...) contractual damages seek to put the claimant in the position
he would have expected to have been in, whereas tortious damages seek to return the claimant to
the position he was in before the unfair practice; fraud damages are the most generous covering
all damages flowing from the practice. However, in the consumer context these debates are rather
academic. (...) Hugh Collins [Hugh Collins, A Private Right of Redress for Unfair Commercial
Practices – A Report for Consumer Focus (April 2009)] is right to observe that in the consumer
context most will be satisfied with the tortious measure of damages being “(a) the return of
the purchase price plus any costs incurred and wasted expenditure or (b) the difference in value
between the purchase price and the fair market value of the asset.” If in exceptional circumstances
consumers have other laws they might be able to rely on an independent contractual claim under
the general law.’
278 WILHELMSSON and TWIGG-FLESNER (n 1) 467-468 observe: ‘in making available damages,
it may also be necessary to consider whether these should sound in contract or tort/delict. In
some Member States, the instinctive reaction may be to say that this is a matter for contract
law, whereas others may tend towards tort law. The legislative acquis has not resolved this is-
sue, although pre-contractual information duties appear to be regarded as a matter of contract.’
Wilhelmsson and Twigg-Flesner invite to take a look at a short survey by Advocate-General Geel-
hoed on the legal classification of pre-contractual liability in ECJ Case 334/00 Fonderie Officine
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In what refers to the general law remedies, it is usually quite clear how the rem-
edies are classified. The remedies relative to the breach of contract naturally belong
to the realm of contract law both in Spanish and English law. The liability for the
defects of consent presents some more complexity. Under the English law the defects
of consent traditionally give rise to liability in tort,279 (although the remedy of con-
tract rescission is of contractual nature); the adoption of the Misrepresentation Act
1967 introduced statutory liability for misrepresentation, nevertheless the measure
of damages stays tortious.280 In what refers to the Spanish law, the art 1270 of the
Co´digo civil gives no clear indication as the nature of the liability;281 the opinions are
divided,282 however it seems the Tribunal Supremo is inclined to treat the liability
arising out of misrepresentation – dolo – as contractual.283 Nevertheless, the remedy
Meccaniche Tacconia Spa v Heinrich Wagner Sinto Maschinenfabrik GmbH [2002] ECR I-7357
paras 58–63. Nevertheless, the very decision in this case seems to suggest that the pre-contractual
duties are a matter of tort law. Wilhelmsson and Twigg-Flesner note that: ‘the Court was asked
to determine whether a claim for pre-contractual liability was a “matter relating to contract” or
“matter relating to tort” for the purposes of the Convention [the Brussels Convention on Juris-
diction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968]. It observed that a
dispute could be relating to a contractual matter without there being a contract, but it was “es-
sential ... to identify an obligation”. In the absence of an “obligation freely assumed by one party
towards another”, there could be no matter relating to contract; consequently, an action based on
pre-contractual liability is a matter relating to tort. This decision therefore points towards tort
as the basis of liability for a breach of a pre-contractual duty to provide information, although it
would perhaps be going too far to regard this decision as having resolved the point conclusively.’
279 See eg GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Per-
spective’ (n 26) 313ff; SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ (n 24) 27.
280 S 2 Misrepresentation Act 1967; GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Informa-
tion from an English Perspective’ (n 26) 309.
281 Germa´n BERCOVITZ A´LVAREZ, ‘Art´ıculo 1270’ in Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodr´ıguez-Cano (ed),
Comentarios al Co´digo Civil (3rd edn, Thomson Reuters Aranzadi 2009) 1502-1503; GARCI´A
VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1270’ (n 276) 9134.
282 In favour of the contractual liability see eg BERCOVITZ A´LVAREZ (n 281) 1503, GO´MEZ PO-
MAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 149) 20; in favour of the liability of
tortious (extracontractual) nature: GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1270’ (n 276) 9134-9135; Anto-
nio Manuel MORALES MORENO, ‘El Dolo como Criterio de Imputacio´n de Responsabilidad al
Vendedor por los Defectos de la Cosa’ (1982) 35 Anuario de Derecho Civil 591, 629.
283 See eg: Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Recurso de Casacio´n nu´m. 1929/1992, Sentencia de 14
de diciembre 1995 (RJ 1995/9101), Fundamentos de Derecho, Segundo; Tribunal Supremo (Sala
de lo Civil), Sentencia nu´m. 396/2000 de 19 de abril (RJ 2000/3185), Fundamentos de Derecho,
Septimo, Noveno; Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia nu´m. 671/2000 de 30 de junio
(RJ 2000/6747), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero; Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n
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available for mistake is that of contract rescission, however with no claim for dam-
ages available. Moreover, the mistake vitiates party’s consent as to very important
issues regarding the subject-matter of the contract,284 and although the contract is
only voidable, not void, treating the issue of mistake as extracontractual seems to
be more appropriate.
In what refers to the statutory remedies established in the specific legislation, the
character of some is rather clear. For instance, the remedies for lack of conformity
are definitely of a contractual nature, since the regime of non-conformity is relative
to the consumer sales law. Therefore the damages available under both Spanish285
and English law286 for lack of conformity will be of contractual measure.
As to the specific remedies established directly in the Directive on consumer
rights and transposed into both Spanish and English law: consumer not having
to bear some additional costs or charges and delivery costs287 and consumer not
being bound by the order they placed,288 the question is not that clear. Those are
statutory remedies sui generis : the Directive (and national legislation) simply states
that: ‘if the trader has not complied with the information requirements on additional
charges or other costs (...) the consumer shall not bear those charges or costs.’289
and ‘the trader shall ensure that the consumer, when placing his order, explicitly
acknowledges that the order implies an obligation to pay. (...) If the trader has not
complied with this subparagraph, the consumer shall not be bound by the contract
or order.’290 Those two remedies differ in substance: in the first situation the contract
1a), Sentencia nu´m. 1/2007 de 18 de enero (RJ 2007/529).
284 See art 1266 Co´digo civil.
285 See art 117 TRLDCU.
286 See s 19(10) and (11) CRA 2015.
287 Art 97.6 in relation to art 97.1.e) and 97.1.j) of the TRLDCU and regs 35(5)(b) and 40 of the
Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013, cf also regs 36 on supply of service in the cancellation
period and 37 on supply of digital content in the cancellation period of the Consumer Contract
Regulations 2013 and art 108.4 of the TRLDCU on the supply of water, gas, electricity or heating
through the town systems and of digital content in the cancellation period.
288 Art 98.2 second para TRLDCU and reg 14(3)-14(5) Consumer Contract Regulations 2013.
289 Art 6.6.
290 Art 8.2 para 2.
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between the parties exist and is perfectly valid, only some part of it – additional
charges or costs – is not enforceable against the consumer. Therefore this remedy
seems to be of a contractual character. In what refers to the second one, however, I
am inclined to consider it to be of tortious nature: no contract is formed between the
parties if the consumer is not properly informed about their obligation to pay. Any
liability that may arise in such situation stays outside of the realm of the contractual
liability and is extracontractual – tortious.
Finally, the nature of the private law remedies under UTR 2008 seems to be that
of tort rather than contract. The redress for misleading action of regs 5 and 27Aff
UTR 2008 resembles to a great extent an action for misrepresentation, and indeed
its availability excludes the application of s 2 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 in
what refers to the right to be paid damages. The action for contract rescission is
still available, the damages for misrepresentation are of tortious measure, as already
mentioned, hence the tortious character of the remedies under UTR 2008 can be
deduced.
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3 Remedies for breach of
information duties available to
consumers in English and
Spanish law
3.1 Specific remedies available to consumers
3.1.1 Relevant legislation
Specific remedies for breach of information duties – the statutory remedies – are
established in specific consumer legislation,1 it does not mean however that they are
listed in a coherent way in a part of a concrete piece of legislation. On the contrary,
specific remedies are dispersed through different provisions of different pieces of
primary and secondary legislation. One of the reasons of such status quo is the fact
that information duties are linked to various aspects of law and it would simply be
impossible to create one piece of legislation containing all the relevant provisions in
1 Although under general English contract law disclosure duties are imposed scarcely, there are vari-
ous exceptions to this principle, especially established in legislation, cf Paula GILIKER, ‘Formation
of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspective’ in Stefan Grundmann
and Martin Schauer (eds), The Architecture of European Codes and Contract Law (Private Law
in European Context Series, Kluwer Law International 2006) 306 noting under what heads those
exceptions are established.
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one place.
As already noted in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.3 Types of remedies available rem-
edies for breach of information duties must be distinguished from legal classification
of the breach. It is of importance for the analysis of specific remedies because in some
cases specific consumer legislation provides the aggrieved party with a possible clas-
sification of the breach of their information rights, but the remedies available will
be those of general law. For example, pre-contractual information that consumers
receive from traders as established in the Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013
becomes a term of the contract – ss 11(4), 11(5) and 12 (in relation to goods), ss
36(3), 36(4) and 37 (in relation to digital content) and s 50(3) and 50(4) (in relation
to services) of the CRA 2015 require the pre-contractual information received by
the consumer in distance constracts to be treated as a term of the contract; sim-
ilarly various provisions of the TRLDCU allow for the information to be included
in the contract: art 61.2. relative to the contents of advertisements, art 65 which
implies contractual liability for information omission contrary to the good faith and
art 97.5 providing for the pre-contractual information to be considered an integral
part of the distance contract.2 In consequence, pre-contractual information in B2C
electronic contracts becomes a term of the contract both in English and Spanish law.
Moreover, the trader’s obligation to provide pre-contractual information is regarded
as an implied term of such contracts, which stems from reg 18 of the Consumer Con-
tracts Regulations 20133 and art 65 of the TRLDCU. Therefore, both provision of
false information or omission of information required by legislation can be classified
as a breach of term. However, what are the remedies available in such situation?
There is no simple answer: the remedies will be varied,4 and under English law will
comprise statutory remedies, common law and equity remedies, and in Spanish law
remedies resulting from application of TRLDCU and general civil law, that is mainly
2 Cf also observations set out in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.1.1 Content and scope of the information
duties.
3 Which reads: ‘Every contract to which this Part applies is to be treated as including a term that
the trader has complied with the provisions of (...) regulations 9 to 14, and (...) 16’, which includes
reg 13 relative to the pre-contractual information in distance contracts.
4 On relationship between the specific statutory remedies and general law remedies see Chapter 2
Subsection 2.2.2 Major problematic issues related to the remedies for breach.
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Co´digo civil and court decisions based on the legislation.5
5 In what refers to the English law, before the adoption of the CRA 2015, implied terms were cat-
egorised either as ‘conditions’ of the contract or ‘warranties.’ Most of the statutory implied terms
were conditions, breach of which enabled the consumer to choose either to treat the contract as
terminated or to continue with the contract (ie keep the goods) but claim damages. The implied
terms regarding goods being free from third parties’ rights were in turn classified as ‘warranties.’
Their breach was relatively less serious but could also give rise to a claim for damages. Moreover,
the legislation previously in force set out statutory remedies for consumers in situations where the
implied terms regarding quality, fitness for purpose and corresponding to descriptions or samples
were breached, those remedies included repair or replacement of goods, followed in some circum-
stances by termination of contract or receiving an appropriate reduction from the price (see note
43 in Explanatory Notes to CRA 2015). Currently, a different system of remedies is available to
consumers. Generally speaking, various terms are considered to be implied by the CRA 2015, the
Act cross-references to the Schedule 2 of the Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013. The remedies
for breach of implied term vary depending on the one hand on the information requirement that
was breached, and on the other on the type of breach and will be analysed in detail in the follow-
ing Section 3.2 General private law and remedies it offers, here it is worth mentioning that they
comprise the right to recover from the trader the amount of any costs incurred by the consumer as
a result of the breach, up to the amount of the price paid or the value of other consideration given
for the goods from s 19(5) CRA 2015, the short-term right to reject from s 19(3)(a) CRA 2015,
the right to repair or replacement from s 19(3)(b) CRA 2015, and the right to a price reduction
or the final right to reject from s 19(3)(c) CRA 2015. Additionally, specific remedies described in
the present Section will not exclude the application (although there are some exceptions where
legislation expressly excludes application of general law remedies, see eg s 2(4) Misrepresentation
Act 1967 as amended by The Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014) in addition
to, instead of or where no specific remedy is provided – as stated in s 19(10) CRA 2015 – of general
private law, that is common law or equitable remedies for breach of contractual term, such as
claiming damages (s 19(11)(a) CRA 2015), seeking specific performance (s 19(11)(b) CRA 2015),
relying on the breach against a claim by the trader for the price (s 19(11)(d) CRA 2015) or for
breach of an express term, exercising a right to treat the contract as at an end (s 19(11)(e) CRA
2015). The general law remedies are nevertheless limited and shaped by the statute in some in-
stances, for example in the context of the breach of term, s 19(12) of the CRA 2015 ‘provides that
that the consumer is only entitled to treat the contract as at an end for breach of one of the stat-
utory rights in sections 9-11, 13-16 or 17(1) by exercising a right to reject under Chapter 2, [which]
(...) overrides any common law right to terminate the contract for breach of the terms which these
sections require to be treated as included in the contract.’ (see note 95 of the Explanatory Notes
to the CRA 2015).
Under the Spanish law, a series of remedies, both of the specific character and of general law,
is available to an aggrieved party when the term of their contract was breached. Arts 61.2 and
65 TRLDCU provide consumers with a possibility to claim general contract law remedies (Sergio
CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 65: Comentario’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente (ed), Coment-
arios a las Normas de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Texto Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y Otras
Leyes y Reglamentos Vigentes en Espan˜a y en la Unio´n Europea (Editorial Constitucio´n y Leyes
COLEX 2011) 581), that is specific performance, damages, and rescission for breach (termination)
– resolucio´n por incumplimiento (Fernando GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en
Derecho Espan˜ol’ [2007] InDret: Revista para el Ana´lisis del Derecho 1, 1). The Spanish law does
not refer to different contract terms, conditions or warranties, nevertheless the Tribunal Supremo
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The consumer law provisions that establish statutory remedies for breach of
information duties comprise various rules set out in different pieces of legislation
in both Spanish and English law. The traditional legal solutions, in English law
stemming from common law or equity, are of lesser relevance here – consumer law,
partly due to the influence of the European law, tends to be based on statutory
provisions. In Spanish law, specific remedies are established in one specific piece of
consumer legislation, that is in the TRLDCU, however in a dispersed manner.
Firstly, the legislation implementing the provisions of the Directive on consumer
rights transposes remedies there established. Hence, art 97.6 in relation to art 97.1.e)
and 97.1.j) of the TRLDCU and regs 35(5)(b)6 and 40 of the Consumer Contracts
Regulations 2013 regulate the consequences of the trader omitting information about
some costs or additional charges and the costs of returning the product in the case
of consumer’s cancellation. Similarly, art 98.2 second para of the TRLDCU and reg
14(3)-14(5) Consumer Contract Regulations 2013 establish that the consumer will
not be bound by a contract or order they placed, if they have not been clearly
informed7 and have not explicitly acknowledged that the order would imply an
obligation to pay. Also, the omission of the information on the right of withdrawal
results in a specific consequence of the withdrawal period extension of up to 12
months.8
Another set of specific provisions that needs to be taken into account when look-
on many occasions underlined that the remedy of the rescission for breach can only be available for
a breach of certain seriousness (eg Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia nu´m. 353/1999
de 28 de abril (RJ 1999/3422), Fundamentos de Derecho, Primero; Tribunal Supremo (Sala de
lo Civil), Sentencia nu´m. 538/2000 de 23 de mayo (RJ 2000/3493), Fundamentos de Derecho,
Primero; Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 8/2005 de 19 de enero
(RJ 2005/519), Fundamentos de Derecho, Segundo). The TRLDCU also provides consumers with
specific remedies sui generis that are described in this Subsection.
6 Cf also regs 36 on supply of service in the cancellation period and 37 on supply of digital content in
the cancellation period of the Consumer Contract Regulations 2013 and art 108.4 of the TRLDCU
on the supply of water, gas, electricity or heating through the town systems and of digital content
in the cancellation period.
7 According to reg 14(4) Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013: ‘if placing an order entails activating
a button or a similar function, the trader must ensure that the button or similar function is labelled
in an easily legible manner only with the words “order with obligation to pay” or a corresponding
unambiguous formulation indicating that placing the order entails an obligation to pay the trader.’
8 Art 105 TRLDCU and reg 31 Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013.
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ing for remedies for breach of information duties are rules relative to the lack of
conformity of the product with the contract. Those provisions can be regarded as
containing indirect information duties, as discussed in Chapter 1 Subsection 1.2.3.1
More general and indirect information duties. Moreover, they can provide the ag-
grieved party with remedies, especially, but not limited to the situations where the
piece of information that was false was relative to the main characteristics of goods.
The regime of the conformity of the goods with the contract in the English law is
established in various ss of the CRA 2015.9 S 9(1) provides that ‘Every contract
to supply goods is to be treated as including a term that the quality of the goods
is satisfactory’ which is to be assessed considering especially ‘the standard that a
reasonable person would consider satisfactory, taking account of (...) any description
of the goods (...).’10 S 10 is relative to the goods being fit for particular purpose,
a condition which is to be implied as a term of the contract if ‘before the contract
is made the consumer makes known to the trader (expressly or by implication) any
particular purpose for which the consumer is contracting for the goods.’11 One of
the most relevant provisions from the point of view of information duties, s 11(4)
states that:
any information that is provided by the trader about the goods and is in-
formation mentioned in paragraph (a) of Schedule 1 or 2 to the Consumer
Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regula-
tions 2013 (SI 2013/3134) (main characteristics of goods) is to be treated
as included as a term of the contract.
Finally, s 12, although strictly speaking not belonging to the regime of conformity
of goods with the contract,12 contains other provisions of importance in the context
9 From the perspective of the present study, ss 9, 10, 11 and 12 are the most important. However,
according to the s 19(1) CRA 2015, from the provisions listed only ss 9, 10 and 11 are actually
relative to the conformity: ‘(...) In this section and sections 22 to 24 references to goods conforming
to a contract are references to—
(a) the goods conforming to the terms described in sections 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14,
(b) the goods not failing to conform to the contract under section 15 or 16, and
(c) the goods conforming to requirements that are stated in the contract.’
10 See s 9(2) CRA 2015.
11 See s 10(1) CRA 2015.
12 Cf s 19(1) CRA 2015.
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of the breach of information duties:
Where regulation 9, 10 or 13 of the Consumer Contracts (Information,
Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3134)
required the trader to provide information to the consumer before the
contract became binding, any of that information that was provided
by the trader other than information about the goods and mentioned in
paragraph (a) of Schedule 1 or 2 to the Regulations (main characteristics
of goods) is to be treated as included as a term of the contract.13
It should be noted that the cross-referencing technique used in this and other
provisions of the CRA 2015 does not actually contribute to the clarity of the legal
framework applicable to the issue of breach of information duties and consumer
rights put more widely. Quite the opposite: from a consumer’s perspective, such
legislation is unnecessarily complex and requires significant effort to be understood.14
The provisions relative to the conformity of goods with the contract15 established
in the CRA 2015 is where the legal classification of the consequences of the breach
of information duties can be found: the information provided is considered to be a
term of the contract. It is only however the s 19 of the CRA 2015 that provides
us with a full framework of rules applicable in the case of breach, indicating the
remedies available:
If the goods do not conform to the contract because of a breach of any
of the terms described in sections 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14, or if they do not
conform to the contract under section 16, the consumer’s rights (and the
provisions about them and when they are available) are—
(a) the short-term right to reject (sections 20 and 22);
(b) the right to repair or replacement (section 23); and
(c) the right to a price reduction or the final right to reject (sections
20 and 24).16
13 S 12(2) CRA 2015.
14 Paula GILIKER, ‘The Consumer Rights Act 2015 — a Bastion of European Consumer Rights?’
Legal Studies, Record published 17.10.2016 1, 8-9.
15 Cf provisions relative to the contracts for supply of digital content: ss 34ff and services: ss49ff.
16 S 19(3) CRA 2015.
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The remedies will be different however if the breach is relative to the information
duties referred to by s 12 of the CRA 2015:
If the trader is in breach of a term that section 12 requires to be treated
as included in the contract, the consumer has the right to recover from
the trader the amount of any costs incurred by the consumer as a result
of the breach, up to the amount of the price paid or the value of other
consideration given for the goods.17
The quoted provisions of the CRA 2015 create a very specific regime of remedies
available for the breach of information duties on the basis of the rules relative to the
conformity of the product with the contract.
In what refers to the Spanish law, the TRLDCU creates a scheme of remedies
for non-conformity in its arts 114ff. Art 119 establishes consumer’s right to claim
remedies listed in art 118, which are the following: repair, replacement, price reduc-
tion or contract rescission, in the case of a lack of conformity of the product with
the contract.18 The Spanish Act, similarly to the English CRA 2015, includes vari-
ous provisions relating to the conformity of the product with the contract. Art 116
states that product is considered conforming provided that, inter alias, it matches
the trader’s description (art 116.1.a), is fit for both normal (art 116.1.b) and partic-
ular purpose if made known to the trader (art 116.1.c) and is of satisfactory quality
(art 116.1.d).19 The last criterion, that of a satisfactory quality, is framed as being
17 S 19(5) CRA 2015.
18 The TRLDCU refers to ‘productos’ – ‘products,’ which are considered to be any movable good,
in accordance with art 335 of the Co´digo civil. The services are therefore not covered by those
provisions; the question arises as to a possible qualification of the digital content as products, see
Sergio CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘La Nueva Proteccio´n del Consumidor de Contenidos Digitales
Tras la Ley 3-2014, de 27 de Marzo’ [2014] Centro de Estudios de Consumo CESCO Working
Paper <http://blog.uclm.es/cesco/files/2014/10/La-nueva-protecci\%C3\%B3n-del-consumidor-
de-contenidos-digitales-tras-la-Ley-3-2014-de-27-de-marzo.pdf> accessed 15 March 2016, 27ff,
62-62 who argues in favour of such solution; see also Esther TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo
115: Comentario’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente (ed), Comentarios a las Normas de Proteccio´n de los
Consumidores: Texto Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y Otras Leyes y Reglamentos Vigentes en Espan˜a
y en la Unio´n Europea (Editorial Constitucio´n y Leyes COLEX 2011) 1066-1067.
19 Esther TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 116: Comentario’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente (ed),
Comentarios a las Normas de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Texto Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y
Otras Leyes y Reglamentos Vigentes en Espan˜a y en la Unio´n Europea (Editorial Constitucio´n y
Leyes COLEX 2011) 1072-1077.
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of a quality usual for such type of a product that could be expected taking into
account the nature of the product and public statements made by the trader, such
as advertising or labelling.20
The remedies, hierarchy of which will be analysed in the following Subsection
3.1.2.1 Information duty breached relative to the main characteristics of goods, ap-
ply practically independently of the type of breach, with the exception of contract
termination that is not available if the non-conformity is of little importance – ‘de
escasa importancia’ – according to the art 121 of the TRLDCU. It can be therefore
observed, that the English legislation determines the instances of non-conformity
and similar provisions, such as s 12 of the CRA 2015 relative to the information
other than on the main characteristics of good, in much more detail than the Span-
ish Act does, providing different remedies depending on the breach of a concrete
information duty. The TRLDCU does not contain a provision similar to the s 12
of the CRA 2015, as the Spanish Act is only concerned with the conformity of the
product with the contract, ie the breach of product-related information requirements
can only lead to application of the regime of the arts 114ff.
There is also quite a clear difference between provision of false information and
information omission in what refers to the legal classification of breach in both
English and Spanish law, as generally speaking it is the provision of some false
information rather than information omission that will give rise to the remedies
for non-conformity. Within the provisions relative to the conformity, a description,
including public statements, of goods or products is taken into account, therefore it
needs to be false in order to give rise to the remedies; there is no list of information
items to be provided – non-disclosure might be actionable in situations where a
defect of the product is hidden by the trader, and it results in an unsatisfactory
quality or the product non-conforming to the description. In what refers to the rules
on fitness for a particular purpose, a communication of personal character between
the consumer and the trader needs to take place,21 since the particular purpose has
to be made known to the trader in order to be actionable. It is only the Spanish
20 Ibid 1075-1077; cf also s 9(5) and (6) CRA 2015.
21 The purpose of the goods (products) can be made known to trader expressly or by implication –
see s 10(1) CRA 2015; the TRLDCU does not pronounce itself on the way of making the purpose
known to the trader.
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TRLDCU that requires the trader to expressly confirm that the product will be fit
for that purpose.22
Finally, some rules relative to the unfair commercial practices also belong to the
specific consumer law provisions that provide remedies for breach of information
duties, nevertheless only under English law – the Spanish specific legislation does
not offer any specific right of private redress for consumers who were victims of
unfair trading practices.23 Therefore, only general rules of contract law will be of
assistance for aggrieved consumers in Spain if the facts of the unfair commercial
practice provide grounds for action for defects of consent for example; in England the
situation has changed only recently after the adoption of the Consumer Protection
Amendment 2014 to the UTR 2008.24 In the context of the breach of information
duties, only the provisions relative to the misleading actions will be of interest –
aggressive commercial practices are outside of the scope of this study and misleading
omissions, as discussed below, are not covered by the private redress rights.
The introduction of specific consumer law redress for unfair commercial prac-
tices in the English law had been subject to a wide debate in which academics
and the Law Commission took part.25 Effectively, the new regime practically re-
placed the common law and statutory rules of misrepresentation and duress, the
former being of interest to the present study. The law of misrepresentation might
22 See art 116.1.c).
23 See A´ngel CARRASCO PERERA, ‘Desarrollos Futuros del Derecho de Consumo en Espan˜a, en el
Horizonte de la Transposicio´n de la Directiva de Derechos de los Consumidores’ in Sergio Ca´mara
Lapuente and Esther Arroyo Amayuelas (eds), La Revisio´n de las Normas Europeas y Nacionales de
Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Ma´s Alla´ de la Directiva sobre Derechos de los Consumidores y del
Instrumento Opcional sobre un Derecho Europeo de la Compraventa de octubre de 2011 (Civitas-
Thomson Reuters 2012) 318-322; actions available under Spanish law are those of commercial
law – see art 32 of the Ley de Competencia Desleal and administrative law offences – see art 49
TRLDCU.
24 Cf Geraint HOWELLS, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices – Future Directions’ in Reiner Schulze
and Hans Schulte-Nolke (eds), European Private Law - Current Status and Perspectives (sellier
European law publishers 2011) 135-136 who mentions other European systems where private re-
dress is possible.
25 See Hugh COLLINS, ‘Harmonisation by Example: European Laws against Unfair Commercial
Practices’ (2010) 73 The Modern Law Review 89; HOWELLS, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices –
Future Directions’ (n 24); Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Consumer Redress for
Misleading and Aggressive Practices (Law Com No 332, 2012 / Scot Law Com No 226, 2012).
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still result applicable to the instances of breach of information duties,26 however it
will be of a much lesser importance to the aggrieved consumer now after the new
private redress rights have been adopted. Doubts were expressed whether consumers
would benefit from replacing the old general law scheme by a new one of unknown
efficacy.27 Nevertheless, the old rules offering consumers redress for misleading com-
mercial practices, that is mainly the law of misrepresentation, were considered to be
unnecessary complex and poorly adapted to consumers’ needs:
The law of misrepresentation has not been developed with consumers
in mind.28 (...) The 1967 [Misrepresentation] Act is not well known or
well-used. It uses obscure and tortuous language and has been subject to
academic criticism. Furthermore, there is considerable uncertainty over
the three remedies it provides: rescission, damages and damages in lieu
of rescission.29
The consultations revealed great support for adopting a specific regime of private
redress for consumers aggrieved through unfair commercial practices30 and the Law
Commissions concluded that:
The current [ie before the adoption of the Consumer Protection Amend-
ment 2014] law of misrepresentation is not as effective as it should be.
Consumers find it too difficult to value losses and obtain redress. Busi-
nesses also incur unnecessary costs in having to come to grips with the
Regulations [UTR 2008] and with the different concepts used in the [gen-
eral legislation] (...).31
From the comparative perspective the availability of private redress for some of
the unfair commercial practices is an important factor that influences not only the
26 See Section 3.2 General private law and remedies it offers.
27 HOWELLS, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices – Future Directions’ (n 24) 138.
28 Law Com No 332, 2012 / Scot Law Com No 226, 2012 para 4.5.
29 Ibid para 4.6.
30 Ibid paras 4.9-4.14.
31 Ibid para 4.15.
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individual consumer’s situation,32 which is rather obvious, but also market func-
tioning. As Howells observes, the market impact of the unfair commercial practices
law depends on the combination of substantive rules, sanctions and their enforce-
ment, which are now very different among the EU Member States, as the example
of Spanish and English law shows; such situation might go against the purposes of
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive that was designed with the unification
of the law in the internal market in mind.33
The relevant provisions introducing the private right of redress for consumers
harmed through unfair commercial practices are contained in Part 4A of the UTR
2008 regs 27A – 27L. Various rights: the right to unwind the contract,34 the right to
a discount,35 and the right to damages36 are granted to consumers who entered into
a contract with a trader37 who engages in a prohibited practice:38 either misleading
action under reg 5 or aggressive practice under reg 7.39 The prohibited practice must
constitute ‘a significant factor in the consumer’s decision to enter into the contract
32 As HOWELLS, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices – Future Directions’ (n 24) 142 puts it: ‘(...) there is
a feeling that consumers harmed by unfair practices should be restored to the position they were
in beforehand.’
33 Ibid 142-143; see also European Parliament, ‘Implementation of Unfair Commercial Practices Dir-
ective’ (Resolution) P7 TA(2014)0063 para 1 stressing ‘the effectiveness of the legislation estab-
lished by the Directive and its importance in making consumers and traders more confident with
regard to transactions within the internal market (particularly cross-border transactions), in guar-
anteeing businesses greater legal certainty, and in helping to enhance consumer protection in the
Union’ and pointing out to the fact that the ‘(...) disparities in the application of the Directive
risk impairing its effectiveness.’
34 Regs 27E-27H.
35 Reg 27I.
36 Reg 27J.
37 See reg 27A(2): ‘The first condition [of a consumer’s right to redress] is that—
(a) the consumer enters into a contract with a trader for the sale or supply of a product by the
trader (a “business to consumer contract”),
(b) the consumer enters into a contract with a trader for the sale of goods to the trader (a
“consumer to business contract”), or
(c) the consumer makes a payment to a trader for the supply of a product (a “consumer pay-
ment”).’
38 Reg 27A(4) – it is the second condition of a consumer’s right to redress.
39 Misleading omission under reg 6 UTR 2008 is not covered by the private right of redress.
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or make the payment.’40
Misleading omissions ex reg 6 UTR 2008 are excluded from the private redress
rights. Such legislative solution comes as no surprise, given the approach of the
English law to non-disclosure. The arguments against providing redress for non-
disclosure, albeit in the context of the general private law, are well known.41 Nev-
ertheless, some important drawbacks for consumers might occur in consequence of
exclusion of the misleading omissions from the specific redress scheme. Rogue traders
may take advantage of a loophole thus created, as the line between misleading ac-
tions and omissions is rather fine.42
For the commercial practice, and especially the misleading action, which is of
interest to the present study, to be actionable, various conditions must be met.
Firstly, the consumer must have entered into the contract with the trader – as noted
above the reg 27A requires it to be a business to consumer contract, ie where the
trader sales or supplies a product to the consumer; a consumer to business contract,
where it is the consumer who sells goods to the trader, as eg where a consumer sells
their jewellery to a jeweller; or a consumer payment contract, in which the consumer
makes a payment to the trader for the supply of a product. In consequence, there is
no redress right under the scheme established in the UTR 2008 if the contract has
not been entered into between the consumer and the trader.
Furthermore, reg 27B(1)(a) requires the trader’s practice to amount to a mis-
leading action, as defined in reg 5 of the UTR 2008.43 This means that the consumer
40 Reg 27A(6).
41 See Chapter 1 Subsection 1.2.2.2 General duty to disclose and its breach in national private law.
42 See eg Karen CLUBB, ‘Redressing the balance?’ (New Law Journal, 28 February 2014) <www.
newlawjournal.co.uk/content/redressing-balance> accessed 15 May 2016.
43 Reg 5.–(1) A commercial practice is a misleading action if it satisfies the conditions in either
paragraph (2) or paragraph (3).
(2) A commercial practice satisfies the conditions of this paragraph—
(a) if it contains false information and is therefore untruthful in relation to any of the matters
in paragraph (4) or if it or its overall presentation in any way deceives or is likely to deceive the
average consumer in relation to any of the matters in that paragraph, even if the information is
factually correct; and
(b) it causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision he would
not have taken otherwise.
(3) A commercial practice satisfies the conditions of this paragraph if–
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(a) it concerns any marketing of a product (including comparative advertising) which creates
confusion with any products, trade marks, trade names or other distinguishing marks of a com-
petitor; or
(b) it concerns any failure by a trader to comply with a commitment contained in a code of
conduct which the trader has undertaken to comply with, if–
(i) the trader indicates in a commercial practice that he is bound by that code of conduct, and
(ii) the commitment is firm and capable of being verified and is not aspirational, and it causes
or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision he would not have taken
otherwise, taking account of its factual context and of all its features and circumstances.
(4) The matters referred to in paragraph (2)(a) are–
(a) the existence or nature of the product;
(b) the main characteristics of the product (as defined in paragraph 5);
(c) the extent of the trader’s commitments;
(d) the motives for the commercial practice;
(e) the nature of the sales process;
(f) any statement or symbol relating to direct or indirect sponsorship or approval of the trader
or the product;
(g) the price or the manner in which the price is calculated;
(h) the existence of a specific price advantage;
(i) the need for a service, part, replacement or repair;
(j) the nature, attributes and rights of the trader (as defined in paragraph 6);
(k) the consumer’s rights or the risks he may face.
(5) In paragraph (4)(b), the “main characteristics of the product” include–
(a) availability of the product;
(b) benefits of the product;
(c) risks of the product;
(d) execution of the product;
(e) composition of the product;
(f) accessories of the product;
(g) after-sale customer assistance concerning the product;
(h) the handling of complaints about the product;
(i) the method and date of manufacture of the product;
(j) the method and date of provision of the product;
(k) delivery of the product;
(l) fitness for purpose of the product;
(m) usage of the product;
(n) quantity of the product;
(o) specification of the product;
(p) geographical or commercial origin of the product;
(q) results to be expected from use of the product; and
(r) results and material features of tests or checks carried out on the product.
(6) In paragraph (4)(j), the “nature, attributes and rights” as far as concern the trader include
the trader’s–
(a) identity;
(b) assets;
(c) qualifications;
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has redress rights if the information provided to them was false or in any way de-
ceiving, although factually correct and in the meantime caused (or was likely to
cause) the average consumer to take a transactional decision44 he would not have
taken otherwise. The average consumer benchmark is also employed in assessing if
the information was deceiving or likely to deceive. The cross-reference from the reg
27B(1)(a) to the reg 5 of the UTR 2008 results in the consumer having to prove not
only that the misleading action has been carried out, but also that it has been likely
to cause the average consumer to enter into the contract. There are various implic-
ations, first of all a potential difficulty of proof, and secondly, practical exclusion of
more vulnerable consumers from the scheme.45
In addition to the objective test above, the consumer must also show that the
prohibited practice carried out by the trader was a significant factor in their actual
decision to enter into the contract. Such requirement has only been introduced in
the Consumer Protection Amendment 2014, it had not existed before in the UTR
2008 in relation to an offence of reg 5. The standard of proof that must be met
in civil proceedings is all probability,46 nevertheless it is still an important obstacle
that consumers need to overcome to obtain their redress.
(d) status;
(e) approval;
(f) affiliations or connections;
(g) ownership of industrial, commercial or intellectual property rights; and
(h) awards and distinctions.
(7) In paragraph (4)(k) “consumer’s rights” include rights the consumer may have under Part
5A of the Sale of Goods Act 1979(a) or Part 1B of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982(b).
44 ‘Transactional decision’, as defined in reg 27B(2) means: ‘(...) any decision taken by a consumer
to enter into a contract with a trader for the sale or supply of a product by the trader, or for the
sale of goods to the trader, or to make a payment to a trader for the supply of a product.’
45 For more on vulnerable consumers and average consumer benchmark established in the Unfair
Commercial Practices Directive see Chapter 1 Subsection 1.1.2.2 The model of consumer in the
e-commerce law.
46 As opposed to ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in criminal proceedings; reg 27K(1) reads: ‘A consumer
with a right to redress under this Part may bring a claim in civil proceedings to enforce that right.’;
on standard of proof in civil and criminal proceedings see eg Mike REDMAYNE, ‘Standards of
Proof in Civil Litigation’ (1999) 62 The Modern Law Review 167.
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3.1.2 Specific remedies established in statutes
3.1.2.1 Information duty breached relative to the main characteristics
of goods
National legislation provides consumers with various remedies that are presented in
this Chapter. First I am looking at remedies resulting from specific consumer legis-
lation; the next Section 3.2 General private law and remedies it offers is dedicated
to general private law remedies. The analysis of the general private law is organised
around the distinction between information omission and provision of false informa-
tion; such divide in available remedies can also be seen in the context of the specific
statutory remedies, as shown in Figures 1. – 4. Especially in what refers to English
law, specific remedies for omission of material information are significantly more lim-
ited then those available in the case of misinformation. Such approach stems from
the traditional law of misrepresentation, which will be analysed further on, together
with other general private law remedies, where omission of material information is
usually not actionable.
The specific remedies for breach of information duties also differ significantly
depending on the type of information duty breached. We can distinguish two types
of situations where consumer was provided with untrue or inaccurate information.
This distinction is closely related to the consequences of breach of information duties
and plays an important role in the law of misrepresentation and general law remedies.
However it also seems to have shaped the system of specific remedies up to some
point and therefore it is worth mentioning at this stage of the study as well. Firstly,
traders misinform consumers, providing false or misleading information with the aim
of influencing consumer’s decision on entering the contract. This practice is common
in trade and it usually concerns the information on the product (good). On the other
hand, traders might also try to misinform consumers in a different way, making it
more difficult for them to pursue their rights, for instance giving false information
on their rights to redress, hoping it would discourage consumers from presenting
complaints.
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In the sales of goods contracts,47 information relative to the description of goods
is specifically protected, allowing consumers to take advantage of some specific rights,
applying almost exclusively to the situations of breach of information duties relative
to the main characteristics of goods, set out in the provisions on non-conformity of
goods with the contract. For this reason, the remedies for breach of an information
duty relative to the main characteristics of goods are presented first.
Generally speaking, and subject to the observations made below, both English
and Spanish law treat the information about the main characteristics of goods as
contract terms.48 Also both systems provide consumers with similar remedies for the
lack of conformity of goods with the contract:49 the rights to repair, to replacement,
to discount and to reject the goods – rescind (terminate) the contract. The CRA 2015
specifically indicates in its s 19 statutory remedies which are available to consumers
for breach of terms treated as included by the ss 9 – 11,50 moreover reminding that
general contract law remedies for breach of those terms are open to consumers in the
circumstances.51 TRLDCU also lists specific remedies available for non-conformity,52
not excluding the application of general law remedies, although neither expressly
47 For the sake of clarity, I am focusing in this Subsection on the remedies available for the breach of
information duties in the contracts for the sale (supply) of goods. Nevertheless, there also are many
provisions, relative to other types of contracts than sale contracts and to contracts for supply of
other products, and especially digital content and services. The CRA 2015 for example establishes
specific remedies for contracts for supply of both digital content and services: ss 33-47 and ss
48-57 respectively. So do other pieces of specific legislation (see eg footnote 101 below for UTR
2008). The Spanish TRLDCU often refers to products, a concept which includes digital content as
well, see CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘La Nueva Proteccio´n del Consumidor de Contenidos Digitales
Tras la Ley 3-2014, de 27 de Marzo’ (n 18) 27ff; see also footnote 18. The remedies however are
practically the same as in the case of the breach of information relative to the goods, therefore the
remedies available in contracts for supply of goods are analysed and serve as a model showing the
mechanisms and solutions adopted. Wherever pertinent, other contracts are also mentioned.
48 See ss 9-11 CRA 2015 and arts 61.2, 65 and 97.5 TRLDCU.
49 Under Spanish general law, there is no breach of contract if the good is not fit for a particular
purpose or if it is not of satisfactory quality, provided that it was not specified in the contract, see
Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 981/2005 de 20 de diciembre (RJ
2006/291), Fundamentos de Derecho, Se´ptimo. As we shall see, the specific provisions of consumer
law establish the contrary.
50 That provide remedies for breach of information duties relative to the goods.
51 S 19(9)-(11) CRA 2015.
52 Art 118 TRLDCU.
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referring to them.53
Both CRA 2015 and TRLDCU establish a hierarchy of the remedies, in the sense
that a consumer is only free to exercise some rights after they have unsuccessfully
tried to exercise another. Such was the concept first introduced in the Directive
on the sale of consumer goods,54 transposed into Spanish and English law. The
TRLDCU adheres to the text of the Directive, making it available to consumers
to first choose between repair or replacement of non-conforming goods; only if the
consumer cannot exercise their right to repair or replacement – eg because it is
impossible or would be disproportionate – or when the trader has failed to complete
one of those remedies within a reasonable time and without significant inconvenience
to the consumer, then is the consumer entitled to require price reduction or contract
rescission.
According to the art 119 TRLDCU, the consumer can require the trader to repair
or replace the non-conforming product, the choice being the consumer’s: there is no
hierarchy of those two remedies, none has preference over the other.55 However,
the condition is that none of the two turns out to be objectively impossible56 or
53 See observations made in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.2.1 Dual nature of information duties and
remedies for their breach.
54 The art 3.2 of the Directive reads: ‘in the case of a lack of conformity, the consumer shall be entitled
to have the goods brought into conformity free of charge by repair or replacement, in accordance
with paragraph 3, or to have an appropriate reduction made in the price or the contract rescinded
with regard to those goods, in accordance with paragraphs 5 and 6’ and then clarifies that ‘in the
first place, the consumer may require the seller to repair the goods or he may require the seller to
replace them, in either case free of charge, unless this is impossible or disproportionate’ (art 3.3)
and only then can the consumer require price reduction or contract rescission: ‘the consumer may
require an appropriate reduction of the price or have the contract rescinded:
– if the consumer is entitled to neither repair nor replacement, or
– if the seller has not completed the remedy within a reasonable time, or
– if the seller has not completed the remedy without significant inconvenience to the consumer.’
Even then however, ‘the consumer is not entitled to have the contract rescinded if the lack of
conformity is minor’ (art 3.6).
55 See eg Audiencia Provincial de Cantabria (Seccio´n 4a), Sentencia nu´m. 52/2008 de 17 de enero
(JUR 2008/115557), Fundamentos de Derecho, Segundo.
56 Objectively in the sense of excluding the subjective impossibility on the side of the trader, see
Esther TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 119: Comentario’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente (ed),
Comentarios a las Normas de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Texto Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y
Otras Leyes y Reglamentos Vigentes en Espan˜a y en la Unio´n Europea (Editorial Constitucio´n y
Leyes COLEX 2011) 1093.
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disproportionate.57 Once the consumer has chosen the desired remedy, both thems
and the trader are bound to follow with their choice.58
The repair should make the product conforming with the contract, it has to
be proportionate, free of charge and satisfactory to the consumer and needs to
be carried out within a reasonable time and without significant inconvenience to
the consumer.59 The replacement consists of providing the consumer with a new
product, which is conforming to the contract – a remedy which might turn out to
be burdensome especially for the SME, while being understandably attractive to
consumers.60
If the repair or replacement did not succeed in making the product conforming
to the contract,61 the consumer now has a possibility not only to require the other
remedy, ie replacement or repair, but also is entitled to exercise their right to the
price reduction or contract rescission.62
The consumer’s choice of secondary remedies of price reduction and contract
57 A remedy is disproportionate if it implies costs that are unreasonable when compared to the costs
of carrying out other remedies: art 119.2 TRLDCU explains that a remedy is to be considered
disproportionate when in comparison to another remedy imposes on the trader costs which are
unreasonable, taking into consideration the value of the product as it would be conforming to the
contract, the relevance of the non-conformity and whether the alternative remedy could be carried
out without major inconvenience for the consumer.
58 See eg Audiencia Provincial de Tarragona (Seccio´n 3a), Sentencia nu´m. 245/2009 de 16 de julio
(AC 2009/1881), Fundamentos Jur´ıdicos, Segundo.
59 See art 120 TRLDCU; TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 119: Comentario’ (n 56) 1092; Esther
TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 120: Comentario’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente (ed), Comentarios
a las Normas de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Texto Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y Otras Leyes y
Reglamentos Vigentes en Espan˜a y en la Unio´n Europea (Editorial Constitucio´n y Leyes COLEX
2011) 1099-1100.
60 TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 119: Comentario’ (n 56) 1092.
61 See Audiencia Provincial de Palencia (Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 109/2006 de 5 de abril (JUR
2006/236935), Fundamentos Jur´ıdicos, Tercero, where it is noted that it is the consumer who needs
to demonstrate that the product still lacks conformity after the repair; see also Audiencia Provincial
de Burgos (Seccio´n 2a), Sentencia nu´m. 61/2005 de 17 de febrero (JUR 2005/101107), Fundamentos
de Derecho, Cuarto, where the Court observed that the consumer’s personal satisfaction in relation
to how the repair was carried out is irrelevant, as it is the objective lack of conformity that persists
despite the repair that needs to be demonstrated for the consumer to be entitled to secondary
remedies of price reduction, rescission or the other remedy (ie replacement in this case).
62 Art 120.d) and f) TRLDCU.
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rescission is not limited by the requirement of proportionality,63 the only factor
preventing the consumer from opting for the contract rescission is when the non-
conformity is of minor importance – ‘de escasa importancia’.64 Price reduction65
consists of the consumer keeping the ownership of the good and receiving monetary
compensation that cannot nevertheless be a full refund, as this would mean contract
rescission.66 The right to rescission, as already noted above in Chapter 2 Subsection
2.2.3.1 Main remedies to be considered, is restricted in Spanish law to the specifically
delimited situations, as the Spanish system tends to favour security of transactions
and maintaining the contractual relationship over allowing the parties to terminate
it in any event of breach. The art 121 TRLDCU, which puts the right to rescind at a
secondary place in comparison to the repair and replacement, and further limits the
rescission to where the lack of conformity was more than just of a minor importance
– is still seen as a significant widening of the availability of the remedy of the contract
rescission (termination) for breach in the Spanish law, as a particular seriousness of
the breach is not required by the provisions of the TRLDCU.67
The solution adopted in the CRA 2015 differs importantly from those of the
Directive on the sale of consumer goods and the TRLDCU, especially in what refers
to the hierarchy of the remedies. The CRA 2015 provides consumers with an addi-
tional right to reject – to contract rescission (termination) for breach – ‘a short-term
right to reject’, available for 30 days after the goods were delivered.68 The availab-
63 Esther TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 121: Comentario’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente (ed),
Comentarios a las Normas de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Texto Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y
Otras Leyes y Reglamentos Vigentes en Espan˜a y en la Unio´n Europea (Editorial Constitucio´n y
Leyes COLEX 2011) 1105.
64 Art 121 TRLDCU in fine.
65 For the amount of the price reduction see Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.3.1 Main remedies to be
considered.
66 Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona (Seccio´n 16a), Sentencia nu´m.100/2008 de 22 de febrero (AC
2008/660), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero.
67 TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 121: Comentario’ (n 63) 1107.
68 S 22(3) CRA 2015: ‘The time limit for exercising the short-term right to reject (unless subsection
(4) applies) is the end of 30 days beginning with the first day after these have all happened–
(a) ownership or (in the case of a contract for the hire of goods, a hirepurchase agreement or a
conditional sales contract) possession of the goods has been transferred to the consumer,
(b) the goods have been delivered, and
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ility of the short-term right to reject does not influence the other remedies – it is
an additional right; also exercising other rights of repair or replacement within the
short-term rejection period does not deprive the consumer of this right, according
to s 22 CRA 2015:
(6) If the consumer requests or agrees to the repair or replacement of
goods, the period mentioned in subsection (3) or (4) [30 days or less for
perishable goods] stops running for the length of the waiting period.
(7) If goods supplied by the trader in response to that request or
agreement do not conform to the contract, the time limit for exercising
the short-term right to reject is then either–
(a) 7 days after the waiting period ends, or
(b) if later, the original time limit for exercising that right, extended
by the waiting period.
The additional – in comparison to the Directive and to the Spanish legislation
– short-term right to reject reflects the English law preference to let the aggrieved
party terminate the contract and pursue damages, as opposed to the continental law
principle of maintaining the contractual relationship.69
The CRA 2015 combines the common law short-term right to reject with the rem-
edies introduced through the transposition of the European Directive, of more ‘con-
tinental’ character. Apart from this additional short-term right to reject, consumers
under the Act can opt for remedies similar to those established in the TRLDCU:
the rights to repair or replacement, and secondary rights to price reduction or final
reject. The repair of the goods is achieved through making the goods conform to
the contract.70 The repair or replacement of the goods must be done within a reas-
onable time and without significant inconvenience to the consumer,71 and is free of
(c) where the contract requires the trader to install the goods or take other action to enable the
consumer to use them, the trader has notified the consumer that the action has been taken.’
69 GILIKER, ‘The Consumer Rights Act 2015 — a Bastion of European Consumer Rights?’ (n 14)
9.
70 S 23(8) CRA 2015.
71 S 23(2), subsection (5) CRA 2015 provides a definition of those concepts: ‘Any question as to what
is a reasonable time or significant inconvenience is to be determined taking account of–
(a) the nature of the goods, and
(b) the purpose for which the goods were acquired.’
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charge for them.72 As under Spanish rules, the consumer ‘cannot require the trader
to repair or replace the goods if that remedy (the repair or the replacement) (...) is
impossible, or is disproportionate compared to the other of those remedies.’73 Fur-
ther, the Act explains the meaning of ‘impossible’ and ’disproportionate’, practically
repeating the wording of the Directive on the sale of consumer goods, and therefore
in words similar to the TRLDCU:
Either of those remedies is disproportionate compared to the other if it
imposes costs on the trader which, compared to those imposed by the
other, are unreasonable, taking into account–
(a) the value which the goods would have if they conformed to the
contract,
(b) the significance of the lack of conformity, and
(c) whether the other remedy could be effected without significant
inconvenience to the consumer.74
The art 119 of the TRLDCU requires the impossibility to be objective, therefore
excluding the subjective impossibility on the side of the trader. The CRA 2015 does
not mention the objectivity of the impossibility, nevertheless such is the interpreta-
tion of the identical wording of the Directive on the sale of consumer goods,75 it can
be assumed that the impossibility referred to by the CRA 2015 is also objective.
The choice of the primary remedy binds the consumer, in the sense that the
consumer who requires or agrees to repair or replacement cannot exercise the other
remedy or the short-term right to reject, however only to give the trader a reasonable
time to proceed with the chosen remedy, and unless giving the trader that time would
cause significant inconvenience to the consumer.76
72 S 23(2)(b) CRA 2015: ‘[If the consumer requires the trader to repair or replace the goods, the
trader must–] bear any necessary costs incurred in doing so (including in particular the cost of any
labour, materials or postage).’
73 S 23(3) CRA 2015.
74 S 23(4) CRA 2015.
75 See eg Hanna SIVESAND, The Buyer’s Remedies for Non-conforming Goods: Should There be
Free Choice Or are Restrictions Necessary? (European Legal Studies Vol 2, Sellier European Law
Publishers 2005) 29.
76 S 23(6) and (7) CRA 2015.
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One of the secondary rights: the rights to price reduction or final right to reject
can only be exercised after the primary rights, ie repair or replacement, did not
succeed in making the goods conform to the contract, or consumer cannot require
neither repair nor replacement, as they are both impossible or disproportionate,
or the trader failed to repair or replace the goods within a reasonable time and
without significant inconvenience to the consumer.77 The amount of price reduction,
as already noted in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.3.1 Main remedies to be considered can
reach the full amount of the price that the consumer has paid or is required to pay,78
which stays in contrast to the solution adopted in the Spanish law. Moreover, there
is no requirement for the non-conformity to be more than of a minor importance
for the consumer to claim the final right to reject – as it is established both in
the TRLDCU79 and in the Directive on the sale of consumer goods.80 Those solu-
tions, together with the fact that the CRA 2015 grants consumers the additional
short-term right to reject, demonstrate the policy choices made by the legislators in
England and Spain: the former focusing primarily on the individual rights, the lat-
ter more concerned with the transactional security and maintaining the contractual
relationships.
In both analysed legal systems, the remedies for lack of conformity constitute
a response to the situations where information duties relative to the goods were
breached. Indeed, s 11(4) of the the CRA 2015, relative to the provisions on con-
formity, entitled ‘Goods to be as described’, directly points to the information re-
quirements established in the Schedule 2 relative to the information in distance
contracts of the Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013:
Any information that is provided by the trader about the goods and is in-
formation mentioned in paragraph (a) of Schedule 1 or 2 to the Consumer
Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regula-
tions 2013 (SI 2013/3134) (main characteristics of goods) is to be treated
as included as a term of the contract.
77 S 24(5) CRA 2015.
78 S 24(2) CRA 2015.
79 Art 121 TRLDCU.
80 Art 3.6 Directive on the sale of consumer goods.
260
3.1. SPECIFIC REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO CONSUMERS
The lack of conformity resulting from the goods being different to what was
described to the consumer – the hypothesis of art 116.1.a) TRLDCU and s 11 CRA
2015 – fits perfectly the situation of the information duties breach, especially through
provision of false or inaccurate information, and even more so in the electronic
contracts. The trader, taking advantage of the fact that the consumer does not see
the good themselves, describes it – and also graphic presentation of goods, such
as pictures or photographs should be taken into account – in such a way as to
make it seem more attractive to the consumer, in order to sell the good to them.
Subsequently however, when the consumer receives the good, they realise it is not
as it was presented by the trader, ie it is not conforming to their contract, as the
trader’s description of goods is treated both by Spanish and English law as contract
terms: arts 61.2 and 97.5 of the TRLDCU and s 11(1) of the CRA 2015. This example
nevertheless is hard to reconcile with a situation where the information was omitted:
s 11(4) of the CRA 2015 expressly refers to ‘any information that is provided by the
trader (...)’, art 61.2 TRLDCU mentions the content of the information provided
(el contenido) and according to the art 97.5 of the TRLDCU the information forms
integral part of the contract and cannot be change afterwards – which implies there
needs to be information that can be changed.
Some provisions allow to treat the omission of information as breach on inform-
ation duties, giving rise to remedies for the lack of conformity. This is the case with
provisions relative to the quality of the goods and their purpose. Trader can free
themselves from the liability for the non-conformity resulting from the unsatisfact-
ory quality of the goods if they specifically draw consumer’s attention to it before
the contract is made.81 Therefore, if the trader omits the information on the un-
satisfactory quality, the consumer will have remedies for non-conformity available.
In the context of the provisions relative to the purpose of the goods, English and
Spanish legislative solutions differ. S 10 of the CRA 2015 stipulates that the trader
will be in breach of term, if the goods are not fit for a particular purpose, made
known to the trader by the consumer. It does not require however the trader to ex-
pressly confirm the fitness of the goods for that particular purpose – contrary to the
81 S 9(4) CRA 2015; the TRLDCU in its art 116.1.d) in relation to 116.3 indirectly states the same:
there is no lack of conformity if the consumer knew or reasonably should have known about the
lack of conformity.
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Spanish provision of art 116.1.c) of the TRLDCU – which entails a conclusion that
keeping silent in the case of goods not fit for the particular purpose will amount to
the lack of conformity under English law, but not under Spanish law. Nevertheless,
the liability for information omission may rise under the TRLDCU if the trader fails
to inform the consumer that the goods are not fit for normal purpose.82
Nevertheless, as Figures 1. and 3. demonstrate, there are various rules relative to
the lack of conformity entailing information duties that can practically be breached
only through provision of false information; what will be the consequences of omit-
ting information in those cases? Under Spanish law, art 65 of the TRLDCU provides
a solution to the issue: the loopholes in consumer contracts are to be completed, to
the consumer’s benefit according to the principle of the objective good faith, also in
the cases of omission of the relevant pre-contractual information. Ca´mara Lapuente
notes that it can be therefore understood that the omitted information may be
enforced by consumers.83 Nevertheless, determining the content of the omitted in-
formation does not consist of interpreting the parties’ subjective intentions, nor their
hypothetical reconstruction – the extension of the contract contents is done through
the operation of the objective good faith principle.84 The concept of the objective
good faith refers to the way the parties act: their honest and just behaviour.85
Under English law however, only reg 18 of the Consumer Contracts Regulations
entitled ‘Effect on contract of failure to provide information’ expressly deals with
consequences of information omission, stating that: ‘every contract (...) is to be
treated as including a term that the trader has complied with the provisions (...)
[including reg 13 on information to be provided before making a distance contract].’
Nevertheless, a difference in the approach adopted by the TRLDCU and the Con-
sumer Contracts Regulations 2013 can be noted: Spanish law aims at filling the gaps
82 Art 116.1.b) in relation to art 116.3 TRLDCU.
83 CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 65: Comentario’ (n 5) 581.
84 Ibid; see also: Calixto DI´AZ-REGAN˜O´N GARCI´A-ALCALA´, ‘Art´ıculo 1258’ in Rodrigo Bercovitz
Rodr´ıguez-Cano (ed), Comentarios al Co´digo Civil (3rd edn, Thomson Reuters Aranzadi 2009)
1482-1483, in the context of the art 1258 Co´digo Civil establishing a similar principle to the art 65
TRLDCU for the general contract law, who notes that a particular ‘reconstruction’ of the contract
takes place, and is done through the sources which are foreign to the parties subjective intentions.
85 See eg Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 84/2009 de 12 de febrero
(RJ 2009/1487), Fundamentos de Derecho, Segundo.
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in the parties’ contract, ie actually providing the consumer with adequate informa-
tion – substituting the information that could have been reasonably expected to have
been included in the contract86 – therefore effectively providing the consumer with
means to enforce their rights in exactly the same way as if they had been provided
with false information. The English law, on the other hand, offers to include a term
that the trader has complied with the information duties – the trader will therefore
be in breach of this particular term, and not in breach of a concrete information
requirement. In consequence, the omission of information under the Spanish law,
through the application of the art 65 of the TRLDCU will result in application of
the remedies for the non-conformity of the goods with the contract, in addition to
the general contract law remedies for breach of contract: specific performance, con-
tract rescission and damages. The remedies for breach of reg 18 are those available
for the breach of term, as discussed in Section 3.2 General private law and remedies
it offers, as there is no indication that information omission could give rise to rem-
edies for lack of conformity (except for the situations analysed above).87 It should
be noted, however, that both art 65 of the TRLDCU (through the reference to the
objective good faith principle) and reg 18 of the Consumer Contracts Regulations
2013 are concerned with the trader’s behaviour: the compliance with the informa-
tion requirements. Art 65 goes a step further than reg 18, however, as it aims at
reconstructing the very content of the contract between the parties, and not only
promotes the trader’s behaviour according to the requirements.88
Also the availability of other remedies referred to in Figures 1. and 3. is influenced
86 CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 65: Comentario’ (n 5) 581-582.
87 Moreover, s 19(12) of the CRA 2015 excludes the right to treat the contract as at an end, ie the
right to rescind the contract, for a breach of an implied term except as provide s 19(3) and (4),
however only referring to the terms implied by the CRA 2015. It does not apply directly to the reg
18 Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013, nevertheless constitutes another evidence of the English
law’s hostility to the duty of information disclosure and providing remedies for pure information
omission.
88 It should be noted that another interpretation is also possible: that reg 18 Consumer Contracts
Regulations 2013 has actually a similar meaning to art 65 TRLDCU and allows to fill in the
loopholes in the contract which occurred through trader’s failure to provide information. Such
a view seems nevertheless less coherent with the general English law approach that, as already
discussed on various occasions in the present study, is reluctant to reconstruct parties’ contracts
according to the principles of good faith and fair dealing, and also to provide remedies for the
information omission.
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by the type of breach, ie information omission or provision of false or inaccurate
information. English law provides in UTR 2008 private redress only for misleading
actions of reg 5, but not for misleading omissions of reg 6,89 therefore only provision
of false information will give rise to the private law remedies, ie: the right to unwind
the contract and get a full refund,90 the right to a discount91 and the right to claim
damages for additional losses or harm the consumer has suffered.92 The consumers
can claim other remedies under another statute, common law or equity for prohibited
practices – with the notable exception of the claim for damages under s 2 of the
Misrepresentation Act 196793 – however it cannot lead to a double recovery.94
The private redress rights for unfair commercial practices were introduced through
the Consumer Protection Amendment 2014, after the public consultations had been
carried out on the matter.95 Previously, aggrieved consumers could only seek private
redress through general law, which in the context of breach of information duties
89 See reg 27B.(1) UTR 2008.
90 Regs 27E, 27F, 27H UTR 2008.
91 Reg 27I UTR 2008.
92 Reg 27J UTR 2008.
93 S 2(4) Misrepresentation Act 1967.
94 Reg 27L.(2) UTR 2008.
95 Law Com No 332, 2012 / Scot Law Com No 226, 2012; see also COLLINS, ‘Harmonisation by
Example: European Laws against Unfair Commercial Practices’ (n 25) 115 who describes how the
idea of private redress for unfair trading practices seemed far-fetched in the context of the English
system: ‘(...) the new right of action would in effect create a new kind of private law claim. The
current laws of misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence could be supplemented by an action
for compensation for losses caused by unfair commercial practices. The existing common law is
cautious in providing compensation for actions during pre-contractual negotiations. It does not
accept a general duty to bargain in good faith or with professional diligence and it imposes few
duties of disclosure of information on businesses. A private right of redress might introduce some
significant changes. For example, it might give the right to claim compensation for misleading,
but not false, statements. Similarly, it might give the right to claim compensation for failure to
disclose material information, a right that has been steadfastly denied by the common law judges
for centuries. A private right of redress might also create for the first time a remedy of compensation
for undue influence or aggressive business practices, where the traditional remedy has been limited
to rescission of the contract and restitution. The Government has given the task of assessing the
implications of a civil action to the Law Commission. Its preliminary advice, pending a full report,
concerns the complexity of the issue of providing private redress.’
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refers mainly to misrepresentation;96 the fact which has been criticised as the law
of misrepresentation is quite complex and has been developed mainly in the course
of business-to-business litigation and therefore does not particularly fit consumers’
needs.97
The consumers can exercise their right98 to unwind the contract within 90 days,99
through an indication made to the business,100 unless the goods101 have already been
fully consumed.102 Moreover, a consumer does not have the right to unwind in respect
of the contract if they have exercised previously the right to a discount, clearly in
respect of the same contract and the same prohibited practice.103
The other two remedies: the right to a discount and the right to damages are
not restricted to within the 90 days period, therefore the normal limitation period
of six years applies.104 The amount of the discount depends on the amount payable
for the product under the contract and the seriousness of the prohibited practice.105
If the amount payable under the contract does not exceed £5,000, then the amount
of the discount will be 25% if the prohibited practice is more than minor, 50% if it is
96 Other general private law doctrines that consumers could refer to were duress, undue influence
and harassment, which are however relevant rather in the context of the aggressive commercial
practices, which are not the focus of the present study.
97 See considerations expressed in the following Section 3.2 General private law and remedies it offers.
98 See also analysis of the remedies in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.3 Types of remedies available.
99 Reg 27E.(3): ‘(...) 90 days beginning with the later of–
(a) the day on which the consumer enters into the contract, and
(b) the relevant day.’
100 Which can be something that the consumer says or does – reg 27E.(2).
101 This Subsection of the present study focuses on the remedies available for breach of information
duties relative to the goods, nevertheless the UTR 2008 also make reference to the services, digital
content, lease and other rights. The bar to the unwinding from the contract in those cases would be
other circumstances: full performance of the service (reg 27E.(8)(b)), full consumption of the digital
content (reg 27E.(8)(c) – in the sense that if the digital content was available to the consumer for a
fixed period and that period has expired, reg 27E.(9)(b)), expiration of the lease (reg 27E.(8)(d)),
full exercise of the right (reg 27E.(8)(e)).
102 Goods have been fully consumed only if nothing is left of them – reg 27E.(9)(a).
103 Reg 27E.(10).
104 See s 5 the Limitation Act 1980.
105 Reg 27I.(4)-(7) UTR 2008.
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significant, 75% if it is serious, and ultimately 100% if it is very serious.106 It can be
noted that again the English law allows for a discount or price reduction equalling
the full amount paid under the contract. The seriousness of the practice is to be
assessed by reference to the trader’s behaviour, the impact it had on the consumer,
and the time lapse since the prohibited practice took place.107 For contracts in which
the consumer was to pay more than £5,000108 the discount equals the percentage
difference between the market price of the product and the amount payable for
it under the contract.109 Finally, consumers are also entitled to claim damages for
financial loss incurred and alarm, distress or physical inconvenience or discomfort
suffered;110 the right to damages is limited only to damages in respect of loss that
was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the prohibited practice.111 Only in relation
to the remedies of damages, defences are available to the traders:
A consumer does not have the right to damages if the trader proves that–
(a) the occurrence of the prohibited practice in question was due to–
(i) a mistake,
(ii) reliance on information supplied to the trader by another person,
(iii) the act or default of a person other than the trader,
(iv) an accident, or
(v) another cause beyond the trader’s control, and
106 Reg 27I.(4) UTR 2008.
107 Reg 27I.(5) UTR 2008; see also observations made in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.3.1 Main remedies
to be considered.
108 And also when the market price of the product, at the time that the consumer entered into the
contract, is lower than the amount payable for it under the contract, and when there is clear
evidence of the difference between the market price of the product and the amount payable for it
under the contract – reg 27I.(6)(b) and (c).
109 Reg 27I.(7) UTR 2008.
110 Reg 27J UTR 2008.
111 Reg 27J.(4) UTR 2008; such solution is less favourable to the aggrieved consumer than the damages
under s 2 Misrepresentation Act 1967, which are referred to as ‘generous’ by some authors (see
eg Ewan MCKENDRICK, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn, Oxford University
Press 2012) 607). Indeed, damages for misrepresentation seek to put the claimant in a position
they would have been in, had they not entered into the contract, and the defendant is liable for all
losses flowing directly from the misrepresentation made, regardless of their forseeability (Royscot
Trust Ltd v Rogerson [1991] 2 QB 297).
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(b) the trader took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due
diligence to avoid the occurrence of the prohibited practice.112
The burden is on the consumer to establish their claim, and especially they need
to show that they entered into the contract with the trader,113 the misleading action
had been carried out by the trader, which is likely to cause the average consumer to
enter into the contract,114 and finally that the misleading action was a ‘significant
factor’ in their transactional decision.115 The UTR 2008 therefore makes reference
to two different tests: an objective one of the average consumer – when establish-
ing if the prohibited practice had been carried out, and a subjective one – when
establishing whether the practice constituted a significant factor in the claimant’s
decision. The implications are that such a solution makes the law less clear and it
may happen to be complicated for consumers at the moment of establishing traders’
liability. Moreover, both tests may also turn out difficult to demonstrate. The aver-
age consumer benchmark has already been present for sometime in the UTR 2008
before the reform, which introduced the private redress rights, for the purposes of
the administrative or criminal offences in various Member states, not only England,
and in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive itself, it has been therefore more
or less thoroughly examined.116 Nevertheless, it is not clear how it could be trans-
ferred into the domain of private individual redress, where it is not a governmental
body, such as the Competition and Markets Authority, that needs to demonstrate
the influence of the practice on the average consumer, but an individual claimant.
Also fulfilling the subjective test, ie demonstrating that the practice was a significant
112 Reg 27I.(5) UTR 2008.
113 Reg 27A.(2) UTR 2008, which excludes therefore advertisements for example.
114 Reg 5.(2)(b) UTR 2008.
115 Reg 27A.(6) UTR 2008.
116 See eg Annette NORDHAUSEN SCHOLES, ‘Information Requirements’ in Geraint Howells and
Reiner Schulze (eds), Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (sellier European
law publishers 2009); Joasia LUZAK, ‘Passive Consumers vs. the New Online Disclosure Rules
of the Consumer Rights Directive’ [2015] Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 2015-02 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2553877> accessed 13 June
2016; Bram B DUIVENVOORDE, The Consumer Benchmarks in the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive (Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, Volume 5, Springer International
Publishing 2015) 20-22.
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factor in one’s decision may cause some issues: is significant a decisive one? Or is it
just one of the main factors that made the consumer choose this particular offer?
Consumers unable to carry out the proof in relation to those two tests will not be
entitled to the remedies set out in the UTR 2008. It might however be possible for
them to claim redress under the law of misrepresentation instead, especially as there
is no average consumer benchmark in the traditional law, although an action in mis-
representation certainly has its own particularities as discussed below in Section 3.2
General private law and remedies it offers.
The private redress rights for unfair commercial practices may also bring about
some undesirable consequences for the traders, as the 90 days period for unwinding
the contract is rather long. Consumers are entitled to reject even used products,
often with no allowance for the usage.117 There is a fine line between consumer
(additional) protection through private redress against unfair trading practices and
consumers trying to avoid contracts that turned out to be not as attractive as they
thought.118
3.1.2.2 Remedies for breach of other information duties
There are significantly fewer remedies available to consumers when breach of in-
formation duties concerns requirements relative to information other than about
the goods, as Figures 2. and 4. illustrate. The reason is evident: the scheme of rem-
edies for the lack of conformity is the most prominent and it is only relevant in the
context of the information about the goods. Nevertheless, the English CRA 2015
contains a provision similar to those relative to the non-conformity but concern-
ing information other than about the goods — s 12 entitled ‘Other pre-contractual
information included in contract,’ which reads:
(1) This section applies to any contract to supply goods.
(2) Where regulation (...) 13 [relative to the information to be provided
before making a distance contract] of the Consumer Contracts (Informa-
117 Reg 27F.(7)-(10).
118 Cf considerations expressed by CARRASCO PERERA, ‘Desarrollos Futuros del Derecho de Con-
sumo en Espan˜a, en el Horizonte de la Transposicio´n de la Directiva de Derechos de los Consum-
idores’ (n 23) 314.
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tion, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3134)
required the trader to provide information to the consumer before the
contract became binding, any of that information that was provided by
the trader other than information about the goods and mentioned in
paragraph (a) of Schedule (...) 2 to the Regulations (main characterist-
ics of goods) is to be treated as included as a term of the contract.
(3) A change to any of that information, made before entering into the
contract or later, is not effective unless expressly agreed between the
consumer and the trader. (...)
Therefore any pre-contractual information in distance contracts (contracts to
supply goods) becomes a term of the contract under the CRA 2015. Similar obser-
vation can be made about Spanish law – arts 61.2 and 97.5 of the TRLDCU also
require that the information be treated as a contract term. What is different how-
ever, are the remedies available: the CRA 2015 provides a specific statutory remedy
in its s 19(5):
If the trader is in breach of a term that section 12 requires to be treated
as included in the contract, the consumer has the right to recover from
the trader the amount of any costs incurred by the consumer as a result
of the breach, up to the amount of the price paid or the value of other
consideration given for the goods.
The Spanish law only provides general contract law remedies, as already noted
above in the context of the breach of information about the goods. It can be observed
that the remedy established in the CRA 2015 is much more limited than the scheme
of remedies for the lack of conformity; moreover it is only operative in the case
of provision of false information, and not omission, as the wording of the s 12(2)
indicates.
There are some particular information items specifically protected both in Span-
ish and English law in a very similar way, as their protection originates in the
Directive on consumer rights: explicit information about an order implying obliga-
tion to pay, information about additional payments and costs and information about
the right of withdrawal. Those information items were developed with the electronic
contracts in mind – an information that clicking on a button labelled ‘order’ will
imply an obligation to pay or the need to obtain consumer’s express consent for
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the additional payments, which cannot occur through pre-ticket boxes on a web-
site. Also, the particularity of those information items resides in the fact that it is
the omission of the information that entails legal consequences. It is logical, as all
those information items are of an ‘all-or-nothing’ kind: either they are provided (eg
the information about the order implying an obligation to pay) or not; the trader
wanting to deceive a consumer can only not inform them – otherwise they would
need to put up an express lie on their website, such as ‘the order does not imply an
obligation to pay’, which would not make any sense.
Another aspect that all those information items have in common is that they in-
form a consumer about their rights (the right of withdrawal) or obligations (to pay,
to bear the costs or charges), which makes providing a remedy for breach of the in-
formation quite straightforward: the consumer is either not bound by the obligation
they were not informed about, or the period to exercise the right gets prolonged, as
they might not know about the right. And so omission of an explicit information
about the order implying obligation to pay and failure to obtain consumer’s express
acknowledgement of that information results in consumer not being bound by that
order according to the reg 14(3)-(5) of the Consumer Contract Regulations 2013
and art 98.2 of the TRLDCU. Similarly, omission of clear information on some ad-
ditional payments and not getting consumer’s express consent for them leads to the
consumer not having to pay that costs, or if they have already paid, then trader’s
duty to reimburse them: reg 40 of the Consumer Contract Regulations 2013 and art
97.6 in relation to art 97.1.e) of the TRLDCU.
Finally, two information items are linked to the right of withdrawal. The effect of
the omission of the information about the consumer’s obligation to bear the costs of
direct returning of the good in the instance of cancellation is that the consumer does
not have to bear that costs, similarly as in the case of other charges and payments
mentioned above.119 The omission of the information on the very existence of the
cancellation right brings about the extension of the period in which the consumer
is entitled to exercise that right up to 12 months from 14 days.120 Technically, as
Wilhelmsson and Twigg-Flesner note, the remedy consists more of a cancellation
119 Reg 35(5)(b) Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 and art 97.6 in relation to art 97.1.j) TRLDCU.
120 Reg 31 Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 and art 105 TRLDCU.
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period postponement than extension – as the 14 days period starts running when
the consumer receives the information about their right, at any time during the 12
months.121
Under English law, also in what refers to the information other than concerning
the main characteristics of goods, the remedies established in the UTR 2008 are
available. They operate in an identical manner in both the case of information
relative to the characteristics of the goods and other information, and are presented
in detail above. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that one of the conditions of trader’s
liability for a misleading action is that it needs to constitute a significant factor in
the consumer’s decision to enter into the contract.122 In a great majority of cases
it is the information about the good or product being the subject-matter of the
transaction that can influence consumer’s contracting intention – although it does
not mean that other situations are impossible.
Finally, it should be noted that general law remedies, both contractual and tor-
tious, also play an important role providing consumers with means to enforce their
rights, often through a provision of the consumer law that cross-references to the
general law.
3.2 General private law and remedies it offers
3.2.1 Overview of the analysis of the general private law
remedies
General private law constitutes a necessary foundation and development for the con-
sumer law provisions.123 General private systems of law in England and Spain regu-
121 Thomas WILHELMSSON and Christian TWIGG-FLESNER, ‘Pre-contractual Information Duties
in the Acquis Communautaire’ (2006) 2 European Review of Contract Law 441, 466.
122 Reg 27A.(6) UTR 2008.
123 In ‘Introduction’ to the Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. Draft
Common Frame of Reference, Outline Edition, Prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil
Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group), edited by Christian von Bar
and others (Munich 2009) para 40 it is noted that: ‘The two Groups concur in the view that
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late possible consequences of breach of information duties in the B2C e-commerce.
There are various situations of breach where specific remedies, analysed in Section
3.1 Specific remedies available to consumers will be applicable. Nevertheless, quite
often it is the general private law that will have to guarantee the effectiveness of the
duties established in legislation implementing European directives.124 General law
remedies might also be applicable instead of, or in addition to specific remedies.125
The analysis of the general private law applicable to breach of information duties
requires a slightly different approach than examining specific remedies established
in legislation. Breach of information duties covers the situations where although the
consumer was not provided with relevant information, in an effective manner, at
the pre-contractual stage, the contract was completed. Both English and Spanish
law, as already discussed above, contain various provisions relative to non-disclosure,
which might result applicable when consumer’s right of information was breached.
All the possible remedies that will be analysed must be applicable in the situation
where in the B2C contract made on-line consumer’s right to receive information was
breached. This implies various assumptions for the consecutive analysis.
First of all, the contract between the parties – consumer and trader – was made.
It is worth emphasizing that potential pre-contractual remedies will need to be
applicable in the situation when the contract was actually made, therefore losses
suffered and potential claims and remedies resulting from breach of negotiations or
costs incurred by the consumer mislead by advertising for instance, not leading to
contract formation, will be outside the scope of this study.126
Secondly, in the situation analysed, where parties entered the contract over the
Internet, the trader’s duty to inform results from legislation. The (non-)existence
of the general duty to disclose and its consequences for the contract law in general
consumer law is not a self-standing area of private law. It consists of some deviations from the
general principles of private law, but it is built on them and cannot be developed without them. And
“private law” for this purpose is not confined to the law on contract and contractual obligations.’
124 As already observed in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.2 Major problematic issues related to the remedies
for breach.
125 Cf Figures 1. – 4.
126 Cf with the observations concerning the private redress rights established in the UTR 2008 made
in Section 3.1 Specific remedies available to consumers above.
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were discussed above in Chapter 1 Subsection 1.2.2 General duty to disclose and
its breach in national private law, and the conclusion was reached that English
law does not recognise a general duty to disclose. Traditionally, it is based on the
principle of freedom of contract, therefore it is on the buyers to inform themselves,
caveat emptor, and ask relevant questions during negotiations, as active deceiving
is not permitted.127 Nevertheless, the underlying philosophy of freedom of contract
and transactional certainty stems from a commercial context where equality, at least
theoretical, of bargaining power between the parties is present.128 This is not the case
of consumer contracts though, hence information duties imposed on businesspersons
contracting with consumers. In this special class of contracts, consumer contracts,
similarly to uberrimae fidei contracts duty to disclose indisputably exists in both
English and Spanish law. Therefore, when analysing remedies available for breach
of information duties, we should keep in mind that the legal situation in which they
will apply is such where specific information duties are established in the legislation.
The following analysis aims not only at being comparative, but also at adopting
an approach to the problem, which is theoretical but focuses also on practical im-
plications of the rules analysed. Similarly to the analysis of the specific remedies in
Section 3.1 Specific remedies available to consumers, the general law remedies are
organised according to different situations of breach. The method adopted is not
one of specific case studies,129 however the practicality of the approach resides in
starting hypotheses and functional comparative method.130 The remedies and legal
classifications coming into play in the case of breach of information duties are there-
127 See eg Paula GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and
French Law’ (2005) 5 European Review of Private Law 621, 624 pointing out that ‘The courts
will not permit statements which actively mislead the other party,’ however as already discussed
previously, this ‘does not extend to a duty to disclose information which would influence the other
party’s position.’
128 Ibid 630.
129 As is the case for other studies, see for instance an excellent study of defects of consent and
information duties: Ruth SEFTON-GREEN (ed), Mistake, Fraud and Duties to Inform in European
Contract Law (The Common Core of European Private Law, Cambridge University Press 2004).
130 More on comparative law methodology see eg Ralf MICHAELS, ‘The Functional Method of Com-
parative Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 431ff; Jaakko HUSA, A New Introduction to
Comparative Law (Hart Publishing 2015) 96ff; see also Introduction to the present study.
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fore analysed for different kinds of breach: information omission and provision of
false information, and reactions of Spanish and English law to such hypotheses are
presented. Within those, the possible classifications of breach are compared, notably
the defects of consent and vitiating factors and the breach of contract.
The applicable legal rules, concepts they create and actual remedies need to
be organised in groups in order to facilitate the comparative analysis, which can
be done in various ways. For instance, Beale131 proceeds to analyse the rules of
the general contract law that may provide party with remedy when they entered a
contract under some form of ‘misapprehension’ of the facts, according to how the
‘misapprehension’ of the facts occurred, ie if it was induced by the other party (or
a third party) or self-induced. Beale uses the term ‘misapprehension’, as the word
‘mistake’ is a legal term bearing a lot of connotations as to its legal relevance that
may denote different concepts in various legal systems. Also, Beale focuses only on
misapprehension of facts, such as characteristics of the product or circumstances of
the contract, as opposed to misapprehension of the terms of the contract. When
analysing French, German and English law Beale suggests that all these systems
share the approach to fraud (fraudulent misrepresentation) – the aggrieved party
will be entitled to avoid the contract and the fraudster liable for potential damages.
The terminology appears to differ importantly in relation to negligent or innocent
misrepresentation, treated as mistake induced by the other party in German and
French law, however the results stay similar for all analysed systems – one can
avoid a contract if ‘the misapprehension was as to something important’ and the
other party will be liable for damages if acted negligently. It is in the third category
of Beale’s division – self-induced misapprehension – that the results achieved by
common law and civil law systems differ importantly, especially in what refers to
a situation when the other party new about their contractor’s mistake, but kept
silent.132
Sefton-Green133 suggests to examine four distinct foundations of the duty to
131 Hugh BEALE, ‘Pre-contractual Obligations: The General Contract Law Background’ (2008) XIV
Juridica International 42.
132 For English law approach to silent non-disclosure see observations made in Chapter 1 Subsection
1.2.2 General duty to disclose and its breach in national private law and the analysis below.
133 Ruth SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ in Ruth Sefton-Green (ed), Mistake, Fraud and
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inform, which are: fraud, pre-contractual liability, duty to disclose arising from op-
eration of law and mistake. Fraud, understood as fraudulently induced mistake, is
related to the pre-contractual liability – where the breach of the duty to inform
involves negligence, such as in negligent misrepresentation. Remedies for both fraud
and pre-contractual liability will usually include the right to set the contract aside
and damages based in tort. Nevertheless, as Sefton-Green points out, misrepresent-
ation comes from a duty to tell the truth, which is not the same as duty to inform,
on which the culpa in contrahendo (pre-contractual liability) is based. The duty to
disclose established in law is the third possible foundation analysed by the author.
It is twofold – may be established by specific legal provisions, as is the case of the
consumer law, or may also originate in case law applicable to certain contractual
relationships, eg where there is a relationship of trust between the parties, such as
in the uberrimae fidei contracts. Finally, the author considers mistake caused by
information omission.
The scope of this study, however, in comparison to Beale’s and Sefton-Green’s
analysis is broader and more restricted at the same time. First of all, the focus of this
study is breach of information duties and its consequences. Defects of consent, such
as fraud, mistake and misrepresentation (on which Beale and Sefton-Green focus)
form an important part of this study, but in my analysis I also take into consideration
rules relative to breach of contract and specific consequences of breach and remedies
established in consumer legislation. On the other hand, I will examine rules that
specifically apply to the B2C e-commerce, which means that some provisions relative
to B2B and C2C contracts will not be relevant. Moreover, the comparative scope
of this study is limited to English and Spanish law, therefore other European legal
systems are not analysed.
Various general private law doctrines regulate the transmission of the information
between the contracting parties,134 independently from the consumer law provisions.
Indirect information duties135 stemming from general private law not only overlap
Duties to Inform in European Contract Law (The Common Core of European Private Law, Cam-
bridge University Press 2004) 13-14.
134 Horst EIDENMULLER and others, ‘Towards a Revision of the Consumer Acquis’ (2011) 48 Com-
mon Market Law Review 1077, 1112-1113.
135 See Chapter 1 Subsection 1.2.3.1 More general and indirect information duties.
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with the specific duties established in the consumer law, but also, even more import-
antly, provide remedies for breach of those specific duties. General private law rules
that need to be taken into consideration comprise especially rules on formation and
interpretation of contracts, especially the doctrines of mistake and misrepresenta-
tion – or defects of consent in the continental law terminology, and rules relative to
breach of term or more generally breach of contract.136
As pointed out in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.1.3.3 Breach of information duties de-
pending on the remedies: information omission and provision of false or inaccurate
information breach of the duty to inform can occur in two different ways and I
will organise my analysis accordingly.137 This division is primarily inspired by the
English law of misrepresentation, according to which only active misinformation
requires legal consequences, whilst silence is usually not operational. This tradi-
tional and highly individualistic approach is still present in the common law – hence
different specific remedies established for omission of material information and for
providing false information, as we could see in Section 3.1 Specific remedies available
to consumers above.
Therefore, in my analysis I will first focus on the breach that may occur when
the information, or its important piece, was simply omitted by the trader. And
although the general principle states that non-disclosure is not operational in Eng-
lish law, the consumer contracts constitute an exception to that principle, as the
European rules on B2C contracts impose numerous information requirements thus
making the disclosure mandatory. Through an operation of an implied term originat-
ing in legislation, the gap in the contract resulting from information omission can be
filled in. Then, a breach may amount to the breach of term, but also other possible
qualifications, such as defects of consent, come into play. Second possibility involves
situations, where the information that was provided to the consumer is incorrect
136 Cf EIDENMULLER (n 134) 1112 who refer to: ‘the rules on the formation and interpretation
of contracts, on the incorporation of standard terms of business, on mistake, misrepresentation,
undue influence and fraud, and finally on breach of contract based on failure to conform to the
description of the goods or services.’
137 See also explanations relative to my organisation of specific remedies established in legislation in
Section 3.1 Specific remedies available to consumers above.
276
3.2. GENERAL PRIVATE LAW AND REMEDIES IT OFFERS
– not true or inaccurate.138 In this context especially the law of misrepresentation,
fraud and mistake will be relevant. Nevertheless, implied terms and breach of stat-
utory duty may also result applicable. The classifications of breach of information
duties and remedies available to consumers assigned to the two groups mentioned
above overlap. For example the courts may imply terms of the B2C contract in two
situations: when the information was not provided and when it was provided but
was flawed in some way. Nevertheless, this division makes it possible to carry out a
comparative analysis of two different legal systems, with a focus on remedies and a
practical approach.
Before presenting the general law rules providing consumers with remedies for
breach of information duties, some general issues need to be briefly looked at. First
of all, it is necessary to remember that although terminology and often the very
philosophy behind certain solutions in general private law seem to differ importantly
between English and Spanish law, sometimes the application of different rules may
lead to surprisingly similar results.139
For instance, both Spanish and English systems recognise similar defects of con-
sent that potentially occur during contract formation,140 although in English law
defects of consent do not constitute a unitary concept – rather, there are various
separate grounds for setting the contract aside.141 Moreover, one has to be careful
with terminology – although at first glance it may seem that we can translate error
as mistake and dolo as fraud, these doctrines are deeply embedded in the traditional
138 See Ruth SEFTON-GREEN, ‘Duties to Inform versus Party Autonomy: Reversing the Paradigm
(from Free Consent to Informed Consent)? - A Comparative Account of French and English Law’
in Geraint Howells and others (eds), Information Rights and Obligations: A Challenge for Party
Autonomy and Transactional Fairness (Markets and the Law, Ashgate 2005) 174-175.
139 BEALE, ‘Pre-contractual Obligations: The General Contract Law Background’ (n 131) 43ff; see
also observations made by Ewan MCKENDRICK, Contract law (11th edn, Palgrave 2015) 219
who notes that ‘(...) civilian lawyers may well use the doctrine of good faith to reach results which
English law would reach by a more narrowly defined doctrine. (...) The difference may be more
one of technique than result.’
140 Cf John CARTWRIGHT, ‘Defects of Consent in Contract Law’ in Arthur S Hartkamp and others
(eds), Towards a European Civil Code (4th edn, Kluwer Law International 2011) 537.
141 See Comment to Notes to Article 4:101: Matters not covered, PECL – in Ole Lando and Hugh
Beale (eds), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II Combined and Revised (The
Hague 2000) and Ole Lando and others (eds), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III (The
Hague 2003).
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contract law, and their scope, application, limitations and even basic characteristics
may be very different. Finally, some concepts, such as misrepresentation in English
law, do not have a corresponding doctrine in the other system.142 The approach of
each system to similar situation may be very different, the result, however, may be
alike. As Cartwright puts it when analysing responses of various European contract
law systems to the problem of defects of consent:
This does not mean that there is no comparison to be made between such
different systems in this area: on the contrary, there may be functional
similarities in the operation of various doctrines within the legal systems
even if their theoretical basis is very different.143
Different policies may underline contract law philosophy:144 for example, the
validity of contract, which corresponds with procedural issues, may or may not take
precedence over contractual fairness, which is a question of substance – but even if
142 This is why the remedial approach, ie investigating the consequences of certain behaviours —
in the present study at the consequences of failing to provide information in the B2C electronic
contracts, makes it possible to carry out a comparative analysis; cf considerations expressed by
SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ (n 133) 15.
143 CARTWRIGHT, ‘Defects of Consent in Contract Law’ (n 140) 538.
144 Ibid 539-540 where it is noted that: ‘There are competing policies at play. On the one hand, a
contract is based on the parties’ mutual agreement, intentions or consent; and so the law should
protect each party against being bound where his expression of agreement or intention or his
consent was imperfect. (...) The law may therefore adopt a policy which is more protective of the
apparent consent, in the interests both of the individual party who may, for example, have relied
on the contract, and of the system of contracting more generally since an over-generous principle
of invalidity of contracts may be perceived as threatening the security of contracts in general. In
reality all legal systems, in developing their rules in this area, have been sensitive to these different
policies, and have struck a balance. But the particular balance varies between the different systems;
and it is often struck by the application of different techniques – using a subtle interrelation of
the rules relating to the grounds of invalidity of contracts, the imposition of duties during the
negotiating phase, the definition of fault and responsibility, and the rules relating to damages and
other remedies.’
The different philosophy underlying the contract law system also influences the mentality of the
lawyers and the lawmakers of each system: see Pierre LEGRAND, ‘Against a European Civil Code’
(1997) 60 The Modern Law Review 44, 45, the Legrand’s argument concerning legal mentality –
’mentalite´’ – can be related to the ideas expressed in the present study, for instance the different
approach to the remedies available in cases of breach of information duties through omission of
information and active misinformation, in Spanish and English law and both in the context of
specific and general law remedies.
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the law focuses more on standards of behaviour rather than parties’ consent,145 the
practical solutions and results it leads to might be very close.
Another important consideration that needs to be born in mind is the fact that
the concepts analysed in this study, the remedies for breach of information duties,
are in the process of evolution, being brought about by the social changes on the
one hand – introduced especially through the rapid development of the technologies
allowing the parties to enter into contracts over the Internet, and by the legal reac-
tions to that changes on the other hand – the recently adopted Consumer Protection
Amendment 2014 granting consumers private redress rights in the case of (some)
unfair commercial practices may constitute an example, especially as it has also
an important influence on the general law, as explained below. Sefton-Green points
further to the effect the specific sectoral legislation and solutions there adopted
have on a change in the underlying legal values of contract in general.146 Defin-
itely there are certain dynamics and some approximation between different legal
families147 necessarily occurs, especially through the harmonisation process,148 nev-
ertheless the legal mentality of the legislator and simple lawyers in each system stays
quite unchanged,149 which results in differences in transposition and application of
145 SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ (n 133) 16-17.
146 Ibid 29 where it is noted that: ‘If it is true that mistake, fraud and duties to inform are in the process
of evolution, arguably this is a reflection of a change in underlying legal values of contract; (...)
One obvious answer [to the question for the reasons of those changes] may lie in the fact that the
procedures and the circumstances in which contracts are made are changing, (...) contracts qualified
as door-step sales are subject to special protective legislation, and this surely has a profound effect
on the requirements of consent in contracting. Another reason for the shift lies in the fact that
expectations about contract-making and contracts in general are changing. This may lead to an
enquiry into the relationship between contract-dynamics (contract-making) and contract-products
(the end result).’
147 Partially because, as LEGRAND, ‘Against a European Civil Code’ (n 144) 44-45 points out, there
are more differences than similarities between the continental civil law systems and the English
law, therefore the globalisation of the contracting process must bring about some approximation
at least.
148 The process of harmonisation of law within the European Union will now necessarily be stopped
in what refers to the English law, when (and if) the UK leaves the Union. How it will be dealt
with and whether the process of untangling the English law from the European influences will
actually take place is impossible to say; nevertheless up to that moment the harmonisation and
approximation between civil and common law within the European Union will still be taking place.
149 Cf LEGRAND, ‘Against a European Civil Code’ (n 144).
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the European law, as was demonstrated in the context of specific law remedies for
breach of information duties. To understand those differences however, some analysis
of the general private law is necessary.
The law applicable to the situations where consumer’s right to receive informa-
tion was breached is quite complex, since various specific and general remedies can
result applicable.150 Specific consumer legislation, such as CRA 2015 and TRLDCU,
tries to remedy this complexity,151 however quite unsuccessfully it seems. The reason
for such situation is the one expressed above: consumer law cannot exists without
the general private law, for it to be independent a complete new system of consumer
contracts would need to be devised, and it is neither possible nor really necessary.
Improvements are needed, no doubt, in order to make the law easier to apply, but
no new coherent and complete system within each national law is really feasible.
Nevertheless, the result is that the system of consequences of breach of informa-
tion duties by traders and potential remedies available to consumers under English
and Spanish law still remain rather complex and unclear.152 Various statutes estab-
lish information requirements in B2C on-line contracts, and generally the existence
of statutory remedies does not exclude the application of traditional ones.153
150 See for instance observations of the Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Consumer
Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices (Law Com No 332, 2012 / Scot Law Com No
226, 2012), Outline, xiv, quoted by John CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-
Disclosure (3rd edn, Contract Law Library, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) in Preface:
‘The current law of misrepresentations provides redress in most cases of consumer detriment but
the problem is that the rights are fragmented, complex and unclear. We consider seven possible
routes to a remedy that may apply where a trader has misled a consumer. Many of these causes
of action depend on proving the trader was fraudulent or negligent, which is difficult in consumer
cases. The definition of a misrepresentation is also overly complicated. (...)
Although the statutory remedies for misrepresentation in England (...) provide a good balance
of protection, they are perceived as inaccessible. The remedies are uncertain and consumers rarely
know what they are entitled to. Overall the current law confuses traders, consumers and their
advisers alike and hinders private ordering.’
151 See eg Explanatory Notes to CRA 2015, note 5: ‘There is general agreement across business and
consumer groups that the existing UK consumer law is unnecessarily complex. It is fragmented and,
in places, unclear, for example where the law has not kept up with technological change or lacks
precision or where it is couched in legalistic language. There are also overlaps and inconsistencies
between changes made by virtue of implementing European Union (“EU”) legislation alongside
unamended pre-existing UK legislation.’
152 See Figures 1. – 4.
153 For more details see Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.2.1 Dual nature of information duties and remedies
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However, in some cases the availability of the general law remedies is barred by
the specific legislation, forcing the consumer to rely only on specific remedies. This
consideration has been already explored in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.2.1 Dual nature
of information duties and remedies for their breach; some more observations need
to be added here.
S 2(4) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 does not allow the consumer to be
paid damages under the Misrepresentation Act 1967 if they have a right to redress
under the specific legislation for misleading practice of reg 5 of the UTR 2008.154
The importance of the traditional law of misrepresentation for consumer contracts
is therefore restricted to a great extent; moreover it should be noted that the dam-
ages under s 2 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 are much more generous than
the compensation provided for in the UTR 2008.155 On the other hand, as already
mentioned, the law of misrepresentation is quite complex and consumers were less
likely to seek redress under the general law.156 However, the general statutory law of
misrepresentation will continue to provide remedies in cases where consumers have
no right to redress under the Part 4A of the UTR 2008 introduced in the Con-
sumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014. Those specific provisions require
the trader’s representation to constitute a misleading commercial practice, which in
turn is based on the average consumer benchmark. In consequence, more vulnerable
consumers might find themselves with no specific right to redress, with the tradi-
tional law of misrepresentation being their only way of private redress. Moreover, s
2(4) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 excludes only the right to claim damages,
without making any reference to other remedies available for misrepresentation, and
for their breach.
154 S 2(4) Misrepresentation Act 1967 reads: ‘This section does not entitle a person to be paid damages
in respect of a misrepresentation if the person has a right to redress under Part 4A of the Con-
sumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/1277) in respect of the conduct
constituting the misrepresentation.’
155 Damages for misrepresentation seek to put the claimant in a position they would have been in,
had they not entered into the contract, and the defendant is liable for all losses flowing directly
from the misrepresentation made, regardless of their forseeability (Royscot Trust Ltd v Rogerson
[1991] 2 QB 297), under the reg 27J.(4) UTR 2008 consumer’s right to damages is limited only to
damages in respect of loss that was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the prohibited practice.
156 See footnote 150 above.
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especially contract rescission. Also, the common law of misrepresentation, the tort
of negligence, and all the remedies stemming from those rules are still available,
albeit they are probably less advantageous to consumers seeking redress than the
statutory rights. In conclusion however, it is still necessary to analyse the general
law of misrepresentation, also for comparative purposes, as the Spanish legal system
does not offer specific consumer law remedies for consumers who were victims of
the unfair commercial practices, and because the law of misrepresentation shaped
the mentality of the English lawyers and lawmakers to the extent that still can be
observed also in the context of specific remedies.
Under Spanish law, the applicability of the specific law of non-conformity of the
product with the contract of arts 114ff of the TRLDCU excludes the possibility to
apply for the general law of the latent defects of art 1484ff of the Co´digo civil.157
Similarly, provisions of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 dealing with the lack of con-
formity are no longer applicable to consumer contracts, as they are replaced by the
CRA 2015.158
Another issue of importance for both Spanish and English law is the compatibility
of the specific regime of the non-conformity with the general law rules relative to
the breach of contract. The specific scheme of remedies of ss 19ff of the CRA 2015
and arts 114ff of the TRLDCU is governed by a particular hierarchy described
in the Section 3.1 Specific remedies available to consumers above. The hierarchy
of specific remedies has its rationale, precisely defining (not necessarily limiting
in comparison to the general law though) situations in which consumers have a
right to reject the goods and treat the contract as at an end, aiming at bringing
security of transactions and forseeability to the market. It is an argument in favour
of excluding the application of the general law rules relative to the breach of contract
where consumers can apply for remedies established in the specific regime of non-
conformity. Indeed, s 19(12) of the CRA 2015 states that:
It is not open to the consumer to treat the contract as at an end for
breach of a term that this Chapter requires to be treated as included in
157 A solutions that is in line with the CISG, which replaces the latent defects regime with the scheme
of remedies for non-conformity; see art 117 TRLDCU; this issue in more detail was also raised in
Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.2.1 Dual nature of information duties and remedies for their breach.
158 The CRA 2015 is applicable to all the contracts entered into after 1 October 2015.
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the contract, or on the grounds that, under section 15 or 16, goods do
not conform to the contract, except as provided by subsections (3), (4)
and (6).
Therefore the consumer can only treat the contract as at an end for breach
of one of the statutory rights established in ss 9-11, 13-16 and 17(1) of the CRA
2015 by exercising a right to reject; it is important to notice that this excludes any
common law right to terminate the contract for breach of a term that is implied by
these provisions. Nevertheless, consumers will still have available all the general law
remedies for breach of an express term of the contract which is not covered by the
provisions of the CRA 2015.159
Spanish law does not pronounce itself that clearly on this matter, as the art 117
of the TRLDCU only refers to the possibility for the consumer to apply for damages
under the general law, however not excluding availability of any remedies, apart
from the latent defects regime mentioned above. The position of the academics is
against applicability of the general law remedies for breach of contract in the cases
covered by the law of non-conformity,160 while the courts tend to allow consumers
to claim damages based on the general law.161 Nevertheless, the availability of the
contract rescission for breach based on the general law rules seems to be limited
when the remedies for the lack of conformity are available; indeed the courts do not
permit contract rescission prior to exercising primary rights of repair or replacement,
as it goes against the hierarchy of the remedies established in the arts 114ff of the
TRLDCU.162
159 See s 19(9)(c) CRA 2015.
160 See Nieves FENOY PICO´N, El Sistema de Proteccio´n del Comprador (Col Nal Registradores
Propiedad y Mercantiles 2006) 157, 172; Esther TORRELLES TORREA, ‘Art´ıculo 117: Coment-
ario’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente (ed), Comentarios a las Normas de Proteccio´n de los Consum-
idores: Texto Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y Otras Leyes y Reglamentos Vigentes en Espan˜a y en la
Unio´n Europea (Editorial Constitucio´n y Leyes COLEX 2011) 1081-1082 and the literature there
cited.
161 See eg Audiencia Provincial de Pontevedra (Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m.95/2007 de 15 de febrero
(AC 2007/1432); Audiencia Provincial de Pontevedra (Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m.337/2009 de 9
de julio (AC 2009/1840), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero.
162 See eg Audiencia Provincial de Murcia (Seccio´n 4a), Sentencia nu´m. 153/2006 de 30 de mayo
(JUR 2006/187552), Fundamentos de Derecho, Cuarto; Audiencia Provincial de Sevilla (Seccio´n
6a), Sentencia nu´m. 563/2006 de 5 de diciembre (JUR 2007/180986), Fundamentos de Derecho,
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The general law remedies for breach of contract including contract rescission for
breach are nevertheless of primary importance as in many instances of breach those
remedies are applicable. In the context of Spanish law three provisions provide for
availability of the remedies for breach of contract as a major consequence of the
breach of information duties, and both in the case of provision of false information
and information omission, these are arts 61.2 (on including the advertising and other
promotional offers as terms of the contract), 65 (on implying terms in the contract
in the case of information omission) and 97.5 (on information forming an integral
part of the contract) of the TRLDCU. In a great deal of situations of breach of
information duties, and especially, but not limited to, when the information other
than about the main characteristics of the goods is concerned, those provisions of the
TRLDCU provide main remedies – or rather main classification of breach, ie breach
of contract, as it is the general contract law especially of Co´digo civil that provides
remedies. English law relies more on the specific legislation, particularly when the
lack of conformity is concerned, however similarly to Spanish law, reg 18 of the
Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 relies on the general contract law remedies
for breach of a term it implies (that the trader has complied with the information
duties), as the Regulations do not establish specific remedies for breach of terms
they imply.
Comparative analysis of the general law remedies, ie defects of consent and rem-
edies for breach of contract as possible consequences of misinformation resulting
from breach of information duties needs to take into account various aspects of
those concepts which are present in the national law. In what refers to the defects
of consent, Cartwright163 suggests to look primarily at the operation of the defects
of consent in relation to the validity of contract, establishing types of mistakes that
are legally relevant, existence of any additional requirements, such as a particular
degree of seriousness of the mistake, and the potential relevance of the parties’ fault
– which is where the relationship of mistake and misrepresentation (fraud) needs to
be researched. The consequences of the occurrence of mistake or fraud, ie remedies
Segundo; Audiencia Provincial de Zamora (Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 237/2009 de 1 de octubre
(AC 2009/2255), Fundamentos Jur´ıdicos, Cuarto.
163 CARTWRIGHT, ‘Defects of Consent in Contract Law’ (n 140) 539.
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available to the aggrieved party, should be the second focus of the analysis. In what
refers to the contract rescission, understood as a retrospective contract avoidance,
questions should be answered as to how it is effected (eg by act of parties, by court),
what might prevent the rescission (eg passage of time, third party’s rights) and what
further consequences flow from the rescission (such as the restitution of the benefits
conferred under the contract). Both Spanish and English law provide a possibility
to claim damages in the cases of defects of consent, their basis and assessment need
therefore to be established.
Similarly, breach of contract and its consequences in English and Spanish law
are to be compared. The analysis will try to determine what constitutes a relevant
breach of contract, taking into consideration the trader’s164 fault and/or intentions,
the seriousness of the breach and its consequences, ie available remedies, availability
of which might also differ depending on the factors listed.
Finally, potential relevance of the tortious or extra-contractual liability should be
briefly looked at. From the perspective of English law, a claim for misrepresentation,
even if brought under the Misrepresentation Act 1967, is a hybrid one, drawing
together the laws of contract and tort, since the damages are awarded on a tortious
measure.165 Moreover, an action for a negligent misstatement at common law –
an action for misrepresentation in tort – is also possible.166 The tortious aspect
of the misrepresentation claim is discussed together with other defects of consent.
Outside misrepresentation, an obligation to inform, breach of which would result
in liability in tort is rare.167 An issue of a breach of statutory duty found in the
consumer protection legislation could be mentioned, nevertheless there is a general
presumption against a statutory tort, and even more so in situations where the losses
164 In the context of the present study it is always the trader in the B2C contract who is in breach of
their information duties.
165 GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspective’
(n 1) 313.
166 Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. [1964] AC 465.
167 See GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspect-
ive’ (n 1) 314-315, an indirect information duty arising from the Consumer Protection Act 1987:
liability may be avoided by the producer if they give a clear warning of any possible dangers, see
eg Worsley v Tambrands Ltd [1999] EWHC 273 (QB).
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are of economic nature rather than personal injury or property damage,168 which
is generally the case for the breach of information duties in the B2C electronic
contracts analysed in this study. Therefore such basis for tortious liability can also
be discarded.
In what refers to Spanish law, the defects of consent give rise to contractual
liability;169 potential tortious nature of the consequences of breach of information
duties can be sought in the realm of pre-contractual liability or culpa in contrahendo.
Three possible scenarios can be discussed in relation to the pre-contractual liabil-
ity:170 firstly, breaking off negotiations – pre-contractual liability sensu stricto171
which stays outside of the scope of the present study, as no contract is entered into
in this situation; secondly, conclusion of a contract that subsequently turns out to
be void or avoidable due to the breach of the duty of pre-contractual good faith; and
thirdly, conclusion of a valid contract, which is nevertheless disadvantageous to one
of the parties as a result of the other acting in a unfair manner in the pre-contractual
phase. The second hypothesis will give rise to the remedies for defects of consent,172
of contractual character as noted above. The third possibility refers to the so-called
dolo incidental out of art 1270 para II Co´digo civil : a party liable for fraud which
168 COLLINS, ‘Harmonisation by Example: European Laws against Unfair Commercial Practices’
(n 25) 113-114 notes: ‘(...) there is a general presumption against the view that a breach of a
statutory duty gives rise to any private law cause of action, unless it can be shown, as a matter
of construction of the statute, that the statutory duty was imposed for the protection of a limited
class of the public and that Parliament intended to confer on members of that class a private
right of action for breach of the duty. [X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC
633; O’Rourke v Camden London Borough Council [1998] AC188] This presumption against a
statutory tort is likely to be stronger in the context of unfair commercial practices where the losses
will probably be mostly economic rather than personal injury or property damage.’
169 See Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.3.2 Nature of remedies: contractual, tortious or other?
170 Alberto MANZANARES SECADES, ‘La Naturaleza de la Responsibilidad Precontractual o Culpa
in Contrahendo’ (1985) 38 Anuario de Derecho Civil 979, 979-980; see also Mar´ıa Paz GARCI´A
RUBIO and Marta OTERO CRESPO, ‘La Responsabilidad Precontractual en el Derecho Con-
tractual Europeo’ [2010] InDret: Revista para el Ana´lisis del Derecho 1, 33; Jose´ Ramo´n GARCI´A
VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1270’ in Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodr´ıguez-Cano (ed), Comentarios al Co´digo
Civil. Vol. VII (Tirant Lo Blanch 2013) 9132.
171 See eg John CARTWRIGHT and Martijn HESSELINK (eds), Precontractual Liability in European
Private Law (The Common Core of European Private Law, Cambridge University Press 2008) 21ff
(case studies).
172 GARCI´A RUBIO and OTERO CRESPO (n 170) 46.
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is of minor seriousness is liable only in damages, the contract formed cannot be res-
cinded. Here again, dolo incidental is an instance of fraud and belongs to the realm
of defects of consent, which give rise to a contractual liability.173 Therefore, both
under Spanish and English law, all the potential tortious consequences of a breach
of information duties are mainly related to the liability for defects of consent, and
will be analysed within such classification.
3.2.2 Omission of the information that should have been
provided
When analysing especially the issue of omission of information, one can easily notice
very different values underlying English and Spanish rules which grant relief to the
party whose right to pre-contractual information was breached. What are those
values? Up to what extent do they influence a potential outcome of a case of breach?
The law applicable to the breach of information duties in consumer contracts is
rather complex due to the multitude of potentially relevant provisions established
both in legislation and case law, not to mention different origins of the duties, which
may originate in European law as well as come from national rules. This complexity
can be illustrated by the rules regulating situations where trader breached their
information duty through omitting certain piece of information.
In what refers to English law, as already pointed out in Section 3.1 Specific rem-
edies available to consumers, the consequences of omission amounting to breach of
information duties are much more limited than potential effects of providing untrue
information. Under the Spanish law provisions, the difference between information
omission and active misinformation is less pronounced, although it also exists. Gen-
erally speaking, private general law offers various ways of redress in the case of breach
of information duties in the B2C e-commerce. The areas that should be looked at in
the context of information omission comprise both contractual and extra-contractual
doctrines.
Breach of term implied by legislation that was analysed in the previous Section
173 Against considering dolo incidental (together with other defects of consent) as a case of contractual
liability see GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1270’ (n 170) 9134-9135.
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of the present Chapter is most relevant in the case of information omission in the
scope of English law provisions, since under English law non-disclosure of mater-
ial facts is not operational,174 and therefore remedies for such situation are rather
scarce. In contrast, Spanish law provides various possible classifications of breach of
information duties through omission – both originating in the breach of contract ex
art 65 of the TRLDCU and in the defects of consent.
Arguably, the area of law where English law is profoundly different from contin-
ental legal traditions, both in its philosophical aspect175 and in the possible outcomes
of concrete cases, is the mistake of facts and non-disclosure.176 This consideration
can be illustrated by the fact that in English law, if one party is labouring under
mistake, and the other party is aware of that fact, they are not under duty to rectify
the mistake – they can simply take advantage of it.177 In what refers to the defects
of consent (vitiating factors), especially mistake178 and the law of misrepresentation
should be taken into account. In the case of omission, the application of the law of
misrepresentation in English law is considerably limited, since it is primarily con-
cerned only with false statements. The Spanish concept of dolo in contrast includes
fraudulent concealment (reticencia dolosa).179 However, in some cases silence can
174 See, in addition to case law cited in Chapter 1 Subsection 1.2.2 General duty to disclose and its
breach in national private law, Norwich Union Life Ins Co Ltd v Qureshi [1992] 2 All ER (Comm)
707 at 717; The Unique Mariner [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 438 at 449; Lloyds Bank v Egremont [1990]
2 FLR 351.
175 See John CARTWRIGHT, ‘Defects of Consent and Security of Contract: French and English Law
Compared’ in Peter Birks and Arianna Pretto (eds), Themes in Comparative Law: In Honour
of Bernard Rudden (Oxford University PRess 2002) 153, who points out that different values
underlying ancient Roman and English conception of contract can be observed from the mere
order in which Gaius organised his Institutes.
176 Hugh BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (Clarendon
Law Lectures, Oxford University Press 2012) 12, Beale considers that in general, despite the differ-
ences between English and civil law traditions, roughly three quarters of concrete cases reach the
same outcome. Neverthless, this is not true for mistake and non-disclosure, since this area of law
is fundamentally different in those two legal traditions and the outcomes are more likely to vary.
177 Ibid 18.
178 See the analysis of common mistake and unilateral mistake below in Subsection 3.2.2.2 Defects of
consent where information was not provided.
179 The Spanish courts that recognise a concept of a fraud by non-disclosure: see Tribunal Supremo
(Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 263/2009 de 24 de abril (RJ 2009/3167), Fundamentos
de Derecho, Cuarto where the words ‘reticencia dolosa por ocultacio´n de una informacio´n que la
288
3.2. GENERAL PRIVATE LAW AND REMEDIES IT OFFERS
amount to the English misrepresentation as well, which is to be analysed in more
detail below.180
3.2.2.1 Breach of an implied term and contractual liability
Can information requirements imposed on traders through legislation be in certain
circumstances treated as terms of contract? If so, their breach might then amount
to breach of contract, or at least breach of term. As we shall see below in Subsection
3.2.3.2 Consumer induced into the contract through misleading information: defects
of consent generally speaking, pre-contractual statements made by the parties can
be classified either as terms of contract, representations or mere puffs with no legal
effect.181 Nevertheless, this is relevant in situations where the trader has provided the
consumer with some, albeit inaccurate or even untrue, information. What happens
if no information was provided?
In such circumstances consumers can rely mainly on specific sectoral legislation,
which in addition to specific remedies also provides consumers with other tools.
Omission of a piece of information can amount to breach of contract, where there was
a contractual term breached by non-disclosure, especially when such term is implied.
In the context of consumer on-line contracts reg 18 of the Consumer Contracts
Regulations 2013, entitled ‘Effect on contract of failure to provide information’ states
that:
Every contract to which this Part applies is to be treated as including a
term that the trader has complied with the provisions of–
(a) regulations 9 to 14, and
(b) regulation 16.
Reg 13 is the one imposing the information requirements, therefore every B2C
on-line contract will have an implied term that the trader has provided the consumer
buena fe le impone suministrar(...)’ are used -– negative fraud due to omission; see also Francisca
SANCHEZ HERNANZ, ‘Discussions - Spain - Case 2: Celimene v. Damien’ in Ruth Sefton-Green
(ed), Mistake, Fraud and Duties to Inform in European Contract Law (The Common Core of
European Private Law, Cambridge University Press 2005) 157-158.
180 See Subsection 3.2.2.2 Defects of consent where information was not provided.
181 MCKENDRICK, Contract law (n 139) 145ff.
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with relevant information, as listed in Schedules 2 of the Consumer Contracts Reg-
ulations 2013. Moreover, when information concerning the goods in a sales contract
was omitted, for example when a consumer was not informed by the trader that the
goods are not fit for a particular purpose, which was made known to the trader,
or when consumer’s attention was not specifically drawn to what was making the
quality of the goods unsatisfactory, then specific remedies established in the CRA
2015 will come into play.182 Moreover, consumer protection rules usually will not
exclude application of general private law.183 This is true for provisions mentioned
– s 19(9)(a) states that: ‘This Chapter does not prevent the consumer seeking other
remedies– (a) for a breach of a term that this Chapter requires to be treated as
included in the contract (...).’ Nevertheless, as already noted, a remedy of contract
rescission for breach (treating contract as at an end) under the general law is not
available to consumers for breach of terms that the CRA 2015 implies in contracts.184
In what refers to the Spanish law, it is the art 65 of the TRLDCU that needs to
be taken into account. The art 65, as already discussed above, implies terms which
fill in the omitted information into the contract’s content, in accordance with the
objective good faith principle. The breach of those implied terms will result in the
application of the general contract law remedies, following the general law governing
those remedies.185
Therefore, apart from application of specific consumer-oriented remedies for
breach of an implied term, general private law may also be sought by a consumer
whose right to receive pre-contractual information in on-line contracts was breached.
In the situations of breach of information duties through information omission it is
practically only the breach of implied term that can be taken into account, since if
the information was not provided we cannot talk about express terms.
Remedies available for breach of an implied term under Spanish law comprise
on the one hand specific remedies for lack of conformity out of arts 114ff, already
182 See Section 3.1 Specific remedies available to consumers above for more on sectoral specific legis-
lation and breach of information duties.
183 BEALE, ‘Pre-contractual Obligations: The General Contract Law Background’ (n 131) 42, footnote
3.
184 S 19(12) CRA 2015.
185 CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 65: Comentario’ (n 5) 581-582.
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discussed in the previous Section, if the omitted information was relative to the
product being the subject-matter of the contract; and on the other general contract
law remedies.186 The general law remedies that need to be taken into account are
specific performance, damages and contract rescission for breach; as already noted
it seems that if the remedies for non-conformity are applicable then the consumer’s
access to general law remedies, and especially to contract rescission should be lim-
ited, as it goes against the hierarchy of remedies established in arts 114ff of the
TRLDCU.
In practice, Spanish courts do apply the art 65 of the TRLDCU when mater-
ial information is omitted, nevertheless through varying legal reasoning provide
consumers with various remedies. In some cases the application of art 65 of the
TRLDCU, among other provisions, leads to filling the loopholes in the parties’ con-
tract and declaring its breach, serious enough to grant contract rescission on that
basis.187
However, sometimes after confirming an omissive breach of the information duty
the courts might also base their decisions on other claims available, such as the de-
fects of consent leading to the aggrieved party avoiding the contract for mistake188
or allow to use the art 65 as a defence against the trader’s claim for contract per-
formance, stating that the consumer is not bound by the agreement as they lacked
material information necessary to enter into the contract.189 As the Figures 3. and
4. demonstrate, remedies for the defects of consent are available simultaneously to
the general law remedies for breach of contract resulting from the information omis-
sion out of art 65 of the TRLDCU: logically, when material information is omitted
186 Ibid.
187 See Audiencia Provincial de Murcia (Seccio´n 4a), Sentencia nu´m. 287/2013 de 2 de mayo (JUR
2013/201686); see also Audiencia Provincial de Madrid (Seccio´n 12a), Sentencia nu´m. 52/2012 de 30
de enero (JUR 2012/228888); for the significance of the seriousness of breach for the availability of
the remedies see Subsection 3.2.3.1 When misinformation amounts to breach of term and remedies
resulting from contractual liability below.
188 See eg Audiencia Provincial de Madrid (Seccio´n 12a), Sentencia nu´m. 820/2013 de 5 de noviembre
(AC 2013/2193); see also Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instruccio´n nu´m. 1 de Segorbe (Provincia
de Castello´n), Sentencia de 22 de octubre (AC 2012/2201).
189 See eg Audiencia Provincial de Salamanca (Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 245/2011 de 8 de junio
(JUR 2011/246306); Audiencia Provincial de Madrid (Seccio´n 25a), Sentencia nu´m. 227/2013 de
17 de mayo (JUR 2013/215258).
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contrary to the good faith principle, then the contracting party (the consumer) will
also lack information necessary for them to give an informed consent, which might
in turn give rise to an action for mistake or fraud or a defence against a trader
claiming the contract performance. The courts apply the remedy which bests suits
the individual consumer in their particular case, and avoiding the contract is what
seems to fit those needs quite often. The remedy of contract rescission for breach of
contract under the general Spanish law is not always easily available,190 hence the
commonplace foundation of the decision on the basis of the defects of consent.
Both Spanish and English law provide consumers with various remedies for
breach of terms implied by consumer legislation, and it seems that the manner
in which those two systems operate in this case is not that different. The English
law focuses mainly on the specific remedies for non-conformity established in the
CRA 2015, expressly barring the consumer from pursuing contract rescission for a
breach of an implied term on the common law basis. The TRLDCU does not contain
such provision, however it can be understood that the logic of the rules out of arts
114ff effectively has the same result. The CRA in its s 19(9)-(11) reminds consumers
that it is open to them in the circumstances to claim general law remedies – the
TRLDCU does not prohibit it, and in practice Spanish courts do provide consumers
with general law remedies, founding their decisions on the art 65 of the TRLDCU
which deals with information omission. The potentially available remedies for breach
of contract are presented in more detail below,191 in the context of the express terms
and their breach.
3.2.2.2 Defects of consent where information was not provided
Another possible response of the legal systems analysed to the situation of breach
of information duties are defects of consent. The defects of consent, as Sefton-Green
points out, cross the conceptual bridge between the contract formation phase and
breach of contract: in many national legal systems, and notably in Spanish and
190 The concept of breach of contract and remedies available are analysed in more detail in the context
of the breach of an expressed term in Subsection 3.2.3.1 When misinformation amounts to breach
of term and remedies resulting from contractual liability below.
191 Ibid.
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English law as well,192 the remedies under the heads of defective consent and breach
of contract overlap.193 Especially in the context of breach of information duties it
is apparent: the remedies for breach of contract respond to situations in which one
of the parties, being misinformed, expected a different performance of the contract;
the defects of consent play a role when the misinformed party could not give their
real consent, due to the lack or inaccuracy of pre-contractual information received.
English law has no uniform theory of defects of consent,194 which are usually
referred to as vitiating factors.195 Various legal concepts, such as law of misrep-
resentation, doctrine of mistake, duress and undue influence are often analysed in
comparative studies as counterparts of defects of consent present in continental legal
systems.196 However, misrepresentation, mistake and other vitiating factors will be
found in separate chapters or parts of English legal textbooks, since they are con-
sidered to be different, although sometimes overlapping, grounds that either allow to
avoid the contract or make it void ab inicio.197 In what refers to the Spanish system
of private law, technically speaking the theory of defects of consent is also a kind of
192 See Subsection 3.2.3 Provision of incorrect information below on differences between pre-
contractual representations and terms.
193 SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ (n 133) 2.
194 CARTWRIGHT, ‘Defects of Consent and Security of Contract: French and English Law Compared’
(n 175) 154.
195 Ibid: as Cartwright points out in the context of French law, in English law vitiating factors are
called so, because they primarily vitiate the contract, and the concept of defects of consent puts
more emphasis on the ‘consent’ of the parties.
196 See eg CARTWRIGHT, ‘Defects of Consent and Security of Contract: French and English Law
Compared’ (n 175); SEFTON-GREEN, Mistake, Fraud and Duties to Inform in European Contract
Law (n 129).
197 The contract being void means that in reality there is no contract and the agreement is flawed to
such extent that in the eyes of law it has never actually existed. The contract which is voidable,
on the other hand, can be rescinded at the option of the representee, and however it is avoided
retrospectively, the contract itself existed until the moment when it was rescinded. The distinction
is important especially because of the effect on property rights of a third party both concepts have:
if the good being the subject matter of the contract was subsequently sold to a third party, if
the first contract was void, that party never acquired the property of the good. However if it was
merely voidable, the rights of the third party will not be affected, provided they acquired the good
in good faith (Edwin PEEL, Treitel on the Law of Contract (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015)
452) – as already noted in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.3 Types of remedies available.
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a doctrinal creation based on various casuistically defined defects.198 Nevertheless,
the very fact of the existence of such creation illustrates the difference in approach
between Spanish and English law.
For the further analysis of the vitiating factors and defects of consent it is ne-
cessary to look at the approach Spanish and English systems take to the contract
– agreement itself. In English law the contract – the agreement of the parties – is
interpreted strictly objectively –199
To create a contract by exchange of promises between two parties where
the promise of each party constitutes the consideration for the promise
of the other, what is necessary is that the intention of each as it has been
communicated to and understood by the other (even though that which
has been communicated does not represent the actual state of mind of
the communicator) should coincide.200
This approach was confirmed multiple times, for example Steyn LJ stated:
(...) English law generally adopts an objective theory of contract forma-
tion. That means that in practice our law generally ignores the subjective
expectations and the unexpressed mental reservations of the parties. In-
stead the governing criterion is the reasonable expectations of honest
men.201
Therefore the real, internal consent of the parties is not actually relevant to the
formation of the contract, which explains the difference in terminology: English law
talks about the factors vitiating the contract as such, and not the consent of the
parties, as in Spanish law.
The objective test adopted in English law is nuanced by a subjective element;
Blackburn J in Smith v Hughes set out the test:
198 Luis DIEZ-PICAZO, Fundamentos del Derecho Civil Patrimonial. Vol.1: Introduccio´n, Teor´ıa del
Contrato (6th edn, Thomson-Civitas 2007) 186.
199 See CARTWRIGHT, ‘Defects of Consent and Security of Contract: French and English Law Com-
pared’ (n 175) 156-157; PEEL (n 197) 1, 10.
200 The Hannah Blumenthal [1983] 1 AC 854 at 915.
201 G. Percy Trentham Ltd v Archital Luxfer Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 25 at 27.
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If, whatever a man’s real intention may be, he so conducts himself that
a reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms pro-
posed by the other party, and that other party upon that belief enters
into the contract with him, the man thus conducting himself would be
equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the other party’s terms.202
As the test ignores real intentions, it is strongly objective. However, Blackburn’s
J words ‘upon that belief’ reflect also the subjective element.203
In what refers to Spanish law, according to article 1261 of the Co´digo civil there
are three essential elements of the contract – the consent of the contracting parties,
a certain object which is the subject matter of the contract and the cause of the
established obligation. Without any of those elements contract cannot be formed
and therefore does not exist.
Pre-contractual information exchanged between the parties is not only a factor
influencing the very decision to enter the agreement, but also often allows the
parties to give correctly their free consent, a necessary element of the contract being
formed.204 The consent itself is understood as a combination of three phenomena:
202 Smith v Hughes [1871] LR 6 QB 597 at 607.
203 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 608ff, where the elements
of the test and different approaches adopted by courts along the way are explained in detail not
necessary in the present study; Cartwright finally summarises the test to be applied at 614ff:
‘1. The first question is whether the parties were in fact (subjectively) in agreement on the
existence and terms of the contract. If they were, that should be determinative.
2. If the parties were not, in fact, in agreement, then – in the case where the claimant is seeking
to rely on there being a contract on terms (x), and the defendant is either denying that there is a
contract at all, or is asserting that there is a contract on terms (y) – the question becomes whether
the claimant can in law hold the defendant to have agreed to a contract on terms (x). He may do
so if:
(a) the defendant’s words, conduct or (exceptionally) silence would have led a reasonable person
in the claimant’s position to believe that the defendant was agreeing to (x); and
(b) the claimant in fact believed that the defendant was agreeing to (x).
3. If the claimant succeeds in showing that he can hold the defendant to a contract on terms (x)
in accordance with proposition 2, he has established a contract on terms (x) unless the defendant
can rebut this by showing that the claimant’s conduct, words or (exceptionally) silence would have
led a reasonable person in his position to believe that the claimant was agreeing to (y), and that
the defendant in fact believed that the claimant was agreeing to (y). In such case, there is no
contract.’
204 I am distinguishing between the notion of ‘decision whether to enter the agreement’ from the
concept of ‘consent’, the former describing an internal mind process without legal consequences,
whilst the latter being its externalisation that makes it accessible and understood by other parties
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first – individual, subjective and internal expression of will, second – objective, ex-
ternal declaration of will visible to others, and finally – common will or intention of
both contracting parties, the meeting of minds.205
General provisions of Spanish contract law established in the Co´digo civil do
not impose any direct information duties as such. However, the duty to inform the
contracting party about main characteristics of the product or service is implicit in
the norms that regulate the defects of consent – mistake (error) and fraud (dolo),
established in arts 1265, 1266 and 1269 of the Co´digo civil.206 The consent is at the
origin of any contract and no contract can exist if it is flawed: Diez-Picazo notes that
for the contract to exist the consent needs to be serious, spontaneous and free.207
Art 1265 states that consent given by mistake, or because of duress, intimidation
or fraudulent misrepresentation shall be voidable. This list of the vices of consent is
considered to be exhaustive.208
The defects of consent that are of special importance in the context of breach
of information duties are misrepresentation and mistake. As stated in The Great
Peace Shipping, ‘mistake can be simply defined as an erroneous belief.’209 Cartwright
offers further definitions: ‘A mistake is a misunderstanding, a misapprehension, a
misconception (...).’210 Diez-Picazo refers to a mistake – error – which is a wrong
or inexact belief or mental representation that serves to the contracting party as
premise for the transactional decision they are making.211
Technically speaking, misrepresentation or dolo212 is a sub-category of mistake
participating in the market and therefore necessary for creating binding legal agreements.
205 Luis DIEZ-PICAZO and Antonio GULLO´N, Sistema de Derecho Civil. Vol. II/ I: El contrato en
general. La relacio´n obligatoria (10th edn, Tecnos 2012) 40.
206 Julio PICATOSTE BOBILLO, ‘El Derecho de Informacio´n en la Contratacio´n con Consumidores’
[2011] Actualidad Civil 372, 376.
207 DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198) 185.
208 Although some express doubts, see ibid 187.
209 [2002] EWCA Civ 1407 at 28.
210 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 578.
211 DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198) 207.
212 Although the concept of misrepresentation is wider – and simply different in many aspects –
than that of dolo, as it is explained below, and therefore the two are not synonyms, nevertheless
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– a type of induced mistake, which can overlap in some factual scenarios with mis-
take.213 According to Cartwright, the meaning of misrepresentation is: ‘(...) a false
statement, by words or conduct (but not silence), of fact which is sufficiently certain
to be relied upon by the representee excluding, therefore, statements of opinion and
intention, and “sales talk” or “mere puffs”.’214 Dolo under the Spanish law is the
vast set of dishonest actions, contrary to the rules of honesty, deployed in order to
deceive the other party (who is acting in good faith) with a view of own profit.215
Legal consequences of mistake and misrepresentation are different; misrepresenta-
tion and dolo, because of the component residing in the actions of the other party
that induced the mistake are closer to the hypothesis of breach of information duties,
and therefore will be presented first.
From the point of view of English law, the most important vitiating factor is
misrepresentation, since bare mistake is quite rarely accepted by the courts.216 Such
policy choice, although may seem unfair and unjust – ultimately, the mistaken party
did not actually agree to enter the contract – is justified by other considerations. First
of all, as already mentioned in English law an objective test is used to determine if the
contract was formed. Secondly, the security of transactions is of primary importance
for the English system. In Bell v Lever Bros Ltd Lord Atkin observed:
(...) it is of paramount importance that contracts should be observed,
and that if parties honestly comply with the essentials of the formation
of contracts – i.e., agree in the same terms on the same subject-matter
– they are bound, and must rely on the stipulations of the contract for
protection from the effect of facts unknown to them.
(...) it is of greater importance that well established principles of
contract should be maintained than that a particular hardship should
be redressed; and I see no way of giving relief to the plaintiffs in the
present circumstances except by confiding to the Courts loose powers
for the sake of simplicity I often refer to the two ideas jointly. Another possible counterpart for
misrepresentation is error provocado, induced mistake, also referred to below.
213 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 2.
214 Ibid 352.
215 DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198) 198.
216 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 587ff; CARTWRIGHT,
‘Defects of Consent and Security of Contract: French and English Law Compared’ (n 175) 154.
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of introducing terms into contracts which would only serve to introduce
doubt and confusion where certainty is essential.217
Finally, English law aims at protecting reasonable expectations of the non-
mistaken party, who relied on the other party’s promise. ‘Why should the non-
mistaken party lose the contract [if they did not actively try to deceive the other
party]?’ asks Cartwright.218
Spanish law, on the other hand, is concerned with protection of individuals who
make mistakes to a greater extent than English law.219 Firstly, mistakes are effect-
ively raised in litigation in the context of breach of information duties in consumer
contracts.220 Moreover, the Co´digo civil as such in its art 1266 adopts a perspective
focused on subjective will, which has nevertheless been called notorious: the pro-
tection of the other, non-mistaken, party’s interests and the security of contracts in
general is not considered by the provision.221 Those were the courts that adopted a
different angle, out of the necessity to protect the security of transactions, requiring
a series of conditions to be fulfilled in order to grant relief in the cases of mistake.222
Party’s mistake must be excusable – it cannot be possible to discover through an
average diligence, according to the good faith principle – this way the legal system
avoids protecting those labouring under mistake who do not deserve the protection
due to their negligent actions, as then it is the trust and security of the other party
that needs to be taken into account.223 Such solution is similar to the English one
217 [1932] AC 161 at 224, 229; this passage is cited by CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and
Non-Disclosure (n 150) 588, who observes that the approach adopted by Lord Atkin emphasises
certainty, which could be threatened by admitting mistake too widely and in consequence require
courts to deal in a discretionary way with individual cases.
218 CARTWRIGHT, ‘Defects of Consent and Security of Contract: French and English Law Compared’
(n 175) 159.
219 However, it is important to note that there were voices in favour of this type of approach, cf Solle
v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671, where the judge considered an equitable relief for mistake; nevertheless
this case is not good law anymore, see The Great Peace [2002] EWCA Civ 1407.
220 See eg SAP Madrid nu´m. 820/2013 de 5 de noviembre (AC 2013/2193).
221 Jose´ Ramo´n GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1266’ in Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodr´ıguez-Cano (ed),
Comentarios al Co´digo Civil. Vol. VII (Tirant Lo Blanch 2013) 9102.
222 Ibid.
223 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia nu´m. 113/1994 de 18 de febrero (RJ 1994/1096),
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presented above. However, the required diligence depends also on the other party’s
behaviour: if the party knows, or should reasonably know that the other party is
labouring under mistake and do not warn them, then the courts are more likely to
grant relief.224 Moreover, if the mistake in such case can be assimilated to dolo –
fraudulent misrepresentation – then it will always be excusable. And it needs to be
born in mind that the Spanish law of misrepresentation, contrary to the English
system, does not really distinguish between situations of providing false information
and omitting relevant information; what is more – taking advantage of the other
party’s error may be considered dolo in itself.225
In what refers to misrepresentation where information was omitted,226 the very
nature of the claim for misrepresentation under the English law assumes that a false
statement was made, therefore generally speaking non-disclosure cannot amount
to misrepresentation.227 Furthermore, as Sefton-Green observes, misrepresentation
is distinct from the non-disclosure, because of the point of time at which the duty
arises. The duty to inform requires providing material information – making a state-
ment of importance to the other party before entering a contract. Misrepresentation
does not require this initial information or statement to be provided, here the duty
arises later – once the statement was made, then it has to be true.228
As already mentioned, English law classifies pre-contractual statements of traders
as mere puffs, from which no legal consequences arise; representations, breach of
which amounts to misrepresentation; and finally terms included in the contract
Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero; Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia nu´m. 896/1996
de 6 de noviembre (RJ 1996/7912), Fundamentos de Derecho, Segundo; Tribunal Supremo (Sala de
lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 1090/2004 de 12 de noviembre (RJ 2004/6900), Fundamentos
de Derecho, Segundo.
224 STS nu´m. 113/1994 de 18 de febrero (RJ 1994/1096), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero.
225 Jose´ Ramo´n GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1269’ in Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodr´ıguez-Cano (ed),
Comentarios al Co´digo Civil. Vol. VII (Tirant Lo Blanch 2013) 9126.
226 The law of misrepresentation under English law in particular is of much more relevance for situ-
ations where false information was provided to consumers, and it will be analysed in more detail
below in Subsection 3.2.3.2 Consumer induced into the contract through misleading information:
defects of consent.
227 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 3-4.
228 SEFTON-GREEN, ‘General Introduction’ (n 133) 25.
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between the parties. In what refers to omission of material information, generally it
cannot amount to misrepresentation, since the latter is based on the duty not to lie, ie
when a representation was made, it has to be true, while the very nature of omission
means that no representation whatsoever was made. No statutory remedies will arise
for non-disclosure under Misrepresentation Act 1967 – the Act repeats the phrase
‘misrepresentation made’, making it clear this way that some statement amounting
to misrepresentation must be produced.229
The false statements that constitute foundation to the claim for misrepresent-
ation can be however made by other means than words. Lord Campbell LC made
reference to misrepresentation by conduct in Walters v Morgan:
Simple reticence does not amount to legal fraud, however it may be
viewed by moralists. But a single word, or (I may add) a nod or a wink,
or a shake of the head, or a smile from the purchaser intended to induce
the vendor to believe the existence of a non-existing fact (...).230
Lord Denning in Curtis v Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co. confirmed:
In my opinion any behaviour, by words or conduct, is sufficient to be
a misrepresentation if it is such as to mislead the other party (...). If the
false impression is created knowingly, it is a fraudulent misrepresentation;
if it is created unwittingly, it is an innocent misrepresentation (...).231
Other actions, not as direct as a nod or a wink, may therefore also amount to
misrepresentation. For instance actions of a captain intending to sell a ship (which
was in poor condition with worm-eaten bottom), who ‘took her from the ways on
which she lay, and where the state of her bottom and her keel might easily have been
discovered, and kept her constantly afloat, so that these defects were completely
concealed by the water.’232
229 PEEL (n 197) 493.
230 (1861) 3 De GF & J 718 at 724-725.
231 [1951] 1 KB 805 at 808-809.
232 Schneider and Another v Heath (1813) 170 ER 1462 at 507-508, cited by CARTWRIGHT, Misrep-
resentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 34, see also other case law cited there in footnote
12.
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Moreover, provision of information that was misleadingly incomplete may also be
treated as misrepresentation.233 For example, in Dimmock v Hallett,234 a farm put
up for sale was described with a reference to a rent that was paid by a person lately
occupying the property. However, what the advertisement failed to mention was the
fact that this late occupier was out of possession for more than a year and in the
meantime no one wanted to rent the farm for much less. Therefore the advertisement
created an impression that the land was worth much more than it really was at the
market as it was then.
This is already very close to omission; the situations where information was
completely omitted and this omission induced a consumer to enter a contract with
a trader can be hard to delimit from those where part of the material information
was omitted; the latter cases can possibly constitute basis for a successful claim for
misrepresentation. It is pointed out that the Misrepresentation Act 1967 will turn
out to be applicable in the situations where misrepresentation was made by conduct
or through misleading omission.235
European soft law instruments, as for example DCFR, treat omission of material
information in a way more similar to Spanish law. In its article II.-7:205 DCFR
provides that a party may avoid a contract when induced to contract by the other
party through fraudulent non-disclosure of any information which good faith and
fair dealing, or any pre-contractual information duty, required that party to disclose.
According to European soft law instrument, non-disclosure is fraudulent if it is
intended to induce the person from whom the information is withheld to make a
mistake. Various circumstances can assist us in determining whether good faith and
fair dealing required a party to disclose particular information.236
233 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 39 talks about partial
omission in the context of statements that are true, but in the meantime misleading; see also
BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (n 176) 35.
234 (1866-67) LR 2 Ch App 21.
235 Peel (n 202) 494.
236 Art II.–7:205.(3) DCFR:
(a) whether the party had special expertise;
(b) the cost to the party of acquiring the relevant information;
(c) whether the other party could reasonably acquire the information by other means; and
(d) the apparent importance of the information to the other party.
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Such solution is particularly similar to that of the Spanish system. Although the
Co´digo civil in its art 1269 relative to the dolo refers only to words and ‘insidious
machinations’, which could be understood as active deception tactics at face value,
but again the courts’ decisions and academic writings interpret the provision in such
a manner that it includes as well dolo reticente, also called negative fraud – fraud
through omission. There are at least two instances of fraud through omission, argues
Garc´ıa Vicente: when the fraudulent party keeps silent on the matters relevant to
the correct formation of the contracting will;237 and when the fraudulent party takes
advantage of the mistake made by the other party.238 The latter is in contrast with
English law, where the general rule states that a party is under no duty to disclose
the fact that a mistake was made, even if they know that the mistaken party would
have never entered the contract if it had not been for their misapprehension.239
According to Blackburn J famous statement in Smith v Hughes : ‘(...) for, whatever
may be the case in a court of morals, there is no legal obligation on the vendor
to inform the purchaser that he is under a mistake, not induced by the act of the
vendor.’240 If the consumer directly asks the trader a question concerning the issue
and the trader answers, then untrue answer will amount to misrepresentation. But
if the consumer does not ask any particular question or the question asked is not
formulated precisely enough241 – no liability on the part of the trader will arise under
English law. Cockburn CJ in Smith v Hughes states: ‘If, indeed, the buyer, instead
of acting on his own opinion, had asked the question whether the oats were old or
new, or had said anything which intimated his understanding that the seller was
237 See eg Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia de 28 noviembre de 1989 (RJ 1989/7914),
Fundamentos de Derecho, Cuarto; Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia de 27 septiembre
de 1990 (RJ 1990/6908), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero.
238 GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1269’ (n 225) 9126; the latter instance may constitute a probable
contractual scenario linked to the information omission, in which a party is contracting under
mistake as to facts which was not induced by the other party, but that other party knows about
it.
239 BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (n 176) 2.
240 At 607.
241 The caveat emptor rule assumes that the buyer will ask right questions, see Sykes v Taylor-Rose
[2004] EWCA Civ 299.
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selling the oats as old oats, the case would have been wholly different (...).’242 But
the buyer did not ask – ‘The parties are expected to look after their own interests
in all circumstances’ as Beale puts it.243
It does not mean however that the Spanish law concept of fraud knows no re-
strictions. There is a certain limit as to what can be considered fraud: not only the
information omission needs to take place, but it also has to be insidious, contrary
to good faith.244 In numerous cases the courts confirmed that a negative fraud can
result from an omissive breach of an information duty originating in legislation, ob-
jective goods faith or custom,245 among other situations, also linked to the disclosure
duty, albeit in a more indirect manner.246
Another interesting difference between English and Spanish systems – which after
a closer look does not seem to be particularly striking, as simply similar results are
achieved through different concepts – is the English law concept of misrepresenta-
tion, which includes not only fraud that can be compared to the Spanish dolo, but
also negligent and innocent misrepresentation. In this study I often refer to misrep-
resentation and dolo together, although the concept of misrepresentation is much
broader. However, it does not mean that Spanish law provides for no consequences
in situations where a party was induced to enter a contract based on a mistaken
belief provoked by the other party’s behaviour, negligent or even innocent. In such
cases it is on the basis of the law of mistake (error) that a relief may be granted.
A provoked mistake leads on the one hand to lowering of the standard of diligence,
as the mistaken party is not bound to distrust the other party; on the other in such
242 At 605.
243 BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (n 176) Preface v.
244 See eg STS de 28 noviembre de 1989 (RJ 1989/7914), Fundamentos de Derecho, Cuarto.
245 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia de 1 octubre de 1986 (RJ 1986/5229), Fundamentos
de Derecho, 3; Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia de 27 marzo de 1989 (RJ 1989/2201),
Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero; Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m.
1/2005 de 17 de enero (RJ 2005/517), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero; Tribunal Supremo (Sala
de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 289/2009 de 5 de mayo (RJ 2009/2907), Fundamentos de
Derecho, Quinto.
246 Such as not resolving ambiguities, eg Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia de 26 octubre
de 1981 (RJ 1981/4001); or concealing some data, eg Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia
de 9 septiembre de 1985 (RJ 1985/4257).
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situation all the conditions necessary for the fraud to occur might not be met, eg
because the actions of the non-mistaken party were not insidious.247
The other relevant vitiating factor – or defect of consent – is mistake (error). The
law of mistake covers a wide range of different factual situations,248 therefore first
we need to delimit the scope of mistake rules relevant to this study.249 All types of
operative mistakes will render a contract void under English law,250 whilst Spanish
law treats the contract vitiated through one party’s mistake as voidable.251
247 STS nu´m. 113/1994 de 18 de febrero (RJ 1994/1096), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero.
248 The terminology used by both judges and legal writers also varies especially in what refers to the
English law, which makes classifications even more complex, see CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresenta-
tion, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 582ff.
249 The cases of mistake in English law are classified as either ‘common mistake’ (also called ‘mutual’,
eg in Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161) or ‘shared’ mistake (eg in Great Peace Shipping
Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407). Following CARTWRIGHT,
Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) I will use the term ‘common mistake’. The
common mistake nullifies consent of the parties, whilst unilateral mistake negatives it – see PEEL
(n 197) 346, as Lord Atkin observed: ‘If mistake operates at all it operates so as to negative or in
some cases to nullify consent.’ (Bell v Lever Bros Ltd at 217). CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation,
Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 585 explains that when mistake negatives consent, it prevents
parties from reaching any agreement, so in reality no contract was made between them. If mistake
nullifies consent, it means that the agreement was reached by the parties, but on a basis of such
a serious mistake that the parties should not be bound by it. In the English common mistake
cases parties both operate under a fundamentally mistaken assumption and as explained above the
contract made under such share mistake is void at law. However, the doctrine of common mistake
applies only if the contract was impossible (see Great Peace Shipping Ltd at 76). This is similar to
Spanish doctrine of impossibility (see eg Jordi RIBOT IGUALADA, ‘La Imposibilidad Originaria
del Objeto Contractual’ (2015) 2 Revista de Derecho Civil 1) and will not be applicable to cases of
breach of information duties, unless both trader and consumer made the same fundamental mistake
as to the contract they formed. Nevertheless, the typical situation of breach of information duties
will be the one where the trader, knowingly or not, misinforms the consumer or fails to provide
relevant information, which will rest outside the scope of application of the common mistake
doctrine.
250 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 585.
251 GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1266’ (n 221) 9102, although with some reservations relative to the
distinction between two types of mistakes that Spanish legal writers distinguish — see ibid 9103-
9104; DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198) 210-211. The mistake of the party may be relative to the external
representation of their contracting will or to the very internal contracting will itself. The former
type of mistake is not covered by the provisions of the Co´digo civil, and it consists in a discrepancy
between the expressed will and the real will of the party, and theoretically in such cases there
should be no consent and therefore no contract is really formed, ie the contract is void or even
non-existent (Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia nu´m. 1134/1999 de 22 de diciembre
(RJ 1999/9369), Fundamentos de Derecho, Cuarto). Nevertheless, from a practical point of view,
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A unilateral mistake on the side of the consumer is the one relevant in the
hypothesis of breach of information duties.252 In the cases of unilateral mistake, the
parties operate at cross-purposes and in reality they never reach an agreement, so
technically no contract is formed between them. Therefore many English contract
law authors treat unilateral mistake as a matter of contract formation and analyse it
together with the rules on offer and acceptance.253 An actionable unilateral mistake
maybe as to the person, as to the subject-matter of the contract, as to the terms of
the contract or as to law.254
From the point of view of this study the most relevant are mistakes as to the
subject-matter; but other types of mistakes should also be mentioned.255
as it is difficult to distinguish between the two types of mistakes in practice, it is generally accepted
that mistake (for which all the necessary conditions are met) makes a contract voidable and not
void.
252 It is the trader who has the information but does not share it with the consumer, the consumer is
therefore labouring under mistake due to the lack of information.
253 See eg MCKENDRICK, Contract law (n 139), who analyses unilateral mistake in Part I of his
book, dealing with the formation and scope of the contract, whilst the common mistake rules are
examined in Part III under the ’Policing the contract’ heading, together with frustration doctrine,
after a duty to disclose and misrepresentation.
254 PEEL (n 197) 367ff; CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150)
584ff.
255 In what refers to mistakes as to the person, it can be noted that they are of limited or no relevance
in the case of breach of information duties. The Spanish law recognises mistakes to as person in the
art 1266 Co´digo civil and states that they are only actionable when it is the identity of the person
that has been the main motive for entering into the contract. In the context of the B2C electronic
contracts, being the focus of the present study, such a mistake is of limited relevance, and will
mainly occur in the contracts for the supply of services and provision of false information by a
trader pretending to be someone else. Out of various possible mistakes as to the person under the
English law only mistakes of identity are actionable – ‘fundamental’ – and contracts formed under
such mistakes are void ab inicio. Those cases are typically ones of fraudulent buyers pretending
to be someone else (see eg Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cas 459; Phillips v Brooks Ltd [1919]
2 KB 243; Ingram v Little [1961] 1 QB 31). Litigation in those cases usually concerns the title to
the goods – the rogue buyer who did not pay for the purchase sells the goods to a third party
(a sub-buyer) and the effect of that will depend on the misapprehension of the seller in the first
contract. If an actionable mistake can be established, this contract is void, and therefore no title
to goods had passed. On the other hand, if it was mere misrepresentation, the contract is only
voidable, and if the sub-buyer was in good faith, they would be a new owner (PEEL (n 197) 368).
In the context of the present study, however, the opposite situation would be of more interest to us
– where a trader breaches his information duties, fraudulently providing the consumer with false
information relative to trader’s identity. Such a situation nevertheless requires provision of false
information. One can also imagine a situation when consumer is mistaken as to the identity of the
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Both under English and Spanish law, various conditions have to be met, so that
a mistake as to the subject matter of the contract could be actionable.256 Both
systems require the mistake to be fundamental,257 or essential,258 meaning serious
enough to make the whole transaction deprived of sense for the mistaken party.
English law considers mistake to be fundamental ‘if one party intends to deal with
one thing, and the other with a different one.’259 The Spanish concept of an essential
mistake denotes a situation in which the subject-matter of the contract lacks some
attributes associated with it, and particularly attributes which were fundamental to
the mistaken party’s motives and the contract’s purpose.260 Those requirements are
similar in both systems. In addition, under English law mistake must be ‘operative’,
characterised by the fact that one party knows about the other party’s mistake,
or negligently induced by the other party. Also it is noted that ‘there may be such
ambiguity in the circumstances that a reasonable person could not draw any relevant
inference from them at all.’261
Spanish law requires the mistake to be excusable – not attributable to the mis-
taken party and not avoidable through an average diligence (in accordance with the
expertise of the individuals involved and requirements of good faith); in this manner
the system will not grant protection to mistaken parties that do not deserve protec-
tion because of their negligent behaviour. Finally, both systems recognise as action-
able only those mistakes that constituted the factor that induced the contract.262
trader, because the latter omitted information as to their identity. If the trader is fraudulent and
takes consumer’s money without sending them the good, various possible actions will arise on the
side of the consumer, but claiming mistake as to identity will not make much sense to them – no
title to goods is involved and the breach of their information rights is consumer’s least concern in
this scenario.
256 PEEL (n 197) 369ff; DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198) 213.
257 Guenter TREITEL, The Law of Contract (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2003) 298.
258 See GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1266’ (n 221) 9105; DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198) 213-215.
259 TREITEL (n 257) 303.
260 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 829/2006 de 17 de julio (RJ
2006/6379), Fundamentos de Derecho, Primero.
261 TREITEL (n 257) 307-309.
262 TREITEL (n 257) 298; art 1266 Co´digo civil – see GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1266’ (n 221)
9102.
306
3.2. GENERAL PRIVATE LAW AND REMEDIES IT OFFERS
Unilateral mistake results in parties’ consent being negatived, as parties intend to
deal with different things, ie there is no real agreement between the parties as to the
subject-matter of the contract.263 It is worth noting, however, that mistake as to the
quality, unless the quality is a fundamental one by which the thing is identified, will
not negative consent under English law,264 whilst the Spanish system will take into
consideration the concrete purpose pursued by the mistaken party in the contract
– if the mistake as to the quality prevents the party from achieving the purpose, it
may be actionable.265
The unilateral mistake as to the facts should be distinguished from that as to
the terms of the contract, which occurs when parties are thinking they entered a
contract, but on different terms.266 Under English law, mistake as to terms need not
to be fundamental in order to negative consent.267 According to the classic case of
Smith v Hughes, the difference between contracting under mistake as to terms and
as to facts (quality of the subject-matter) is: ‘(...) the same as that between buying
a horse believed to be sound, and buying one believed to be warranted sound.’268
The proposition in law is that mere belief as to the quality held by one party is not
enough to grant a relief if it is mistaken, however if the mistaken party believes that
a contractual promise, a warranty, was made as to the quality – then their mistake
might be relevant. It appears that the reason for this distinction that originates from
the Smith v Hughes case, is that the seller is bound by the warranty, if he behaves
so as to induce the buyer reasonably to believe to be contracting on the specific
terms.269
When the duty to inform becomes a term of the B2C contract, its breach may
263 Falck v Williams [1900] AC 176, Scriven Bros & Co v Hindley & Co [1913] 3 KB 564.
264 Smith v Hughes [1871] LR 6 QB 597, for more on quality of the thing being fundamental (or not)
see PEEL (n 197) 358ff.
265 DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198) 216-217.
266 See eg Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa Ltd v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co [1972] AC 741 or Felt-
house v Bindley (1862) 11 CB (NS) 869.
267 PEEL (n 197) 376.
268 At 608.
269 PEEL (n 197) 381.
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then theoretically result in consumer’s unilateral mistake as to terms.270 In what
refers nevertheless to the breach of information duties in consumer contracts mis-
takes as to the terms of the contract are of limited relevance, because of the statutory
remedies established in consumer contracts and relative to the guarantees in con-
sumer sales law.271 The Spanish doctrine of mistake is relative mainly to mistakes as
to some facts that found the party’s transactional decision; a mistake as to contract
terms is not distinguished from the factual mistakes.
Also mistakes as to law should be mentioned. The DCFR in its art II.-7:201
treats it the same as mistake of fact.272 Traditionally, both Spanish and English law
distinguished the two concepts and denied actionability to mistakes of law.273 How-
ever, nowadays both systems regard mistakes as to law as identical to mistakes as
to facts, requiring the same conditions in order to allow the claim for mistake.274 In
consumer contracts mistakes of law may be relevant: consumers not aware of their
rights or duties may enter into contracts believing the law to be different. Never-
theless, there are factors that makes claims in mistake of law difficult to succeed.
Under Spanish law it is the requirement of excusability: the law is usually known
and one employing average diligence should be able to discover its current state.275
270 It will also be applicable in ‘reversed’ situations, where it is the consumer who tries to snap up an
offer mistakenly put on the market, see eg Hartog v Colin & Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566 or Chwee
Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR 502.
271 See Subsection 3.2.2.1 Breach of an implied term and contractual liability above.
272 Art II.–7:201: Mistake: ‘(...) A party may avoid a contract for mistake of fact or law existing when
the contract was concluded (...).’
273 The Spanish legal writers would say, basing their argument on the art 6.1 Co´digo civil, that
not knowing the law does not allow to not follow its rules, see: DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198) 211-
212. Under English law, the traditional rule stated that payments made under mistake of law
were not recoverable and the mistake of law did not make contract void, see: CARTWRIGHT,
Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 57-58.
274 DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198) 212 points out that the traditional argument was wrong: the mistake as to
the law is not relevant for situations where one does not follow the law and tries to excuse their
breach of the rules, it is relevant when a party tries to avoid a contract they entered into on a
mistaken belief regarding a rule of law; see also Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia
de 7 julio de 1981 (RJ 1981/3052); in what refers to the English law a relatively recent decision
in Kleinwort Benson (KB) v Malaysia Mining Corporation BHD (MMC BHD) [1989] 1 WLR 379
disregarded the traditional standpoint and there is no longer a mistake of law rule in contract, see
CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 57-58.
275 STS de 7 julio de 1981 (RJ 1981/3052).
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In what refers to the English system, the condition of mistake being fundamental
might also not be easy to meet. Omission of the information about the right of
withdrawal could be an example of a possible mistake as to law: a consumer enters
a contract not aware of their right. As we know, the specific legislation provides a
statutory remedy to such omission, which is the withdrawal period extension.276 Is
the consumer however able to claim contract avoidance (or being void) for mistake
instead of the specific remedy, for instance after the 12 months provided for by the
legislation have passed? It will be at least difficult if not impossible, for the right to
withdraw would need to constitute the main reason for which the consumer entered
into the contract.
Mistakes in general, even if fundamental and inducing the contract, are rarely
operative under English law, which stems from the objective principle, brought about
by the need of certainty and security in transactions. Common law traditions are
primarily concerned with the reliance of contracting parties.277 Under English law,
parties are bound by the contracts, irrespective of their real intentions, if a reasonable
man would understand their conduct as an agreement to the other party’s terms.278
The limited cases were mistakes are operative are where one party knew about
the other party’s mistake,279 but still all the other conditions have to be met –
the mistake being fundamental and concerning the subject-matter of the contract
– so that the party could be granted a relief. Under Spanish law, mistakes are
also extraordinary, exceptional occurrences: the law balances interests of the two
contracting parties, distributing the risk resulting from the defective information,
protecting on the one hand the mistaken party’s consent, but on the other the
reliance of their counterpart.280 More emphasis is put however on the mistaken party
than under the English law, and Spanish courts are actually likely to grant relief
in the basis of mistake (error) in situations of information omission in consumer
276 Reg 31 Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 and art 105 TRLDCU.
277 BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (n 176) 79.
278 PEEL (n 197) 1.
279 TREITEL (n 257) 307-309.
280 DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198) 208-209.
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contracts.281
In what refers to standard form electronic contracts, where the list of information
requirements is there, ready to be provided, the rules on mistake might not seem
relevant at first glance in the English context. English law requires some minimal
personal contact or exchange between the parties, so that the mistake of one party
could be appreciated by the other, and therefore be ‘operative’ – a requirement not
present in the Spanish system. However, this contact, even in B2C contracts, is not
unusual, hence for instance the rules established in CRA 2015 or TRLDCU con-
cerning goods’ fitness for a particular purpose.282 If the purpose for which consumer
is buying goods is known to the trader, the seller will have to inform the buyer if
the goods are not fit for this purpose. It is effectively a duty to advise, going bey-
ond mere information provision. The specific rule guarantees that the goods will be
adequate to consumer’s needs, if the trader knows about them – for instance if the
consumer e-mailed the trader before entering the contract. Nevertheless, any other
mistaken belief held by the consumer, not concerning the purpose of the goods, even
if known to the trader, will not benefit from the protection of the specific rules from
the CRA 2015 or TRLDCU. Here, general rules will apply.
Beale points out that various legal systems adopt different approaches to mistake,
of which he distinguishes three main trends:
(...)
(1) to prioritize the protection of informed consent as an element of
autonomy of the will, so that a party who was not fully informed about
a vital matter may escape from the resulting agreement;
(2) to take a similar approach to autonomy of the will, but to balance
against it the interest of the other party in the form of legitimate reliance
on the contract; or
(3) to rely on general clauses that raise questions of both substantive
and procedural fairness or even purely substantive question, whether the
resulting exchange was equal.283
In his study, Beale identifies various legal systems, which are not the focus of
281 See eg SAP Madrid nu´m. 820/2013 de 5 de noviembre (AC 2013/2193).
282 See Section 3.1 Specific remedies available to consumers above.
283 BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (n 176) 42.
310
3.2. GENERAL PRIVATE LAW AND REMEDIES IT OFFERS
this study however, that follow these models: approach (1) is represented by French
law, approach (2) by German and Dutch law and finally approach (3) by the Scand-
inavian law. Beale’s study is focused on researching potential models for reform of
English law, therefore he does not include English approach in this division. He
does not deal with Spanish law either, however I am inclined to identify the Span-
ish system with the (2) approach, as I argued above. As for the English system, it
is primarily concerned with security of transactions,284 parties consent is free, but
they themselves have to make sure it is informed as well and ask the other party the
right questions – caveat emptor. Under English law mistake which was not induced
by the other party, even if they knew about their contracting partner labouring
under mistake, is not actionable.
The contrast between English law and European soft law instruments, such as
PECL and DCFR, is stark. For instance the DCFR establishes in its article II.-7:201
that a party may avoid a contract for mistake if the other party:
(...)
(ii) caused the contract to be concluded in mistake by leaving the
mistaken party in error, contrary to good faith and fair dealing, when
the other party knew or could reasonably be expected to have known of
the mistake;
(iii) caused the contract to be concluded in mistake by failing to com-
ply with a pre-contractual information duty or a duty to make available
a means of correcting input errors; (...)
Good faith and fair dealing principle influences the approach to the parties’ beha-
viour – if the trader does not correct consumer’s mistake, the latter will be entitled
to avoid the contract, according to the DCFR. Moreover, non-disclosure through
failure to comply with information duties that causes the consumer’s mistake and
results in contract being concluded in mistake, will have the same outcome in the
European soft law.
Civil law traditions, including Spanish law, provide relief for the mistaken party,
even if the mistake was not known to the other party. On the other hand, European
284 As pointed out in Chapter 1 Subsection 1.2.2.2 General duty to disclose and its breach in national
private law where the lack of general duty to disclose in English law was discussed.
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soft law instruments, such as PECL and DCFR, adopt a middle position between
English and civil law rules: the relief for unilateral mistake is granted only where
the non-mistaken party knew or should have known about the mistake.285
Under English law, as we could see, private redress for mistake is very limited.
In those cases, however, where it succeeds the main remedy is declaring the con-
tract void by the court.286 Usually, the mistaken party, or sometimes a third party,
wants to declare the contract non-existent. Sometimes, rectification in equity is also
available,287 when party asks for the contract to be binding, but on the terms they
(mistakenly) understood. Generally speaking damages cannot be awarded on the
basis of mistake. However, if the claimant can establish that the other party com-
mitted a tort of deceit or negligence, then in addition to declaring the contract void
the court may award them damages.288 Under Spanish law, the contract in which
one party’s consent was vitiated by mistake may be avoided. Moreover, art 1266
of the Co´digo civil also allows for correction, rectification, of simple mistakes in
calculation.289
As Beale puts it: ‘(...) conduct which on the continent is regarded as fraud is
regarded in England as good business.’290 It is pointed out that English approach,
where one party can take advantage of other party’s mistake – when they knew about
their counterpart contracting under mistake, however they refrained from rectifying
it – is often unjust and inefficient.291 Law turning a blind eye to the possibility
of taking advantage of other party’s fundamental mistake is also judged immoral.
Cockburn CJ himself affirms in Smith v Hughes :
285 BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (n 176) 72.
286 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 592ff.
287 Rectification of contract is an equitable remedy available only in the case of written contracts, see
ibid 648ff.
288 Ibid 595ff. Showing that the contract is void will exclude damages for breach of contract, as there
was no contract it could not have been breached, and for misrepresentation, under s 2(1) of the
Misrepresentation Act 1967, because the Act applies where the party ‘has entered into a contract’,
which again is impossible since it was declared void.
289 DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198) 216-217.
290 BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (n 176) 73.
291 Hence the propositions to reform English law of mistake, at least in some aspects, as the cited
work of BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (n 176).
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The case put of the purchase of an estate, in which there is a mine under
the surface, but the fact is unknown to the seller, is one in which a man of
tender conscience or high honour would be unwilling to take advantage
of the ignorance of the seller; but there can be no doubt that the contract
for the sale of the estate would be binding.292
Dura lex sed lex, the law is harsh, but it is the law, one would like to say.293 And it
has been the law for centuries, however some changes start to occur, possibly due to
the influence of the European Union law and specific sectoral legislation on consumer
contracts as well. Moreover, in many situations in practice there have appeared some
particular standardized mechanisms that ensure more efficient outcome.294 The de-
velopment in consumer law may have influenced English legal system, promoting
protection of weaker parties, but the traditional common law, stemming from com-
mercial litigation, ‘remains stoutly individualistic when compared to many of its
continental counterparts’.295
3.2.3 Provision of incorrect information
When the pre-contractual information received relative to the goods or service
proved wrong, a consumer will have various remedies, depending on how that in-
formation is classified. Discussing the solutions adopted in English law, Woodroffe
and Lowe propose six possibilities (of which some may overlap): mere puff, mis-
representation, negligent misstatement, contractual term, collateral warranty and
description of goods.296 Advertising puffs do not entail any legal consequences for
292 At 604.
293 The ideological message sent by the English law is, according to BEALE, Mistake and Non-
Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (n 176) 112, ‘look out for yourself, don’t
expect the court to come to the rescue’.
294 BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (n 176) 26; see also
eg Omri BEN-SHAHAR and Eric A POSNER, ‘The Right to Withdraw in Contract Law’ [2010]
John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 514 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=1569753> accessed 15 May 2016 who talk about such mechanisms in practice in
relation to the right of withdrawal in the U.S.
295 BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (n 176) 106.
296 Geoffrey WOODROFFE and Robert LOWE, Woodroffe & Lowe’s Consumer Law and Practice
(9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 29ff.
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the trader, misrepresentation may result in consumer’s right to rescind the contract
and/or damages. Breach of contractual term also gives rise to damages and con-
sumer may sometimes additionally treat the contract as at an end. The collateral
warranty is given by a third party, eg manufacturer, with whom consumer has no
other contractual relationship. Description of goods can usually be classified as con-
tractual term, according to provisions of CRA 2015 discussed above in Section 3.1
Specific remedies available to consumers. The law of misrepresentation can overlap
with breach of contract, when pre-contractual statements fulfil the conditions ne-
cessary to be treated as both representations and contract terms.297 Furthermore,
misrepresentation can naturally overlap with a claim based on mistake – misrepres-
entation can be described as a qualified type of mistake induced by the other party.
Finally, contractual misrepresentation is in a very close relationship with tort law –
torts of deceit and negligence are present in many instances of misrepresentation.298
Spanish general law also provides various possible classifications for provision
of false information: art 61.2 of the TRLDCU allows to consider false information
(including advertising) as contract terms; art 97.5 of the TRLDCU establishes that
all the pre-contractual information be treated as included in the contract; rules of
general law on mistake and fraud will also apply to the information provided prior
to the contract formation. All these and some other possible legal consequences of
misinformation based on general private law are discussed below.
3.2.3.1 When misinformation amounts to breach of term and remedies
resulting from contractual liability
Some terms of contract are implied by legislation, as discussed above,299 which is
especially relevant when important pre-contractual information was omitted by a
trader. In what refers to situations where consumer was provided with some false
information, the scope of potential action in contract can be broader than in cases
of omission. The falsehood of pre-contractual statements made by a trader – the
297 Ibid.
298 GILIKER, ‘Formation of Contract and Pre-Contractual Information from an English Perspective’
(n 1) 313-314.
299 See Subsection 3.2.2.1 Breach of an implied term and contractual liability above.
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representations they made – can amount to breach of contract, because of a con-
tractual term, which can be also implied, that was breached by the provision of false
information. Furthermore, the statements made, including advertising, may amount
to contractual promises, become express terms in themselves, and therefore their
breach will also be treated as breach of contract. Finally, sometimes the aggrieved
party may be able to claim the existence of a contractual duty of care on the side of
the defendant, when they ‘gave a contractual undertaking that [they] were exercising
reasonable care and skill in making [their] statement (...).’300
Both English and Spanish law contain in their consumer legislation provisions
incorporating pre-contractual information in distance contracts into the contract
content: art 97.5 of the TRLDCU and ss 11(4) and 12(2) of the CRA 2015, which is
a consequence of transposition of art 6.5 of the Directive on consumer rights.301 The
Directive, which is supposed to be without prejudice to the national contract law,
does not attribute any status to the information items, leaving it therefore to the
Member States’ national systems to decide what consequences (if any) the breach
of information included in the contract will have.302
300 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 450.
301 Nevertheless, the Directive in its recital (14) states: ‘This Directive should not affect national law in
the area of contract law for contract law aspects that are not regulated by this Directive. Therefore,
this Directive should be without prejudice to national law regulating for instance the conclusion
or the validity of a contract (for instance in the case of lack of consent) (...).’ NORDHAUSEN
SCHOLES (n 116) 223 notes that such a limitation is especially questionable in the context of
obligatory inclusion of the information obligations as an integral part of the contract.
302 Cf interesting observations of NORDHAUSEN SCHOLES (n 116) 223 who analyses the potential
inclusion of information duties into the contract as essentialia negotii in the context of the Directive
on consumer rights’ proposal (the analysed provision is the same in the finally adopted Directive):
‘The statement that the information obligations form an integral part of the contract is a welcome
clarification (and in some cases widening) of the status of the information. But does this go far
enough? The definition of “an integral part of the contract” remains unclear. It is not clear, and
will differ in the national laws of the Member States, which status the information will assume in
the contract. It can be assumed that generally the information will become part of the contract
terms. But what status will the information be given within the contract terms? Is the information
essentialia negotii and therefore hinders the valid formation of a contract? This would be a possible,
albeit rather strict, interpretation. It would mean that a contract may not be validly concluded at
all if the information is not given, or not given in the correct way or at the correct time. It is more
likely, especially in connection with the requirement of national contract law remedies, that this
will mean that they are not essentialia negotii (unless they are included in the essentialia under
national law anyway), so generally the contract will be valid. Otherwise there would be no room
for the required contract law remedies there would simply be no contract at all (which may be seen
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The potential for contractual liability of the trader who breaches information
duties under Spanish law resides mainly in arts 61.2 and 97.5 of the TRLDCU. The
former provision is more general, applicable to all sorts of consumer contracts, the
latter is relative to distance contracts. Art 61.2 states that the content of promotional
offers or advertising, special characteristics of the good or service offered and legal
or economic conditions and guarantees offered are enforceable by consumers, even if
not expressly included in the contract formed between the parties or in the contract
confirmation document. Picatoste Bobillo points to various differences between ad-
vertising and information, such as different target group (indefinite consumers or
a particular contracting consumer) and different purpose (publicizing with the aim
of selling or providing factual precise information required by the law); however
concludes noting that advertising can also fulfil a function of providing consumers
with objective information.303 Art 61.2 of the TRLDCU is considered to be refer-
ring to such type of advertising.304 Completing the contract contents with what was
advertised results from the objective requirements of the security of transactions
and reliance of the parties in good faith.305 Art 61.2 of the TRLDCU, and before
that art 8 of the previous Act,306 has been interpreted widely by the courts, who
understand it applies to all different pieces of information provided to consumers
prior to contract conclusion.307 From such a perspective art 97.5 of the TRLDCU
as a contract law remedy as well). The interpretation of the information obligations as essentialia
negotii (and therefore no valid contract in case of non-fulfilment) could be harsh on the consumer as
well, who relied on the contract and may want to affirm the contract regardless of the information
deficit. In addition, the proposed Directive states explicitly that the contract law of the Member
States shall remain unaffected. It is questionable whether the definition of information obligations
as an integral part of the contract is consistent with this limitation. The remedies, however, are
not harmonised and can vary significantly between Member States.’
303 PICATOSTE BOBILLO (n 206) 403.
304 Ibid.
305 Sergio CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 61: Comentario’ in Sergio Ca´mara Lapuente (ed),
Comentarios a las Normas de Proteccio´n de los Consumidores: Texto Refundido (RDL 1/2007) y
Otras Leyes y Reglamentos Vigentes en Espan˜a y en la Unio´n Europea (Editorial Constitucio´n y
Leyes COLEX 2011) 516-517.
306 Ley 26/1984, de 19 de julio, General para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios. Bolet´ın
Oficial del Estado, de 24 de julio de 1984, nu´m. 176, p. 21686 (repealed).
307 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 910/2004 de 29 de septiembre
(RJ 2004/5688), Fundamentos de Derecho, Segundo; Audiencia Provincial de Ma´laga (Seccio´n 5a),
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seems redundant, as it applies to pre-contractual information received in a distance
contract. It was introduced in the TRLDCU through a recent reform implementing
the Directive on consumer rights308 and it seems that its scope is very similar to
that of art 61.2. At least now, with art 97.5 it is very clear that all the information
items provided in electronic contracts are to be included as terms of contract.
The consequences of breach of information duties through provision of false in-
formation out of arts 61.2 and 97.5 of the TRLDCU in consumer contracts are
available within two different regimes: the specific scheme of remedies for the lack
of conformity of goods with the contract and the general contract law remedies.309
As already discussed in Subsection 3.2.1 Overview of the analysis of the general
private law remedies above although the TRLDCU does not exclude the application
of general contract law remedies for breach when specific remedies for the lack of
conformity are available, it seems reasonable to rule out the availability of at least
contract rescission for breach in such cases.310 Nevertheless, and contrary to the Eng-
lish law scheme of remedies out of the CRA 2015, under the Spanish TRLDCU only
information relative to the main characteristics of products being subject-matter
of the contract is protected through specific remedies. The CRA 2015 contains a
provision of s 12(2) that in connection with the s 19(5) establishes specific remedies
also for provision of any other (than about the main characteristics of goods)311 false
information in distance contracts; there is no such provision in Spanish law. There-
fore, general law remedies for breach of contract, rescission for breach included, will
be of a much more relevance to consumer contracts in Spain than under English
Sentencia nu´m. 599/2008 de 30 de octubre (JUR 2009/63790), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero;
Audiencia Provincial de Sevilla (Seccio´n 5a), Sentencia de 24 julio de 2003, (JUR 2003/220935),
Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero; Audiencia Provincial de Ourense (Seccio´n 2a), Sentencia de 10
julio de 2001 (AC 2001/1294), Fundamentos Jur´ıdicos, Segundo.
308 Ley 3/2014, de 27 de marzo.
309 CA´MARA LAPUENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 61: Comentario’ (n 305) 515.
310 As the specific scheme of remedies for non-conformity introduces a strict hierarchy of remedies, in
which the remedy of contract rescission for breach is of secondary nature and cannot be exercised
without prior exercise of primary remedies of repair or replacement, it would therefore go against
the logic of the scheme of remedies to allow claiming general law remedies including contract
rescission for breach in such cases where remedies for the lack of conformity are available.
311 Out of Schedule 2 to the Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013.
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law.
The main remedies of general contract law for breach of contract in Spanish
law are specific performance, damages and contract rescission for breach.312 The
availability and characteristics of those remedies depend on the behaviour of the
party in breach – in our case the trader’s, and on the extent of the breach itself.
Specific performance is arguably the main remedy for breach in Spanish law,313
according to the principle of maintaining the contractual relationship,314 implying
the fulfilment of what is due, ie through carrying out the obligations under the con-
tract or for example repairing or substituting the faulty product subject-matter.315
Damages are probably the most common remedy for breach of contract;316 the meas-
ure of damages differs according to various factors. Contract measure of damages
(intere´s positivo) intends at putting the aggrieved party in a position they would
be, had the contract been performed correctly.317 The compensation in damages
is limited by the art 1107 Co´digo civil to the consequences of breach which were
foreseeable at the moment the contract was formed and are the direct consequence
of the breach of contract.318 Nevertheless, if the trader’s breach is premeditated,
voluntary, conscious,319 then according to art 1107 para II of the Co´digo civil the
312 Nevertheless, Spanish law is said to be lacking a coherent regulation of breach of contract in the
current version of the Co´digo Civil, the Propuesta de Anteproyecto de Ley de Modernizacio´n del
Derecho de Obligaciones y Contratos opts for the articulate concept of breach, similar to that of
the CISG, see Luis DI´EZ-PICAZO, ‘La Propuesta de Modernizacio´n del Derecho de Obligaciones
y Contratos (una Presentacio´n)’ (2011) 2130 Bolet´ın del Ministerio de Justicia 1, 6.
313 See the observations on this point in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.3.1 Main remedies to be considered ;
the issue is controversial, see GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho
Espan˜ol’ (n 5) 16.
314 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 150/2009 de 12 de marzo (RJ
2009/1982), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero.
315 GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 5) 15.
316 Ibid 19.
317 Ibid 20; even in situations when damages are combined with a remedy of rescission for breach, see
Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia nu´m. 833/1999 de 15 de octubre (RJ 1999/7430);
Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 325/2005 de 12 de mayo (RJ
2005/6377).
318 Cf Hadley v Baxendale [1854] EWHC Exch J70.
319 As understood by the Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia de 21 junio de 1980 (RJ
1980/2726); Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia de 23 octubre de 1984 (RJ 1984/4972);
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liability in damages of the party in breach is not limited – they are liable for all the
damage knowingly resulting from the breach. Moreover, non-material damage may
be compensated by the courts with higher probability and wider scope if the party
in breach was acting voluntarily.320
The remedy of contract rescission for breach is not available for all kinds of
breach; Spanish law adopts principles similar to those expressed in the European
soft law instruments and CISG.321 In assessing the extent of breach and if it is
fundamental, ie serious enough to allow the court to grant the contract rescission, the
court will need to determine whether the breach is definitive, making it impossible
to satisfy the contractual interest violated through the breach.322 The remedy of
contract rescission can be combined with damages.323
In what refers to English law, the Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 initially
contained a provision of a very similar wording to the art 97.5 of the TRLDCU in
reg 13(6), which has however recently been revoked by the Consumer Contracts
(Amendment) Regulations 2015,324 as the provision was considered by the legislator
to have been replicated in the CRA 2015.325 Therefore currently the applicable
provisions of the CRA 2015 are ss 11(4) and 12(2) of the CRA 2015. Breach of terms
implied by those sections, relative both to information omission and provision of false
information, as it is discussed in Section 3.1 Specific remedies available to consumers,
is subject to specific remedies provided for by the CRA 2015. Nevertheless, s 19(9)
of the Act states that it is open to a consumer to claim general law remedies,
including those for breach of term, and especially for breach of an express term –
particularly relevant in the context of provision of false information – as s 19(9)(c)
however some authors express the opinion that an intention to harm is also necessary, see GO´MEZ
POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 5) 10-11.
320 GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 5) 11.
321 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n 1a), Sentencia nu´m. 1180/2008 de 17 de diciembre (RJ
2009/675), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero; cf arts 25 and 49 CISG, art 8:103 and 9:301 PECL
and III.–3:502 DCFR.
322 STS nu´m. 150/2009 de 12 de marzo (RJ 2009/1982), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero.
323 GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’ (n 5) 30.
324 SI 2015/1629.
325 Explanatory Note to the Consumer Contracts (Amendment) Regulations 2015.
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reads: ‘This Chapter does not prevent the consumer seeking other remedies (...) for a
breach of a requirement stated in the contract.’ The potential availability of general
law remedies will then depend on the traditional contract law rules. Nevertheless,
there is a notable exclusion introduced in s 19(12) of the CRA 2015: consumers
cannot treat the contract as at an end for a breach of term the Act requires to be
treated as included in the contract, expect as provided by the Act. It means that the
general contract law remedy of termination (rescission) for breach is not available
to consumers and they can only treat the contract as at an end through the right
to reject as established in the CRA 2015.
English law does not provide for a clear provision similar to art 61.2 of the
TRLDCU, and therefore the consequences of various statements made by the trader
in the pre-contractual phase, including advertising, need to be looked at. How can
a contractual, biding promises be delimited from other statements?
Cartwright observes that in many decisions the word ‘warranty’ is used, simply
meaning ‘a contractually binding promise’,326 as Denning LJ explained in Oscar
Chess Ltd v Williams :
In saying that he must prove a warranty, I use the word “warranty”
in its ordinary English meaning to denote a binding promise. Everyone
knows what a man means when he says “I guarantee it” or “I warrant
it” or “I give you my word on it”. He means that he binds himself to
it.327
A contractual promise (a warranty) can be relative to the fact that in making
their statement, the representor took care, as Lord Denning MR noted:
Now I would quite agree with Mr. Ross-Munro that it was not a warranty
– in this sense – that it did not guarantee that the throughput would
be 200,000 gallons. But, nevertheless, it was a forecast made by a party
– Esso – who had special knowledge and skill. It was the yardstick (the
e.a.c.) by which they measured the worth of a filling station. They knew
the facts. They knew the traffic in the town. They knew the throughput
of comparable stations. They had much experience and expertise at their
326 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 427.
327 Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370 at 374.
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disposal. They were in a much better position than Mr. Mardon to make
a forecast. It seems to me that if such a person makes a forecast, intending
that the other should act upon it – and he does act upon it, it can well
be interpreted as a warranty that the forecast is sound and reliable in
the sense that they made it with reasonable care and skill. It is just as if
Esso said to Mr. Mardon: “Our forecast of throughput is 200,000 gallons.
You can rely upon it as being a sound forecast of what the service station
should do. The rent is calculated on that footing.” If the forecast turned
out to be an unsound forecast such as no person of skill or experience
should have made, there is a breach of warranty.328
However, the contractual promise it not be presumed by courts. First of all, the
aggrieved party will have to be able to show that the parties intended the statement
to be incorporated as a term of the contract:329
(...)in respect of the question of the existence of a warranty the Courts
have had the advantage of an admirable enunciation of the true principle
of law which was made in very early days by Holt C.J. with respect to
the contract of sale. He says: ‘An affirmation at the time of the sale
is a warranty, provided it appear on evidence to be so intended.’ So
far as decisions are concerned, this has, on the whole, been consistently
followed in the Courts of Common Law.330
The test of parties’ intention is objective, similarly to the general test regarding
contract formation.331 What counts in the eyes of the law is whether the aggrieved
party could reasonably believe that the other party was making a binding promise,
which is assessed in the circumstances:
328 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v Mardon [1976] QB 801 at 818; in the same case another judge, Shaw
LJ confirmed Lord Denning’s reasoning, at 832: ‘The representations which were admittedly made
to Mr. Mardon conveyed and in my view were intended to convey that Esso warranted that in-
formation which they had available to them and on which the representations were founded (...).’
329 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 88ff.
330 Heilbut, Symons & Co. v Buckleton [1913] AC 30 at 49; The decision which was confirmed to
be good law in Esso Petroleum Co. at 826: ‘In my view, following Lord Moulton in the Heilbut,
Symons case, at 50, the test is whether on the totality of the evidence the parties intended or must
be taken to have intended that the representation was to form part of the basis of the contractual
relations between them. Bisset v. Wilkinson [1927] AC 177, 180 fits into this scheme.’ In Heilbut,
Symons & Co. v Buckleton it is pointed out that judges sometimes accepted certain representations
as warranties (terms of the contract), even though they did not fulfil the test of parties’ intention.
331 See above Subsection 3.2.2.2 Defects of consent where information was not provided.
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Lord Moulton made it quite clear that ‘The intention of the parties can
only be deduced from the totality of the evidence.’ The question whether
a warranty was intended depends on the conduct of the parties, on their
words and behaviour, rather than on their thoughts. If an intelligent
bystander would reasonably infer that a warranty was intended, that
will suffice.332
Advertising can constitute an offer and therefore be contractually binding, just
as in Spanish law (ex art 61.2 of the TRLDCU), but only if it is sufficiently clear
and a reasonable belief of the aggrieved party in the intention of the other party to
be bound by their advertisement can be established.333
Secondly, in order to establish incorporation of the representation into the con-
tract the court will look at the seriousness, particular importance of the statement
made.334 Finally, the court will take into consideration other circumstances. In An-
drews v Hopkinson, a case concerning a contract of hire-purchase of a car, the car
dealer said: ‘It’s a good little bus. I would stake my life on it. You will have no
trouble with it.’335 The court observed:
I am satisfied (1) applying the principle stated by Holt J. in Crosse v.
Gardner and Medina v. Stoughton, that if the transaction between the
plaintiff and defendant had been in law a sale [contrasted with hire-
purchase contract actually made], [these] words (...), could properly be
held to be words of warranty, i.e., an affirmation made at the time of
sale intended to be a warranty; (2) that the words amounted at least to
a warranty that the car was in good condition and reasonably safe and
fit for use on a public highway; and (3) that the plaintiff acted upon
this warranty in the sense that without it he would not have accepted
delivery of the car or entered into the hire-purchase agreement.336
332 Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams at 375.
333 Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1892] EWCA Civ 1.
334 Behn v Burness (1863) 3 Best and Smith 751 at 759: ‘The question on the present charterparty is
confined to the statement of a definite fact—the place of the ship at the date of the contract. Now
the place of the ship at the date of the contract, where the ship is in foreign parts and is chartered
to come to England, may be the only datum on which the charterer can found his calculations
of the time of the ship’s arriving at the port of load. A statement is more or less important in
proportion as the object of the contract more or less depends upon it.’
335 [1957] 1 QB 229 at 230.
336 At 235.
322
3.2. GENERAL PRIVATE LAW AND REMEDIES IT OFFERS
The third element raised here by McNair J, the fact that the representee acted
upon the statement is not a necessary element of claim for breach of contract, as
in the claim for misrepresentation discussed below, but nevertheless is a strong
guidance indicating to the court that the representor effectively wanted to be bound
by the statement – he made it to induce the representee to enter the contract.337
Another possible factor indicating the intention to incorporate the statement into the
contract could be a superior position of the representor, their relatively higher skill or
better access to information.338 Also the fact that the contract was made or recorded
in writing can assist court in deciding whether the representations were incorporated
into it, however the written contract does not exclude the possible existence of other
contractual obligations, not explicitly included in writing.339 The representor’s state
of mind is irrelevant for the claim in breach of contract – the statement can be made
with or without belief in its truthfulness, the mere fact of a contractual promise
being false gives rise to an action for breach of contract.340 Nevertheless, in the case
of a warranty promising duty of care in making the statement, the aggrieved party
will have to show that the other party did not exercise care and skill as required by
the warranty.341
Main remedies for breach of contract through provision of false information will
be damages and termination of the contract, nevertheless the possibility to apply
for the general law remedy of termination is excluded in many cases by the CRA
2015.342 The s 19(11)(e) establishes a possibility to treat the contract as at an end – ie
terminate – for breach of an express term, nevertheless it results from the provisions
of ss 9, 10, 11 and 12 that practically all the pre-contractual information provided
by the trader is to be treated as included as terms, thus it is covered by the exclusion
out of s 19(12). Nevertheless, there are some possible examples of express terms of
337 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 435.
338 Ibid 438ff.
339 Ibid 446.
340 Ibid 443, 453; the representor’s state of mind will be though of importance when determining
remedies available for misrepresentation in tort or under statute, see below Subsection 3.2.3.2
Consumer induced into the contract through misleading information: defects of consent.
341 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 453-454.
342 See s 19(12) CRA 2015.
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contract, not treated as included by the CRA 2015, which are however included the
concept of pre-contractual information. For instance, s 18(1) CRA 2015 entitled ‘No
other requirement to treat term about quality or fitness as included’ reads: ‘Except
as provided by sections 9, 10, 13 and 16, a contract to supply goods is not to be
treated as including any term about the quality of the goods or their fitness for any
particular purpose, unless the term is expressly included in the contract.’ This is an
example of an express term not treated as included by the CRA 2015 and therefore
potentially subject to the general contract law remedies for breach, including the
remedy of termination for breach.
Contract termination is a ‘prospective’ remedy, in result of which the contract
ceases to exist, but the obligations which have already accrued under the contract
can survive the termination.343 The remedy of termination is only available for
breach that was serious enough – breach of a ‘condition’, which is a term of contract
that, usually explicitly, gives the injured party right to terminate the contract,344 or
for so-called ‘fundamental breach’ – substantial failure to perform the contract.345
The substantial failure to perform is such that it substantially deprives the injured
party of his purpose in making the contract.346 Such approach is very similar to
that of Spanish law. In the context of provision of false information by a trader, the
injured party – a consumer in our case – may be able to show that the statement
made was not only a term of contract, but also a condition, especially if the statement
was about the subject-matter of the contract.347 Furthermore, the consumer may
also be able to show that a substantial failure to perform on the side of the trader
took place, which will also entitle the injured party to terminate the contract, if the
subject-matter of the contract is so different from what was promised and therefore
defective to such extent that the consumer was deprived of the whole benefit from
the contract made on the basis of the false statement.348
343 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 463.
344 PEEL (n 197) 979ff.
345 Ibid 970ff.
346 Cf arts 25 and 49 CISG.
347 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 472-473.
348 Ibid 473.
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Other remedies for breach of contract, such as specific performance and injunc-
tion will often turn out inappropriate – the trader cannot be ordered to perform
a promise to make a truthful statement or to take care in making it, when their
statement proved to be false. Moreover, there already exists a specific consumer law
scheme of remedies for the lack of conformity resulting from the application of the
CRA 2015,349 which practically comprises the situations in which a consumer might
want to apply for specific performance.
Similarly to the solution adopted in Spanish law, damages in contract are awar-
ded to put the claimant in the position he would be in, had the contract been
performed correctly.350 In the context of the provision of false information it would
then mean to put the aggrieved party in a position they would be in, had the state-
ment made been true. If a contractual promise to take care in making the statement
was breached, then the representee should be rather compensated for having entered
into the contract in reliance on the statement, therefore they resemble more tortious
measure of damages for misrepresentation, which are designed to put the claimant
in a position he would have been in, had he not relied on the statement and not
entered the contract.
3.2.3.2 Consumer induced into the contract through misleading inform-
ation: defects of consent
Pre-contractual information plays a major role in consumer contracts, especially
influencing consumer’s decision on entering a particular contract with a particular
trader. This corresponds especially with the rules relative to the defects of consent,
where the fact that consumer was induced to enter into the contract by a certain
piece of false information is fundamental for the existence of liability or for possibility
to avoid the contract351 – or declare it void352 – for mistake.
Pre-contractual information provided by trader can be classified as terms of con-
349 Described above in Section 3.1 Specific remedies available to consumers.
350 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 459.
351 Under Spanish law.
352 Under English law.
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tract or as statements that can give rise to actions for defects of consent. Generally
speaking, a claim for defects of consent: fraud (dolo), misrepresentation in tort or
under statute, or mistake (error), is less favourable for the aggrieved party than the
breach of contractual term.353 On the other hand, the fact that a pre-contractual
statement can be considered a term of contract will not exclude the availability of
the remedies for defects of consent.354
The distinction between pre-contractual information that can give rise to a claim
in contract and for the defects of consent has become even more relevant for the
English law of consumer contracts after the adoption of the Consumer Protection
Amendment 2014 which introduced the new scheme of private redress for misleading
commercial practices, in the meantime excluding the availability of damages for stat-
utory misrepresentation when the specific redress is available. Although the right to
terminate the contract for breach of contract under general law is excluded in part
by the CRA 2015, the claim for damages for breach of contract under the general
contract law rules stays available under s 19(11) of the CRA 2015. In what refers
to Spanish law, due to the arts 62.1 and 97.5 of the TRLDCU, which allow to treat
a great majority of information provided both in fulfilment of the pre-contractual
information duties and in the advertising as contract terms, it is considerably easier
for consumer to claim trader’s liability in contract under the general rules. Never-
353 In many aspects, such as the measure and availability of damages: as the contractual measure of
damages putting the claimant in the position they would be in, had the contract been performed
correctly is often more generous than tortious measure where the claimant is being put in the
position they would have been in, had the contract never been entered into in the first place.
Moreover the damages are often not available for mistake and innocent misrepresentation. Similarly,
in what refers to the availability of specific performance, claim in contract is more advantageous,
since it is a remedy basically only available for breach of contract. We should also consider lesser
relevance of the traders intentionality and behaviour (ie intention to harm, negligence, innocence)
in the case of contractual liability; longer limitation periods for contractual liability under the
Spanish law (5 years in contract and one year in tort), although the limitation period to avoid
the contract for mistake is 4 years under Spanish law, and under English law, as mistakes make
contract void, such claim cannot be barred by the lapse of time.
354 Under English law, the statement being a term of the contract does not bar the representee from
claiming misrepresentation, be it in tort or under statute or mistake, see CARTWRIGHT, Mis-
representation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 427; under Spanish law in general it is also
allowed to claim remedies under the heads of breach of contract or defects of consent for the same
set of facts satisfying both hypotheses, especially when the claimant is a consumer, cf FENOY
PICO´N, El Sistema de Proteccio´n del Comprador (n 160) 247-252.
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theless, a claim for contract rescission for breach may be limited where the scheme
of specific remedies for the lack of conformity out of arts 114ff of the TRLDCU is
available, therefore some consumers may be willing to claim defects of consent in
order to avoid the contract with the trader.
Mistake was already discussed above in Subsection 3.2.2.2 Defects of consent
where information was not provided. The focus of that Subsection was, however, the
mistake relevant in cases of omission of important information. The English law of
misrepresentation is practically not applicable in such circumstances. Nevertheless,
where the mistake of one of the parties was induced by what the other party said,
then mistake and misrepresentation may overlap. This situation is quite common,
since often parties say things to induce other party to contract, and if what was said
turns out to be untrue, it will give rise to misrepresentation under English law, re-
gardless if the representations made were fraudulent, negligent or innocent. Spanish
law treats fraudulent misinformation as dolo; cases of negligent and innocent misin-
formation can be classified as mistakes (errores) induced by the other contracting
party.
Irrespective of its seriousness, ie whether fundamental or not, misrepresentation
under English law will render the contract voidable; the only necessary condition is
that the statement induced the mistaken party to enter into the contract, there is
no requirement as to the misapprehension of the misrepresentee to be fundamental.
What constitutes different types of misrepresentation under English law, corresponds
according to the principle of functionality in comparative law to various doctrines
of Spanish law, and particularly to the concepts of dolo and error. For the dolo to
allow the party to avoid the contract it needs to be of such significance, as to have
induced the mistake party to enter into the contract355 – dolo grave – which is the
same requirement as in English law. The dolo to be actionable however requires
a fraudulent intention,356 negligent or innocently induced mistake is generally not
sufficient.357 Therefore the situations in which one party induces the other into the
355 Arts 1269 and 1270 para II Co´digo civil, see GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1270’ (n 170) 9130;
DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198) 200-201.
356 Art 1269 Co´digo civil.
357 However, in the context of information omission, a negligent omission of information required by
legislation or good faith is considered by the courts to amount to dolo; see STS de 1 octubre de
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contract through providing untrue information but without an intention to deceive
cannot be treated as dolo; they are covered by a concept of a provoked mistake –
error provocado.358
It is worth noting, that although under English law a claim in misrepresentation
is the one that can succeed much easier than showing that the contract is void for
mistake, the latter claim has some advantages to the aggrieved party. Cartwright
points out for example, that rescission of a contract voidable for misrepresentation
may be barred by the lapse of time,359 however there is no limitation period for
claiming that a contract is void for mistake.360 Under Spanish law, the action for
fraud is also easier available than the one for mistake, as only mistakes relative to
the ‘substance of the subject-matter’ of the contract, or to its qualities that were
the primary motive that induced the contract are actionable, whilst there are no
such restrictions in what refers to the claim for dolo.361 Nevertheless, the doctrine
of mistake does not require a proof of the fraudulent intentions, which may make
it easier to claim. The limitation period for both mistake and fraud is the same
under art 1301 of the Co´digo civil : four years counting from when the contract was
performed.
To be able to claim remedies for breach of contract under English law, the con-
sumer must be able to show that the information provided – statements made before
contract was entered into – can be classified as contract terms. Under Spanish law
it is easier for consumers because of arts 61.2 and 97.5 of the TRLDCU accord-
ing to which all the pre-contractual information provided, including informative
advertising and promotional offers, is to be considered as contract terms.362 False
1986 (RJ 1986/5229), Fundamentos de Derecho, 3; STS de 27 marzo de 1989 (RJ 1989/2201),
Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero; STS nu´m. 1/2005 de 17 de enero (RJ 2005/517), Fundamentos
de Derecho, Tercero; STS nu´m. 289/2009 de 5 de mayo (RJ 2009/2907), Fundamentos de Derecho,
Quinto; GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1269’ (n 225) 9126.
358 STS nu´m. 113/1994 de 18 de febrero (RJ 1994/1096), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero; GARCI´A
VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1266’ (n 221) 9106.
359 After 6 years, see Green v Eadie and Ors [2011] EWHC B24 (Ch) at 35.
360 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 594.
361 Cf arts 1266 and 1269 of the Co´digo civil.
362 Nevertheless, the courts often allow the consumer to avoid the contract for mistake, even though
the breach of information duties, including those resulting from art 61 TRLDCU is confirmed,
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pre-contractual statements that do not amount to contract terms, still can entail
trader’s liability in defects of consent; moreover even if they are considered contract
terms, the defects of consent can still be claimed. Nevertheless, not all that is said
before contract formation can give rise to any liability at all: it is common practice
in trade to exaggerate a bit, to tout one’s merchandise – the so-called advertising
gimmicks or puffs cannot be relied on and cannot be actually enforced. In practice
it may difficult to decide if a particular statement is a puff, representation or a term
of contract. All the circumstances must be considered, eg what the seller’s intention
was and if the buyer relied on the statement.
English law puts a lot of emphasis on defining representations – statements
‘relating to the marketed product [that] may be more than (...) puff[s] and less than
(...) warrant[ies]: [they] may be so important that [they] may induce a contract, may
now amount to (...) negligent misrepresentation(...).’363 The angle at which Spanish
law approaches the issue is different; the law is not concerned with precisely defining
pre-contractual statements – breach of pre-contractual duties will often influence the
consent of the consumer, thus depriving them from a possibility to form an informed
consent. Therefore, the contract can be avoided for an induced mistake, especially
if the fraudulent intention of the trader cannot be proved.364
As mentioned, English law emphasises the distinction between actionable misrep-
resentation and mere puff. Puffs are not intended to give rise to legal liability, they
can be described as typical sales patter and are usually vague and not specific.365
The ‘puffs’ were described in Kingspan Environmental Ltd v Borealis A/S : ‘There
is a category of statement, sometimes referred to as “puffs” and, in more modern
language mere sales talk, which will not found a case in representation. This may
see eg Audiencia Provincial de Islas Baleares (Seccio´n 3a), Sentencia nu´m. 457/2010 de 23 de
noviembre (JUR/2011/46728), Fundamentos de Derecho, Segundo, Cuarto.
363 Lambert v Lewis [1982] AC 225 at 262.
364 SAP Islas Baleares nu´m. 457/2010 de 23 de noviembre (JUR/2011/46728), Fundamentos de
Derecho, Cuarto; Audiencia Provincial de Madrid (Seccio´n 12a), Sentencia num. 820/2013 de 5
de noviembre (AC/2013/2193), Fundamentos de Derecho, Vigesimosegundo.
365 WOODROFFE and LOWE (n 296) 30; CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-
Disclosure (n 150) 45.
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be so where a statement is in such general terms as to be unverifiable.’366 The court
will also take into account if the statement was seriously meant to become legally
binding, ie the intention of the party making the statement,367 and other circum-
stances of the contract as a whole – the burden of proof that the statement was
sufficient to amount to representation rests on the claimant,368 ie the consumer in
our case.
The Spanish system recognises a concept similar to ‘puffs’: the so-called ‘dolus
bonus ’, a good lie. The concept is inspired by art 1270 of the Co´digo civil, which
distinguishes between serious (grave) and minor (incidental) fraud, both of which
give rise to representor’s liability, however minor fraud does not make contract void-
able and only entitles the aggrieved party to damages. The existence of a scale of
seriousness implies therefore that there also is a type of fraud, which in reality is
not one, as it is a lie consisting of exaggeration acceptable in advertising, providing
that it is contained within the limits tolerated in trade and its advertising character
is evident.369
The English system requires various conditions that have to be met for a state-
ment to become a potentially actionable misrepresentation. First of all, as already re-
peated on various occasions, there must be some statement made to the claimant,370
because mere silence cannot constitute a representation. Secondly, the statement
must be a false statement of fact. Statements of opinion, belief, about future facts or
366 Kingspan Environmental Ltd v Borealis A/S [2012] EWHC 1147 (Comm) at 420; the court then
goes on at 421 to cite the classic case of Dimmock v Hallett [1866] LR 2 Ch App 21: ‘Thus in
Dimmock v Hallett (...) a description in auction particulars that a farm’s land was “fertile and
improvable” was said to be “a mere flourishing description by an auctioneer” which could not, save
in extreme cases, be regarded as a misrepresentation, and a statement that the land “in course of
time may be covered with warp and considerably improved at moderate cost” was said to put “a
purchaser on inquiry, and if he chooses to buy on the faith of such a statement without inquiry, he
has no ground of complaint”.’
367 See eg Mallan v Radloff (1864) 17 CB (NS) 588 at 597.
368 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 45ff.
369 Audiencia Provincial de Valencia (Seccio´n 9a), Sentencia nu´m. 81/2003 de 4 de febrero (JUR
2003/93495), Fundamentos Jur´ıdicos, Segundo; Audiencia Provincial de Toledo (Seccio´n 1a), Sen-
tencia nu´m. 365/2008 de 5 de noviembre (JUR 2009/146067), Fundamentos de Derecho, Primero;
DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198) 201-202; GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1270’ (n 170) 91309131.
370 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 33, the statement can
be also made to the representee’s agent.
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intentions are not relevant. However, if there is a significant information asymmetry
between the contracting parties, the courts are likely to find an implied statement
of fact.371 Statements of law were also traditionally distinguished from statements
of fact,372 although similarly to the mistake of law rule mentioned above373 it can
be said that recent developments show that the fact versus law distinction is not
pertinent anymore. Spanish law, as mentioned above, does not have such an elab-
orated doctrine of statements inducing the party to contract, nevertheless it can be
noted again that the Spanish system does not differentiate between providing false
information or providing no information at all.
In both England and Spain the courts will always require representee’s reliance
on the statement – the reliance has to be reasonable and must have influenced the
decision-making process of the representee, ie induced them to enter the contract.374
The English position emphasises that once a statement was made, the representee
can safely rely on it, thus promoting security of transactions, therefore in many
cases of misrepresentation it will be irrelevant if the representee had had a chance
to verify if representor’s statement was true. The remedy of rescission has long been
available even if the representee could discover the truth375 and the damages for
fraudulent misrepresentation cannot be barred by the fact that representee could
have checked the truth of the statement. Nevertheless, a defence of contributory
negligence is available for the tort of negligence and may be also used against a
371 Smith v Land and House Property Corp. (1884) 28 Ch D 7 at 15: ‘It is material to observe that it
is often fallaciously assumed that a statement of opinion cannot involve the statement of a fact. In
a case where the facts are equally well known to both parties, what one of them says to the other
is frequently nothing but an expression of opinion. The statement of such opinion is in a sense a
statement of a fact, about the condition of the man’s own mind, but only of an irrelevant fact, for
it is of no consequence what the opinion is. But if the facts are not equally known to both sides,
then a statement of opinion by the one who knows the facts best involves very often a statement
of a material fact, for he impliedly states that he knows facts which justify his opinion.’
372 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 58ff.
373 See Subsection 3.2.2.2 Defects of consent where information was not provided above for mistake
of law, the misrepresentation of law rule was also ablolished after the Kleinwort Benson decision,
see Pankhania v Hackney LBC [2002] EWHC 323 (Ch).
374 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 91ff, 139ff; DIEZ-
PICAZO (n 198) 201.
375 Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 ChD 1.
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claim under section 2(1) of Misrepresentation Act 1967.376
Spanish law does put relatively more emphasis on the deceived party’s con-
duct.377 Although the general rule is similar to that of English law: the fraudulent
conduct of the representor prevails over the lack of diligence of the deceived party,378
the principle of the responsibility in transactions – caveat emptor – also needs to
be pondered against the conduct of the aggrieved party.379 There are two aspects
of the diligence of the party against the fraudulent conduct of the other party: the
diligence in discovering the fraud and the necessity of a certain degree of mistrust.380
For instance, certain qualities of the deceived party: experience, professionalism in
certain field, can prevent the contract from being voidable for dolo.381 On the other
hand, a particular vulnerability of the deceived or apparent trustworthiness of the
fraudulent party make it easier for the claim to succeed.382 In the context of inform-
ation duties and their breach, it is considered that if the information is provided by
one party, then the duty of the other party to check the information for themselves
is limited.383 Such position seems to be echoing the English approach.
The remedies available for misrepresentation under English law, and for dolo
and mistake in the Spanish system as well, will depend on the behaviour of the
representor – the trader. Three main instances need to be considered: fraud, negligent
misrepresentation and innocent misrepresentation. The situations in which one of
the parties provided knowingly untrue information to the other contracting party,
treated as fraudulent misrepresentation in English law and as fraud in Spanish law,
produce similar results in both legal systems – the contract can be avoided and
damages can be recovered.
376 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 365.
377 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia de 26 octubre de 1981 (RJ 1981/4001).
378 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia de 15 julio de 1987 (RJ 1987/5494).
379 GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1269’ (n 225) 9128.
380 Ibid.
381 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia de 7 junio de 1989 (RJ 1989/4348), Fundamentos
de Derecho, Segundo.
382 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia de 27 febrero de 1989 (RJ 1989/1403), Fundamentos
de Derecho, Tercero.
383 GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1269’ (n 225) 9129.
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For fraudulent misrepresentation the aggrieved party can claim rescission and
damages under statute – section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 or in tort of
deceit. The action in fraud of deceit was created by English courts in late eighteenth
century.384 The elements of the tort of deceit are: a false representation made to the
representee by the representor, the fact that the representor intended the represetee
to act upon the representation, the representation was a factor that induced the
representee to enter the contract with representor, and finally, the particular state
of mind of the representor – representor’s lack of honest belief in the truth of the
statement they made.385 In the case of fraudulent misrepresentation, the statement
to be actionable does not have to be necessarily one of fact – any fraudulent state-
ment which was intended to act upon by the representee, be it of fact, law, opinion or
intention, will suffice.386 The core concept for the tort of deceit is ‘fraud’ – the repres-
entor’s state of mind, composed of two elements. First, the lack of honest belief that
the statement made was true – Lord Herschell in Derry v Peek observed that ‘To
prevent a false statement being fraudulent, there must, I think, always be an honest
belief in its truth.’387 Secondly, the representor must intend the statement be acted
upon by the representee.388 The statutory liability for fraudulent misrepresentation
is easier to claim, as there is no need to prove the representor’s lack of honest belief
in the statement’s truthfulness, however the tort of deceit might prove useful again
to consumers denied claim for damages under s 2 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967
due to the availability of private redress under UTR 2008.389
Spanish law requires two main conditions for the fraud to be actionable: the use of
deceptive ‘machinations’ by one of the parties and the effect of those machinations
consisting in inducing the other party to enter into the contract.390 A subjective
384 Pasley v Freeman (1789) 100 ER 450.
385 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 190ff.
386 Ibid 193.
387 (1889) 14 App Cas 337 at 374.
388 Barton v County Natwest Ltd [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 408 at 419, 420.
389 See Section 3.1 Specific remedies available to consumers above.
390 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia de 1 octubre de 1986 (RJ 1986/5229), Fundamentos
de Derecho, 3.
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deliberate intention to deceive and harm on the side of the fraudulent party is
not strictly necessary, the Tribunal Supremo considers it is sufficient if the party
accepts that they may deceive the other party and tries to take advantage of the
situation.391 The vast spectrum of possible fraudulent machinations includes false
statements, concealment, tactics of baiting the other party suggesting an opportunity
of profit, creating an atmosphere of pressure, simple omission of information and
active hiding of unfavourable facts.392 An emphasis is put on the seriousness of
the fraud, ie its potential to induce the other party to contract.393 Finally, it is
considered that the deceptive conduct of both parties deprives them from respective
claims.394 The remedies available for dolo comprise contract rescission (avoidance)
and/or damages.395
Under English law rescission is available in any case of misrepresentation.396 If the
rescission is granted, the contract will be voidable, and not void ab inicio as in the
mistake cases. The contract is avoided retrospectively, from the beginning, and any
performance made under the contract has to be reversed.397 Rescission takes effect
391 STS de 1 octubre de 1986 (RJ 1986/5229), Fundamentos de Derecho, 3.
392 Court decisions describing those and some more possible actions or omissions constituting dolo:
Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia de 18 julio de 1988 (RJ 1988/5727), Fundamentos de
Derecho, Se´ptimo; STS de 27 febrero de 1989 (RJ 1989/1403), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero;
STS de 27 marzo de 1989 (RJ 1989/2201), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero.
393 Art 1270 Co´digo civil ; GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1269’ (n 225) 9124; DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198)
201.
394 Art 1270 Co´digo civil ; GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1270’ (n 170) 9131.
395 See art 1270 Co´digo civil.
396 It is an equitable remedy for misrepresentation developed by courts in the nineteenth century, while
the common law remedy was only damages; sometimes the remedy of rescission was available, but
only when fraud could be proved. Nowadays in practice the aggrieved party can just claim rescission
of the contract in any case of misrepresentation, and it will actually be the equitable remedy, see
CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 101ff.
397 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 106 explains: ‘In the
case of misrepresentation there was a sufficient agreement between the contracting parties to form
a contract (and so the contract was not void ab inicio), but on the representee’s side it was
based on a false assumption which was created or perpetuated by the representor’s statement. The
remedy therefore operates back to the time at which the defect arose: the moment of formation.’
The remedy of rescission has to be contrasted with a prospective remedy of termination of the
contract, where the contract is ‘rescinded’ but only with future effects.
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through an act of election by the aggrieved party, a court order is not necessary,398
and the representee has to communicate his intention to the representor. Until that
moment the latter will be entitled to treat the contract as continuing.399 There are
several bars to rescission, of which the lapse of time is the most interesting in the
context of consumer law, as well as comparative analysis. In what refers to fraudulent
misrepresentation, the time runs against the representee only from the moment when
he discovered that the fraud was committed,400 and not from the time the contract
was made, as in non-fraudulent instances of misrepresentation.
The contract formed under dolo, as well as under error, is voidable according
to art 1301 of the Co´digo civil.401 The limitation period402 is of 4 years counting
from the contract performance.403 Contract rescission operates at the instance of
the aggrieved party and is retroactive.404
The aim of the remedy of rescission is to put the aggrieved party in the same
position they were before they entered the contract. Sometimes however, it is not
possible – then the representee has to claim other possible remedies: indemnity or
damages.405 Indemnity is an equitable remedy, a compensation to a party who under-
took obligations in favour of third parties under a contract which is now rescinded,
available only in addition to contract rescission. If the aggrieved party incurred other
general losses, which cannot be recovered under indemnity, then they will be able
398 ‘The right to set aside or rescind the transaction is that of the representee, not that of the court.’
– T.S.B. Bank Plc. v Camfield [1995] 1 WLR 430 at 438.
399 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 124.
400 Ibid 144ff.
401 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia nu´m. 549/2000 de 5 de junio (RJ 2000/3587),
Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero.
402 Which seems to be of the ‘prescripcio´n’ regime, rather than ‘caducidad’ – see Jose´ Ramo´n GARCI´A
VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1301’ in Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodr´ıguez-Cano (ed), Comentarios al Co´digo
Civil. Vol. VII (Tirant Lo Blanch 2013) 9253-9254; the difference between two types of limitation
periods is that ‘prescripcio´n’ can be interrupted and needs to be invoked by the interested party,
‘caducidad’ extinguishes the right subject to it after the time lapse ipso iure.
403 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n Unica), Sentencia nu´m. 569/2003 de 11 de junio (RJ
2003/5347), Fundamentos de Derecho, Segundo.
404 Ana COLA´S ESCANDO´N, ‘Art´ıculo 1301’ in Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodr´ıguez-Cano (ed), Coment-
arios al Co´digo Civil (3rd edn, Thomson Reuters Aranzadi 2009) 1545.
405 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 120.
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to claim damages.
In the case of fraudulent misrepresentation, these will be damages in tort of
deceit. Damages are awarded to compensate the representee for the loss they suffered
because of their reliance and are designed to put the representee in a position they
would have been if the representation had not been made, according to the tortious
measure of damages.406 Damages in tort of deceit can include a potential, probable
benefit lost,407 for instance because of a lost opportunity to engage in a profitable
business, since the recoverable loss is the one suffered due to the fact that the
representee had entered into a contract in the first place: ‘in cases of fraud a plaintiff
is entitled to any loss which flowed from the defendant’s fraud, even if the loss could
not have been foreseen: see Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd. [1969] 2 QB 158.’408
The representee who suffered loss due to the fraudulent misrepresentation can also
claim damages under the Misrepresentation Act 1967,409 which is more attractive
406 As explained by Balcombe LJ in Royscot Trust Ltd v Rogerson [1991] 2 QB 297 at 304: ‘(...)
the tortious measure, [operates] so as to put the representee in the position in which he would
have been if he had never entered into the contract, or the contractual measure, so as to put the
representee in the position in which he would have been if the misrepresentation had been true,
and thus in some cases give rise to a claim for damages for loss of bargain.’
407 See East v Maurer [1991] 1 WLR 461.
408 Royscot Trust Ltd v Rogerson at 305.
409 Which nevertheless is a controversial question and may be overturned by the Supreme Court,
should a case on the issue arise. As of now, s 2(1) Misrepresentation Act 1967 is interpreted
as incorporating all the aspects of the claim in tort of deceit, except for the representor’s state of
mind (however the intention that the statement be acted upon still has to be proved). The problem
arises in what refers to the measure of damages, especially whether it is the measure of damages
as in tort of deceit or as in tort of negligence, since apart from the scope mentioned above, the
remoteness of damage rule is also different. S 2(1) Misrepresentation Act 1967 states that: ‘(...) if
the person making the misrepresentation would be liable to damages in respect thereof had the
misrepresentation been made fraudulently, that person shall be so liable notwithstanding that the
misrepresentation was not made fraudulently (...).’ The words ‘so liable’, according to the law
as it now stands, are interpreted this way that the measure of damages is in tort of deceit – in
Royscot Trust Ltd v Rogerson at 305 Balcombe LJ explained: ‘in my judgment the wording of
the subsection is clear: the person making the innocent misrepresentation shall be “so liable,” i.e.,
liable to damages as if the representation had been made fraudulently.’ However, CARTWRIGHT,
Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 378ff points out that it appears likely that
the Supreme Court will overrule those decisions changing the measures of damages to be the same
as in tort of negligence. Lord Steyn in Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] AC
254 at 283 observed: ‘The question is whether the rather loose wording of the statute compels the
court to treat a person who was morally innocent as if he was guilty of fraud when it comes to the
measure of damages. There has been trenchant academic criticism of the Royscot case: see Richard
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to the representee, as the measure of damages is the same for both actions, under
the Act there is no need to prove the representor’s state of mind.
In what refers to Spanish law, the nature of liability for fraud and mistake as
well is not clear, some treat it as contractual, others are inclined to consider it to be
tortious.410 The courts seem to be in favour of the contractual measure of damages
in the case of defects of consent arising from fraud and mistake.411 Such approach
is based on the second para of art 1270 of the Co´digo civil, stating that a minor
fraud (dolo incidental) gives rise only to liability in damages, and not to contract
rescission. Hence, the contract stands despite the fraud that took place. Moreover,
the Tribunal Supremo decided that the action in contract rescission for fraud and
the action in damages are independent, meaning that the aggrieved party can claim
one of the actions or both at the same time, up to their discretion.412 Thus the party
may be awarded damages for fraud but the contract will stay valid. The standpoint
of Spanish law is therefore different to that of English law: contract rescission is
not available in all instances of fraud and damages are subject to the contractual
measure. Such discrepancy between the two systems may partly stem from the fact
that fraud under English law vitiates the contract, ie the agreement of the parties
suffer and therefore the system tries to remove such transactions. On the other hand,
Spanish law considers it is the party’s consent that has been vitiated, so if they so
Hooley, “Damages and the Misrepresentation Act 1967” (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 547. Since this point
does not directly arise in the present case, I express no concluded view on the correctness of the
decision in the Royscot case.’
410 In favour of the contractual liability see eg Germa´n BERCOVITZ A´LVAREZ, ‘Art´ıculo 1270’ in
Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodr´ıguez-Cano (ed), Comentarios al Co´digo Civil (3rd edn, Thomson Reuters
Aranzadi 2009) 1503; GO´MEZ POMAR, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Espan˜ol’
(n 5) 20; in favour of the liability of tortious (extracontractual) nature: GARCI´A VICENTE,
‘Art´ıculo 1270’ (n 170) 9134-9135; Antonio Manuel MORALES MORENO, ‘El Dolo como Criterio
de Imputacio´n de Responsabilidad al Vendedor por los Defectos de la Cosa’ (1982) 35 Anuario de
Derecho Civil 591, 629.
411 See eg: Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Recurso de Casacio´n nu´m. 1929/1992, Sentencia de 14
de diciembre 1995 (RJ 1995/9101), Fundamentos de Derecho, Segundo; Tribunal Supremo (Sala
de lo Civil), Sentencia nu´m. 396/2000 de 19 de abril (RJ 2000/3185), Fundamentos de Derecho,
Septimo, Noveno; Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia nu´m. 671/2000 de 30 de junio
(RJ 2000/6747), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero; Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil, Seccio´n
1a), Sentencia nu´m. 1/2007 de 18 de enero (RJ 2007/529), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero; STS
nu´m. 289/2009 de 5 de mayo (RJ 2009/2907), Fundamentos de Derecho, Sexto.
412 STS nu´m. 1/2007 de 18 de enero (RJ 2007/529), Fundamentos de Derecho, Tercero.
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desire, the contract can stand whilst the loss suffered needs to be compensated. Now
if the contract is not set aside, the logical measure of damages is the contractual one,
putting the party in the position they would be, have the contract been performed
correctly, as this is what the party needs.413
Tort of negligence differs from fraudulent misrepresentation primarily because
the claim in the former is based on representor’s failure to take reasonable care,
as opposed to intentional fraud. In English law, the development of the action for
careless statements (misrepresentation) in tort of negligence started in early twen-
tieth century,414 but it was finally created as late as in 1963 in the decision Hedley
Byrne.415 The elements of the claim in tort of negligence are: the representor owing
a duty of care to the representee in making the representation, the representor being
in breach of that duty by failing to take reasonable care, the representee suffering
loss of a kind that is within the scope of the duty and not too remote in consequence
of the representor’s breach of the duty.416 The tort of negligence as such is not spe-
cifically aimed at careless statements, and all the elements of a claim in tort of
negligence are to be present.417 It was not until the Esso Petroleum Co. that the
responsibility in tort of negligence for pre-contractual misrepresentation was con-
firmed.418 In the action in tort of negligence for careless statements the factor of
representee’s reliance on the statement made takes primary importance. There is
413 STS nu´m. 289/2009 de 5 de mayo (RJ 2009/2907), Fundamentos de Derecho, Sexto.
414 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 248ff where various cases
marking this development are cited.
415 [1964] AC 465, until that time in practice only representors making fraudulent representation could
face liability.
416 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 254.
417 This is not the aim of this study to discuss the tort of negligence in general, for more on tort of
negligence see eg Paula GILIKER, Tort (5th edn, Textbook Series, Sweet & Maxwell 2014).
418 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v Mardon [1976] QB 801 at 820: ‘It seems to me that Hedley Byrne & Co.
Ltd. v Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465, properly understood, covers this particular propos-
ition: if a man, who C has or professes to have special knowledge or skill, makes a representation
by virtue thereof to another—be it advice, information or opinion—with the intention of inducing
him to enter into a contract with him, he is under a duty to use reasonable care to see that the
representation is correct, and that the advice, information or opinion is reliable. If he negligently
gives unsound advice or misleading information or expresses an erroneous opinion, and thereby
induces the other side to enter into a contract with him, he is liable in damages.’
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no distinction between statements of fact, opinion, law or intentions. The test is
whether in the circumstances the particular representee was reasonably entitled to
rely on the statement.419
Remedies for negligent misrepresentation can be claimed either in tort of neg-
ligence or on the basis of statutory liability out of s 2(1) of the Misrepresentation
Act 1967. The Act uses a so-called ‘fiction of fraud’ – the representor will be liable
under the Act if he would have been liable in damages in the tort of deceit, if he
was fraudulent.420 Therefore the representee will have to prove all the elements of
the tort of deceit in respect of the statement made to them, except for the fraud,
which is the most difficult one to establish in the context of the tort of deceit. Al-
though the Act technically speaking does not use the term ‘negligence’, in practice
the liability imposed is for statements where the representor cannot prove that he
was both honest and reasonable in his belief that the statement he made was true,
which is therefore the liability for negligence. The action under s 2(1) of the Act
places the burden of proof on the representor to establish that they had reasonable
grounds to believe and actually did believe that their representation was true. This
is a significant advantage for the aggrieved party in comparison with both tort of
deceit and tort of negligence, where the representee has to prove the breach of duty
of care. Moreover, damages under the Act are more generously awarded than in tort
of negligence, since to the former the same measure as in tort of deceit applies, as
the law now stands.421
Spanish law distinguishes between fraud and provoked mistake (error provocado)
both in theory422 and practice.423 Breach of information duties by one party leads to
419 Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. at 503: ‘(...) if in a sphere in which a person is so placed that others
could reasonably rely upon his judgment or his skill or upon his ability to make careful inquiry, a
person takes it upon himself to give information or advice to, or allows his information or advice
to be passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will place reliance upon it,
then a duty of care will arise.’
420 See CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 360 who explains
where this ‘curious device’ comes from.
421 See footnote 409 above.
422 DIEZ-PICAZO (n 198) 216.
423 SAP Madrid nu´m. 820/2013 de 5 de noviembre (AC 2013/2193), Fundamentos de Derecho, Viges-
imoprimero, Vigesimosegundo.
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the other party’s misapprehension which induces that party to enter into the contract
– an element of both fraud and mistake actions under Spanish law.424 Nevertheless,
for the dolo to be actionable, a fraudulent intention discussed above must be present.
If it is not, as for instance in the case described in the SAP Madrid nu´m. 820/2013
de 5 de noviembre (AC 2013/2193), then the court will consider the existence of
error provocado. In such case, the elements of error, ie essentiality (fundamentality)
and excusability, must be proved. The defandant’s behaviour has influence on the
latter condition – that the mistake must be excusable, meaning not attributable to
the mistaken party. If the defandant had provoked the mistake, it is more probable
that the mistaken party will obtain the relief.425 The error provocado is independent
from the subjective intentions of the party that induced the mistake – if they do not
amount to fraud, then it does not matter if they provoked the other party’s error
negligently or innocently.
Remedies available to the aggrieved party in the case of negligent misrepresent-
ation will be rescission, together with indemnity and damages. In what refers to
damages in negligence, their scope is more limited than the scope of damages in
tort of deceit, since it depends on the scope of the duty of care, in Cartwright’s
words: ‘(...) the recoverable loss is limited to that which flows from the information
being inaccurate, and does not extend, for example, to other losses which flow from
[representee’s] entering into the contract.’426
General losses incurred can also be recoverable under s 2(1) of the Misrepres-
entation Act 1967.427 Damages under the Act are also calculated in tort measure,
although the remedy is restricted only to contracting parties, while under the tort
of negligence it is available in all cases where the representee can establish the ex-
istence of the duty of care. On the other hand, the extent of damages is higher,
according to the current law, under the statute and the elements of the claim under
the Act are easier to establish, as mentioned above, therefore especially in the con-
text of pre-contractual statements the action under the Act will be more attractive
424 See arts 1266 and 1270 Co´digo civil.
425 GARCI´A VICENTE, ‘Art´ıculo 1266’ (n 221) 9106.
426 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 382.
427 Ibid 121.
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to the representee. Nevertheless, as we shall remember, the action in damages for
misrepresentation under s 2 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 is excluded when the
consumer can apply for private redress for a misleading commercial action under
the UTR 2008.428
The rescission is limited by the lapse of time, in the case of non-fraudulent
misrepresentation, the representee should not delay too long after the contract was
made — an action for misrepresentation has to be brought ‘within a reasonable
time.’429 Misrepresentation Act 1967 provides the courts with statutory discretion
to refuse rescission in the case of non-fraudulent misrepresentation and to award
damages instead.430 Although the right to damages is excluded in many consumer
cases, the right to rescind a contract is not affected by this provision, therefore the
court even in such instances will keep the discretion to refuse rescission. However,
as Peel points out, it is unlikely to so refuse, as it will be no longer able to award
damages in lieu.431
Negligently or innocently induced error under Spanish law will give rise to the
same remedy as mistake in general, ie contract rescission. Even though the mistake
may be induced by the other party in a negligent manner, the legal system does not
provide for compensation of losses incurred.
Under English law, also an innocent misrepresentation may be actionable. It
occurs when the false statement, which induced the injured party to enter the con-
tract, was made neither fraudulently nor negligently by the representor. Remedies
for innocent misrepresentation are more limited than those available in the instances
428 S 2(4) Misrepresentation Act 1967.
429 See Leaf v International Galleries [1950] 2 KB 86 at 92; CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation,
Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 152.
430 S 2(2) Misrepresentation Act 1967 reads: ‘Where a person has entered into a contract after a
misrepresentation has been made to him otherwise than fraudulently, and he would be entitled, by
reason of the misrepresentation, to rescind the contract, then, if it is claimed, in any proceedings
arising out of the contract, that the contract ought to be or has been rescinded, the court or
arbitrator may declare the contract subsisting and award damages in lieu of rescission, if of opinion
that it would be equitable to do so, having regard to the nature of the misrepresentation and the
loss that would be caused by it if the contract were upheld, as well as to the loss that rescission
would cause to the other party.’
431 PEEL (n 197) 437.
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where the representor was negligent or fraudulent. The main remedy is rescission.432
The victim of innocent misrepresentation will be also entitled to indemnity, so that
they could be restored to the position before making the contract, nevertheless,
there is no remedy of damages for innocent misrepresentation. Under section 2(2)
of Misrepresentation Act 1967 the court will however have a discretion to award
damages in lieu of rescission. If the right to rescission is lost, then there will be no
available remedy for innocent misrepresentation.433
3.3 Problem of adequacy of general remedies to
particularities of B2C electronic contracts
3.3.1 Problems resulting from application of general rem-
edies
Figures 1. – 4. illustrate the role of the general law remedies in the context of the
breach of information duties in consumer contracts. In many cases, it is mainly the
general law system that provides remedies, which is true even in the case of electronic
contracts. Nevertheless, in spite of the availability of those remedies, both systems:
English and Spanish, have also introduced specific statutory remedies for consumer
contracts. If the general law doctrines analysed above in Section 3.2 General private
law and remedies it offers, mainly breach of contract based on incorporation of in-
formation into the contract and defects of consent, are efficient in protecting the
interest of the consumer in receiving certain information from the trader, it should
be considered redundant to introduce additional information duties together with
specific remedies for their breach.434 On the one hand, the proliferation of informa-
432 According to Derry v Peek at 359, rescission in equity is available for innocent misrepresentation:
‘Where rescission is claimed it is only necessary to prove that there was misrepresentation; then,
however honestly it may have been made, however free from blame the person who made it, the
contract, having been obtained by misrepresentation, cannot stand.’
433 See eg Zanzibar v British Aerospace [2000] 1 WLR 2333.
434 EIDENMULLER (n 134) 1112-1113.
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tion duties at the European level and their necessary transposition into the national
systems is definitely to blame for the quantity of the specific duties and remedies in
the national law,435 however on the other hand the national legislators also adopted
some specific schemes of remedies – as the example of the new private redress rights
under Part 4A of the UTR 2008 in English law shows.
The question arises if the general private national laws can fulfil a meaningful
function in the scheme of remedies available for breach of information duties and
therefore if the introduction of specific statutory redress rights is necessary.436 As
already discussed, the amount of information duties established in the European
acquis and implemented into the national laws causes concern, similarly creating
new remedies available only to parties considered consumers can also have negative
effect on the legal system and market functioning.437
Provision of an excessive amount of information leads to information overload, a
phenomenon which results in consumers not understanding any of the information
items provided.438 In such cases, consumers’ transactional decisions cannot be taken
on a rational informed basis. Nevertheless, remedies for lack of appropriate inform-
ation are of little help here: firstly, because the information is effectively received,
and secondly, even if provision of excessive information can be considered as breach
435 See Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.2 Major problematic issues related to the remedies for breach.
436 EIDENMULLER (n 134) 1119 consider that the Member States should be particularly cautious
about incorporating the specific information duties originating in the European law ‘into their
general contract laws and thus subjecting them to the standard contractual remedies, as it is by
no means obvious that the application of such remedies fulfils a meaningful function.’
437 EIDENMULLER (n 134) 1113; the issue needs to be approached from at least two angles: firstly,
the discussion should take into account the arguments of morality and social justice, balancing
protection of weaker parties with principles of freedom of contract and party autonomy. This
point of view is characteristic for continental legal traditions. Secondly, economic analysis of law
reasoning, closer to common law systems, should assist answering questions about the extent of
protection through information duties in the e-commerce – see GILIKER, ‘Regulating Contracting
Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French Law’ (n 127) 639.
438 Proliferation of information duties in consumer contracts is a widely criticised issue, as noted in
Subsection 1.1.2.3 Issues relative to information duties in consumer contracts. It seems however,
that at least in some areas, the legislator has started to take into consideration the problem of
information overload and its influence on consumer’s transactional decision – see for instance
Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November
2014 on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products
(PRIIPs) [2014] OJ L352/1.
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of information duties, the remedies for breach also present the same negative char-
acteristic as the duties themselves – they are established in a rather chaotic manner.
Therefore, despite the fact that, at least in some cases of breach, the remedies are
abundant, the consumers still might find it difficult to access the remedies.
It can be pointed out that the availability of too many remedies, and especially
of different character, ie stemming from general traditional rules or from specific
consumer legislation, either does not contribute to clarity of the legal framework.
The lack of clarity in turn is detrimental to consumers who cannot effectively access
their rights, as they simply do not understand them.439
It needs to be noted that the general private law remedies had been developed
much earlier than even the very concept of consumer contracts and consumer pro-
tection appeared. Therefore, if we talk about English law, we have to bear in mind
that the English contract law and remedies it offers are not only influenced to a
great extent, but often even created in the course of commercial litigation between
traders resulting from conflicts that appeared in some B2B transactions.440 On the
other hand, the continental law, especially French and Spanish systems, but also
other legal systems under the heritage of the Napoleonic Code, focus more on C2C
contracts, where none of the parties is specialised or has importantly greater eco-
nomic power than the other.441 The economics of such contracts, be it B2B or C2C,
are very different from those of B2C transactions where consumers are bargain-
ing with traders. From the regulator’s point of view, businesspersons market beha-
viour is more predictable, rational, their main goal being maximising their profit.442
439 Cf observations expressed by GILIKER, ‘The Consumer Rights Act 2015 — a Bastion of European
Consumer Rights?’ (n 14) 8-9 in the context of the CRA 2015 and (the lack of) transposition of
the Directive on consumer rights through the Act.
440 See BEALE, ‘Pre-contractual Obligations: The General Contract Law Background’ (n 131) 47,
who while discussing the principle of the lack of a general obligation to act in good faith and a
duty to disclose in English law, explains that: ‘English law is very heavily influenced by the heavy
diet of commercial cases that are heard in English courts’; see also Paula GILIKER, ‘A Role for
Tort in Pre-contractual Negotiations? An Examination of English, French, and Canadian Law’
(2003) 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 969, 970.
441 However, parties are considered to be reasonable, knowledgeable men that know law well, see Elias
N STEBEK, ‘Zweigert and Kotz on West European Legal Traditions’ (2008) 2 Mizan Law Review
353, 361; PICATOSTE BOBILLO (n 206) 374.
442 Klaus MATHIS and Ariel David STEFFEN, ‘From Rational Choice to Behavioural Econom-
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Consumers, looking for goods of everyday utility or leisure are more likely to be
driven by irrational emotions, making their preferences less stable and predictable.443
Moreover, consumers’ distinct motivation in contracting together with the moderate
value of effectuated purchases, especially in the context of the e-commerce, logically
decreases their inclination to take part in litigation. The particularities of consumer
contracts and the necessity of special treatement of those contracts brought about
the development of consumer law as a distinct from the general contract law field,
which has been appreciated by the legislators at the European level, but also at the
national level, hence the adoption of the TRLDCU in Spain and the recent CRA
2015 in the UK.
The first issue linked to the use of general law remedies in consumer contracts is
the fact that the traditional private law claims for defects of consent and breach of
contract involve traditional court proceedings as means of enforcement. It does not
mean that the specific remedies are enforced differently: the specific consumer law
remedies also need to be enforced through the courts proceedings, however the way
they operate in what refers to the burden of proof and lesser complexity of actions
needs to be noted.444 Private redress rights for a misleading omission constituting an
unfair commercial practice445 compared with the law of misrepresentation in England
can constitute an example. Law Commission in their report regarding the potential
establishment of private redress rights in consumer contracts recommended the ad-
option of a specific scheme due to issues concerning the law of misrepresentation; it
was noted that:
(...) consumers must rely on existing private law doctrines, such as the
law of misrepresentation and duress. This is problematic: the law of
ics: Theoretical Foundations, Empirical Findings and Legal Implications’ in Klaus Mathis (ed),
European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics (Springer 2015) 35.
443 Richard A POSNER, ‘Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law’ (1997) 50 Stanford
Law Review 1551, 1553ff; see also observations made in Chapter 1 Subsection 1.1.2.2 The model
of consumer in the e-commerce law.
444 See art 6.9 of the Directive on consumer rights, which states: ‘As regards compliance with the
information requirements laid down in this Chapter [on consumer information and right of with-
drawal for distance and off-premises contracts], the burden of proof shall be on the trader.’
445 See reg 5 and regs 27Aff UTR 2008.
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misrepresentation is complex and uncertain;446
(...) In private law, misleading actions fall within the law of ‘misrep-
resentation,’ which is a large and varied set of rules. In theory the law
provides redress for most misleading trade practices where consumers
suffer detriment, but it is fragmented, complex and unclear. It is partic-
ularly difficult to apply in a consumer context, because the law primarily
evolved to deal with business disputes.447
B2C online transactions usually concern goods or services of a limited value and
of an everyday utility for consumers, often related to leisure activities or hobbies.448
Private law remedies may be well established in relation to commercial contracts in
English law, or certain transactions between individuals in continental legal systems,
where parties on equal footing negotiate contractual terms and conditions, never-
theless they are flawed as potential remedies in B2C e-commerce standard form
contracts. Court proceedings in civil cases are costly and lengthy, which results in
consumers’ general reluctance to take action in court in a case of a dispute with
traders in general, not only over an online transaction.449 Furthermore, disputes
that finally end up in courts in their great majority are those concerning consumer
contracts of a significant value, as the Spanish courts’ decisions cited in the present
study show; these are concerning for example property purchase,450 cars,451 or mort-
446 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive
Practices (Law Com No 332, 2012 / Scot Law Com No 226, 2012) Summary para S.2.
447 Ibid para S.12.
448 Consider products commonly purchased on the Internet: transport tickets (plane etc), holiday
rentals (hotels, cars, apartments), clothes, sports equipment, cosmetics, digital content such as
music, films and computer games, see for instance Alberto UREN˜A and others, Estudio sobre
Comercio Electro´nico B2C 2013: Edicio´n 2014 (Observatorio Nacional de las Telecomunicaciones
y de la SI 2014)).
449 See Commission, ‘Consumer empowerment’ Special Eurobarometer No. 342 (2011), 184, 204 <http:
//ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer empowerment/docs/report eurobarometer 342 en.pdf> Ac-
cessed 10 January 2016, for the reasons consumers themselves give for avoiding court proceedings.
450 SAP La Rioja nu´m. 396/2011 de 1 de diciembre (AC/2011/2394); SAP Madrid nu´m. 52/2012 de
30 de enero (JUR/2012/228888); SAP Madrid nu´m. 709/2010 de 10 de noviembre (AC/2011/668).
451 SAP Almer´ıa nu´m. 38/2015 de 3 de marzo (JUR/2015/172394); SAP Ourense de 10 de julio 2001
(AC/2001/1294); SAP A Corun˜a nu´m. 404/2007 de 24 septiembre (AC/2008/435); SAP Barcelona
nu´m. 100/2008 de 22 de febrero (AC/2008/660).
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gages and financial instruments of high value and complexity,452 although some court
decisions relative to contracts of lower value can be found as well, mainly in the con-
text of the lack of conformity.453 Also, when general law remedies are invoked, the
burden of proving the damage caused by the lack of relevant information stays on
the consumer. In conclusion, general law remedies may therefore be not effective as
deterrent in the mass standard form adhesion contracts.454
Deemed to be faster and considerably cheaper than litigation, Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution (ADR) schemes offer a possible solution to many problematic issues
linked with traditional court proceedings in relation to disputes arising from B2C
online contracts. Recently, the Directive on consumer ADR and the Regulation on
Online Dispute Resolution were adopted.455 Nevertheless, it is pointed out that
ADRs present major drawbacks, especially for consumers in B2C contracts: con-
sumer rights are often not protected sufficiently and the decisions are not published,
which entails less legal certainty.456 In ADR schemes consumer cannot enforce their
rights to the same extent as in litigation and the solutions – remedies – offered will
often be different from the traditional ones.
Furthermore, breach of information duties will often not produce enough material
damage on the side of consumers to make them willing to claim misrepresentation,
452 SAP Islas Baleares nu´m. 457/2010 de 23 de noviembre (JUR/2011/46728); SAP Madrid nu´m.
820/2013 de 5 de noviembre (AC/2013/2193).
453 Disputes concerning contracts relative to eg: phone bill – SAP Alicante nu´m. 118/2002 de
4 de marzo (AC/2002/825); special breed dogs – SAP Granada nu´m. 485/2008 de 21 de
noviembre (JUR/2009/60612); quad motorbike – SAP Ourense nu´m. 340/2008 de 22 de septiembre
(JUR/2009/81438); vitroceramic cooktop and oven – SAP Pontevedraa nu´m. 337/2009 de 9 de julio
(AC/2009/1840).
454 Gisela RUHL, ‘Alternative and Online Dispute Resolution for Cross-Border Consumer Contracts:
a Critical Evaluation of the European Legislature’s Recent Efforts to Boost Competitiveness and
Growth in the Internal Market’ (2015) 38 Journal of Consumer Policy 431, 432.
455 Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on
online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and
Directive 2009/22/EC [2013] OJ L165/01; for a comment on those texts see Agust´ın MADRID
PARRA, ‘Directiva 2013/11 (ADR) y Reglamento 524/2013 (ODR): una Apuesta Europea por
la Solucio´n Alternativa de Litigios y en pro del Comercio Electro´nico Transfronterizo’ (2013) 18
Spain arbitration review: revista del Club Espan˜ol del Arbitraje 37, 37ff.
456 For comprehensive analysis of disadvantages of ADRs in consumer cases see RUHL (n 454) 443,
and the studies cited there.
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other defects of consent or breach of contract. Apart from the compensation available
when material damage can be proved, consumers whose contractual right of inform-
ation has been breached, would often benefit from a simple contract rescission. As
far as the market efficiency is concerned, this solution allows customers to allocate
their resources again in a better way, and leaves dishonest traders eventually out of
the market. Rescission should be granted when some important misapprehension as
to the contract terms or facts has occurred vitiating parties’ consent at the moment
of concluding the contract. Nonetheless, general private law is reluctant to intervene
in misapprehension cases. In general, the mere fact of making a mistake does not
allow parties to set the contract aside.457
Moreover, also in misrepresentation – or fraud and provoked mistake cases –
consumers may find it difficult to obtain a remedy of contract avoidance or rectifica-
tion. This is because the burden of proof is on them to establish that they would not
have entered into the contract at all, or only on different terms, had the information
duties been fulfilled correctly. The relevance of many information items established
in the Schedule 2 of the Consumer Contracts Regulations or arts 60 and 97.1 of the
TRLDCU might not be sufficient for the consumer to show they would not have
concluded the contract, had they been provided those information items.458
Legislative burden of proof reversal, as established for example in the art 6.9 of
the Directive on consumer rights, and transposed through art 97.8 of the TRLDCU
in Spanish law and reg 17 of the Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 in English
law, makes it easier for consumers to claim various specific remedies for informa-
tion requirements breach – and especially those established directly in the Directive.
Nevertheless, in some cases of specific remedies, as for instance those arising out of
reg 27A of the Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 or claims for the lack of conformity,
it is the consumer who needs to prove that their transactional decision was influ-
enced by the trader’s misleading action or that they failed to receive information
that would make the product conforming to the contract. As already discussed in
Subsection3.1.1Specific remedies available to consumers, such placement of the bur-
den of proof may effectively bar consumers’ access to some remedies. Consequently,
457 CARTWRIGHT, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 150) 587ff.
458 EIDENMULLER (n 134) 1122.
348
3.3. PROBLEM OF ADEQUACY OF GENERAL REMEDIES TO
PARTICULARITIES OF B2C ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS
burden of proof reversal may constitute a useful measure in widening the availability
of the remedies for breach of information requirements. However, it is understand-
able that in some cases it may be impossible for a trader to prove for instance
that his actions could not influence consumer’s decision. It seems appropriate in the
first place, therefore, to require traders to provide proof of having complied with
information duties, also those of an indirect character. Furthermore, in the respect
of specific claims arising out of misleading actions ex reg 27A of the Unfair Trading
Regulations 2008 or relative to the lack of conformity of the product with the con-
tract, effectively at least the burden of proving that the misleading action was not
likely to induce an average consumer to contract or that the product was conforming
to the contract, should be placed on the trader. Clearly in what refers to the general
law and rules relative to the defects of consent and breach of contract, the onus is
on the consumer-claimant.
Those limitations are due to the underpinning principles of contract law and the
ever-present necessity to strike a balance between the certainty of transactions on
the one hand, and the protection of the mistaken party on the other. Neoclassical
trend in economic analysis of law goes even further, implying that courts should not
intervene when one of the parties to the transaction is mistaken, thus promoting act-
ive market participants who take steps to avoid mistakes by reading and analysing
available information relevant to the contract beforehand.459 It is also argued that
in situations of mere information deficiency judicial intervention could be harmful,
as it would lead to withdrawal of some offers from the market. This consequence
would be due to the high costs of informing consumers to the satisfaction of courts,
especially when there are excessive information requirements in force.460 Moreover,
it is also argued that non-disclosure can be justified as increasing general welfare, as
459 See Richard A EPSTEIN, ‘Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market Corrections’ (2006)
73 The University of Chicago Law Review 111, 116-117, who concludes that the solution is: ‘rather
it is to set up a firm rule so that all those who are about to participate in commercial affairs take
steps to minimize that gap [between intention and performance] by learning to say what they mean
(as well as mean what they say).’
460 Eric A POSNER, ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure?’
[2002] John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 146 <http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=304977> accessed 20 September 2016, 15.
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it promotes investing in information.461 Finally, each system needs to balance the
protection of the mistaken party with the fact that it will inevitably increase uncer-
tainty. Beale notes that the application of general standards, such as good faith and
fair dealing principle has such effect, and for instance in the context of English law,
an increase in uncertainty is highly undesired: certainty of transactions is one of the
most important ‘export’ values of English law, hence in so many commercial rela-
tionships parties choose the law of England and Wales to govern their contracts.462
Nevertheless, the position of numerous continental legal traditions, of which Spanish
law can constitute an example, is that generally speaking the mistaken party was not
sufficiently informed, and therefore the contract should not be binding on them463 –
either because it is immoral, since their promise was based on false assumptions, or
because it will not be good for the contract as means of wealth exchange – parties
will not be better off after such transaction.464
A legally established relief for the mistaken party may indeed have some adverse
effects discouraging parties from trying to avoid mistakes, but only when contract
is being concluded between two equally situated parties.465 However, this classic
approach cannot be justified in consumer contracts where one of the parties is out
of its definition less informed and imperfectly rational.466 Therefore legal remedies
461 BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (n 176) 92; in
consequence however disclosure should be mandatory if the information was or could be acquired
at no cost or at very low cost, see Robert B COOTER and Thomas ULEN, Law and Economics
(6th edn, The Pearson Series in Economics, Addison-Wesley 2011) 358.
462 BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (n 176) 116.
463 See eg Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), Sentencia nu´m. 1134/1999 de 22 de diciembre
(RJ/1999/9369), Fundamentos de Derecho, Cuarto, where different types of mistake – mistake
as a defect of consent and mistake making the contract non-existent, are discussed.
464 BEALE, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Fact: Models for English Contract Law (n 176) 77ff.
465 Oren BAR-GILL, ‘The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts’ (2007) 92 Minnesota Law
Review 749, 790-791 states that: ‘put differently, Professor Epstein presumes that the mistaken
party is the least-cost avoider, and thus should bear responsibility for the mistake. Professor Ep-
stein’s concerns (...) are justified in the classic contractual interaction between two symmetrically-
situated parties. They are not justified in consumer contracts, where sophisticated sellers with
superior information engage in form contracting with imperfectly informed and imperfectly ra-
tional consumers.’
466 Cf observations made in Chapter 1 Subsection 1.1.2.2 The model of consumer in the e-commerce
law.
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for consumers that were mistaken, or better said, whose mistake was induced by
flawed information provided by traders, should exist and be easily available.
Furthermore, where no particular remedy for breach of some specific information
duties is established, often the breach will have no consequences whatsoever for
the trader.467 After the cooling-off period, discussed below, has expired, consumers
usually have no individually enforceable rights against businesspersons who did not
provide them with certain information.468 This is due to the fact that the general
private law remedies usually require a measurable damage to occur on the side of
the aggrieved party, which may be quite difficult to prove in the case of lack of
some information. Only specific and adapted remedies will be useful for consumers
and therefore will give traders enough incentive to disclose true information in a
transparent and efficient manner in order to stay on the market.469
Currently, in both English and Spanish law, specific and general law remedies
do depend to a certain extent on the importance of the information duty breached.
Nevertheless, as observed above, they do not cover the whole spectrum of pos-
sible instances of breach. In addition to the excessive information duties established
mainly in the specific consumer law 470 this leads to a rather chaotic regulation of
the issue. Therefore, it would be appropriate to consider deregulating the question
of information duties, through limiting the information duties only to information
items that allow the duties to fulfil their main function, ie that directly influence
the consumer’s transactional decision. Other information items, which a consumer
may need for instance at a later stage of the contractual relationship, eg if the con-
tract is breached by the trader, could be provided on a durable medium at the very
467 Hans-W MICKLITZ, ‘Do Consumers and Businesses Need a New Architecture of Consumer Law?
A Thought-Provoking Impulse’ (2013) 32 Yearbook of European Law 266, 316 considers that: ‘The
vulnerability of the information paradigm becomes clear as we explore the weak link of individual
legal redress. The violation of the detailed information obligations remains largely without con-
sequence in civil law. The reason lies in the overwhelming number of duties which hinders the
matching of obligations with adequate remedies.’
468 See ibid 272, where it is pointed out that: ‘Should it emerge afterwards that they did not receive
certain information, they will realise that they have no individually enforceable rights against the
business based on the lack of the required information.’
469 Stefan HAUPT, ‘An Economic Analysis of Consumer Protection in Contract Law’ (2003) 4 German
Law Journal 1137, 1148.
470 Cf Section 1.1.2.3 Issues relative to information duties in consumer contracts.
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moment of contract formation – the consumer actually does not need to read those
pieces of information before entering a contract. Introduction of such a distinction
between key information items and other information would then allow to reorganise
the scheme of remedies for breach of information duties. Breach of key information
should be mainly protected through a remedy of contract rescission – if we consider
that this information induced a consumer into the contract, therefore if it is false or
lacking (creating a false impression), the consumer should be able to recover their
money and satisfy their needs somewhere else. Breach of other information items,
however, could be subject to other remedies, depending on the importance of the in-
formation in question and the reasons for its breach. Moreover, simplification of the
information duties and remedies for their breach should be complemented through
public enforcement, especially when provision of adequate means of redress is pos-
sible, as eg established in s 219A of the Enterprise Act 2002. This way, consumers
who suffered loss due to trader’s lack of compliance with the information duties,
will be able to avoid the necessity of asserting their rights individually through
court proceedings.
3.3.2 Right of withdrawal as an example of a specific remedy
The right of withdrawal – or cancellation – goes against the traditional principle
common to all the European systems of contract law: pacta sunt servanda.471 Nev-
ertheless, it has been present from the very beginning of consumer protection dir-
ectives, and is recognised by the DCFR.472
Efficiency of establishing specific remedies is hindered by the ever expanding list
of information requirements. Firstly, information items are not all of the same im-
portance for the consumer’s informed consent and understanding of the contract,
and secondly, the great and increasing with each new directive number of the duties
makes it almost impossible to match a specifically tailored remedy to the breach
of each requirement. An often proposed solution is to create certain groups of re-
471 Horst EIDENMULLER, ‘Why Withdrawal Rights?’’ (2011) 7 European Review of Contract Law
1, 2-4.
472 DCFR arts II.–5:201 and II.–5:202.
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quirements that would be protected with the same remedy, for instance information
duties so important that their breach would result in consumer’s right to cancel the
contract based for example on the institution of culpa in contrahendo, and there-
fore reaching beyond the scope and application of the currently established right of
withdrawal.473 This solution nevertheless also presents a major disadvantage in the
context of consumer contracts, as it would involve civil proceedings in the court of
law, which are not adapted well to the economics of low cost Internet contracts.
Effective remedies for breach of information duties not only should be easily
enforced by consumers, but also the law should establish detailed rules as to how
they operate, in so far as possible avoiding court’s intervention. An example of such
particular remedy can constitute the right of withdrawal, also referred to as the
cooling-off period. The right of withdrawal is a special case of a remedy restoring
contractual balance in B2C distance and especially electronic contracts.474
The cooling-off period in its very own nature constitutes a remedy to information
asymmetry present in contracts formed over the Internet. It allows the consumer to
check the qualities of the good personally and physically at a relatively small cost
— the buyer only has to pay for the depreciation of the good and for the return. As
discussed in Chapter 1 Subsection 1.1.2.1 The role of pre-contractual information in
the European consumer policy, search goods may often become experience goods in
the distance selling.475 The right of withdrawal allows to restore the balance. From
an economic perspective, the consumer will only return the good if they value it less
473 MICKLITZ, ‘Do Consumers and Businesses Need a New Architecture of Consumer Law? A
Thought-Provoking Impulse’ (n 467) 316-317.
474 Within the European Union, according to the Directive on consumer rights art 10 in distance
contracts traders should disclose the information on the existence of the right of withdrawal and
the way it operates as well as enclose a form for consumers that can be used in the case of
withdrawal. If the seller fails to do so, the withdrawal period will be extended from 14 days to up
to 12 months.
475 EIDENMULLER (n 471) 8 explains what risks for the market functioning can be linked to exper-
ience goods: ‘as is well-known, information asymmetries with respect to experience goods can lead
to market failure because of adverse selection. Buyers who are uncertain about the quality of the
good purchased will assume a medium quality standard. High quality vendors will not be able to
charge high prices for their goods, as buyers will not be willing to honor such high quality since
they are incapable of recognizing it. Hence, the average quality of the goods offered deteriorates,
and the market for a particular good may even break down.’
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then the trader does.476 In the e-commerce context the right of withdrawal works
as a warranty granting the consumer an opportunity to inspect the purchase and
compare its quality with its price, thus promoting those traders who offer quality
products at reasonable prices.477
Within the European Union legal system, the right of withdrawal not only helps
protecting consumers from aggressive commercial practices and allows them to un-
derstand the contract they have just entered with less pressure, but also serves as
a tool encouraging consumers to participate in transactions without physical pres-
ence of the trader.478 The existence of the cooling-off period is an example of a
specific remedy, applicable without the need of court’s intervention and protecting
the functionality of the information requirement in itself. Proliferation of informa-
tion requirements makes them often impossible to understand and process before
the contract is formed, but the right to withdraw allows for additional time when
the contract can be evaluated by the consumer. Therefore, the ample exclusions list
concerning various consumer rights granted by the Directive on consumer rights,
and notably concerning the right to withdraw, as well as information requirements,
should be criticised.479
Nevertheless, the same restrictions as to the usefulness of the mandated disclos-
ure, especially those resulting from behavioural findings, may be applicable to the
right of withdrawal as well. Too complex and detailed information will not become
any more transparent, and everyday life will not give the consumer enough free time
to be able to focus on the information received prior to contracting. The consumer
476 BEN-SHAHAR and POSNER (n 294) 2.
477 See Pamaria REKAITI and Roger van den BERGH, ‘Cooling-off Periods in the Consumer Laws
of the EC Member States. A Comparative Law and Economics Approach’ (2000) 23 Journal of
Consumer Policy 371, 381, where it is pointed out that: ‘(...)granting of cooling-off periods works
as an incentive for sellers to set product prices that correspond to products’ actual quality.’
478 BEN-SHAHAR and POSNER (n 294) 4.
479 The exclusions of art 3.3 of the Directive, transposed in art 93 TRLDCU and reg 6 COnsumer
Contracts Regulations 2013, have been criticised as concerning products often offered online, such
as eg plane tickets, see Patricia MA´RQUEZ LOBILLO, ‘Contratacio´n Electro´nica de Viajes Com-
binados: Reflexiones tras la Propuesta de Directiva de julio de 2013 y el Proyecto de Reforma
del TRLGDCU de octubre 2013 sobre el <<Derecho de desistimiento>>’ [2015] La Proteccio´n de
los Consumidores en Tiempos de Cambio. Ponencias y Comunicaciones del XIII Congreso de la
Asociacio´n Sainz de Andino; Lu´ıs Mar´ıa Miranda Serrano and others (eds) 141.
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will benefit importantly, however, from the possibility of using or inspecting the
good and seeing if it really fits their needs. In turn, consumers are more confident
when contracting online, and boosting B2C e-commerce within the internal market
is one of the goals of the European Union.480 The efficiency of the right of with-
drawal as a tool which promotes trade depends however on the time consumers are
granted to exercise their right – in a perfect case balance between the reduction of
uncertainty on their side and trader’s loss (depreciation of the product they offer)
must be struck. When the cooling-off period is fixed, as in European rules, there is
a risk of inefficiency, as the traders might suffer high depreciation costs, and thus
increase the prices.481
The right of withdrawal cannot constitute an only remedy restoring the con-
tractual balance affected by the information asymmetry between the parties. A
particular issue linked to the consumers’ bounded rationality and lack of expertise
is a problem of unobservable and unverifiable actions of traders in B2C contracts. In
some cases of more complex purchases – credence goods – consumers are not able to
verify if the information provided on the product was accurate, or as Hermalin and
others put it, ‘the beneficiary of a contractual promise may be unable to determine
whether the promise has been kept or broken’.482 During the course of the cooling-off
period a consumer may be able to observe if the product looks and works the way
they expected it to, however they usually lack the possibility to check if it is not
flawed in any other way. Therefore, if any problem becomes apparent after the with-
drawal period expiry, the consumer will have to rely either on specific remedies for
example for the lack of conformity, or on traditional remedies such as misrepresenta-
tion or vices of consent, with all their shortcomings. In such cases it will be up to the
consumers to demonstrate that the good was effectively flawed or malfunctioning,
and doing so may quite often be impossible at a reasonable cost.
The right of withdrawal is certainly an important tool in promoting correct mar-
ket functioning in respect of electronic contracts, aiming at restoring the contractual
480 See eg Commission, ‘Digital contracts for Europe – Unleashing the potential of e-commerce’ (Com-
munication) COM(2015) 633 final.
481 BEN-SHAHAR and POSNER (n 294) 5-6.
482 Benjamin E HERMALIN and others, ‘Contract Law’ in AMitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
(eds), Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol.1 (Elsevier BV 2007) 11-12.
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balance affected by the information asymmetries. The European legislator opted for
a mandatory withdrawal period in distance contracts;483 an alternative solution of
a voluntary cancellation period has been adopted in on-premises contracts.484 In re-
lation to the other remedies, the main advantage of the withdrawal right is the fact
that it operates without court intervention, although obviously might be enforced by
courts if need be. The balance between the consumer protection and promoting of
trade has to be carefully struck, as too high costs of granting cancellation periods to
consumers may constitute an obstacle to market functioning, while too complicated
performance of the right can bar consumers from accessing it.485
483 Art 10 Directive on consumer rights.
484 See EIDENMULLER (n 471) 10.
485 Ibid 18-22.
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Conclusions
I.–
Information duties, as well as adequate redress mechanisms for their breach, are
an issue of great importance for consumer contracts; a fact which is widely accepted
by both national, English and Spanish, and European legislators. In the context
of the digital online market, the significance of information is even greater than in
the traditional trade: consumers cannot examine in person the product they are
purchasing, nor can they establish a direct face-to-face contact with the trader or
their agent with whom the contract is formed.
The breach of information duties is a complex issue needing in depth analysis
due to its potential influence on the market on the one hand, and its importance
for the individual rights of consumers on the other. Although institutional remedies
stemming from administrative or competition law allow to meet the effectiveness
requirement for implementing EU directives, they do not provide individual redress
mechanisms for consumers whose pre-contractual information rights were breached.
It is the private law – both general law and specific consumer legislation – that makes
various remedies available to consumers in such situations. The private law redress
mechanisms and availability of efficient remedies contribute to correct regulation of
the market of online consumer contracts through boosting consumers’ confidence
and promoting correct market functioning.
II.–
The European consumer policy is in a great measure founded on the inform-
ation paradigm putting much emphasis on the role of the information duties in
consumer protection and market economy: protecting consumers helps contributing
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to promoting consumption which in turn keeps the market healthy and the economy
developing. Such is also the approach adopted in the directives relative to the B2C
e-commerce: the Directive on consumer rights and the Directive on the electronic
commerce.
Information asymmetry between consumers and traders is considered to be the
most important among various market failures; its consequences might be poten-
tially damaging for the market, as higher quality products and producers might
simply be pushed out of the market due to the adverse selection mechanisms. In the
context of the e-commerce environment the means of distance communication used
imply a natural restriction of the availability of information about goods and ser-
vices to consumers, due to the lack of simultaneous physical presence of the parties,
impossibility of product inspection prior to purchase and complex purchasing pro-
cess. These characteristics of the online trade bring about the need to establish and
fulfil the information duties correctly: their main aim is to restore the information
balance in the relationship of the parties. Correct provision of information prior to
contract conclusion can influence consumers’ choices and the ultimately successful
outcome of the transaction to a higher extent than in traditional physical trade.
Nevertheless, pre-contractual information plays also an important role in the
period posterior to contract formation, especially through providing consumers with
knowledge regarding their contract and its potential breach. From such perspective,
information duties are an instrument providing consumers with means of redress
in the event of an unsatisfactory performance of their contract by the trader. In
addition, information provision prevents the breach, if it should occur, from being
unobservable for the consumer.
III.–
Information requirements imposed on traders can fulfil their functions both re-
lative to the consumers’ transactional decisions and redress option in the case of
breach of contract only if a certain model of consumer is presumed: an active, cir-
cumspect and knowledgable consumer who can make actual use of the information
received from the trader, basing on it their rational decisions.
This information empowerment concept, based on the assumption that provided
with correct information consumers will make rational choices promoting market
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development, has attracted criticism as not taking into consideration the needs of
more vulnerable passive consumers.
Nevertheless, vulnerable consumers who do not reach the active and well-informed
standard model still seem to stay outside of the main focus of the European con-
sumer protection, which can be demonstrated by the recently adopted measures. The
Directive on consumer rights in its art 8.1 and 8.7 requires the information to be
‘provided’ or even ‘made available to the consumer’ — the concepts that according
to the CJEU decisions imply an active behaviour on the side of the consumer, who
might need to engage in a certain action in order to get the information, in contrast
with a situation in which the consumer ‘receives’ the information in a passive way.
IV.–
The criticism towards information duties as main means of consumer protec-
tion within the EU is growing. The list of concerns regarding the proliferation of
information requirements is extensive, the main being the effectiveness of mandated
disclosure in consumer protection and its undesired effects potentially harming the
market functioning.
High quantity of information requirements has a negative impact on the swiftness
of transactions, given that information duties constitute a significant, yet not always
necessary, intervention into the contractual balance – even though they are designed
to reduce transaction costs of a supposedly weaker, less informed party, ie the con-
sumer, they will almost certainly increase the costs for the other party. Information
duties become thus a double-edged sword: putting more burden on traders will lead
to them trying to compensate the costs resulting from mandatory rules through an
increase of the prices of their products, resulting in consumers paying for their own
protection.
Another line of criticism towards information duties in the B2C contracts ori-
ginates in the behavioural trend in economic analysis of law. Behavioural law and
economics, basing its findings on empirical research, questions the premise of ration-
ality, arguing that consumers do not always behave rationally. Consumers whose
rationality is bounded, even when provided with information, will not be able to
exercise choice in a desired manner.
Furthermore, when combined with the speed of transactions being one of the
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main features of the online market, where offers are sometimes available for a lim-
ited time only, the information overload will almost certainly lead to consumers
simply not reading all the pre-contractual information provided. E-commerce makes
choice available to consumers practically limitless, however ironically the genuine
free consent and choice is hindered due to oversupply of pre-contractual informa-
tion.
V.–
Breach of the information duties is an issue mainly dealt with at the level of
national law: the European law imposes only information duties which are trans-
posed into the national systems. The approach of the legal systems of England and
Spain to the information duties differs, both in what refers to the requirements in-
troduced through implementation of the European law integrated into the national
contract law, and those traditionally existing in the national private law. In general
terms, English law approaches information duties with scepticism, whilst Spanish
law provides for exchange of essential information by the contracting parties at the
pre-contractual stage basing such requirement on the principle of pre-contractual
good faith.
English system regards the contracting parties as being in adversarial positions
and there is no obligation on them to disclose any information to the other party.
The fact that non-disclosure is not viewed negatively does not mean however that the
parties can mislead each other providing false information. There are various reasons
for rejection of the general duty to disclose by English law: potential financial value
of information, vagueness of the general disclosure duty making it hard to determine
in each case the exact scope of the duty, which in turn could undermine transactional
certainty, finally the prevalence of the freedom of contract principle.
Spanish law in contrast promotes the active co-operation between the contracting
parties. Both parties are bound to communicate to each other all the circumstances
known to them, which they believe that if known to the other party as well could
influence their decision as to the contract itself or at least as to some of its terms. The
parties shall not take advantage of each other, conduct going against the good faith
and trust between the parties is inadmissible. The Spanish courts assume that the co-
operation of the parties at the pre-contractual stage contributes to achieving the best
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outcome, increasing the general wealth and reducing litigation. The pre-contractual
good faith principle is understood as an objective criterion used to evaluate the
behaviour of the contracting parties; the general principle needs to be specifically
applied in each situation, thus giving the concrete information duties precise scope
and meaning.
VI.–
There are two main types of information duties established in both of the legal
systems analysed. Direct information duties are introduced in usually long lists in
provisions that expressly state the information items that are to be provided to a
consumer before the contract is concluded. Indirect information duties are obliga-
tions arising from vaguer terms, not laid down as positive, clearly specified duties.
Often the indirect duties will arise from the legal rules that establish some negative
consequences of the non-disclosure, thus encouraging information disclosure.
Specific direct and general indirect information duties often overlap, which makes
it possible to treat breach of a concrete direct duty as breach of an indirect more
general obligation, thus providing the aggrieved party with various remedies.
VII.–
Information duties relevant to consumer electronic contracts, of both direct and
indirect nature are established mainly in the specific consumer legislation, although
general contract law doctrines should also be considered.
In what refers to the direct specific duties, two main groups can be identified.
The requirements applicable generally in the e-commerce are established in arts 10,
19-22, 27 LSSICE in what refers to the Spanish legislation, and in regs 6-9 of The
E-commerce Regulations 2002. Furthermore, the consumer protection legislation
introduces other information duties in arts 60 and 97 of the TRLDCU in Spain and
regs 13, 14 and Schedule 2 to The Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 in England
and Wales.
Indirect duties can be found both in the specific sectoral legislation and in general
private law. Firstly, we should consider the consumer law provisions relative to the
conformity of goods (products) with the contract, out of arts 114ff TRLDCU (Spain)
and ss 9ff CRA 2015 (England and Wales). Also, indirect information duties result
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from the rules on the unfair commercial practices. The Spanish Ley Competencia
Desleal in its arts 5-7 deals with the unfair trading practices, however it needs to
be noted that it does not give rise to any specific rights of individual redress. In
contrast, prohibition of misleading commercial actions in English law, out of reg 5
in relation to Part 4A UTR 2008, makes concrete individual redress rights available
to consumers.
In what refers to the general private law, indirect information duties can be found
in rules relative to the defects of consent in both systems, with particular emphasis
on misrepresentation in English context, and additionally in the Spanish system in
the general principle of pre-contractual good faith.
VIII.–
The content and scope of the information duties imposed on traders determines
the consequences of their breach. Pre-contractual information duty is an obligation
(more than mere incentive or encouragement) on the side of the trader resulting
from legal rules requiring in a direct or indirect manner that information be provided
to the other party. Private rights of redress on the side of consumers will usually
not arise until the contract has been entered into, therefore information duties,
although pre-contractual, belong to the realm of contract law. The content of the
pre-contractual information includes information provided through advertising, if
it is sufficiently precise and the trader’s intention for it to be relied upon can be
established (art 61 TRLDCU and Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893]
1 QB 256 in general and s 9(2) CRA 2015 in what refers to the description of
goods), however informative advertising needs to be distinguished from mere puffs
and exaggerated statements accepted in trade by both systems. Furthermore, pre-
contractual information provided is subsequently treated as terms of the contract
(if it is formed): art 97.5 TRLDCU and ss 11(4), 11(5) and 12 CRA 2015 in relation
to goods; 36(3), 36(4) and 37 in relation to digital content and s 50(3) and (4) in
relation to services.
IX.–
The manner in which the information has been provided to the consumer is also
directly linked to the breach of information duties and its extent. In this context the
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transparency requirement, recognised both in English and Spanish law (s 68 CRA
2015 and art 80 TRLDCU) needs to be taken into account.
Interestingly, although this requirement is a direct consequence of transposition
of the art 5 of the Directive on unfair terms, it is laid down differently in the national
systems analysed: the Spanish provision is limited only to standard-form contracts,
where the terms were not individually negotiated, while provisions of the CRA 2015
apply to all B2C contracts; moreover the TRLDCU is more specific than the CRA
2015 not only requiring the terms to be precise, clear and plain, but also easily
accessible and legible, so that the consumer is able to familiarise themselves with
the terms before entering into the contract, regulating even the size of the letters
and colour of font used in the contract terms.
Furthermore, other provisions refer to the clear and comprehensible manner of
providing information (arts 60 and 97 TRLDCU and regs 13 and 14 The Consumer
Contracts Regulations 2013) and a form and manner which is easily, directly and
permanently accessible (regs 6(1) and 9(1) The E-commerce Regulations 2002 and
arts 10.1 and 27 LSSICE), the Spanish legislation also adding the requirement of
the information being available for free.
Both systems, English and Spanish, use a variety of slightly different concepts,
such as ‘clear’, ‘prominent’, ‘comprehensible’, ‘intelligible’ – a situation for which
there is no convincing rationale, the explanation being the terminology chaos present
at the European level; those concepts being of relevance in the process of determining
the fulfilment of the information duties and the extent of a potential breach.
X.–
Breach of information duties can be treated in different ways by the national law;
these possible legal classifications of the situation of breach need to be distinguished
from the remedies, as the same or similar remedies may be available under different
classifications.
The most obvious consequence of breach of information duties is the applica-
tion of specific remedies resulting directly from the specific consumer law provisions
(eg withdrawal period extension or consumer not being bound by their order if no
information on the obligation to pay), established in reg 14, 31, 35 and 40 The
Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 and arts 97.6, 98.2 and 105 TRLDCU, how-
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ever there is no such consequence established for the great majority of the direct
information requirements.
Breach of information duties, especially relative to the information about the
goods (or under Spanish law — products) subject-matter of the contract may result
in application of the rules relative to the non-conformity (arts 114ff TRLDCU and
ss 9ff CRA 2015). Furthermore, and only under English law, due to the recently ad-
opted Consumer Protection Amendment 2014, private law remedies for a misleading
action out of reg 5 UTR 2008 may come into play.
Also, breach of information duties can be classified as breach of term — express
or implied — on the basis of inclusion of the pre-contractual information items in
the contract content, as established in arts 61.2, 65 and 97.5 TRLDCU and ss 11(4),
11(5) and 12 CRA 2015.
Finally, in general private law of both England and Spain indirect information
duties can be found, providing other possible consequences of breach through the
laws of defects of consent (or vitiating factors). In the Spanish context also the
general principle of good faith is to be considered, however it does not stand alone as
a separate ground for remedies, but rather is taken into account mainly in application
of art 65 TRLDCU and defects of consent.
XI.–
Breach of information duties produces consequences even when the contract does
not materialise, however private redress rights for the breach of information duties
being the focus of this study depend on the subsequent contract formation. The
fact that a contract has been formed does not nevertheless automatically imply
that the remedies will be of contractual nature: both contractual (responsabilidad
contractual) and tortious (responsabilidad extracontractual) nature of the remedies
should be considered.
Determining whether contract or tort law applies is of significance for the length
of limitation periods, for the law applicable in the case of potential cross-boarder
dispute, or for the measure of damages.
Having said that, the remedies relative to the breach of contract naturally be-
long to the realm of contract law both in Spanish and English law. The liability
for the defects of consent presents some more complexity. Under English law the
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defects of consent traditionally give rise to liability in tort, although the remedy
of contract rescission is of contractual nature; the adoption of the Misrepresenta-
tion Act 1967 introduced statutory liability for misrepresentation, nevertheless the
measure of damages stays tortious. In what refers to Spanish law, art 1270 of the
Co´digo civil gives no clear indication as to the nature of the liability; the Tribunal
Supremo seems to be inclined to treat the liability arising out of fraud – dolo – as
contractual. In what refers to specific remedies, the remedies for lack of conformity
are definitely of a contractual nature, since the regime of non-conformity is relative
to the consumer sales law.
In what refers to the measure of damages, the tortious measure of damages
(intere´s negativo) is the one best fitting consumer contracts: the aggrieved party is
put in a position they were before the contract conclusion and are able to allocate
they assets again — purchase a similar product from a different trader, therefore
keeping the market functioning. The compensation resulting from an action in mis-
representation (or defects of consent) will be of such character. Nevertheless, the
damages available under both Spanish and English law for the breach of contract
and lack of conformity will be of contractual measure.
XII.–
In many instances consumers will have both specific and general law remedies
available due to the potential overlapping classifications of breach in a given set of
facts. Generally speaking, both English and Spanish law will allow the aggrieved
consumer to claim general law remedies in spite of availability of the specific stat-
utory remedies, instead of or in addition to them, however clearly not so as to recover
twice the same loss.
Nevertheless, there are some notable exclusions of the application of the general
law remedies in both systems. There is a particular hierarchy of remedies for the
lack of conformity of goods (products) with the contract, in which the remedy of
contract termination for breach (also referred to as rejection of goods or rescission for
breach) is only a secondary remedy that cannot be exercised unless other remedies
have been sought previously. This is true for both systems analysed, although English
law recognises an additional short-term right to reject. Except for that right however,
there is a great similarity between English and Spanish law, due to the fact that the
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scheme of remedies for the lack of conformity originates in the European Directive
on the sale of consumer goods.
Therefore, it is logical to assume that allowing to claim a general contract law
remedy of contract termination for breach where the remedies for non-conformity
are available would be inappropriate, as it would go against the rationale of the
hierarchy of remedies. Indeed, s 19(12) CRA 2015 expressly bars the consumer from
pursuing contract termination for a breach of a term relative to the conformity of
goods implied by the CRA 2015 on the common law basis. In what refers to Spanish
law, the TRLDCU does not establish any rules preventing consumers from seeking
contract rescission for breach under the general law, and although the prevailing
opinion is that it should be barred, the courts seem to approach the issue in an
unorthodox manner, sometimes allowing the aggrieved consumers to claim remedies
not established in the arts 114ff TRLDCU.
It should be added however that the TRLDCU does expressly exclude the avail-
ability of the general law remedies for latent defects (vicios ocultos) in the cases of
lack of conformity. Another notable exclusion concerns the availability of the dam-
ages for misrepresentation under s 2 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 when the
consumer is entitled to the remedies for a misleading action under Part 4A UTR
2008; an exclusions which is of significance due to the statutory damages under
Misrepresentation Act 1967 being particularly generous to the aggrieved party.
XIII.–
Despite a variety of specific statutory remedies available in both systems, English
and Spanish laws still rely in an important extent on the general law as providing
means of redress to consumers. As s 19(10) CRA 2015 states, general law remedies
are available in addition to specific remedies, instead of them and where no such
remedy is provided for.
The English law landscape of specific law remedies for breach of information
duties is more developed than the Spanish one, especially due to the private redress
rights of Part 4A UTR 2008 and s 12 CRA 2015 providing specific remedies for breach
of any information item provided according to the Schedule 2 to The Consumer
Contracts Regulations 2013.
In contrast, Spanish law relies more on general law remedies, as through provi-
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sions of arts 61.2, 65 and 97.5 TRLDCU the statute provides a possible classification
of breach, ie breach of an implied or express contract term, however the remedies
must be sought in general contract law (the remedy of specific performance, com-
pensation in damages or contract rescission for breach).
The comparative analysis based on the functional approach needs to take into
account the rules that are applicable in both systems in the same set of facts.
Therefore, the English law of private redress for misleading commercial actions out
of regs 27Aff UTR 2008 should be compared against the general private law of fraud
and induced mistake in the Spanish system.
The reasons for adoption of a specific scheme of remedies in English law are well
known, the main being the inadequacy of the complex law of misrepresentation to
the disputes arising out of consumer contracts. In the Spanish system however it
seems that the general law secures the rights of the parties to a sufficient extent,
which is also confirmed by the amount of judicial decisions concerning consumer
contracts where the relief is provided through the law of mistake or fraud.
XIV.–
The provisions establishing information duties, such as Schedule 2 to The Con-
sumer Contracts Regulations 2013, art 97.1 TRLDCU, art 10 of the LSSICE or
any other analysed, do not distinguish information requirements of higher or lesser
importance.
However, the remedies available for breach of different duties do correlate with
the significance of the information items. The discussion relative to the disclosure
duty in the general law revolved around ‘material information’; for example for
the defects of consent to be actionable, a common condition is for the information
item breached to have induced the consumer into the contract. Such requirement of
‘materiality’ can also be noted in the context of specific statutory remedies under
the English law of misleading action: the third condition out of reg 27A UTR 2008
requires the information to have constituted an important factor in the consumer’s
decision on entering into the contract.
In what refers to other specific information duties, the duties relative to the
main characteristics of goods, and also digital content – products – subject-matter
of the contract are also clearly akin to the ‘material information’ concept. Remedies
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of a different types are available for breach of information items relative to the
main characteristics of goods: the scheme of remedies for non-conformity of arts
114ff TRLDCU and ss 19ff CRA 2015 includes repair, replacement, discount and
contract termination for breach. Also other very particular information items, as
the information on the right of withdrawal, are protected through specific remedies.
However in general, if breach was relative to information items other than about
the goods, then s 19(5) CRA 2015 provides only for the right to recover from the
trader the amount of any costs incurred by the consumer as a result of the breach,
up to the amount of the price paid. Spanish law provides for no specific remedies in
such case, relying solely on the inclusion of the information in the contract through
arts 61.2, 65 and 97.5 TRLDCU and general contract law remedies. General law
remedies in both English and Spanish law are only available for breach of a certain
seriousness (relative to the ‘material information’), therefore it can be assumed that
some instances of breach, concerning information items of lesser importance, are not
protected through private law individual remedies.
XV.–
A difference in availability of the remedies depending on how the breach oc-
curred: through omission of certain information items or through provision of false
information, presumed in the research questions, has been confirmed by the de-
tailed analysis. The distinction originates in the general contract law especially in
English law due to the doctrine of misrepresentation, according to which only false
statements made and not silence can amount to actionable misrepresentation. The
Spanish general law recognises no such distinction, treating fraud through provision
of false information and through omission practically equally.
The divide between active misinformation and omission is relevant also to the
specific statutory remedies under English law: the English regulator provided for
private redress rights only for misleading actions out of reg 5 UTR 2008, but not for
misleading omissions out of reg 6 UTR 2008, which is not surprising nevertheless
given the similarities between the law of misrepresentation and the newly intro-
duced redress rights. The distinction between non-disclosure and provision of false
information reaches however further: for instance, s 12(2) CRA 2015 considers any
information other than about the goods provided to the consumer to be a term
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of the contract, however non-disclosure only results in application of reg 18 Con-
sumer Contracts Regulations 2013 implying that the trader has complied with their
information duties.
Spanish law provides in many cases different remedies in the cases of active mis-
information and information omission, however such distinctions are natural and
due to the characteristics of information duties and their breach. A remedy of con-
sumer not being bound by an order, when they were not clearly informed about it
implying an obligation to pay can illustrate such natural distinction. In such case
the only misinformation logically possible would be that of not informing about the
obligation to pay. The distinction observable in English law however is a product of
policy choices.
In my opinion, the traditional approach of English law to disclosure duties
and their breach described in this paragraph adapts well to the reality of the
B2C e-commerce, as one can observe a significant practical difference between non-
disclosure and provision of false information. The fact that the trader omitted some
or all pre-contractual information creates a need on the side of the consumer to
either try to find the information themselves, or to look for another offer, which as
we know are abundant on the Web, where the information they are interested in
is provided. Nevertheless, provision of false information will induce the consumer
to purchase a product which probably does not fit their needs. Here, not only the
interests of the consumer are not satisfactorily fulfilled, but also, even more import-
antly, the market functioning suffers, as the consumer cannot just easily allocate
their assets with a different – honest – trader.
XVI.–
Observations made above illustrate the influence the traditional law and the legal
mentality of the regulators have on the specific statutory solutions adopted in the
field of consumer law and often the implementation of the harmonised measures.
Specific remedies for breach of information duties, although directly influenced by
European directives, still maintain various national characteristics, such as: distinc-
tion between active misinformation and non-disclosure or accepting the information
omission as giving rise to the same liability as provision of false information; intro-
duction of an additional short-term right to reject in the English law in the context
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of a scheme of remedies originating in a directive adhering to continental principles
putting more emphasis on maintaining the contractual relationship of the parties
than allowing contract rescission.
The extent of the influence of the general law on the specific rules needs to be
noted and taken into account in the process of adopting new harmonised measures
at the European level. From a practical point of view, the example of remedies
shows that consumer law constitutes an inherent part of the national general private
law and neither cannot nor should not be treated as a self-standing completely
independent area of law. The courts interpret consumer law provisions according to
the general legal spirit of the national law; the consumer law provisions introduced
through harmonisation measures shape in turn the contract law of each system.
The influence of the general law on the application and interpretation of the
consumer law provisions adds to the complexity of the consumer protection law,
which becomes an issue needing urgent reaction, as the consumer law itself is far
from being clear and easy to apply. The legislative measures recently adopted in
both English and Spanish law rely heavily on cross-references between different
pieces of legislation. The CRA 2015 on various occasions cross-references to the
Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013, and especially to the Schedule 2 where the
information requirements are listed. The LSSICE refers to the information duties
established in the TRLDCU, which in turn excludes their application to various
distance contracts as listed in the art 93. Such solutions make it definitely more
difficult for the consumers to access their rights.
XVII.–
The rather chaotic legislation adds to what is probably the most burning problem
linked to the remedies for breach of information duties: no clear list of remedies
applicable exists at any legislative level – neither in the European Union law, nor in
the Spanish or English national systems.
At the European level, casuistic character of information duties leads to market
fragmentation, due to the proliferation of information requirements in the acquis
communautaire on the one hand, and their different implementation by the Member
States, as the example of English and Spanish law illustrates, on the other.
Furthermore, casuistic character of the duties is also an important issue further
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hindering the effective and logical application of the remedies for breach of those du-
ties. The availability of various types of remedies on the basis of the same set of facts
brings about problems relative to the possibility of claiming remedies under different
heads and their potential hierarchy and exclusions. The issue is pertinent especially
under Spanish law as there is no clear provision regulating this question similar to s
19(9)-(12) CRA 2015 and s 2(4) Misrepresentation Act 1967. The abundance of the
information duties of different character and the rather chaotic scheme of remedies
increase the complexity of the legal framework of the breach of information duties,
which in turn may lead to decrease of consumers’ trust in the market.
The rules that apply to the pre-contractual information duties in the B2C e-
commerce in both English and Spanish law originate on two different levels, in the
European law and in the national law. The traditional contract law influences the
scope of the duties and remedies available in each system, in consequence a problem
may arise in connection to the general duty of fair dealing and good faith present
in the national internal legal system. Situation in which it implies a wider than a
maximum harmonisation Directive on consumer rights scope of the duty to inform
could be even considered a violation of the full harmonisation principle.
A significant diversity of the remedies potentially available to consumers for
the breach of information duties can be demonstrated; the aggrieved party may be
entitled to various remedies of different types, such as: remedies linked to ineffect-
iveness of the contract (or payment); monetary remedies; and remedies forcing the
trader to do something. In addition, a remedy sui generis of the withdrawal period
extension common to both English and Spanish law should be mentioned.
XVIII.–
Although the status quo described above leaves much to be desired, a uniformity
of remedies for breach, as proposed in art II.–3:109 DCFR neither seems appropriate.
The available remedies should correspond with the purpose of the information duty
that was breached: the effect on the contract of omission of information relative to the
main characteristics of the good subject-matter of the contract is evidently different
than that of a small detail in trader’s address if they are still easily identifiable.
Moreover, local preferences of consumers influence the design of remedies, as the
example of the short-term right to reject available only under English law, non-
380
Conclusions
existent in Spanish law shows.
It should be mentioned nevertheless, that in many cases the remedy of contract
rescission consisting in consumer returning the product to the trader and recovering
the sum paid is adequate to consumer contracts allowing the consumer to relocate
their money in exchange for more suitable product. Clearly, it goes against trader’s
interests, especially in what refers to the SME.
XIX.–
The scheme of remedies for breach of information duties could be simplified
through tackling the information excess issue. As pointed out above, information
items are not expressly classified into groups according to their importance by the
legislator, however the remedies available for certain information requirements, such
as information relative to the main characteristics of goods, demonstrate that some
information items are undoubtedly of more importance. Those are mainly the in-
formation items that directly influence the consumer’s contracting decision, which
in turn is the main goal of information provision at the pre-contractual stage. The
rest of the information provided, although potentially serving other functions, for
example at a later stage if the contract is not correctly fulfilled, leads to information
overload resulting in consumer not being able to absorb and understand any of the
information received. It would therefore seem appropriate to curb the quantity of
the information consumers receive, or at least clearly identify the information of key
importance for their transactional decision.
Together with effective remedies for breach reasonable information requirements
could correct, at least to some extent, undesired asymmetries in bargaining power
of the parties. A balance between an excessive regulation which hinders the de-
velopment of the e-commerce on the one hand, and establishing rules improving
consumers’ trust and promoting the use of the e-commerce on the daily basis on
the other, should be sought by the regulator. Consumers should be able to focus
on the information items which are of true relevance to them, such as information
relative to the trader they are entering a contract with, the good or product they
are purchasing, the price that needs to be paid and the remedies available in the
case of breach of contract.
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XX.–
Moreover, an effective scheme of remedies for breach of information duties, in-
cluding private law means of individual redress for consumers, could contribute to
tackling the issue of information overload. Remedies adequate to the information
items breached shift focus from the necessity of finding an optimal level of inform-
ation to the functions it fulfils.
Mandated disclosure from such a perspective serves market transparency and
honesty, not because the information is read carefully and taken on board by con-
sumers before they enter a given contract, but due to the fact that they receive
the pre-contractual information together with contract terms on a durable medium
and trader’s compliance with it is secured thanks to effective remedies for breach in
place. Consumers’ transaction costs are lowered, since they do not need to read the
whole list of information provided to them, they can only focus on a few variables
of key importance, such as the price for example, to compare offers available on the
market an choose the optimal one.
XXI.–
Despite the problematic issues that arise out of the specific consumer legislation
presented above, specific statutory remedies resulting from consumer law are more
adequate to consumer contracts disputes, particularly because they are created with
this kind of issues in mind.
The problems with application of the general contract law to the consumer cases
include the low value of the disputes, length of court proceedings, burden of proof
on the side of the claimant – the consumer, conditions including the necessity for
the contract to have been induced through the information provided or hidden and
the the proof of the damage caused by the misinformation.
Although specific remedies in great measure also need to be enforced through the
judicial systems, they still present various important advantages for the consumers.
Various remedies are of ‘automatic’ application and can be used as defence against
trader, eg when a consumer is not bound by their order due to not having received
the information about their obligation to pay: it is the trader who would need to
claim contract enforcement. Remedies often provide for burden of proof reversal,
and the fact that information was material enough to have induced the consumer to
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contract often does not need to be established. Specific remedies are also designed
in a clear manner, defining the hierarchy of their application and other details, such
as a percentage of discount for instance.
The right to withdraw, although strictly speaking not a remedy for breach of
information rights, is closely linked to information duties both from the economics
and legal perspectives. A consumer who feels that the information they had received
about the product they purchased turned out to be inaccurate or misleading, is en-
titled to return the good without specifying the reason within 14 days time period.
The existence of the cancellation right promotes traders who provide truthful in-
formation about the products they offer and allows consumers to evaluate the fitness
of the purchase for the use they intend to give it. In a case where they judge it not
satisfactory, there is no necessity of court proceedings, nor of proving the misinform-
ation caused by the trader. Clearly, the way the right of withdrawal works needs
to be examined and optimised; however it can constitute an example of a remedy
adequate to electronic consumer contracts fitting the mechanisms and particularity
of those.
XXII.–
The aim of the present study was to illustrate the significance of the inform-
ation duties and remedies for their breach in the context of the B2C e-commerce
and present mechanisms governing the application of the duties and remedies. The
analysis has made it clear that the national rules are connected to the inherent fea-
tures of the systems, which inevitably makes it a difficult task for the transnational
regulator to harmonise the rules.
Information duties as such cannot constitute in any case a sole protective meas-
ure in consumer contracts; their effectiveness depends to an important extent on
the existence of adequate remedies for their breach. As argued, the general private
law does not always offer optimal solutions in the context of consumer protection.
Regulators, both at the European and national level, should be aware of the partic-
ular characteristics of the e-commerce and adopt provisions tackling the issue in a
relevant manner. Excessive information duties and chaotically established remedies
for their breach constitute an obstacle to the market development and consumer
protection, rather than a necessary improvement.
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While the adoption of the Directive on consumer rights contributed to the devel-
opment of consumer protection, it is still early to be able to assess the real influence
its transposition, as well as other recently adopted national measures (such as CRA
2015 or Consumer Protection Amendment 2014), will have on the national and
European B2C e-commerce. The newly adopted laws confirm the trend of establish-
ing detailed rules, without however a general vision of how the issue of information
duties should be tackled. A deregulation of certain extent would be a welcomed
move: for consumers oversupply of information has similar consequences to provi-
sion of no information, whilst traders would benefit from less stringent regulation.
An improvement of this kind should mainly consist of identifying the key information
items that consumers need to receive in the e-commerce environment in order to be
able to correctly form their transactional decision, the superfluous information could
only be provided on a durable medium for further reference. Breach of any of the
key information items should result in contract rescission, of a similar character to
the short-term right to reject established within the scheme of the remedies for lack
of conformity in the CRA 2015, should the consumer request so, thus simplifying
the scheme of remedies and limiting the excessive information consumers receive.
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PRIMERA
La importancia del deber de informacio´n, en las relaciones contractuales de con-
sumo, ha sido puesta de relieve tanto por el legislador comunitario, como por los
legisladores nacionales, espan˜ol e ingle´s. Ambos inciden, adema´s, en la necesidad de
establecer mecanismos adecuados tendentes a paliar las graves consecuencias que
pueden derivarse del incumplimiento del deber que hemos analizado.
Si en el Mercado off line la informacio´n al consumidor se considera trascendental,
en aras de conseguir su consentimiento informado, en el Mercado on line la misma
se convierte en elemento imprescindible para la obtencio´n del de un consumidor
que no tiene la posibilidad f´ısica de examinar aquello que esta´ adquiriendo, caso
de la adquisicio´n de productos, o que no tiene la posibilidad de entablar relacio´n
directa con el empresario o su representante, caso, por ejemplo, de la adquisicio´n de
contenidos digitales.
Nos enfrentamos a una materia compleja, que necesita un ana´lisis profundo
debido a su potencial influencia, por un lado, sobre el Mercado, en general; y, por
otro, sobre el ejercicio de los derechos individuales de los consumidores, en particular.
Aunque los remedios institucionales derivados de la transposicio´n de las Disposi-
ciones comunitarias, plasmados fundamentalmente en normas de Derecho admin-
istrativo sancionador y de Derecho de la competencia, proporcionan la adecuada
satisfaccio´n de los intereses del Mercado y contribuyen a su correcto funcionami-
ento, no permiten alcanzar la proteccio´n directa del consumidor, o mejor dicho, no
facilitan remedios contractuales directos para los consumidores que han visto in-
fringidos sus derechos de informacio´n precontractuales. La satisfaccio´n de dichos
intereses habra´ de buscarse, si quiera parcialmente, en otras v´ıas y, concretamente,
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en las normas de Derecho Privado, incluyendo tanto las normas de Derecho general,
como las espec´ıficas en materia de comercio electro´nico o de consumo.
Debemos ser conscientes de la relevancia del cumplimiento del deber de inform-
acio´n, especialmente en los contratos de consumo electro´nicos, as´ı como de la im-
portancia de establecer mecanismos-remedios adecuados que garanticen su cump-
limiento y aplicacio´n, en tanto son esenciales para regular el Mercado de los con-
tratos electro´nicos con consumidores, fomentando la confianza de los mismos y pro-
moviendo su correcto funcionamiento.
SEGUNDA
En esta l´ınea se orienta la pol´ıtica europea de los consumidores, armonizada en
2011 en la Directiva en la materia y, consagrada en 2002, en lo que a servicios de la
sociedad de la informacio´n y comercio electro´nico se refiere, en la correspondiente
Directiva.
De hecho, se considera que la asimetr´ıa informativa entre los consumidores y los
empresarios constituye uno de los fallos ma´s importantes del Mercado de la comer-
cializacio´n a distancia, y potencialmente, puede resultar perjudicial para el propio
Mercado, si tenemos en cuenta que, conforme a los mecanismos de seleccio´n adversa,
el incumplimiento de las obligaciones informativas, puede generar que productores
y productos de mejor calidad sean eliminados del mismo.
Y es que el fundamento u´ltimo para el establecimiento de los deberes precon-
tractuales de informacio´n, en el a´mbito del comercio electro´nico, se encuentra en
la necesidad de restablecer el equilibrio en la relacio´n entre las partes contratantes,
pues, como todos sabemos, las transacciones on line se caracterizan, como no puede
ser de otra forma, por el hecho de que se llevan a cabo a distancia, sin que las partes
se encuentren presentes simulta´neamente en el mismo lugar; porque el consumidor se
enfrenta a la imposibilidad de realizar una inspeccio´n del producto o servicio antes
de su adquisicio´n; por el empleo medios te´cnicos de contratacio´n, incidiendo la difi-
cultad de su manejo en el proceso de compra. Elementos todos ellos que redundan
en la defensa de la importancia del establecimiento y cumplimiento de los deberes
de informacio´n. No debemos olvidar, adema´s, el importante papel que adquiere la
informacio´n precontractual en el per´ıodo posterior a la formacio´n del contrato, es-
pecialmente como mecanismo para que los consumidores conozcan su contenido, las
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obligaciones que se derivan de la relacio´n entablada y las consecuencias que pueden
generarse de su potencial incumplimiento.
Desde esa perspectiva, los deberes de informacio´n precontractual son una her-
ramienta u´til para proporcionar a los consumidores posibles v´ıas de recurso o me-
dios de reparacio´n (means of redress) ante el cumplimiento contractual insatisfact-
orio por la parte del empresario. Tanto es as´ı que la infraccio´n de dichos deberes
puede suponer, especialmente en los contratos electro´nicos, que el consumidor no
sea consciente del incumplimiento por parte del empresario de las obligaciones que
se derivan del concreto acuerdo celebrado, o dicho de otra forma, que la falta de
informacio´n pueda llevarle incluso a ignorar que el contrato esta´ siendo incumplido,
por no saber que sea lo que se esta´ incumpliendo.
TERCERA
Las funciones atribuidas a los deberes de informacio´n impuestos sobre los empres-
arios, sea como mecanismos ido´neos para influir en la toma de las decisiones transac-
cionales por el consumidor, o como cauce para proporcionarle los remedios contrac-
tuales a los que acogerse ante la falta de cumplimiento o el incumplimiento defectuoso
del contrato, solo tendra´n sentido si tomamos como referencia un concreto modelo de
consumidor, el consumidor activo, capaz de utilizar adecuadamente la informacio´n
recibida del empresario, y de actuar racionalmente basando su decisio´n en ella.
Este concepto de empoderamiento a trave´s de la informacio´n, fundado en la
idea de que si el consumidor recibe informacio´n correcta tomara´, sobre la base de
la misma, una decisio´n transaccional adecuada, lo que promovera´, adema´s, el de-
sarrollo del Mercado, ha sido objeto de duras cr´ıticas por entenderse que no toma
en consideracio´n las necesidades de los consumidores ma´s de´biles y vulnerables (los
pasivos).
Dichas cr´ıticas no han tenido reflejo, sin embargo, en el Texto comunitario sobre
Derechos de los consumidores de 2011, toda vez que el legislador europeo parece
tomar como sujeto a los que dirige los mecanismos de proteccio´n que regula a un
consumidor activo, informado, frente al consumidor pasivo que parece quedar al
margen de la pol´ıtica europea de proteccio´n de los consumidores. As´ı podr´ıa dedu-
cirse, por ejemplo, de la interpretacio´n jurisprudencial comunitaria de la exigencia
de puesta a disposicio´n de la informacio´n, consagrada en los art´ıculos 8.1 y 8.7 del
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Texto de 2011, conforme a la cual, se exige una actitud activa al consumidor, una
accio´n de acceso a la informacio´n por su parte, frente a la pasividad propia del
mercado off line.
CUARTA
La imposicio´n de los deberes precontractuales de informacio´n tiene, como no
podr´ıa ser de otra forma, una vertiente negativa, puesta de relieve por aquellos
que critican su utilizacio´n como mecanismos principal para la proteccio´n de los
consumidores en el marco de la Unio´n Europea.
Son varios los argumentos que se esgrimen al respecto. Por un lado, se relaciona
la elevada cantidad de informacio´n que ha de proporcionar el empresario con la
funcionalidad del Mercado, manifestando la incidencia negativa que tiene sobre la
celeridad y la rapidez del mismo. Por otro, se afirma que la imposicio´n de los deberes
que analizamos constituye una intervencio´n significativa, que no siempre necesaria,
en el equilibrio contractual, pues si bien la imposicio´n de los deberes tiene como
objeto reducir los costes de transaccio´n para la parte supuestamente ma´s de´bil (el
consumidor), es obvio que contribuye al incremento de los costes que ha de soportar
la otra parte (el empresario).
As´ı las cosas, la imposicio´n de los deberes precontractuales se convierte en un
arma de doble filo. Si bien es cierto que proporcionan una mayor proteccio´n al con-
sumidor, no lo es menos que el consumidor termina asumiendo los costes econo´micos
de su propia proteccio´n, pues es evidente que el empresario va a repercutir en el pre-
cio final de los productos o servicios el montante de los gastos que le supone el
cumplimiento de las exigencias legislativas relativas a la informacio´n.
Adema´s, tomando como referencia la pauta conductista del ana´lisis econo´mico
del Derecho, y los resultados emp´ıricos de la investigacio´n, se cuestiona la premisa
de la racionalidad, argumentando que los consumidores no siempre ajustan su com-
portamiento a la misma. Es ma´s, en determinados casos el suministro de toda la
informacio´n precontractual exigida legalmente, no va a garantizar su comportami-
ento racional, ni que la eleccio´n del producto o servicio se lleve a cabo en la forma
que ma´s convenga a sus intereses.
No podemos olvidar, por otro lado, la realidad de la Red, la celeridad y rapidez
propia del Mercado on line, el hecho de que en el mismo las ofertas tengan una
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vigencia determinada e incluso en ocasiones muy limitada en el tiempo, acontecimi-
entos que llevan al consumidor, que desea acogerse a las mismas, a la toma ra´pida de
decisiones, pulsando en los iconos ad hoc que contienen la informacio´n sin acceder
a la misma, sin leerla, sin almacenarla.
Es iro´nico, en este sentido, como el exceso de informacio´n precontractual se
convierte en un mecanismo de desproteccio´n de los consumidores, que abrumados,
terminan adquiriendo los productos y servicios ofertados en el Mercado electro´nico
“a ciegas”, habla´ndose ya de los efectos negativos de la denominada “infoxicacio´n”.
QUINTA
Sentadas estas bases, relativas al fundamento de la existencia de deberes precon-
tractuales de informacio´n, predicables tanto del Derecho espan˜ol como del ingle´s,
como no deber´ıa ser de otra manera si tenemos en cuenta su origen comunitario,
nuestra Tesis Doctoral ha tenido como objetivo el examen comparativo del sistema
jur´ıdico de informacio´n y de remedios frente al incumplimiento de los deberes de
informacio´n, consagrado en ambos ordenamientos.
El re´gimen jur´ıdico que los ordenamientos ingle´s y espan˜ol establecen para le-
gislar los deberes de informacio´n es diferente, porque diferentes son las exigencias
al respecto tradicionalmente existentes en el Derecho nacional privado, y, sorpren-
dentemente, porque difieren tambie´n los requisitos introducidos en los reg´ımenes
nacionales cuando se han transpuesto a los respectivos ordenamientos las Normas
comunitarias.
Como regla general, el Derecho ingle´s aborda el tema de los deberes de inform-
acio´n con escepticismo, mientras que el Derecho privado espan˜ol, al sustentarse sobre
el principio de la buena fe precontractual, consagra un sistema ma´s exigente.
El ordenamiento ingle´s considera que las partes contratantes esta´n en una posicio´n
adversaria, y, en consecuencia, no impone a ninguna de ellas una obligacio´n de sum-
inistrar informacio´n a la otra, sin que ello suponga el reconocimiento del derecho a
facilitar informacio´n falsa o abra el camino a la posibilidad de fundar las transac-
ciones sobre la base del engan˜o. Varios son los argumentos que se esgrimen para
fundamentar esta posicio´n. As´ı, por un lado, el potencial valor econo´mico de la
informacio´n. Por otro, la imprecisio´n a la hora de establecer un deber general de in-
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formacio´n, que dificulta la determinacio´n del a´mbito exacto del mismo en cada caso,
y que puede resultar perjudicial para la seguridad jur´ıdica. Por u´ltimo el predominio
del principio de la libertad contractual.
El Derecho espan˜ol, por el contrario, promueve la cooperacio´n activa entre los
sujetos que intervienen en la relacio´n contractual, obliga´ndoles a comunicar todas las
circunstancias que conozcan y/o consideren que podr´ıan influir en su decisio´n acerca
de la conclusio´n del contrato o de la aceptacio´n de las cla´usulas contractuales. Una
parte no puede aprovecharse de la falta de informacio´n a la otra, es ma´s, la conducta
contraria atentar´ıa contra el principio de buena fe y confianza que ha de presidir
la relacio´n que los une, pudiendo entenderse incluso que el contrato es nulo por
quedar el cumplimiento del mismo al arbitrio de la parte que omite la informacio´n.
En este sentido, los Tribunales espan˜oles consideran que la cooperacio´n en la fase
precontractual, contribuye a garantizar un resultado ido´neo y ventajoso para ambas
partes, aumenta la riqueza general y permite reducir la litigiosidad. El principio de
la buena fe precontractual se entiende como un criterio objetivo usado para evaluar
el comportamiento de las partes contratantes. No obstante, debe ser concretado en
cada caso espec´ıfico, proporcionando as´ı un a´mbito y un contenido preciso a los
deberes de informacio´n.
SEXTA
A pesar de la diferente concepcio´n que, de base, tienen ambos ordenamientos en
cuanto a la finalidad y consagracio´n de los deberes de informacio´n, a la que hemos
hecho referencia anteriormente, ambos preve´n dos tipos de deberes informativos,
aunque lo hagan tambie´n estableciendo algunas diferencias.
Los deberes de informacio´n directos, impuestos as´ı en las normas, mediante de-
tallados listados enumerando la informacio´n que obligatoriamente hay que suminis-
trar al consumidor antes de la conclusio´n del contrato.
Los deberes de informacio´n indirectos, establecidos mediante referencias gene´ricas,
ma´s imprecisas, e incluso mediante la consagracio´n de consecuencias negativas frente
al incumplimiento del deber de facilitar la informacio´n.
La consagracio´n de este doble sistema de suministro de la informacio´n puede
provocar, en ocasiones, el solapamiento, propiciando que pueda tratarse el incump-
limiento de un deber concreto directo como el de la obligacio´n ma´s general indirecta,
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y dando entrada a que la parte perjudicada pueda recurrir a varios remedios distintos
frente, en definitiva, al mismo incumplimiento.
SE´PTIMA
Estos deberes de informacio´n para los contratos electro´nicos, sean de naturaleza
directa o indirecta, se imponen, de forma espec´ıfica, en las normas sobre comercio
electro´nico, que se remiten, adema´s, a tuitivas de los derechos de los consumidores,
y como no podr´ıa ser de otra manera, a las previstas en el Derecho general de
contratos.
En cuanto a la consagracio´n de deberes directos de informacio´n, hemos de re-
mitirnos a las disposiciones contenidas en los art´ıculos 10, 19 a 22 y 27 de la LSSICE,
en el derecho espan˜ol, y en los regs 6 a 9 de los E-commerce Regulations 2002, en
el derecho ingle´s. Debera´n tomarse en consideracio´n adema´s las exigencias previstas
en los art´ıculos 60 y 97 del TRLDCU en Espan˜a, y en Inglaterra y Gales en los regs
13 y 14 y en la Schedule 2 de los Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013.
Los deberes indirectos se consagran tanto en la normativa espec´ıfica de consumo,
como en el Derecho privado general. En primer lugar, hay que mencionar las dis-
posiciones relativas a la conformidad de los bienes (productos) con el contrato, de
los art´ıculos 114 y siguientes del TRLDCU (Espan˜a) y de las secciones 9 y siguientes
del CRA 2015 (Inglaterra y Gales).
Encontramos igualmente imposicio´n de deberes de informacio´n indirectos en las
normas sobre las pra´cticas comerciales desleales. En Espan˜a, en concreto, en los
art´ıculos 5 a 7 de la Ley de Competencia Desleal, que si bien abordan la prohibicio´n
de las pra´cticas desleales, no proporcionan, remedios individuales a los consumidores,
diferencia´ndose as´ı de las normas sobre prohibicio´n de las pra´cticas comerciales
engan˜osas establecidas en el derecho ingle´s (reg 5 en relacio´n con la Part 4A de los
UTR 2008) que s´ı otorga unos remedios contractuales concretos a los consumidores
v´ıctimas de las pra´cticas desleales.
En lo que se refiere al Derecho privado general, los deberes indirectos en ambos
ordenamientos resultan de las normas sobre los vicios del consentimiento, en partic-
ular de las relativas al error provocado (misrepresentation) en el contexto ingle´s, y
adicionalmente, en lo que se refiere al sistema espan˜ol, del principio general de la
buena fe precontractual.
391
Conclusiones
OCTAVA
El contenido de los deberes de informacio´n impuestos a los empresarios determ-
ina las consecuencias de su incumplimiento. No podemos olvidar que deber precon-
tractual de informacio´n es una obligacio´n, no un simple incentivo o est´ımulo, que
incumbe al empresario porque as´ı se impone, como hemos tenido oportunidad de
analizar, tanto en las normas generales como en las espec´ıficas. Se trata, adema´s, de
un deber que pertenece al a´mbito de la relacio´n contractual, exigible sobre la base
de la misma, y ello aun cuando los remedios privados individuales de naturaleza
contractual estara´n disponibles una vez el consumidor haya concluido el contrato.
Partiendo de esta premisa, consideramos conveniente recordar el importante pa-
pel que en el cumplimiento de los deberes precontractuales de informacio´n se atribuye
a la publicidad, pues en la mayor´ıa de los casos constituye el cauce o medio para
el suministro de la informacio´n previa al contrato. Somos conscientes de que no cu-
alquier publicidad va a reunir los requisitos de una verdadera oferta contractual y, en
consecuencia, no cualquier publicidad va a ser considerada lo suficientemente precisa
y constitutiva de la voluntad del empresario de vincularse por la misma (art´ıculo 61
del TRLDCU y Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] 1 QB 256).
Debemos distinguir, en este sentido, la publicidad de cara´cter informativo de la
exageracio´n y declaraciones excesivas aceptadas en el comercio por ambos ordenami-
entos, pues una vez formalizado el contrato, solo aquella informacio´n que ostente el
cara´cter de verdadera oferta contractual, publicitada o no, formara´ parte ineludible
del clausulado del contrato, conforme a las previsiones contenidas en los art´ıculos
97.5 del TRLDCU y secciones 11(4), 11(5) y 12 del CRA 2015 [en lo que se refiere a
bienes], secciones 36(3), 36(4) y 37 [en cuanto a los contenidos digitales], y secciones
50(3) y (4) [en lo concerniente a servicios].
NOVENA
La forma de proporcionar la informacio´n al consumidor tambie´n se vincula, de
forma directa, con el incumplimiento de los deberes de informacio´n y su alcance.
En este contexto hay que tomar en consideracio´n el requisito de la transparencia,
reconocido tanto en el derecho ingle´s como en espan˜ol (seccio´n 68 del CRA 2015 y
art´ıculo 80 del TRLDCU).
Curiosamente, aunque este requisito es una consecuencia directa de la trans-
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posicio´n del art´ıculo 5 de la Directiva sobre las cla´usulas abusivas, su incorporacio´n
a los ordenamientos que hemos analizado se ha efectuado de forma distinta. El al-
cance de la norma, en el Derecho espan˜ol, esta´ limitado a los contratos de adhesio´n
que utilicen cla´usulas no negociadas individualmente, mientras que las disposiciones
del CRA 2015 se aplican a todos los contratos B2C.
Adema´s, en el TRLDCU se regula la cuestio´n de manera ma´s espec´ıfica que en el
CRA 2015, no solamente requiriendo que las cla´usulas se redacten de forma precisa,
clara y sencilla, sino tambie´n que las mismas sean fa´cilmente accesibles y legibles,
para que el consumidor pueda conocerlas previamente a la celebracio´n del contrato,
regula´ndose incluso el taman˜o de la letra y el color de la fuente que ha de usarse
para la redaccio´n de las mencionadas cla´usulas.
La exigencia de comprensibilidad y claridad se plasma en los art´ıculos 60 y 97 del
TRLDCU y regs 13 y 14 de los Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013. La exigencia
de acceso fa´cil, directo y permanente se encuentra en las regs 6(1) y 9(1) de los
E-commerce Regulations 2002 y en los art´ıculos 10.1 y 27 de la LSSICE. Se impone
tambie´n por el legislador espan˜ol la gratuidad en el suministro de la informacio´n,
sin que hayamos encontrado regla parangonable en el Derecho ingle´s.
La exagerada proliferacio´n de disposiciones legales al respecto, la diferente ter-
minolog´ıa utilizada para la imposicio´n, en definitiva, de los requisitos de claridad,
concrecio´n, transparencia, o para el establecimiento de la forma en que ha se sumin-
istrarse la informacio´n, tanto en las normas comunitarias sobre comercio electro´nico,
como en las tuitivas de los consumidores, y, por ende, en las de transposicio´n, inglesas
o espan˜olas, son un elemento en contra del propo´sito perseguido con las mismas. El
empleo de te´rminos, en ocasiones incluso incompatibles, genera el efecto contrario:
la desproteccio´n del consumidor.
DE´CIMA
Tanto el ordenamiento ingle´s como el espan˜ol han abordado las consecuencias del
incumplimiento de los deberes precontractuales de informacio´n, como no pod´ıa ser
de otra manera, a fin de dar respuesta a las exigencias de transposicio´n del Derecho
comunitario.
No procede entrar en un ana´lisis detallado de las distintas clasificaciones o formas
de establecer las consecuencias del citado incumplimiento, pues el mismo se ha real-
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izado en las pa´ginas precedentes a estas conclusiones. Queremos poner de relieve
simplemente la carencia, en muchos casos, de un remedio o consecuencia directa.
Dec´ıamos al principio que el recurso al Derecho administrativo sancionador puede
ser suficiente para satisfacer las necesidades del Mercado. Sin embargo, imponer una
sancio´n por incumplimiento de un deber precontractual de informacio´n es un remedio
poco satisfactorio para un consumidor.
Habra´ casos, en los que la consecuencia del incumplimiento de los deberes de
informacio´n sea la aplicacio´n de los remedios espec´ıficos previstos en la concreta
disposicio´n de consumo, como sucede por ejemplo, con la ampliacio´n del plazo del
derecho de desistimiento, cuando no se ha informado sobre el mismo; o con la falta
de vinculacio´n del consumidor con el contrato cuando no ha recibido la informacio´n
sobre la obligacio´n del pago, en los supuestos de adquisicio´n de productos que la
conlleven.
Sin embargo, para gran mayor´ıa de los deberes de informacio´n directos no se han
establecidos consecuencias de la misma naturaleza, lo que obliga a que la bu´squeda
de los remedios frente a su incumplimiento haya de realizarse mediante el recurso
a consecuencias indirectas. As´ı, en el caso de incumplimiento de los requisitos de
informacio´n relativos a las caracter´ısticas principales de los bienes (productos) objeto
del contrato, habra´n de tomarse en consideracio´n las disposiciones relativas a la falta
de conformidad (art´ıculos 114 y siguientes del TRLDCU y secciones 9 y siguientes
del CRA 2015). En Derecho ingle´s, adema´s, podr´ıa recurrirse a los remedios privados
individuales previstos para las pra´cticas comerciales engan˜osas en el reg 5 de UTR
2008, en virtud del recientemente adoptado Consumer Protection Amendment 2014.
Otra v´ıa de solucio´n puede hallarse recurriendo a art´ıculos 61.2, 65 y 97.5 del
TRLDCU y secciones 11(4), 11(5) y 12 del CRA 2015. El incumplimiento de los
deberes de informacio´n precontractuales puede generar el de una cla´usula contrac-
tual, prevista expresamente en el contrato o que puede deducirse impl´ıcitamente del
contenido del mismo ex lege. El recurso a la anulacio´n del contrato por adolecer
el mismo de vicios en el consentimiento, propiciados por el incumplimiento de los
deberes que hemos analizado, constituye otro remedio indirecto a tener en cuenta.
UNDE´CIMA
Aunque es evidente que del incumplimiento de los deberes precontractuales de
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informacio´n pueden derivarse consecuencias en los supuestos en los que no se haya
concluido el contrato, los remedios contractuales a los que hemos dedicado nuestra
Tesis entran en juego una vez el contrato se ha perfeccionado. Ahora bien, este hecho,
no implica automa´ticamente que los remedios aplicables sean de naturaleza contrac-
tual, pues como hemos indicado algunos de ellos vienen, incluso, determinados ex
lege.
Debemos tener en cuenta, por tanto, el cara´cter de la responsabilidad que asume
el empresario, pues la naturaleza de la misma, contractual o extracontractual, va a
condicionar, por ejemplo, el plazo de prescripcio´n de las acciones, el derecho aplicable
en el caso de litigios transfronterizos o el importe de los dan˜os y perjuicios.
Partiendo de esta base, es obvio que los remedios relativos al incumplimiento
contractual naturalmente pertenecen al campo de la responsabilidad contractual,
tanto en el Derecho espan˜ol, como en ingle´s.
El recurso, como remedio, a la responsabilidad derivada de los vicios del con-
sentimiento presenta, sin embargo, ma´s complejidad. En el derecho ingle´s, de la
existencia de vicios del consentimiento tradicionalmente surge la responsabilidad
extracontractual (liability in tort), aunque el remedio de la rescisio´n del contrato es
de la naturaleza contractual. La adopcio´n del Misrepresentation Act 1967 introdujo
la responsabilidad de cara´cter reglamentario (statutory liability) por el error pro-
vocado (misrepresentation), no obstante, los dan˜os se calculan conforme al intere´s
negativo.
En el ordenamiento espan˜ol, el legislador en el art´ıculo 1270 del Co´digo civil
no determina claramente la naturaleza de la responsabilidad por dolo, aunque el
Tribunal Supremo parece pronunciarse a favor de su cara´cter contractual.
En lo que se refiere a los remedios espec´ıficos por falta de conformidad, los mismos
son claramente de la naturaleza contractual, dado que el re´gimen de la misma es el
previsto para la compraventa de consumo.
El recurso a la indemnizacio´n de dan˜os y perjuicios se sustenta sobre el principio
de intere´s negativo (tortious measure of damages), consagrado en ambos ordenami-
ento, por entenderse que el mismo se adapta mejor a los contratos de consumo, al
restablecerse a la parte perjudicada en la posicio´n que ocupaba antes de la conclusio´n
del contrato.
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DUOE´CIMA
Como hemos indicado anteriormente, en la mayor´ıa de los ocasiones los consum-
idores tendra´n a su disposicio´n tanto los remedios espec´ıficos como los generales,
con el consiguiente solapamiento de los mismos. En te´rminos generales, ambos or-
denamientos permiten al consumidor perjudicado recurrir, de manera adicional o en
lugar de los espec´ıficamente previstos, a los remedios del Derecho general, y ello,
a pesar de la existencia de remedios reglamentarios espec´ıficos. No obstante, hay
exclusiones notables de la aplicacio´n de los remedios generales en ambos sistemas.
Por ejemplo, se contempla una particular jerarqu´ıa de los remedios por falta de
conformidad de los bienes (productos) con el contrato, proveniente de la Directiva
sobre venta y garant´ıa de los bienes de consumo, conforme a la cual el recurso a
la rescisio´n del contrato tiene cara´cter secundario y no esta´ disponible salvo que
se hayan utilizado otros remedios, excepcio´n hecha del derecho de rescisio´n a corto
plazo disponible solamente en el derecho ingle´s.
As´ı las cosas, ser´ıa inadecuado permitir el recurso a la rescisio´n, aplicando el
Derecho general, cuando conforme a la norma comunitaria se impone otra jerarqu´ıa
de remedios. De hecho, la seccio´n 19(12) del CRA 2015 expresamente proh´ıbe al
consumidor pedir la rescisio´n del contrato sobre la base del Derecho general por el
incumplimiento de una cla´usula relativa a la falta de conformidad de bienes impl´ıcita
por el CRA 2015.
En Derecho espan˜ol no encontramos norma equivalente a la inglesa, lo que
quiza´s ha llevado a la doctrina a pronunciarse mayoritariamente a favor del sistema
jera´rquico europeo al que hacemos referencia. No obstante, el pronunciamiento de
los Tribunales no es uniforme, pues en ocasiones, han permitido que los consum-
idores recurran a los remedios de Derecho general, en detrimento de los previstos en
los art´ıculos 114 y siguientes del TRLDCU.
Otra exclusio´n la encontramos en el TRLDCU cuando preve´ la imposibilidad de
recurrir a los remedios generales por vicios ocultos en el caso de falta de conformidad.
Referencia expresa queremos hacer tambie´n a la exclusio´n prevista en el Derecho
ingle´s y referente al recurso a la indemnizacio´n por dan˜os y perjuicios en caso de
error provocado (misrepresentation en seccio´n 2 del Misrepresentation Act 1967), al
contar el consumidor con la posibilidad de solicitar la compensacio´n por una accio´n
engan˜osa bajo las disposiciones de la Part 4A UTR 2008, y ello, incluso, cuando los
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resultados o beneficios que el consumidor va a obtener de aplicarse el primero de los
remedios son mayores que los derivados del segundo.
DE´CIMO TERCERA
No obstante, las exclusiones puestas de relieve y a pesar de la significante variedad
de remedios espec´ıficos de consumo disponibles en ambos ordenamientos, tanto el
Derecho espan˜ol como el ingle´s se apoyan considerablemente en el Derecho general
como fuente para la fijacio´n de los remedios frente al incumplimiento a que puede
acogerse el consumidor.
En Derecho ingle´s, de hecho, se preve´n de forma expresa (seccio´n 19(10) del CRA
2015) como recurso general, ante la carencia de remedios espec´ıficos, o como recurso
adicional a los espec´ıficamente establecidos. Y ello, a pesar de que el panorama de
los remedios espec´ıficos por el incumplimiento de los deberes de informacio´n esta´
ma´s desarrollado en el Derecho ingle´s que en el Derecho espan˜ol. As´ı, por ejem-
plo, encontramos en Derecho ingle´s remedios espec´ıficos por el incumplimiento de
cualquier requisito de informacio´n incluido en el Schedule 2 de The Consumer Con-
tracts Regulations 2013, mediante los previsto en la Part 4A UTR 2008 y tambie´n
la seccio´n 12 del CRA 2015.
En Derecho espan˜ol, por el contrario, el incumplimiento de las disposiciones
contenidas en los art´ıculos 61.2, 65 y 97.5 del TRLDCU, solo es resarcible por los
cauces previstos en el Derecho general, sea cumplimiento forzoso, la indemnizacio´n
de dan˜os y perjuicios, o la rescisio´n del contrato.
El ana´lisis comparativo basado en el planteamiento funcional tiene en cuenta las
normas que se aplicara´n en cada sistema frente a los mismos hechos. Por lo tanto, las
disposiciones del Derecho ingle´s relativas a las pra´cticas comerciales engan˜osas de
los regs 27A y siguientes de UTR 2008 deber´ıan compararse con el Derecho general
espan˜ol relativo a los vicios del consentimiento (dolo y error).
El fundamento de la adopcio´n de un esquema espec´ıfico de remedios en Derecho
ingle´s para los contratos de consumo no es otro que la constatacio´n de la com-
pleja aplicacio´n a los mismos de las normas generales relativas al error provocado
(misrepresentation). Sin embargo, analizando los pronunciamientos de los Tribunales
espan˜oles, podemos observar el preferente recurso a los remedios que el Derecho gen-
eral proporciona para solucionar los problemas derivados del consentimiento viciado
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(dolo y error).
DE´CIMO CUARTA
La importancia del deber de informacio´n incumplido no constituye, en ningu´n
caso, el elemento objetivo determinante del remedio que se pone a disposicio´n del
consumidor.
A esta conclusio´n puede llegarse analizando el contenido de la Schedule 2 de The
Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013, del art´ıculo 97.1 del TRLDCU, del art´ıculo
10 LSSICE o de cualquier otro precepto que hemos tomado como referencia.
Ninguno de ellos alude a que informacio´n es la realmente importante o no, parece
que se trata ma´s de cantidad que de calidad, y, en consecuencia, ninguno de ellos
determina que remedio sea el ma´s conveniente ante la falta de una concreta inform-
acio´n precontractual.
Sin embargo, si analizamos los remedios espec´ıficos previstos en algunas disposi-
ciones, llegamos a la conclusio´n contraria. Es la norma que preve´ el remedio, la que
termina concretando la importancia del deber.
Si entramos en la discusio´n relativa al deber general de informacio´n, en el Derecho
general esta se concreta en la denominada “informacio´n material”, sin embargo,
este concepto no esta´ reconocido por los deberes espec´ıficos de informacio´n. Si nos
centramos en los requisitos de informacio´n relativos a las caracter´ısticas principales
del bien (producto) objeto del contrato observamos que son claramente semejantes
al concepto de “informacio´n material”. En el caso del incumplimiento de estos re-
quisitos de informacio´n se aplicara´ el re´gimen de remedios previsto en los art´ıculos
114 y siguientes del TRLDCU y secciones 19 y siguientes del CRA 2015, que incluye
reparacio´n, sustitucio´n, rebaja del precio y la rescisio´n del contrato.
Si el incumplimiento recae sobre otros deberes, no relacionados con la informacio´n
sobre los bienes (productos) objeto del contrato, en el Derecho ingle´s la seccio´n 19(5)
del CRA 2015 solo proporciona al consumidor el derecho a recuperar el valor de los
gastos en que incurrio´ hasta el importe del precio pagado. El Derecho espan˜ol, por
el contrario, no proporciona ningu´n remedio espec´ıfico en estos casos, limita´ndose el
legislador en los art´ıculos 61.2, 65 y 97.5 del TRLDCU a establecer la integracio´n
contractual conforme al principio de la buena fe y la inclusio´n de la informacio´n en
el contrato, abriendo la posibilidad de recurrir a los remedios del Derecho general.
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El problema es que los remedios del Derecho general, en ambos ordenamien-
tos, esta´n previstos para incumplimientos de cierta gravedad, lo que genera que, en
caso de incumplimientos de deberes de informacio´n que puedan calificarse de menor
importancia, el consumidor se enfrente a una total desproteccio´n propiciada, precis-
amente, por la ausencia de remedios espec´ıficos. As´ı se pone de relieve, por ejemplo,
en el recurso a los remedios previstos cuando el contrato adolece de vicios en el con-
sentimiento. Ambos ordenamientos requieren el incumplimiento de un requisito de
informacio´n de cara´cter material, de tal naturaleza que el consumidor ha sido indu-
cido a celebrar el contrato sobre la base de dicha informacio´n, adquiriendo la misma
un papel determinante de la voluntad contractual. El Derecho ingle´s contempla, no
obstante, en los remedios espec´ıficos un requisito de naturaleza semejante en la reg
27A de UTR 2008.
DE´CIMO QUINTA
Mencio´n especial merece, por las importantes diferencias que presentan los dos
ordenamientos analizados, las consecuencias previstas en cada uno de ellos para los
supuestos de omisio´n de informacio´n.
Si bien el Derecho espan˜ol la contempla de forma expresa y preve´ recursos frente
a la falta de informacio´n, el Derecho ingle´s se centra en la provisio´n de la informacio´n
falsa, sobre la base de las normas relativas al error provocado (misrepresentation)
segu´n las cuales solo de las declaraciones expresas, y no del silencio, puede surgir
la responsabilidad. El Derecho general espan˜ol no reconoce una distincio´n similar y
trata el dolo por la provisio´n de la informacio´n falsa y por la omisio´n – dolo reticente
– de manera pra´cticamente igual.
La divisio´n entre desinformar de forma activa y a trave´s de la omisio´n es tambie´n
relevante para los remedios espec´ıficos previstos en el Derecho ingle´s, consagrados
solo por la accio´n engan˜osa del reg 5 de UTR 2008 y no por la omisio´n engan˜osa
del reg 6 de UTR 2008, quiza´ por la similitud entre las normas del derecho general
sobre el error provocado (misrepresentation) y las nuevas disposiciones sobre la
accio´n engan˜osa.
La distincio´n entre la falta de suministro de la informacio´n y la provisio´n de
informacio´n falsa alcanza, sin embargo, ma´s alla´ de la accio´n engan˜osa. Por ejemplo,
la seccio´n 12(2) del CRA 2015 considera cada informacio´n suministrada (que no sea
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sobre las caracter´ısticas principales del bien objeto del contrato) como integrada en
el contrato, pero no sanciona la omisio´n de la informacio´n, que solo da lugar a la
aplicacio´n de la reg 18 de los Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013, conforme a la
cual se entiende que empresario cumplio´ con sus deberes de informacio´n.
En Derecho espan˜ol tambie´n se ofrecen diferentes remedios ante la desinform-
acio´n voluntaria y la omisio´n de la informacio´n, sin embargo, estas distinciones son
naturales y se deben a las caracter´ısticas de los deberes de informacio´n y de su
incumplimiento. A t´ıtulo de ejemplo se puede sen˜alar el remedio previsto para el
consumidor que no ha sido informado de que su pedido conlleva obligacio´n de pago
y que consiste en la no obligacio´n por su parte.
La distincio´n que se puede observar en el Derecho ingle´s es fruto de la eleccio´n o
decisio´n consciente del legislador. En nuestra opinio´n, el planteamiento tradicional
del Derecho ingle´s al que nos referimos en este pa´rrafo, se adapta bien a la realidad
del comercio electro´nico B2C, a las opciones que ofrece el Mercado on line. En la
pra´ctica, es ma´s fa´cil diferenciar entre omisio´n de informacio´n e informacio´n falsa
puesto que las opciones que ofrece este Mercado al consumidor son mayores que en
el Mercado tradicional. Si al consumidor no se le facilita informacio´n relevante tiene
ma´s posibilidades de encontrarla, adoptando una actitud activa, que, en el Mercado
tradicional, y en cualquier caso, la ingente oferta de bienes y servicios propia del
Mercado electro´nico, la comodidad, hace que descarte la oferta sin informacio´n a
favor de aquella que contiene toda la informacio´n que considera necesaria. Por el
contrario, cuando al consumidor se le facilita informacio´n falsa, las dificultades para
contrastarlas son mayores, vie´ndose abocado, caso de aceptar la oferta sobre la base
de dicha informacio´n, a recurrir a los remedios que ofrece el ordenamiento.
DE´CIMO SEXTA
Hemos intentado plasmar a lo largo de las conclusiones precedentes la importante
influencia que ejerce tanto el Derecho que podemos calificar de tradicional, como la
propia tradicio´n jur´ıdica materializada en la mentalidad de los legisladores, sobre la
consagracio´n de los deberes de informacio´n y de los remedios frente a su incump-
limiento en el a´mbito de la contratacio´n electro´nica. Buen ejemplo de ello, son los
remedios espec´ıficos por el incumplimiento de los deberes que hemos analizado, pues
si bien la influencia comunitaria es evidente, tambie´n es evidente la influencia del
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Derecho patrio, quiza´s ma´s acusada en el Derecho ingle´s por su alejamiento de la
tradicio´n continental a la que suelen acomodarse las Directivas comunitarias.
Quiza´ el legislador europeo deber´ıa hacerse eco de las especialidades propias de
los ordenamientos nacionales. Somos conscientes de la autonomı´a de cada uno de
los poderes nacionales, pero tambie´n de que, en determinadas materias la labor ar-
monizadora debe ser mayor. La contratacio´n electro´nica es una de ellas. La ausencia
de fronteras espaciales permite que el consumidor pueda adquirir productos o servi-
cios de prestadores establecidos no solo en el espacio de la Unio´n Europea, sino en
cualquier parte del mundo. El consumidor, activo, buscara´ aquella oferta que satisf-
aga mejor sus necesidades y buscara´, por que´ no, aquel ordenamiento que garantice
mejor sus derechos. La falta de uniformidad constituye uno de los principales incon-
venientes de este Mercado, como ha puesto de relieve el propio legislador europeo,
y genera que los consumidores ostenten derechos distintos en un ordenamiento u en
otro, en funcio´n, precisamente de la influencia del Derecho patrio.
No podemos olvidar, adema´s, la discutida autonomı´a del denominado Derecho
de consumo, ni las voces que defienden cada vez ma´s su integracio´n en los Co´digos
civiles. Tampoco podemos permanecer ajenos a la interpretacio´n que, de las normas
tuitivas de los consumidores hacen los Tribunales, en paralelo siempre con el Derecho
general de los contratos en el que, en definitiva, integran el re´gimen jur´ıdico protector
del consumidor.
Tampoco debemos dejar de acusar las deficiencias propias de las normas de
consumo. El recurso a la remisio´n legislativa a otras disposiciones, propio de estas
normas, genera, en cierto modo, una importante inseguridad jur´ıdica para los con-
sumidores. Buen ejemplo de ello, es la disposicio´n contenida en el art´ıculo 2 de la
LSSICE que, como sabemos, remite el re´gimen de proteccio´n de los consumidores
al TRLGDCU, y, dentro del mismo, a las normas sobre contratos a distancia, sin
embargo, analizando el art´ıculo 93 del Texto observamos como dichas disposiciones
no se aplican a varios contratos de consumo electro´nicos, muchos de ellos los ma´s
usuales en el Mercado on line. Si tomamos como referencia el Derecho ingle´s, encon-
traremos un buen ejemplo en la norma contenida en el CRA 2015, y en las continuas
remisiones que la misma contiene a normativa secundaria – los Consumer Contracts
Regulations 2013.
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DE´CIMO SE´PTIMA
Si tenemos en cuenta lo expuesto hasta el momento observamos un import-
ante fallo en el sistema garantista del cumplimiento de los deberes precontractuales
de informacio´n. No existe, ni a nivel europeo, ni en los ordenamientos nacionales
analizados, una enumeracio´n exhaustiva de remedios espec´ıficos a disposicio´n del
consumidor.
A esta quiebra a de an˜adirse otra. El consumidor se enfrenta a un ordenamiento
cao´tico, disperso, desestructurado, lo que genera importantes dificultades a la hora
de poder conocer no solo la informacio´n a la que tiene derecho, sino, y esto es lo
realmente transcendental, los mecanismos con los que cuenta para defenderse ante
las carencias o ausencias en el suministro de la misma. Si para un profesional en la
materia el sistema es, a todas luces cao´tico, para el consumidor es pra´cticamente
inasumible y como hemos manifestado potenciador del efecto contrario al pretendido
pues la ya denominada “infoxicacio´n” provoca, como decimos, que el consumidor
huya de la misma y genera que preste su consentimiento sin conocer, realmente,
aquello para lo que esta´ consintiendo.
Al nivel europeo, el cara´cter casu´ıstico de los deberes de informacio´n, y la con-
sagracio´n de los mismos no siempre en normas de armonizacio´n ma´xima, conduce a
la fragmentacio´n del Mercado interior, incentivada, adema´s, por la diferente trans-
posicio´n llevada a cabo por los Estados miembros, como se ha puesto de relieve en
nuestro ana´lisis de los ordenamientos espan˜ol e ingle´s. Este inconveniente se plasma,
tambie´n, en la falta de establecimiento de un sistema de remedios lo´gico y efect-
ivo. En el a´mbito de los ordenamientos nacionales, si tenemos en cuenta, adema´s,
la influencia del Derecho privado propio de cada uno de ellos observamos como la
tipolog´ıa y contenido de los deberes de informacio´n difiere, como difiere igualmente
la jerarqu´ıa de los remedios disponibles.
Se propicia que la concurrencia de posibles acciones derivables del recurso a un
remedio u a otro genere un efecto contrario al inicialmente pretendido (la proteccio´n
del consumidor), problema que se acusa especialmente en el Derecho espan˜ol, por la
ausencia de disposiciones semejantes a las contenidas en las secciones 19(9) a (12)
del CRA 2015 y 2(4) del Misrepresentation Act 1967, que preve´n, recordemos, la
incompatibilidad de las distintas acciones.
El problema expuesto podr´ıa acusarse especialmente llevando a los extremos la
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aplicacio´n del deber general de buena fe que debe presidir las relaciones contractuales
en el ordenamiento espan˜ol. De la misma podr´ıa generarse un deber de informacio´n
ma´s amplio que el consagrado en la Directiva sobre derechos de los consumidores,
norma que, como sabemos, es de armonizacio´n ma´xima.
En definitiva, el sistema consagrado pone de relieve una gran diversidad de
remedios potencialmente disponibles para los consumidores ante el incumplimiento
de los deberes de informacio´n, en el que podemos encontrar remedios vinculados a
la ineficacia del contrato (o pago), remedios indemnizatorios, remedios de conducta
forzada para el empresario, o remedios tan sui generis como la extensio´n del per´ıodo
de desistimiento, presente en ambos ordenamientos.
DE´CIMO OCTAVA
El sistema merece duras cr´ıticas, las conclusiones que anteceden han pretendido
ponerlas de relieve. Sin embargo, somos conscientes de su adecuacio´n a la realidad
social y econo´mica del Mercado on line y lo somos si comparamos el sistema previsto
con el que se derivar´ıa de aprobarse el Marco Comu´n de Referencia.
Como hemos analizado el Marco se sustenta sobre la base del principio de uni-
formidad de remedios frente al incumplimiento, propuesta en el art II.–3:109. No
consideramos que la misma deba llevarse a los extremos, pues entendemos, que au´n
con sus deficiencias, los remedios frente al incumplimiento deben corresponderse
con el propo´sito del deber de informacio´n incumplido, pues, por ejemplo, no es lo
mismo proporcionar informacio´n falsa sobre las caracter´ısticas principales del ob-
jeto del contrato, que omitir algu´n detalle en la direccio´n del empresario, sobre todo
cuando este ha puesto a disposicio´n del consumidor otros medios de contacto, y, en
consecuencia, no tiene sentido establecer el mismo tipo de remedio en ambos casos.
Especial consideracio´n merece, siguiendo esta l´ınea, el recurso a la rescisio´n del
contrato, pues si bien se trata de un remedio plenamente satisfactorio para el con-
sumidor, siempre que no tenga que ejercitarla judicialmente, pues recupera la can-
tidad invertida y puede darle el destino que considere conveniente, no lo es tanto
para el empresario, sobre todo en el caso de las PYMES.
Adema´s, no podemos olvidar la existencia o previsio´n de remedios que afectan
exclusivamente a un ordenamiento, como el caso de la rescisio´n a corto plazo dispon-
ible solo en el Derecho ingle´s.
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DE´CIMO NOVENA
La simplificacio´n del sistema informativo, la unificacio´n del mismo e incluso su
consagracio´n en un solo cuerpo normativo, contribuir´ıa a la mejora del sistema de
remedios frente al incumplimiento de los deberes analizados.
Como hemos tenido oportunidad de poner de relieve los deberes de informacio´n
no son clasificados por el legislador de forma sistema´tica, atendiendo, por ejemplo,
a la importancia de los mismos. Sin embargo, si se preve´n los remedios disponibles
para paliar el incumplimiento de deberes de informacio´n especialmente importantes.
Es obvio, en consecuencia, que si bien no de forma directa, indirectamente el
legislador considera una informacio´n ma´s importante que otra, quiza´ porque es con-
sciente de que va a ser la que sirve de base para fundar la decisio´n del consumidor.
No queremos con ello decir que el resto de la informacio´n suministrada no tenga
importancia, reconocemos que la misma sirve a otras funciones y pueden ser es-
pecialmente u´tiles en otros momentos contractuales (pensemos, por ejemplo, en el
incumplimiento del contrato), pero debemos ser consciente de que en el momento
inicial la ya denominada “infoxicacio´n”, la sobrecarga informativa, va a provocar
que el consumidor no pueda asumir tanta informacio´n, no sea capaz de asimilarla
y, lo que es ma´s importante, de hacer un uso adecuado de la misma en los distintos
momentos por los que atraviesa la relacio´n contractual.
En un momento inicial sera´ informacio´n suficiente, entendemos aquella que per-
mita al consumidor conocer con quie´n esta´ contratando, como puede contactar con
e´l, que´ producto o servicio esta´ adquiriendo, su precio y los remedios que el orde-
namiento establece en caso de incumplimiento por parte del empresario de estas ex-
igencias informativas. Cualquier informacio´n que exceda de esta que consideramos
ba´sica, insistimos, en el primer momento, provocara´ la temida “infoxicacio´n” del
consumidor.
VIGE´SIMA
El establecimiento de un sistema adecuado de remedios frente al incumplimiento
de los deberes de informacio´n va a cumplir dos funciones trascendentales. Por un
lado, contribuira´ a combatir los problemas derivados de la sobrecarga informativa
a los que hemos hecho alusio´n. Por otro lado, permitira´ disipar las preocupaciones
relativas al cumplimiento o incumplimiento de dichos deberes, al centrarse ma´s en
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las funciones atribuidas al deber de informacio´n que, en la cantidad de informacio´n
en s´ı, pues, insistimos, no se trata de cantidad sino de calidad.
Cuando hablamos de un sistema efectivo de remedios, nos estamos refiriendo a
aquel que contribuye a que ante un incumplimiento contractual el consumidor tenga
acceso a informacio´n detallada sobre las v´ıas ido´neas para obtener la proteccio´n
del ordenamiento y, consecuentemente, la satisfaccio´n de sus intereses contractuales,
siendo fundamental, que incluya referencia a los remedios contractuales individuales
(pensamos por ejemplo, en la necesaria informacio´n sobre el derecho a desistir y el
procedimiento para su ejercicio).
Los deberes de informacio´n, desde esta perspectiva, servira´n a la buena fe que
debe presidir cualquier transaccio´n, incrementando la transparencia del Mercado,
y no siempre porque los consumidores lean la informacio´n cuidadosamente y la
interioricen antes de formalizar cualquier contrato, sino porque han recibido la in-
formacio´n precontractual junto con las cla´usulas del contrato (en soporte duradero)
y su cumplimiento por el empresario esta´ garantizado gracias a la disponibilidad de
los remedios efectivos frente al incumplimiento.
VIGE´SIMO PRIMERA
El Derecho general se presenta insuficiente e inadecuado para resolver los prob-
lemas que se plantean en el a´mbito de la contratacio´n con consumidores, y ma´s
au´n, cuando el contrato se celebra por medios electro´nicos. Esta afirmacio´n puede
parecer obvia, pues de lo contrario, carecer´ıa de sentido aprobar normas especiales
tuitivas de los consumidores en general y de los “ciberconsumidores” en particular,
pero tiene una razo´n de ser, porque las mencionadas normas cumplen un papel que
debe ser puesto de relieve.
Y es que a pesar de los problemas expuestos en relacio´n con la articulacio´n del
sistema protector del consumidor, general o especial, es evidente que los remedios
espec´ıficos del Derecho de consumo o del Derecho del comercio electro´nico son ma´s
adecuados para resolver los problemas que surgen en los contratos con consum-
idores y, por supuesto, satisfacen en mayor medida las necesidades de estos, si los
comparamos con los remedios que preve´ el Derecho general.
Pensamos, especialmente, en aquellos que son de aplicacio´n automa´tica y que
pueden ser alegados como tales ante una reclamacio´n judicial efectuada por el con-
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sumidor. Es fa´cil que un consumidor que no ha sido informado sobre el hecho de
que su pedido implique obligacio´n de pago, alegue ex art´ıculo 98.2 TRLGDCU y
reg 14 de los Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013, que no queda obligado por el
contrato, al recaer sobre el empresario la obligacio´n de demostrar que cumplio´ con
sus obligaciones informativas.
Los remedios espec´ıficos, adema´s, esta´n regulados de manera ma´s clara, como
sucede, por ejemplo, en Derecho ingle´s en la fijacio´n de descuentos para los supuestos
en los que el consumidor presta su consentimiento sobre la base de informacio´n
engan˜osa.
Las consecuencias que ambos ordenamientos preve´n ante la falta de informacio´n
sobre el derecho a desistir son tambie´n un buen ejemplo de la teor´ıa que defendemos.
El consumidor, como sabemos, ostenta la facultad de dejar sin efecto el contrato sin
dar explicacio´n alguna en el plazo de 14 d´ıas desde la celebracio´n del contrato. Si
el empresario incumple su deber de informacio´n sobre el mencionado derecho, dicho
plazo se ampl´ıa automa´ticamente, pudiendo llegar al an˜o, lo que sin duda incentivara´
al empresario a cumplir con sus obligaciones informativas. La idoneidad de este
remedio para la satisfaccio´n de los intereses del “ciberconsumidor” es indudable,
aunque los legisladores no parecen considerarlo as´ı si tenemos en cuenta el amplio
elenco de contratos celebrados a distancia en los que el consumidor es privado de
este derecho, fundamental en la contratacio´n “a ciegas”.
Analizando los remedios que ofrece el Derecho en general podemos poner de
relieve algunos inconvenientes que inciden en la falta de adecuacio´n de los mismos
para resolver los problemas generados en los contratos de consumo y, especialmente,
en los de consumo electro´nico. La resolucio´n judicial de los contratos es un buen
ejemplo de ello. Normalmente los bienes adquiridos son de coste reducido, lo que
desincentiva el ejercicio de acciones judiciales por parte del consumidor, a ello, debe
unirse su obligacio´n de probar los hechos, la duracio´n de los procesos, o, el cara´cter
transfronterizo de los contratos electro´nicos.
VIGE´SIMO SEGUNDA
Hemos intentado en nuestra Tesis Doctoral poner de relieve la importancia del
deber de informacio´n precontractual en los contratos de consumo electro´nico. No
obstante, hemos resen˜ado que la imposicio´n de deberes de informacio´n a los empres-
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arios no debe ser el u´nico mecanismo de defensa y proteccio´n de los consumidores.
Un sistema de obligaciones empresariales de informacio´n se convierte en inu´til para
el fin perseguido si no va acompan˜ado de un adecuado sistema de remedios que
garanticen su cumplimiento.
El recurso al Derecho general no siempre es la solucio´n o´ptima, garantista y tuit-
iva. El legislador europeo y los nacionales deben ser conscientes de las especialidades
del Mercado on line y dicha conciencia debe ser plasmada en las normas jur´ıdicas.
Ahora bien, no queremos parecer unos idealistas, sobre todo si analizamos la solucio´n
propuesta desde la o´ptica armonizadora. El legislador europeo es, quiza´, el que tiene
ma´s dificultades para conseguir dicho objetivo, toda vez que, como hemos intentado
demostrar en nuestro Trabajo, la influencia, la impronta, que el Derecho general
patrio impone a todo el anclaje del sistema tuitivo es en ocasiones ineludible.
Es cierto que la aprobacio´n de la Directiva sobre derechos de los consumidores de
2011 ha contribuido notablemente a mejorar el marco jur´ıdico de la contratacio´n a
distancia, sin embargo, habra´ que esperar a los pronunciamientos de los Tribunales
para conocer, en la pra´ctica, su efecto en los ordenamientos nacionales, pues si
bien la incorporacio´n de la norma europea al Derecho espan˜ol e ingle´s es ya una
realidad, no lo es menos, su dif´ıcil convivencia con los Derechos patrios y con las
normas sectoriales vigentes en ambos ordenamientos y que afectan igualmente a los
contratos de consumo electro´nicos.
Las recientes disposiciones adoptadas (en transposicio´n de la Directiva, caso de
Espan˜a; o por iniciativa propia, caso de Inglaterra y sus CRA 2015 y Consumer
Protection Amendment 2014) siguen estableciendo un elenco desmesurado, dese-
structurado e injustificado de deberes informativos y siguen, lo cual es a todas luces
poco justificable, sin consagrar un re´gimen general unificado de deberes informativos
y de remedios frente a su incumplimiento.
Queremos insistir en los efectos que ello provoca. El establecimiento de disposi-
ciones sobre deber de informacio´n y remedios frente al incumplimiento es necesario,
por las mismas razones que es necesaria su adecuacio´n a nuestra demanda de cal-
idad y no de cantidad. Se debe identificar claramente la informacio´n clave que el
consumidor debe recibir on line a los efectos de manifestar su consentimiento in-
formado, el resto de la informacio´n, aquella que no es transcendental para la con-
formacio´n de su voluntad, bien podr´ıa ser suministrada por otro medio o soporte de
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cara´cter duradero que el consumidor pueda consultar cuando lo estime conveniente
o necesario. No tiene sentido “infoxicarlo” con informacio´n, por ejemplo, sobre el
incumplimiento en el momento precontractual, tiene sentido que sepa que´, co´mo y
do´nde caso de producirse dicho incumplimiento.
Porque, como hemos defendido, la sobrecarga informativa afecta de forma neg-
ativa a todos los sujetos que intervienen en el Mercado de consume electro´nico. Es
indudable que genera en el consumidor un efecto similar a la falta de informacio´n,
incide sobre su consentimiento y provoca que el mismo no se adecue a lo realmente
pretendido por e´l. No podemos negar sus efectos perjudiciales sobre los empresarios
que se enfrentan a importantes costes derivados de la elaboracio´n de las webs y del
mantenimiento de las mismas, desde el punto de vista te´cnico y jur´ıdico.
A pesar de lo expuesto, no consideramos que el cumplimiento de la exigencia de
calidad y no cantidad que defendemos sea suficiente. El legislador debe prever un
remedio ad hoc, ra´pido y efectivo, para aquellos casos en los que se incumple el deber
de informar sobre esos aspectos claves que conforman el consentimiento informado.
No hablamos de resolucio´n judicial, no es efectiva; no hablamos solo de un derecho
a desistir; hablamos y demandamos algo ma´s, porque no un sistema semejante al
short-term right to reject ingle´s, semejante que no ide´ntico.
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